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Homaira M. Azim 
A FOUCAULDIAN ARCHAELOGY OF MODERN MEDICAL DISCOURSE 
Medical education researchers have long been interested in understanding medical 
professional identity formation and its implications for the healthcare system. Various 
theories have been proposed to explain identity formation. Among them, Foucault’s 
discourse theory maintains that it is the discourse of medicine that constitutes medical 
professional identities. This study deployed a Foucauldian archaeological methodology to 
analyze the structure of modern medical discourse and establish links between discourse 
and professional identity formation in medical students. A total of forty-six medical 
students at Indiana University School of Medicine participated in either individual or 
focus group interviews. Direct observation of the clinical and educational settings was 
also performed, which resulted in additional textual data in the form of fieldnotes. 
Archaeological analysis of discourse was undertaken in three levels of the statements, the 
discursive elements, and the discursive rules and relations. Results entailed a detailed 
depiction of the structure of medical discourse including discursive objects and modes of 
enunciation, discursive concepts, and theoretical strategies related to each object. 
Discursive objects are things that are talked about in modern medical discourse. This 
study identified four discursive objects as disease and treatment, the doctor, the human 
body, and the sick person. Modes of enunciation are the different ways in which people 
talk about objects of medicine, whereas concepts consist of the notions people draw from 
when talking about objects of medicine. Theoretical strategies indicate certain positions 
that people take in relation to the objects of medicine. Rules of formation and conditions 
of existence for each discursive element were also established. Since Identities are 
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entrenched through language and interaction, developing a systematic understanding of 
the structure of medical discourse will shed new light on medical professional identity 
formation. Results of this study also have profound implications for teaching 
professionalism and medical humanities in medical curricula. Furthermore, as a research 
methodology used for the first time in medical education, archaeology not only opens 
new territories to be explored by future research, it also provides an entirely new way to 
look at them. 
      James J. Scheurich, Ph.D., Chair 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This study is about medical professionalism, medical professional identities, and 
the way medical discourse functions to produce, shape and reshape both medicine and 
medical identities. These topics are so entangled that it is not possible to study their 
implication separately while attempting to understand the discourse of medicine. Further, 
a central claim in the present inquiry is that medicine needs theorizing. The word 
medicine evokes in one’s mind the image of a unity that is formed based on necessity and 
convenience, not on proper theorization. The current, undefined unity of medicine is 
rather derived “from its autonomous historical development” (Webb, 2013, p. 73). It is 
not entirely clear what is meant and what is not meant by the word medicine. This might 
sound strange to those who are not sure why something as familiar as “medicine” should 
need theorizing. Let us try asking a few questions here to test this familiarity: What does 
medicine refer to as a profession? What is the goal of medicine as a social practice? What 
does medical professionalism mean? Who defines medicine? Which medicine? Practiced 
by whom? Legitimized by whom? In which era? Whose definition is best? Who is 
speaking? To whom? What’s medicine to you? One can see that things are not as simple 
as they might seem to be under the shadow of familiarity. As Gutting (1989) affirms:  
Modern medicine is characterized by a continual conflict of competing 
theoretical interpretations. Even the modern period, therefore, has been 
unable to develop a coherent theoretical account of medicine. (p. 97). 
 
It is worth mentioning that the intention behind challenging the unity of medicine is not 
meant to deny all value to its uses based on necessity; it is to show that it requires 
theoretical elaboration in order to be defined (Foucault, 1972, p. 71). So long as the unity 
of medicine is not theorized, its claim of being a science cannot be verified for the very 
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reason that “it does not examine its own concepts and objects carefully enough to see the 
dispersion within them” (Webb, 2013, p. 61). An archaeological methodological pursuit 
(Foucault, 1972) of the modern medical discourse insists to do just that. In other words, 
present archaeological study stipulates to define medicine as a field of coexistence for 
various concepts and establish “the rules to which this field is subjected” (Foucault, 1972, 
pp. 60-61) 
Medical Professionalism 
Professionalism is one of the few topics in modern medical discourse that 
continue to exist on abstract terms. To date, no concrete definition of medical 
professionalism has been conceived that can be deemed as universally acceptable. 
Teaching professionalism is nonetheless part of the formal medical curriculum in North 
American medical schools. Some scholars believe professionalism stands for medical 
morality (Huddle, 2005). According to this belief, professionalism refers to the capacity 
for moral reasoning and making ethical judgments among several other values (Inui et al., 
2006). Medical professionals are expected to adopt professionalism to develop and 
represent their medical professional identity (Monrouxe, 2010). It needs to be noted that 
medical professional identity does not signify one’s professional title as a medical student 
or a physician, nor does it refer to a certain skill set once might possess. It is rather what 
one does as a medical professional that denotes one’s professional identity (Jenkins, 
2008). Nonetheless, to define what thinking and acting as a medical professional actually 




Medical Professional Identity 
The notion of professional identity formation in medical students has profound 
implications for medical education, as the ways in which future doctors would make 
sense of medical profession–and of themselves in relation to medical profession–directly 
translate into their professional practice in the future (Monrouxe, 2010; Monrouxe et al., 
2011). How doctors position themselves in relation to the patient and in relation to 
medicine in general makes all the difference in how they act towards their patients in 
professional settings. Medical students construct their professional identities as a result of 
their interactions with professional settings as they go through their medical training 
(Monrouxe, 2009b). These include formal and informal settings such as classrooms, 
laboratories, small-group sessions, hospital wards, libraries, and so on. Not to forget, 
“what is taught to, learned by, and evaluated in today’s students and trainees will 
influence both practice patterns and the value system of the medical profession of 
tomorrow” (Cruess & Cruess, 2008, p. 756). It is also important to remind ourselves that 
medical students and physicians are human beings just like everybody else. They bring 
their life histories, multiple identities (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation) and 
personal value systems with them as they enter the medical profession. Perhaps one day 
science will succeed in creating robots that can undertake medical activities (e.g., 
perform surgeries). Until then, we are stuck with human beings who are flesh and blood, 
have emotions, values, and judgments that can impact the way they go about doing 
medicine.  
There is a vast literature suggesting the value-based judgments of physicians in 
clinical practice is seriously affecting patient care. Higashi and colleagues performed an 
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ethnography of two tertiary-care teaching hospitals in Northern California in 2013, and 
found that physicians were dividing up their patients into two major categories: those 
who are more worthy of the physicians’ time and attention and those who are less worthy 
of these privileges (Higashi et al., 2013). Those who were classified as less worthy 
consisted of: drug addicts, homeless, defiant and rude patients, frequent visitors to the 
hospital, and the elderly. Physicians stated that they found working with these types of 
patients “less interesting” at best and “especially frustrating” at worst. Conversely, 
patients who were considered to be more worthy of the physicians’ time and attention 
included: wealthy individuals, colleagues who are in the medical profession themselves, 
wives of important attending physicians, as well as patients who were young, educated, 
socially engaging and interactive (Higashi et al., 2013).  
A good number of such groupings happen unintentionally as physicians try to 
keep things moving under the stressful environment of the hospital. After all, they only 
have a certain amount of time and need to prioritize things. For example, they have to 
decide who needs more attention in order to be more efficient with their time, and that is 
when the value-based judgments enter the picture. There is also the problem of implicit or 
unconscious bias (Fitzgerald et al., 2019; Marceline et al., 2019; Matthew, 2018). 
According to this concept, people may engage in discriminatory behaviors without a 
conscious intention for doing so. Implicit bias leads one to act in accordance to certain 
stereotypical schemas that one has internalized at some point in the past without actually 
being aware of it (Pritlove et al., 2019). 
One’s medical professional identity is also determined by professional relations 
that one maintains as a doctor. Appropriate interprofessional relations are crucial to 
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develop and maintain as they are fundamental parts of modern healthcare delivery 
system. In the clinical settings, patients are not treated by physicians alone. Rather, 
medical care is provided in the form of an interprofessional team-effort by physicians, 
allied health professionals, and social workers. Despite the fact that medical practice 
depends upon the huge body of healthcare workers for technical aid, the structure of 
healthcare teams is characteristically hierarchical (Lingard et al., 2012; Punshon et al., 
2017). More often than not, physicians end up occupying their position right at the tip of 
the power-pyramid. It has been argued that the hierarchical structuring frustrates open 
and participative communication among members of interprofessional team, having 
serious implications for patient care (Bleakley et al., 2004). This can have serious 
implications for patient care.  
For instance, one study based on the thematic analysis of 444 malpractice 
litigation claims as well as interviews with 38 surgeons indicated that 24–43% of surgical 
errors happen due to non-technical issues, such as miscommunication among surgical 
team members (Gawande & Zinner, 2003). Another study that examined 240 malpractice 
claims involving trainee surgeons found that 70% of medical errors were related to team-
based miscommunication (Singh et al., 2007). The Joint Commission on the 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations in U.S. (2004) also placed the figure at 70%; 
while the Institute of Medicine’s study To Err is Human puts the figure as 70–80% (Kohn 
et al., 2009). The latter study also suggests that 50% of these are avoidable mistakes and 
have nothing to do with technical knowledge or skills of the surgeons or other surgical 
team members.  
6 
 
In sum, students develop their professional identities based on their understanding 
of medical professionalism. As argued earlier, the way one defines the function of the 
doctor in medicine, the way one positions one’s self in relation to other healthcare 
professionals and in relation to the society at large affects how one acts as a medical 
professional. In medical education, we care about students’ professional identity 
formation process and factors that might affect this crucial process during medical school 
training. Looking at the big picture, what constitutes formation of medical professional 
identity is really the medical discourse itself. Let us now turn to discuss what discourse 
means and how it relates to medical professionalism and professional identity formation.  
Medical Discourse 
A “discourse” is “a historically evolved set of interlocking and mutually 
supporting statements that are used to define and describe a subject matter” (Butler, 2002, 
p. 44). Roughly put, a discourse is the language of the main intellectual disciplines (e.g., 
legal discourse, medical discourse, aesthetics discourse, advertisement discourse, political 
discourse). Discourses play a central role in social institutions. The regulation of 
institutional practices as well as valuing and justification of certain actions and not others 
within an institution are functions of the discourses that are present within that institution. 
In other words, a discourse is “an institutionalized way of believing, thinking and acting 
that includes allowing social boundaries to define what can and cannot be said about a 
particular topic” (Razack et al., 2015, p. 37).  
There are many different definitions for the term discourse, provided by different 
theorists in different disciplines. Consequently, there are also different methods for 
discourse analysis. Michel Foucault’s discourse theory, which is adopted in this study, is 
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but one way to analyze discourse. Foucault provides a succinct account of discourse 
theory in his studies of the history of practices in law, medicine and penal systems. 
Foucault’s theory of discourse evokes that reality itself is constructed by discourses. This 
explains why there are multiple realities in the world, each constructed by the local and 
specific discourses. Foucault is captivated by the idea that at a certain conjuncture of time 
and space, certain ways of thinking are endorsed as true while others are not. Let us take 
religious discourse as an example. The institution of religion (Christianity, for instance) 
sanctions only certain types of assertions about creation of the world and rejects any other 
hypotheses as false. Thus, the competition between conflicting beliefs (e.g., religious 
versus the scientific discourse) becomes a political matter and part of a contest for power 
(Butler, 2002).  
However, discourses are not always immediately visible and people are unaware 
of the ways in which a particular discourse constitutes their reality. Discourses also have 
a way of naturalizing themselves overtime. Thus, the more dominant a discourse is 
within a community, the more natural and commonsensical it would seem to the people in 
that community. The naturalization process explains why scientific biomedical discourse 
(as opposed to alternative medical systems) sounds like the most commonsensical way of 
making a medical diagnosis in mainstream U.S.-based hospitals today. It is due to this 
naturalization that we internalize the norms of discourses around us to the extent that 
those norms become innate parts of our daily language.  
For example, it is unlikely that one would think of wearing a pink lab coat 
(instead of a white lab coat) in clinical settings. We tend to accept the discursive limits as 
though they were “facts about nature rather than psychologically and politically 
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motivated features of our talk about it” (Butler, 2002, p. 47). To take another example, it 
is unlikely for a college student to sit on their desk instead of a chair during a lecture. 
That is because the discourse of college classroom decorum suggests otherwise. The 
point here is not to say that people should or should not sit on a desk rather than a chair. It 
is only to say that most things we do or not do on a daily basis are not the results of our 
personally thought out ethical decisions. Rather, they are dictated to us by a discourse. It 
is important for medical educators to consider how medical students understand the 
essential purpose of medical practice and how those understandings might inform and 
influence their professional behavior as a physician in the future.  
As mentioned above, there are various approaches to the analysis of discourse in 
the literature. Some scholars have pointed out that discourse analysis refers to interrelated 
sets of texts (e.g., written, conversational, observational) and practices of their 
production, dissemination and reception (McNaughton, 2013). Both formal and informal 
curricula in medical education are considered to constitute the kind of texts that have 
consequences for the way things are done in medical education (Bleakley et al., 2011; 
Hafferty & Franks, 1994). These include ways in which students make sense of 
themselves in relation to their institutions and in relation to the clinical professional 
settings, which is roughly the same as the definition for the professional identity 
formation (Monrouxe, 2009). As a result of such texts, different ideas about medicine as a 
social practice are taken to be both embodied and enacted by medical students.  
A rather more complicated method for analysis of discourse is proposed by 
Foucault in The Archaeology of Knowledge [AK] (Foucault, 1972). Archaeology in a 
Foucauldian sense is a research methodology with its own specifically defined analytical 
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approach. The archaeological analysis of modern medical discourse, which the present 
study is deploying, focuses on medical identity as practiced, as well as language that is 
shaped within institutional settings through social relations. Thus, discourses can be 
investigated as “forms of social action that create effects in the world” (McNaughton, 
2013, p.72). 
It is worth pointing out here that the word medicine in this study does not refer to 
the body of medical scientific knowledge. Rather, the present study is interested in the 
structure of medicine as a social practice, a profession, and a discourse. Furthermore, we 
should note that discourses are sensitive to temporo-spatial changes. They undergo 
transformations at different eras and when making it into new spaces. Medicine has 
witnessed transformation of its discursive elements several times across the history, 
changing in multiple levels to the point that medical discourse itself and its borders with 
other disciplines were faced with the challenge of maintaining their definitions (Webb, 
2013, p.61). For that reason, it is obvious that medicine in sixth century, sixteenth 
century, and eighteenth century were not the same as medicine in 21st century. It is not 
only the difference in their scientific character but also in the variety of the discursive 
elements in each period that sets them apart. 
In addition, the discourse of medicine consists of various domains and therefore 
its claims to be based on empirical scientific knowledge alone needs further 
reassessment. Unlike strictly scientific disciplines that are often homogenous, modern 
medicine embraces a variety of nonscientific practices as well as scientific ones. The 
discourse of medicine consists of not only medical scientific statements but also the 
ideological, philosophical, commonsensical, and broadly subjective statements. In 
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Foucault’s words, clinical discourse consists of groups of hypotheses “about life and 
death, of ethical choices, of therapeutic decisions, of institutional regulations, [and] of 
teaching models”. Moreover, clinical medical practice is not universally homogenous or 
scientifically standard. Depending on its temporo-spatially marked features, clinical 
discourses can be controversial in character, open to philosophical and ethical options, 
and in certain cases quite exposed to political manipulation (Foucault, 1972, p.35). 
According to Gutting: 
Modern medicine sees itself as based on a body of objective, scientific 
knowledge (e.g., that of pathological anatomy). Moreover, it thinks it has 
achieved this knowledge simply by, for the first time, looking at the 
human body and its diseases with a clear and unbiased empirical eye. 
Foucault, however, sets out to show that modern medicine is no more a 
matter of pure observation than was, for example, the medicine of the 
seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. In both cases, medical 
knowledge was based not on a pure experience, free of interpretation, but 
on a very specific way of perceiving bodies and diseases, structured by a 
grid of a priori conceptions. (Gutting, 1989, p. 4) 
 
After all, regardless of the time and space, medical practice always happens under rule-
governed conditions. That is, medicine is a social practice at its roots and therefore 
cannot exist independent of its worldly conditions since it is “utterly embedded in the 
world” (Webb, 2013, p. 107). It is a thing of this world, and as such, inescapably happens 
under the conditions of this world. The ideal medicine representing a “pure interiority” 
has never existed nor will it ever do in the future. Ideality in this case is nothing but a 
naive illusion (Webb, 2013). 
Correspondingly, the body of medicine is made up of various types of statements 
(e.g., biomedical scientific, philosophical, ethical, religious, and political) with 
descriptive statements being “only one of the formulations present in medical discourse” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 33). It is important to know which specific statements (linguistic or 
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behavioral) are emerging within the modern discourse of medicine and what kind of 
effects they might have on medical students’ professional identity formation. 
Furthermore, given that medical discourse is made of different types of statements, 
theorizing the unity of its domain requires taking an interdisciplinary approach to inquiry. 
Put in another way, medicine is borrowing concepts and themes from various discourses, 
which need to be accounted for in an attempt to define the limits of modern medical 
discourse.  
Let us look at an example to demonstrate the practical overlap between various 
unities making up the body of medicine. Certain disciplines such as sociology, 
anthropology, ethics and education have been recognized for quite some time now. Yet, 
those familiar with medical humanities1 research will admit that there is extensive 
overlap between the topics explored by medical sociology, medical anthropology, 
medical ethics, and medical education. For example, the hospital environment is 
researched separately by scholars in the fields of medical sociology, medical ethics, 
medical anthropology, as well as medical education. Scholars of these subdisciplines 
keep re-inventing the wheel in their own terms since there is often minimal constructive 
and sustainable interdisciplinary communication among them at the formal level. For 
example, medical education researchers rarely cite research done in medical 
anthropology or even medical ethics. Thus, an interdisciplinary discussion of findings, 
which can be very relevant to medical education, is largely missing from the academic 
                                               
1 Medical humanities refers to an interdisciplinary field that includes humanities (e.g., ethics, 
philosophy, religion, and history), social sciences (e.g., sociology, anthropology, psychology, and cultural 
studies) and arts (literature, visual arts, films, and theatre), as well as their application to medical education 
and practice.  
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scene. For example, a medical education researcher sets out to study the hospital 
environment and the effects it might have on surgery residents. She looks into the 
research done in medical education literature, identifies a gap and designs her study. She 
may not look into the literature in medical anthropology and medical sociology but it is 
very likely that they contain a lot of useful literature relevant to the same topic that this 
researcher remains unaware of, and thus, sets out to reinvent the wheel that has already 
been spinning.  
The overlap among research domains as described above complicates the job for 
the researchers in medical humanities, especially, of those who attempt to analyze and 
define modern professional or academic discourses. The fact that the borders between 
modern disciplines are “more like the result of messy negotiations rather than clean 
incisions” makes it hard to attribute a statement to any single discipline alone (Webb, 
2013, p. 133). In a Foucauldian archaeology, a “statement” is taken as the smallest 
functional unit of enunciation. Problems arise when one comes across a statement such as 
the following: “surgery residents are often burnt out by their heavy schedule, which 
affects the quality of their performance”. There are no clear-cut criteria for deciding 
whether this statement belongs to the realm of medical education, medical anthropology, 
medical ethics, medical sociology, or modern history of medicine. The point I am trying 
to establish here is that statements such as the one in the example above are part of the 
discourse of modern medicine at any rate, and they are important if we are to have a 
theoretical elaboration of what medicine as a social practice looks like. To further 
complicate the situation, the borders between the above disciplines are not only blurry at 
cross-examination, they are also constantly changing with time. After all, literature, 
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politics, and philosophy did not populate the field of medical discourse in the seventeenth 
or eighteenth century as much as they do now (Foucault, 1972, p. 22). That is because 
medicine is a discursive formation and the rules of all discursive formations are 
inexorably time and space-bound.  
It is important to note that research produced by each of the subdisciplines 
mentioned above is related to the modern discourse of medicine, even though it is not 
often when this research is being used for achieving optimal medical practice. For 
instance, medical sociology, explores issues related to medicine as a social practice. One 
is tempted to wonder, then, is that not what medicine needs to know in order to define its 
limits and theorize its discourse? Do medical professionals typically read research done 
by medical humanities scholars? If not, what exactly is the use of medical humanities’ 
research if its findings are not used by medical professionals to enhance the practice of 
medicine? Sadly, much of this research is developed to live and die within their own 
academic disciplines. This is but one example of the numerous instances where creating 
too many silos in the name of individual disciplines can become a major problem in 
itself. 
Getting back to the discussion of discourse, it is known that discourses create 
limits for what can be said, done, and even thought about a certain object. Hence, “at a 
given period, there are, in total, relatively few things that are said” (Foucault, 1972, p. 
119). We are all subject to social discourses that are present around us in our own time 
and space. One way to expand the horizon of our thoughts and actions in this situation is 
to take up an interdisciplinary approach to medical humanities research. This approach 
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can help medical education researchers see more events and instances that might need 
their attention. As Webb (2013) puts it,  
there is nothing to prevent old habits of thought and analysis from being 
shaken up to form new perspectives, with new objects in view, and that 
what Foucault presents as an invisible condition of experience might 
become visible (for example, patterns of regularity that only appear when 
one looks across several disciplines at once) (p. 113). 
 
Therefore, the present inquiry takes an interdisciplinary approach to blend what is already 
known about medicine as a social practice and use that literature as basis for the present 
archaeological analysis. Archaeology is the specific Foucauldian approach to discourse 
analysis that is adopted in the present study. It is my belief that taking an interdisciplinary 
approach for defining the structure of modern medical discourse using archaeology can 
greatly augment the field of medical education research. 
Problem Statement  
People develop their personal values and beliefs as a function of dominant social 
discourses (Mills, 2004; Foucault, 1981). The point that I am hoping to establish here is 
that discourses set up the ways we do things in general. They set up limits on what we 
think is true, what is possible to say, and to do. We follow the norms of discourses as 
though they were common sense without always being aware of their socially constructed 
nature. People make sense of who they are and what they are supposed to do as a result of 
their interactions with the world around them. One example of this is formation of 
medical professional identities as a function of medical discourse. In medical education, 
we care about medical students’ identities. Today’s students are tomorrow’s doctors, and 
the way doctors position themselves in relation to the world around them has a direct 
impact on how they perform their duties. Identities include personal and professional 
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value-systems that together create a lens through which one sees the world. Physicians’ 
value-systems interact with those of their patients and the process affects patient care as 
well as the healthcare delivery system at large.  
For these reasons, the structure of modern medical discourse needs to be analyzed 
and understood. Various objects, modalities of enunciation, concepts, and theoretical 
strategies about medicine that inform our medical talk need to be identified and examined 
for their impact on medical students’ professional identity formation as well as both the 
practitioner’s and patient’s well-being. An expanded knowledge of how medical students 
position themselves in relation to medicine as a social practice can make invisible and 
unexamined assumptions that serve to reproduce problematic professional behaviors 
come to the surface. Moreover, medical students’ positioning in relation to medical 
profession directly determines their position in relation to medical professionalism, which 
in turn establishes their professional identity.  
Thus, as medical educators, we need to be aware of the medical student 
discourses. That is, we need to be aware of the ways in which they connect themselves to 
the essence of medicine as a social practice and the ways in which they define medical 
professional behavior. Furthermore, it is important for us as medical educators to reflect 
upon and challenge our own unexamined assumptions that are based on social discourses, 
our overall positionality in partaking in the professional discourse and the impact they 
might have on our students. An archaeological discourse analysis, such as the one 
undertaken by this study, can tremendously enhance the discussion of such concerns, all 
of which are vital in day-to-day medical education and practice. 
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It is worth reiterating here that defining what counts as “truth” in a certain age and 
within certain communities is a function of the dominant social discourses. The term 
“truth” here refers to certain belief that are considered to be true. As can be imagined, the 
“truths” constructed as effects of the dominant social discourses can be completely 
baseless even when they sound nothing less than commonsense due to the naturalizing 
effect of powerful discourses. Just like public and political discourses, healthcare 
education is not–and has never been–immune to the “slippery uses of fact and overtly 
manufactured truths” (Hodges, 2017, p. 235). One example of this can be found in 
American Medical Association’s (AMA) president, Alfred Stillé’s inaugural speech, 
delivered in 1871 (Stillé, 1871). In that speech, Stillé referred to women as being “totally 
unfit” to practice medicine because of their “uncertainty of rational judgment, 
capriciousness of sentiment, fickleness of purpose” and “a profound contempt for the 
logic of facts” (Stillé, 1871; cited by Hodges, 2017, p. 236). Stillé’s way of addressing 
was clearly based on the dominant discourse of gender in his time and not grounded in 
research evidence.  
Regardless of how baseless they might sound to some of us today, statements like 
the ones made above have reigned in their own era, have been accepted as truth by many, 
and have therefore brought about profound consequences for several decades to come. 
The echoes of similar themes related to the discourse of gender caused minimal or no 
participation of women in the field of medicine for several years after 1871. Becker, and 
colleagues performed a classic ethnography of the University of Kansas Medical School 
in 1961, which was published under the title Boys in White. Here is how they describe 
the student body in their book: 
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In 1958, 94 new students entered the first year of the school… The 
overwhelming majority of students are men, but each class contains a 
number of women, ordinarily around five. Similarly, the overwhelming 
majority of students are native-born and white. Each class will contain a 
few students from such faraway places as Central America or Africa, as 
well as a small number of women and Negroes, possibly four or five. The 
small numbers of women and Negroes do not reflect any intent to 
discriminate. The school gets very few applicants of either category 
(Becker et al., 1961, pp. 53, 60). 
 
Thus, they saw fit to focus on male students only, in their study (of medical education 
environment), hence the title of the work: Boys in White. The passage above makes it 
evident that we have come a long way in medical education since 1961. It also makes it 
possible to catch a glimpse of the power of dominant social discourse in shaping public 
opinions that guide public behavior and corroborations in relation to certain things that 
are accepted as “truth” within a specific culture. 
What counts as truth, therefore, seems to depend on the discourses that are 
dominant in a certain era, more than anything else. Even when factually incorrect, an 
opinion can be firmly held in place by political, legal and academic institutions. Do such 
synthetic “truths” exist in our age? They certainly do; though they are much more 
difficult to spot since we are living in the same era as them and our opinions too are 
inevitably shaped by dominant discourses which legitimize those truths. To be sure, those 
who lived in 1871 did not find Stillé’s words as odd and baseless as some of us will do 
today. That is because their opinions were shaped by the discourse on gender that was 
dominant in 1871. As Hodges (2017) puts it, 
just as it is valuable to watch for scientific untruths, false associations and 
unsupported claims in health care, it is necessary to be vigilant in order to 
stamp out, or at least point out, unsupported claims, traditions and beliefs 




Indeed, medical education researchers can and should disrupt such commonly held 
notions of truth, first of all, by becoming aware of them through an archaeological 
analysis of medical discourse and identifying the ways in which this discourse is shaping 
our truths and our identity as people who are involved with medicine.  
Purpose of the Study 
This study aims at, first, analyzing the discursive formation of current medical 
discourse in Indiana University School of Medicine, and second, examining the ways in 
which these discursive practices condition the professional identification of medical 
students at Indiana University School of Medicine. It needs to be noted that an 
archaeological analysis of the modern medical discourse at the level of a medical school 
could have many implications for medical education. One important implication, which is 
emphasized in this study, is the way discourse shapes medical students’ professional 
identities.  
In archaeological analysis of discourse, “what is sought is not literally what 
something is, but the way that it … exists” (Webb, 2013, p. 99). Hence, this study is not 
looking to define what medicine is. Rather, the point of interest is in what ways medicine 
currently exists in Indiana University School of Medicine. That is, this study is exploring 
the conditions of existence for elements of medical discourse, rules and relations that 
bring about those conditions, and how those rules, relations and conditions play a role in 
forming medical professional identity in medical students. It is important for both 
medical educators and students to know what it is exactly that medical profession is 
engaged with and aiming for, what things are given the status of objects and concepts 
within this discourse, how are they being talked about, and what positions are possible to 
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be taken in relation to them. Such elements can become “manifest, nameable, and 
describable” only through an archaeological analysis of the medical discourse (Foucault, 
1972, p. 41).  
The primary focus in this study is to depict a clear illustration of the structure of 
modern medical discourse as a discursive formation. It is this discourse that constitutes 
medical students’ understanding of medicine as a profession as well as the language using 
which they speak about medicine. In other words, the present archaeological analysis 
embarks on questioning key aspects of medicine’s contemporary self-understanding. The 
main concern is to show how modern discourse of medicine is constituting professional 
identity of future doctors. It has been established (Monrouxe, 2010) that by navigating 
through the spaces in medical education, which are in turn shaped by the modern 
discourse of medicine, students change their identities and become more like the realm 
into which they move (Foucault, 1972; Foucault, 1975) Being in school for years, they 
learn to conform with the rules of conventional discourses on medicine and 
professionalism. It is like when “fire rises into the air, it undergoes a series of changes 
then eventually changes into air” (Gutting, 1989, p. 141). In this metaphor, fire represents 
the students whereas air represents the discourse of medicine that surrounds them from 
all sides as soon as they enter medical school.  
In short, the basic premise of the present study is based on the Foucauldian 
discourse theory, which establishes clear links between discourse and identity. According 
to the discourse theory, it is the discourse of medicine which constitutes medical 
professional identities and therefore it is fundamental to study the discourse of medicine 
to understand the medical professional identities. Put in a different way, it is necessary to 
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understand (medical) discourse if we want to understand (medical) identities. 
Archaeology is the only methodology for analyzing a Foucauldian discourse, that is, the 
type of discourse that constitutes identities. However, Foucauldian archaeology is a 
fundamentally radical methodology with underlying philosophical assumptions that do 
not match most of the literature in medical education research. This is not to say that a 
Foucauldian approach is better than others, it is only to clarify that it is very different. 
Foucault’s theories and archaeological methodology do not necessarily refute the 
literature, but they would look at the entire field of medicine from a radically different 
angle. That said, this archaeological study is not following the pattern set by other 
research and is therefore not filling a gap in the conventional structuralist research 
literature that is already there on medical education. Instead, it adds to the literature in 
medical education by providing new possibilities and exploring a new way of thinking 
about medical professionalism. Hence, this study is an application of the Foucauldian 
discourse theory in medical education.  
Research Focus 
This research is an exploration of the modern discourse of medicine at Indiana 
University School of Medicine, Indianapolis Campus, and the role of this local discourse 
in constitution of local medical student identities. 
Theoretical Framework 
The present study is largely framed on the basis of Michel Foucault’s discourse 
theory (Foucault, 1972, 1977b, 1980, 1981) and archaeological methodology (Foucault, 
1972). As such, this study is grounded in social constructionist research paradigm with 
postmodern understandings. This theoretical framework has played a fundamental role in 
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sketching the design of the present work (see Anfara & Mertz, 2015 for more on the 
fundamental role of theories in qualitative research). Foucault’s archaeology has 
informed the focus of the study, research methodology, data collection and data analysis 
methods. His archaeological framework has guided the data analysis as well as data 
presentation. Archaeological analytical model used in this study is described in Chapter 3. 
Overview of the Study Design and Methodology 
Foucauldian archaeological methodology has been employed in this work. Data 
collection methods include direct observation of the clinical settings, one-on-one in-depth 
interviews and focus group interviews with medical students across all four years of 
undergraduate medical training (MS1, MS2, MS3, and MS4). Study site is Indiana 
University School of Medicine, Indianapolis Campus, which is a Midwestern U.S.-based 
medical school. Study participants included medical students across all four years of 
training, residents, doctors, patients and patient families. Details about study setting, 
participants, data collection methods, as well as the purpose and procedure for each of the 
data collection methods are provided in Chapter 3.  
Overview of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation includes a review of the literature relevant to the 
present inquiry, including a brief review of the history of modern medical discourse, 
detailed descriptions of discourse, professionalism, and medical professional identity, as 
well as the discussion of how discourse induces the identity. This chapter also contains a 
detailed review of the literature related to archaeological methodology and its chief 
principles as developed by Foucault. Chapter 3 presents a methodological discussion of 
Foucauldian archaeology including descriptions of the statement, discursive elements, 
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discursive rules, relations and conditions, and discussion of general archaeological 
description. This chapter also discusses the study setting, study participants and 
participant selection methods, data collection methods, as well as a statement of my 
positionality as the researcher. Chapter 4 presents the results of the data analysis at three 
different levels: at the level of the statements, at the level of discursive elements, and at 
the level of archaeological rules, relations, and conditions. The final chapter of this 
dissertation, Chapter 5, will present the final discussion and conclusions of the study. 
This chapter also includes a general discussion of archaeological descriptions provided in 
Chapter 4, discussion of findings at the level of the statement, the level of discursive 
elements, and the level of rules, relations and conditions, and lastly, a discussion of 
implications of results for medical education as well as future directions needing to be 




Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
This study explores the modern discourse of medicine and the medical 
professional identities. A good part of this chapter is dedicated to the review of discourse 
theory and archaeological methodology in the literature. Given that the present study 
draws heavily from discourse theory and employs archaeology as its methodological 
framework, a detailed discussion of these topics and how they are being adopted in this 
study is necessary.  The present chapter begins with providing a brief history of the 
modern medical discourse as studied by Foucault. The reason for not consulting any other 
sources to contribute in providing the history of medicine is that working with 
Foucauldian theories requires one to develop a somewhat different sense of history, 
which is not consistent with traditional ways of historical description. Foucault’s 
historical work is grounded in rejection of totalitarianism, transcendence, empiricism, 
chronological continuity, and the assumption that the human agent is the central figure in 
history. A detailed explanation of these characteristic will be provided toward the end of 
this chapter.  
Next, the chapter progresses with reviewing the literature on the discourse theory 
and its rules and regulations; what is identity, what is identity formation, why they matter, 
and how they are inseparably linked with social discourses; approaches for analyzing the 
discourse, with an emphasis on the Foucauldian theories; structure and significance of 
discursive formations; and the difference between discursive and nondiscursive practices. 
In the last part of this chapter, I will provide a review of relevant literature on 
archaeology, which is a Foucauldian methodology for discourse analysis. This section 
will include an introduction of archaeology and its chief principles, as well as a 
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description of aspects that make it unique compared to other research methodologies and 
analytical approaches.  
A Brief History of Modern Medical Discourse in Western Europe 
The goal of this section is to review how medicine emerged as a social practice in 
Western Europe in the modern age. This section is based on the history of medicine in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century as analyzed by Foucault (2003a, 2003b). The 
discussion includes an exploration of meanings that have been attached to medicine as a 
social practice in modern Western societies as well as three major discourses (i.e., 
political, urban, labor force) that have shaped the modern identity of medical practice 
from the eighteenth century onwards. Understanding how and why medicine came to be a 
social practice and the dominant discourses which drove it along the history is important. 
Without this basic understanding one will be unable to fit the present-day discourse of 
modern medicine in its appropriate context.  
Looking at the development of the medical system in the West from the 
eighteenth century onward, three points need to be emphasized: bio-history, 
medicalization, and the economy of health. Bio-history refers to the effects of medical 
intervention at the biological level, which began in the eighteenth century. Medicalization 
denotes practices that brought several features of human existence–including human 
behavior and the human body–into an increasingly dense network of medical discourse. 
Medicalization also dates back to eighteenth century and is still a popular mode of 
medical social reasoning. Lastly, the economy of health signifies the integration and 
improvement of health, health services, and health consumption in the economic 
development of the privileged societies (Rabinow & Rose, 2003). The present discussion 
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focuses on the history of medicalization only, which is more closely linked with birth of 
the social medicine.  
Medicine that was practiced before the rise of modern scientific medicine 
(sometimes called the Greek medicine) cannot be characterized as a collective or social 
form of medicine because it never had any social support systems associated with it 
(Foucault, 2003a). However, there are two important exceptions that were common 
practice in Middle Ages: the politico-medical actions that were taken in order to deal with 
cases of leprosy and plague. Upon their discovery, any cases of leprosy were immediately 
exiled out of the city in order to keep the rest of the population safe. This practice has 
sometimes been categorized as “a medicine of exclusion” (Foucault, 2003a) and it was 
mainly based on a religious model (Elden, 2017). A different and somewhat military-
based mechanism was used to handle the epidemic outbursts of plague. In case of plague, 
the sick persons were not exiled but were put together in a compartment within the public 
sphere in order to be kept under observation. In these cases,  
medicine’s political power consisted in distributing individuals side by 
side, isolating them, individualizing them, observing them one by one, 
monitoring their state of health, checking to see whether they were still 
alive or had died, and, in this way, maintaining society in a 
compartmentalized space that was closely watched and controlled by 
means of a painstaking record of all the events that occurred (Foucault, 
2003a, p. 328). 
 
The two systems of management for leprosy and plague, based on the religious and 
military models, respectively, were common in all European countries during the Middle 
Ages. They illustrate two forms of political power: negative and positive. The expulsion 
of lepers from the urban space can be considered a negative use of power, whereas, 
establishment of administrative strategies to control the plague was a positive use of 
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medical power. Nevertheless, the administrative process was based on strategies of 
selection, normalization, hierarchization, and centralization (Elden, 2017, p. 151).  
On the other hand, the modern scientific medicine2 is not medicine of the 
individual, rather, it is a social practice. The only aspect of modern medicine that 
involves some individualistic values–within the limits of capitalistic market relations, that 
is–is the doctor-patient relationship. Medicine evolved from a private practice to become 
a more collective, social endeavor with the rise of capitalism at the end of the eighteenth 
century to the beginning of the nineteenth century. In capitalism, as Foucault puts it: 
Society’s control over individuals was accomplished not only through 
ideology but also in the body and with the body. For capitalist society, it 
was biopolitics, the biological, the somatic, the corporal, that mattered 
more than anything else. Human body was politically and socially 
recognized as a labor force. Thus, the body is a biopolitical reality; 
medicine is a biopolitical strategy (Foucault, 2003a, p. 321). 
 
Formation of social medicine in this period can be reconstructed in the following three 
stages: state medicine, then urban medicine, and finally the labor force medicine.  
State Medicine 
State medicine was the first formal discourse of socialized medicine that 
developed for the first time in Germany at the beginning of the eighteenth century 
(Foucault, 2003a). At that time, in both France and England the only state attention put 
towards the health of population was through measurement of the birth and mortality 
rates. Beyond this, the state did not make any attempts toward the improvement of public 
health. The state medicine in Germany began with a program called the “medical police”, 
was proposed between 1750 and 1770 (Foucault, 2003a). The term “police” did not 
                                               
2 Foucault defines the modern scientific medicine as medicine that was born at the end of the 
eighteenth century - between Giambattista Morgagni and Xavier Bichat - with the introduction of 
pathological anatomy. See Foucault, 1975 for more. 
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signify the institution of police in the modern sense, however. Reporting back at the state 
level, the institution of medical police performed the following functions:  
 Investigating the presence of any diseases within the population–including 
epidemic and endemic ailments–and documenting them based on the 
information collected from the hospitals and doctors.  
 Standardizing the medical practice and knowledge, which used to be a matter 
of local discretion of the universities and medical scholars before medical 
police was established. As a consequence, medicine and physicians were the 
first objects to become standardized at the state level in Germany. 
 Overseeing the activity of doctors by an administrative office. 
 Developing medical officers who were then appointed by the government to 
take charge of a region. These medical officers operated by the authority of state 
as well as the authority inherent in medical knowledge.  
Other models of social medicine in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were all less-
expanded variations of this state-dominated administrative system introduced in Germany 
for the first time.  
Urban Medicine 
Urban medicine first appeared in France with the expansion of the urban 
structures as a consequence of urban life–by the end of the eighteenth century (Foucault, 
2003a). The main objectives of urban medicine were three: first, identifying and 
analyzing the zones of congestion, disorder, and danger within the urban limits. Examples 
of this is the relocation of graveyards and slaughterhouses from the center of Paris to the 
outskirts of the city. Second, controlling circulation of water and air as these elements 
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were considered to have pathogenic capacity for the population. Third, dealing with the 
organization and distribution of elements such as sewers, pumps, river washhouses, and 
so forth in order to prevent them from causing any public health issues within the urban 
spaces. According to Foucault (2003a), learning about medicalization of the city–that is, 
the practice of urban medicine in the eighteenth century–is important for several reasons:  
1. The need for analysis of elements such as water and air brought medicine in 
contact with sciences such as chemistry for the first time. It is important, then, 
to note that our modern scientific medicine was not born out of medical 
interest in the individual. Rather, it happened due to a politico-medical 
intervention in the health of the masses. 
2. As discussed above, scientific medicine began with analysis of the 
environment, then the effects of the environment on human bodies, and finally 
analysis of the human bodies themselves. It was not the other way around.  
3. Public health was born for the purpose of politico-scientific control of the 
environment. It was this notion that brought together all essential components 
of a social medicine.  
The urban medicine was different from the state medicine of Germany in that the urban 
medicine was not associated with a specifically designated source of power and authority 
controlled by the state.  
Labor Force Medicine 
Labor force medicine was chronologically the third direction that social medicine 
took in Western Europe, and it can be examined best through the example from England. 
Towards the second half of the nineteenth century in England, poverty began to be seen 
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as a health and political hazard for the city and so it was decided for the first time to 
divide the urban space into rich areas and poor areas. As Foucault puts it, “first the state, 
then the city, and finally poor people and workers were the object of medicalization” 
(Foucault, 2003a, p. 333). Meanwhile, a new form of social medicine–in the form of a 
tax-supported welfare for the poor–appeared in England. This was mainly an attempt to 
protect the privileged class from the risk of epidemics that originated from the poor 
communities as well as protect the labor force, which became a necessity of the industrial 
age. To these ends, about one thousand Health Offices were established in England in 
1875 with the following functions: control of vaccination, organizing the record of 
epidemics and disease capable of turning into an epidemic, and identification and 
destruction of the unhealthy localities, if necessary. This was a health service offered to 
the entire population without making a distinction between rich and poor.  
Thus, the English model of social medicine was based on three main objectives: 
providing medical assistance to the poor, preservation and upkeep of the health of the 
labor force, and a general surveying of public health through which the privileged social 
classes were protected against possible dangers arising from the poor population. Further, 
it gradually established the three major medical systems of the modern world, namely, a 
welfare medicine for the poor, an administrative medicine to take charge of the general 
issues such as vaccination and epidemics, and a private medicine which served those who 
could afford it (Foucault, 2003a).  
It is important to understand the politics of health in the eighteenth century 
because they illustrate the following main points: 
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 The modern scientific medicine did not grow out of a clinical interest in the 
body of the individuals to become a social and collective endeavor later. As a 
matter of fact, it went the other way around.   
 The eighteenth century politics of health marks the emergence of a range of 
modern practices: development of a medical market in the form of private 
practice, establishment of qualified physician networks, increased demand for 
professional health care in the society in general, and the rise of an organized 
clinical medicine concentrated on individual patient with explicitly moral and 
scientific and implicitly economic motives. 
 The social prestige of medicine as a general technique of health began to 
exceed even that of its value in caring for the sick. Medical men began to 
assume an increasingly significant social status being supported by the 
administrative system and the machinery of state. Social authority of 
physicians came from two important activities assigned to them by power: 
first, medicine’s medico-administrative handling of the health and sickness, 
conditions of life, housing, and so on. This function of medicine became the 
basis of the “social economy” in the nineteenth century. Second, medicine’s 
politico-medical grasp on the population through a series of remedies 
suggested not only to treat the diseases, but the general forms of human 
existence and behavior (e.g., food and drink, sexuality, fertility, clothing, 
inhabiting, etc.).   
 The doctors began to be seen as the great advisors and experts (Foucault, 
2003b; Elden, 2017) in the second half of the eighteenth century due to their 
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function as the public hygienist–rather than therapist. This was marked by the 
increasing presence of doctors in academia, counseling, advisory, political 
institutions, and other prestigious social activities. The doctor functioned as a 
representative of power and administration that was qualified to take 
authoritarian measures in order to assure maintenance of a well-ordered 
society. The economic and social privileges bestowed on doctors became 
further increased as they began to develop their role as therapists as well as the 
hygienists–in the nineteenth century.  
Foucault’s principle claim in his tracing of the bio-history is that medicine has been a 
social activity at least since eighteenth century. Further, his emphasis on the capitalism 
working its way through the human “body” as a means to maintain the labor force and 
thus the socio-political economy is striking. In the next section, I will explore the relevant 
theoretical literature regarding the discourse theory in general, and how it relates to the 
modern medicine in particular.  
What is Discourse? 
The term discourse has been used in various academic disciplines, especially in 
last couple of decades. Since 1960s, discourse has been seen in association with French 
philosophical thought in general and with the works of Michel Foucault in particular. 
However, many theorists have used this term in a range of ways. Some scholars have 
provided complicated definitions of discourse whereas some others have defined it in 
ways that made the discourse theory more approachable for use in academic research. For 
example, some theorists have subsumed the discourse as a study of language in use 
(Wetherell et al., 2001). Also, another group of scholars have described discourses as 
32 
 
ways of conceptualizing “sets of practices, ideas and institutions” (Shirley & Padgett, 
2004, p. 36) through language and social action (Sarangi & Coulthard, 2014). Grbich 
(2013) suggests that discourses are ways of speech, writing, thinking, and doing.  
Similarly, Monrouxe and colleagues (2011) define discourse as simply what we 
do. They provide an example of how discourse theory can be employed to analyze 
minutiae of language as a set of signifiers (e.g., words) representing something that is 
signified (e.g., concepts). These authors maintain, however, that it is easier to infer 
distinct meanings from physical objects compared to abstract ones. For instance, when 
someone talks about a pencil, a chair, or a door, it is easy to locate what 
meanings/concepts are signified by these words. Whereas words like philosophy, 
education, and medicine are not simple signifiers. Medicine, for one, signifies an abstract 
concept that encompasses several other signifiers within itself (e.g., bioscientific 
competence, professionalism, altruism) with each of them referring to equally variable 
notions. Wear and Nixon (2002) for example, demonstrate the copious ways in which 
terms such as “altruism” are understood and played out across a complicated range of 
clinical situations. There is no easy definition even for the term “competence” that could 
be deemed equally plausible by everyone in medical education and practice (Lingard, 
2009).  
This study conforms to the ways in which the term discourse is used in the works 
of Michel Foucault. According to the discourse theory, as defined by Foucault, there is no 
intrinsic order to the world other than the ordering which we impose on it by our 
description of it through language (Mills, 2004). As such, our only access to reality is 
through discourses. In Foucault’s words: 
33 
 
We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to 
the same discursive formation… it is made up of a limited number of 
statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. 
Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form that also possesses a 
history; the problem is not therefore to ask oneself how and why it was 
able to emerge and become embodied at this point in time; it is, from 
beginning to end, historical - a fragment of history, a unity and 
discontinuity in history itself, posing the problem of its own limits, its 
divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality rather 
than its sudden irruption in the midst of the complicities of time (Foucault, 
1972, p. 117). 
 
Thus, discourses are constructed locally; they are self-enforcing and productive of our 
views and attitudes regarding all worldly phenomena.     
Discourses have certain characteristics that are important to be accounted for (see 
Figure 2.1). The first of these characteristics is the institutional nature of discourse and 
its situatedness in its social context. All discourses are context-bound and follow the local 
rules and limitations, hence the terms political discourse, religious discourse, 
technological discourse, medical discourse and so on (Butler, 2002). Analysis of 
discourse is dependent upon understanding the roles played by institutions and social 
context in the development, maintenance and circulation of discourses. Diane Macdonell 
(1991) has described the institutional nature of discourse based on her analysis of the uses 
of discourse in the works of Foucault and other scholars. In Macdonell’s words,  
a discourse is not a disembodied collection of statements, but groupings of 
utterances or sentences, statements which are enacted within a social 
context, which are determined by that social context and which contribute 
to the way that social context continues its existence (1991, p. 10). 
 
Based on this definition, medical discourse is a combination of utterances/statements that 
are enacted within the context of medical education and profession. These statements are 
produced and shaped by a professional medical context, and they contribute, in turn, to 
the way professional medicine continues to exist. It is important to note that discourses 
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do not form in void; rather, they are the products of constant power struggle and the site 
of endless contestation of meanings (Pêcheux, 1982). As such, they are not fixed entities. 
All discourses are modified and updated over time.  
Figure 2.1 
Major Characteristics of Discourse 
 
The second characteristic of discourse is the dependence of discourses upon a 
number of internal mechanisms for their existence. In The Order of Discourse (1981), 
Foucault discusses three major internal mechanisms to the discourse: commentary, the 
notion of academic discipline, and rarefaction. The mechanism of commentary suggests 
that discourses that are frequently commented upon by others are viewed as more 
valid/worthy. As Foucault puts it, 
we may suspect that there is in all societies, with great consistency, a kind 
of gradation among discourses: those which are said in the ordinary course 
of days and exchanges, and which vanish as soon as they have been 
pronounced; and those which give rise to a certain number of new speech 
acts which take them up, transform them or speak of them, in short, those 
discourses which, over and above their formulations, are said indefinitely, 
remain said, and are to be said again (Foucault, 1981, pp 48-78) 
 
The second internal mechanism of discourse is the academic discipline. Academic 
disciplines determine what can be said and what can count as knowledge within a certain 
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academic domain. New propositions can be articulated to an academic discipline only if 
they are within certain discursive limits of that discipline. For example, attempts to 
discuss valuable ideas in a paper that is not formatted in a certain way (within the 
dominant discursive limits) often remain unfruitful. It is not only the form, but also the 
content of thought that is limits-bound within a certain academic discipline. Thus, 
academic disciplines often exclude other ways of thinking and knowing–which could 
have been possible–simply because they lie “outside” the boundaries of that discipline 
(Mills, 2004; Foucault, 1981).  
One example of how academic disciplines limit what can be said or thought 
related to medicine is the difference in research topics and methodologies employed by 
scholars who undertake research in biomedicine, medical anthropology, medical 
psychology, medical sociology, and medical education. Even though all of them are 
essentially looking at the same type of issues and populations, interdisciplinary 
communication between them is at its minimum even when they are situated in the same 
university campuses. What keeps them from sharing common research frameworks and 
reinforcing each other’s methodological and substantive focus are the discursive limits 
set within each of those disciplines.  
The third internal mechanism of discourse according to Foucault is rarefaction. 
Rarefaction refers to the fact that utterances [or texts] produced within a certain discourse 
are “remarkably repetitive and remain within certain socially-agreed upon boundaries” 
(Mills, 2004). This is in spite of the fact that theoretically, any one person has the choice 
to produce an infinite number of utterances related to any given situation. Rarefaction 
means that the choice of topics of conversation and even the choice of words one can 
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make within a particular domain or discipline are fairly restricted by discursive norms. 
Moreover, people learn to put limits to their own feelings of need or desire when 
operating within a certain discursive framework. One example of rarefaction is the ritual 
of wearing a white coat in clinical settings. There are no intrinsic reasons for the 
physician’s coat to be always white, but it is so because it has been determined by the 
discursive rules of modern medical practice. Furthermore, even when thinking about 
becoming a physician someday, medical students tend to structure their desires within the 
boundaries of what is available. A medical student is unlikely to dream of wearing a pink 
coat on morning rounds as a doctor. That is because it would be incompatible with the 
rarefaction constrains of the medical professional discourse. In The Order of Discourse 
(1981), Foucault explains how our choices are restricted by discursive limits. He suggests 
that people speak and act within bounds of what discourses map out for them, even 
though the choices they make within those limits often feel personal. Surgeons do not, for 
example, wear jeans in the operation theatre unless wearing jeans has been established as 
discursively acceptable and possible in medicine. The discursive limits always need to be 
authorized by an “institution” of some kind (Foucault, 1981; Milles, 2004).  
One final characteristic of the discourse, in addition to its contextual nature and 
dependence upon internal mechanisms, is that discourses are bounded by certain rituals. 
Rituals tend to restrict the number of people who can speak certain type of statements 
with the same type of effect, and the number of settings at which such statements could 
be deemed as acceptable (Foucault, 1981). For instance, only a judge in the courtroom 
has the authority to make a legal judgment and put someone in prison according to the 
legal discourse. If another person speaks the same words as a judge in the courtroom, it 
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would not produce the same type of effect because his words are not backed by the 
authority of legal discourse. Moreover, if a judge makes a legal statement outside the 
courtroom, in a marketplace, for example, it is not counted as a legal statement because 
the setting of the marketplace lies outside the discursive limits of legal discourse. By the 
same token, only a priest can lawfully marry a couple (based on the limits set by the 
religious discourse), only a physician can perform surgery (based on the limits set by 
medical discourse), so on and so forth.  
The implications of the above restrictions for an educational institution such as a 
medical school are numerous. In Foucault’s words, 
what, after all, is an education system, other than a ritualization of speech, 
a qualification and fixing of the roles for speaking subjects, the 
constitution of a doctrinal group, however diffuse, a distribution and an 
appropriation of discourse with its powers and knowledges? (Foucault, 
1981, p. 64) 
 
Thus, medical schools as sites of specific educational systems are also sites of complex 
discursive regularities. There are strict speaking rights within medical schools (e.g., 
students must not speak to each other during a summative examination) as well as strict 
rules about what counts as knowledge. Attempts to express one’s ideas without referring 
to previously accepted knowledge (e.g., citing relevant literature), or to express ideas in 
unconventional formats that are not endorsed by one’s academic discipline are generally 
classified as groundless and futile. Consequently, only forms of knowledge that are 
endorsed in academia are those which operate within the discursive constrains while 
correctly obey all discursive rules of the medical discourse. Essentially, all of the above 
noted mechanisms for structuring, constraining and circulation of information have a 
similar effect: they bring about the production of discourse and only certain types of 
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discourse. They draw limits for what can be said, what can pass as knowledge, and even 
what can be thought or desired by a certain group of people who are subjects of a certain 
discourse. They ensure that everything occurs within the boundaries of those discursive 
limits (Mills, 2004). 
To summarize, discourses are powerful structures that create limits for what can 
be said, thought, or done by people (Butler, 2002). What is more, we are not always 
aware of the discursive structures that bound us to a certain way of existence. Foucault’s 
discourse theory and his proposed archaeological methodology can help us become aware 
of the structures within which discourses are produced, supported, and maintained. 
Attention to discursive practices “forces us to consider the provenance of the very 
apparatus within which we think” (Mills, 2004). Discourse theory is deemed as insightful 
in social sciences because it explains the constraints within which we operate - rather 
than assuming people are free to express whatever they wish (Gee, 2014; Mills, 2004; 
Monrouxe, 2010; Monrouxe et al., 2011; McNaughton, 2013; Hodges, 2017; Hodges et 
al., 2008). Not to forget, discourses not only limit what we can do, they also shape who 
we are. In a later section I will discuss how discourses shape the very identity of those 
who are governed by them. Before getting into that discussion, however, let us first 
explain what is meant by identity in general and in medical education in particular.  
What is Identity and Why it Matters?  
Jenkins (2008) defines identity by stating “it is not something that one can have or 
not; it is something that one does” (p.5). Nonetheless, identities develop, form and 
transform through language. It is important to note that identity is not a fixed or static 
entity. Rather, it is constantly transforming through the process of identification; that is, 
39 
 
as we act and interact with the world around us. This brings us back to the action-oriented 
definition of human identity. In Monrouxe’s (2010) words: “identities are not fixed 
cognitive schemas; rather, identities are what we do” (p.44). Identity formation is a two-
way process that is affected by a combination of internal and external definitions. 
Internal definitions of identity consist of our perceptions about who we are, whereas, 
external definitions consist of our perceptions about who others think we are (Monrouxe, 
2010). Then again, identities are both constructed and perceived through language (e.g., 
speech, writing, and thought) and artifacts (e.g., clothing items and accessories). Through 
identification, we embody who we are and who we are not. One exception to the two-
way process of identity formation is identifications that we embody early in life, such as, 
gender, race, ethnicity and so forth. Embodiment of such identities occurs under the vast 
influence of external definitions. As youngsters, we receive those definitions from our 
parents, families, caregivers and others who are closely in touch with us. For instance, a 
three-year-old girl might wear pink and play with dolls because those are items that are 
made available to her by her parents. Regardless of who made the decision for having this 
little girl wear pink and play with dolls, this “gendered” identity is being embodied by her 
and responded to by others. Moreover, it has been argued that primary identities one 
embodies as a child often become one’s default ways of perceiving the world; and they 
are not easy to change (Jenkins, 2008).  
As medical educators, we need to be aware of medical students’ identity 
formation process as it has momentous implications for both medical education and 
practice (Byram, 2017). It is important to keep in mind that medical students come to 
medical school with various primary and secondary identities. This can either facilitate or 
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impede their newly developing professional identities (Costello, 2005). Every person’s 
unique mix of primary and secondary identities can have a significant impact on how 
they relate to others–defining their so-called “in-group” and “out-group” relations. This 
bears implications for several aspects of medicine as a social practice, including doctor-
patient relationships and general healthcare delivery to the communities. As medical 
professionals, physicians are required to embody a professional identity - both ethically 
and practically (Monrouxe, 2010). Internalization of professional ethics through 
identification facilitates internal regulation of professionals (Freidson, 2004). 
Furthermore, embracing a professional identity is not always a smooth process. Bearing 
in mind every person’s unique mix of primary identities, the development of a 
professional medical identity sometimes requires seeing the world from a new angle, 
adopting new values, and emotional orientations, which is also known as identity 
dissonance (Monrouxe, 2010). Furthermore, medical professional identities are 
constructed and enacted in the interactional spaces in medical schools and hospitals 
(Richards, 2006). These institutions are places within which identification becomes 
consequential (Monrouxe, 2010). 
Identifying with a mixture of internal and external, primarily and secondarily 
developed definitions about who we are, each of us is the bearer of multiple identities at 
the same time, at any given moment of our lives. Roccas and Brewer (2002) propose the 
following four models to explain how one structures one’s perception of one’s own 
multiple identities: intersection, hierarchy, compartmentalization, and merging. 
Monrouxe (2010) provides a hypothetical model of a black female doctor to understand 
the different relationships between one’s multiple identities and their implications for 
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one’s in-group and out-group relations in the society. Resonating with Monrouxe’s 
description of four models mentioned above, I use the example of myself here to 
illustrate this point:  
I identify as a white, Middle Easterner, female educator. One way I can 
understand my multiple identities is to focus on the intersection among them. To do so, I 
can represent myself using a single identity of a white Middle Easterner female educator. 
My intersectional way of dealing with my multiple identities will have implications for 
how I define my in-group and out-group relations with others. People such as an African-
American male educator or a white Asian female nurse will be considered to belong to 
out-groups for me since they do not share my own unique intersectional identity. A 
second way I may understand my own multiple identities is to place them in a hierarchy 
of significance and to consider some of them as more important than others. I can place 
my professional identity as an educator above my gender and racial identities, which will 
lead me to believe that I share a common identity with all educators as my in-group 
people. However, because the identification is hierarchical, I might feel closer to white 
educators than I do with black educators, and even more with female white educators 
compared to male white educators. Those who do not share my dominant identity–people 
who are not educators, in this example–will be considered as members of the out-group.  
A third way I can make sense of who I am is by making a practical compromise 
and compartmentalizing my multiple identities. That is, I activate each of my multiple 
identities within their right context: while at work, I will identify as in-group with all 
educators regardless of their racial and gender identities. Anyone who is not an educator 
will be considered as out-group members by me while I am at work. In other contexts, 
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however, different items of my multiple identities will dictate who I identify with (with 
females at the park, with whites in my son’s school, etc.). The fourth and final way I can 
make sense of my multiple identities is through developing a merged in-group identity for 
myself that is inclusive of exceedingly diverse members. Identifying myself with the 
complex representation of a merged identity, I will refuse to accept inherent categorical 
divisions between people (Roccas & Brewer, 2002) and upgrade to identify with as many 
people as possible as my in-groups.  
 The point of the above illustration is to show that healthcare providers’ multiple 
identities and the way those are comprehended can have serious relevance to patient care 
as well as many other aspects of practicing medicine such as interprofessional and 
intraprofessional communication and teamwork. The clinical setting is, then, a stage 
where multiple identities of people are played out through their actions toward and 
relations with one another. Interactions between doctors, nurses, other allied health 
professionals, patients, patients’ families, hospital staff, so on and so forth all involve 
intragroup (e.g., doctor with doctor) and intergroup (e.g., doctor with others) 
communications. Successful teamworking among these people requires effective 
communication which, in turn, requires sound relations among them. Medical students 
who suffer from some sort of identity dissonance and do not succeed in achieving a 
merged identity during medical training will make incompetent physicians in terms of 
their professional ethics and behavior (Bleakley et al., 2011).   
As I have stated several times already, it is important to remind ourselves that 
medical students and physicians, like all other professionals, are only people. They are 
individuals holding their own personal, emotional, and cultural lenses through which they 
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see the world around them. The way they identify as professionals impacts the way they 
act as individuals having the authority to practice medicine. In Monrouxe’s (2010) words: 
“Identity matters. Who we are, and what we are seen to be, underlies much of what we do 
in medical education” (p. 41). Let us look at a few examples of how physicians’ identities 
have impacted their performance with standardized patients’ history taking, doctor-
patient interactions, and patients’ satisfaction over time. Patients are commonly reported 
to receive variable care based on factors such as their race, ethnicity and socio-economic 
status (Higashi et al., 2013; Moy et al., 2005). Various forms of health disparities exist 
across the United States (Gibbons, 2005, 2008; ACGME, 2018; Azim, 2020) due to 
healthcare providers’ implicit perceptions of patients as their in-group and out-group 
members (Burgess et al., 2007). Van Ryn and Burke (2000) reports how doctors make 
assumptions about different patients’ degrees of intelligence based on factors such as 
patients’ race. Physician’s feelings of affiliation towards patients are affected by whom 
they perceive as belonging to their in-group and out-group members. Such perceptions 
can lead to making strong assumptions about patients’ likelihood of following medical 
advice (Higashi et al., 2013), maintaining physical activity, and risk-taking preferences 
(van Ryn & Burke, 2000; van Ryn et al., 2006). In sum, how physicians conceptualize 
their own identities can consciously or unconsciously affect the way they relate to others 
(Hewstone et al., 2002). 
For these reasons, professional identity formation is one of the hot topics for 
research and a buzz word in medical education research today (Paradis et al., 2013; 
Byram, 2017). One way in which professional identification is being facilitated in 
medical schools is through teaching professionalism as part of the medical curriculum. 
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However, teaching professionalism has not been an easy task so far, chiefly because there 
are so many differing definitions of medical professionalism produced by policy makers 
and medical educators (Wagner et al., 2007). Furthermore, many of these definitions are 
time and/or context bound. It is often a hurdle for medical educators to come up with 
appropriate teaching materials and strategies that would suit their own local contexts 
(Swick, 2000; Cruess et al., 2004; Hafferty & Levinson, 2008; Cruess, 2006; Hilton & 
Slotnick, 2005). Swick (2000) defines professionalism by emphasizing on what doctors 
do, such as “how they meet their responsibilities to individual patients and to 
communities”. This definition is attending to both internal (i.e., competency) and external 
(e.g., a commitment to scholarship) definitions of identity formation process. Arnold and 
Stern (2006) claim that professionalism is founded on clinical competence, good 
communication, and ethical and legal understandings. Therefore, medical professionals 
must attain wise application of the core principles of excellence, humanism, 
accountability and altruism (Arnold & Stern, 2006). The problem is, however, that 
constructs such as wise application can imply an array of subjective meanings. Also, 
depending on their cultural backgrounds, different people often have different 
understandings of the abstract notions such as excellence, humanism, accountability and 
altruism in the first place. The authors do not clearly define what may or may not count 
(in their eyes, of course) as a wise application of those notions either.  
Hilton and Slotnick (2005), on the other hand, provide a definition of medical 
professionalism that has been based upon six domains: ethical practice, reflection and 
self-awareness, responsibility and accountability for actions, respect for patients, 
teamwork, and social responsibility. According to these authors, medical professionals 
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must thrive to acquire practical wisdom which they define as the so-called phronesis. The 
authors describe this practical wisdom (phronesis) in terms of “knowing which rules to 
break and how far to break them to accommodate the reality at hand” (p. 61). Phronesis is 
thought to be both an art and an intellectual activity. It has been linked to mindfulness 
(Epstein, 1999), tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1958), and capability (Fraser & Greenhalgh, 
2001). The problem with phronesis is that it assumes an individual subject who can 
practice high levels of self-awareness, self-regulation, and personal autonomy without 
being influenced by what is spoken, written, conceived and done in the world around 
them. This is an example of how liberal humanistic philosophy can sometimes be 
deceiving by suggesting abstract notions based on pure human agency that are at best 
confusing when applied to the real world.  
Attending to the above concerns, some researchers have acknowledged the 
complexity of professional identity formation processes (Fraser & Greenhalgh, 2001; 
Plsek & Greenhalgh; 2001). Fraser and Greenhalgh (2001), for example, encourage 
medical education to focus on helping students become more capable than competent. 
They define competence as “what people know or are able to do in terms of knowledge, 
skills and attitude”, and capability as the “extent to which individuals can adapt to 
change, generalize new knowledge and continue to improve their performance” (p. 799). 
Moreover, some researchers have tried to come up with new interpretations of medical 
professionalism by using inductive approaches (Wagner et al., 2007; Jha et al., 2006; 
Kearney, 2005; Hasman et al., 2006). Although many in medical education research 
continue to yearn for a standard and universal definition of professionalism that can be 
applied to all medical professional contexts, I would like to question the very possibility 
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of any such definitions. Developing careful, accurate, local definitions and strategies 
might end up being a more realistic alternative to look for. 
As a consequence of somewhat vague but popular definitions of medical 
professionalism, many medical students and physicians seem to be confused when it 
comes to translating principles of professionalism into their day-to-day practice. For 
example, several studies focusing on medical students’ professional identity formation 
found that their study participants expressed high levels of agreement with all principles 
of professionalism as presented to them, whereas, their actual professional behavior 
failed to comply with those same principles (Blue et al., 2009; Blackall et al., 2007; Tsai 
et al., 2007). These findings are in line with another study’s results reporting 50% of the 
3504 doctors who took a survey about medical professionalism did not comply with the 
principle of self-regulation which makes the basis of phronesis (Campbell et al., 2007). 
Such findings demonstrate the complexity of medical students’ identification processes 
that are largely impacted not only by the individual students’ pre-existing primary and 
secondary identities, but also by a range of institutional, interpersonal, and environmental 
factors in the context of medical education (Monrouxe, 2010). I am placing the problem 
of unsuccessful professional identity formation at the level of undergraduate medical 
training, as that is the time when doctors begin to develop their medical professional 
identity. Further, in this study the definition of medical professional identity largely 
overlaps with that of medical professionalism–as both of these concepts refer to the same 
thing, which is acting as medical professionals.  
Before moving on to the next section, I would like to point out that all of the 
discussion on identity formation provided in this section is based on the conventional 
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modernist frame, not a Foucauldian frame. This explanation is essentially different than 
the way Foucault conceptualizes identity and identity formation. For Foucault, the 
dominant discourses are largely constructing what identity can be. This is especially 
relevant to the discussion of how one could make sense of one’s identity in one of the 
four ways proposed by Roccas and Brewer (2002), discussed earlier in this section. 
Although I have used the example of myself to illustrate the difference among the four 
models in that discussion, none of those are actually how I would make sense of my 
identity in real life as well as in relation to the present study. Given my work with 
Foucault, I do not make sense of my identity in those conventional or modernist ways, 
nor do I think medical students involved in discursive formation of modern medicine are 
able to make sense of their identities in those ways. My position in relation to identity 
formation process is that of Foucault’s, which I now turn to discuss in the next section.  
How Discourses Induce Identity Formation 
According to Foucault, discourses entail, impose and demand a particular kind of 
identity for all those who are subjected to them (Butler, 2002). It is well-known that being 
in a sports team or military requires one to act and behave in particular ways (e.g., wear 
uniform, act and speak about particular things in a particular way) in order to “fit in’. 
However, Foucault goes one step further by arguing that “we do not just play roles in 
such cases, but our very identity, the notion we have of ourselves, is at issue when we are 
affected by discourses of power” (Butler, 2002, p. 50). What we call “self’, then, is the 
sum total of one’s positions with regards to the discourses one has been exposed to. 
Humans are social beings; and there is practically no one in the world who is not being 
affected by social discourses since nobody lives in a vacuum. We form our individual and 
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social identities through social discourses. From religion and race to biomedical science, 
fashion, and advertisement–all discourses put us in our place that we occupy as 
individuals in the society (Butler, 2002). It is important to recognize the formative powers 
of discourse to understand how deeply discourses function on the psyche of individuals 
as well as societies. Discourses are not simply certain ways of thinking and acting. 
Foucault argues that discourses bring both our sense of reality and our notion of our own 
identity into being (Foucault, 1981). Discourse is the ontological condition of language 
and as such nothing we ever say, write or think happens outside the discourse. To 
understand this better let us zoom in to the unique interplay between subjects and objects 
of discourse in accordance with the discourse theory.  
The subject of a discourse is anyone who is affected (or subjected) by that 
discourse (Butler, 2002). The fact that we are constituted in a broad range of subjected 
positions makes each of our identities a unique combination of racial, ethnic, regional, 
generational, sexual, class and gender positions. Discourse theory refuses to account for 
the possibility of the individual subject not getting shaped by social discourses. An 
individual, according to the discourse theory, is: “not a unity, not autonomous, but a 
process, perpetually in construction, perpetually contradictory, perpetually open to 
change” (Belsey, 1980, cited in Butler, 2002, p. 53). Foucault’s analysis of relations 
between power and discourse has led to a distinctive view of the nature of the self. This 
remains a challenge to the individualist rationalism that emphasizes on personal 
autonomy, as described by many humanist liberals. In discourse theory the self is 
preferably referred to as the subject. Foucault sees the individual as an effect and a 
product of discourse. Thus, a subject is one who is “subjected’, “controlled” or 
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“constituted” by discourses that predominate in the society one inhabits, whether one 
knows it or not (Butler, 2002). In Foucault’s words, we need 
to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, 
that’s to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution 
of the subject within a historical framework… that is a form of history 
which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains 
of objects, etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is 
either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty 
sameness throughout the course of history (Foucault, 1980, p. 117). 
 
Discourse theory suggests that people are not directly faced with the material reality of 
the world. Rather, we have access to reality only through discourses and discursive 
frameworks. Discourses are our mental filters passing through which material objects and 
events become meaningful to us. Therefore, every object in the world is constituted as an 
object of discourse; furthermore, it cannot constitute itself as an object outside the 
discursive formations (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). As Mills (2004) puts it, “what we 
perceive to be significant and how we interpret objects and events and set them within 
systems of meaning is dependent on discursive structures” (p. 46). In short, according to 
a discourse theoretical view nothing lies outside the discourse and discourses are 
“practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972, 
p.49). Being characterized as such, discourses are productive of themselves, and 
productive of the individuals who adopt them (Mills, 2004).  
Whereas philosophy does not support the claim of representation being possible 
without a consciousness to relay it, Foucault believes human sciences are able to prove 
this notion as possible. He believes “meanings (signs), functions, and conflicts can all be 
represented without appearing to consciousness, merely through their organization by 
norms, rules, or systematic principles” (Gutting, 1989, p. 212). For example, human 
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sciences can investigate the function of social practices, individual psychological 
conflicts and meaning of the myths, all without appealing to the awareness of society, 
individual, or culture in question. In Gutting’s words,  
through unconscious functions, conflicts, and meanings, the human 
sciences are, according to Foucault, able to develop an account of how 
man represents (though not consciously) the fundamental realities of life, 
labor, and language (Gutting, 1989, p. 212).  
Hence, the very forces of life, labor, and language that work as determinants of man as an 
empirical object, in Foucault’s view, can provide a coherent representation of man as a 
representing subject–when seen from human sciences’ perspective. Therefore, Foucault 
concludes that human sciences have succeeded where philosophy failed in “constituting 
man as a coherent object of his own thought” (Gutting, 1989, p. 213). 
To summarize, we are subject to and the object of discourses at the same time. We 
say the things we say, think and act the way we do as a function of our subjectivity and 
objectivity in relation to certain discourses. Simply put, discourses structure our very 
sense of the reality (Mills, 2004). It is important to recognize the extent to which one can 
think and act within certain parameters of the discourses at a certain historical 
conjuncture (Foucault, 1977a; Mills, 2004). Foucault argues that “discourse causes a 
narrowing of one’s field of vision” (Mills, 2004, p. 46). When we are under the spell of a 
certain discourse, we tend to exclude a wide range of concepts as untrue, unworthy of our 
attention, or simply as non-existent (Foucault, 1977a). In other words, for us to consider a 
phenomenon as true, worthy of our attention and real, that phenomenon needs to be 
embedded within the parameters of a discursive formation that we have adopted. 
Ironically, this active process of selection and rejection happens at the subconscious level 
without us being aware of the extent to which we are being loyal to a certain discourse.  
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Let us now try to connect all this to our initial concerns regarding the relationship 
between discourse and medical students’ professional identity formation. The short 
answer to this problem provided by the discourse theory is that: modern discourse of 
medicine circulating in the context of medical schools as well as clinical settings not only 
constitutes student identities but also structures their sense of reality, narrowing it down 
for them to see and appreciate only things that fit within certain discursive limits. Hence 
the need for medical education research to identify the structural elements, conditions, 
and relations which define the limits of modern medical discourse. In other words, to 
understand the process of medical students’ professional identification, which 
undoubtedly determines their future professional practice, we need to dissect their 
medical language and behavior. Particular attention should be paid to the interactional 
settings where linguistic rituals are played out. Archaeological examination of the 
linguistic rituals and behaviors in medical education, such as the one carried out in the 
present study, can reveal specific discursive elements that define students’ ways of 
thinking, speaking and acting like a doctor (Monrouxe, 2010). 
What is Discourse Analysis? 
Various forms of discourse analysis have been used in many disciplines including 
linguistics, psychology, education, information technology, sociology, health, 
management and administration, and communication (Grbich, 2013). There are different 
ways to approach discourse analysis such as: k. Some sources have subsumed the 
Foucauldian discourse analysis as a critical analytical approach (Hodges et al., 2008), 
whereas others (Grbich, 2013) see Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA) to be different 
than critical discourse analysis (CDA). The most important difference between critical 
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discourse analysis and Foucauldian discourse analysis is that the former is critical theory-
oriented, whereas the latter is not. Regardless of the varying approaches, a discourse 
analysis in its most general form is rooted in the study and analysis of social uses of 
language. For example, discourse analysis can be employed to analyze texts (writings or 
conversations or even events as “texts”) in order to find similarities across a range of 
texts. Common data sources for a discourse analysis include transcripts from interviews, 
focus groups, fieldnotes, samples of conversations (audio or video), preexisting 
documents, videos, observations (what is seen in the observation is considered a text) and 
online material. In critically informed discourse analysis, such texts are looked upon as 
the products of a particular set of power relations. The latter type of analysis not only 
examines the texts but also “the ways in which the very existence of specific institutions 
and of roles for individuals to play are made possible by ways of thinking and speaking” 
(Hodges et al., 2008, p. 2). 
Discourse analysis has become common practice in medical education research, 
especially in the last three decades. Interestingly, it was embraced by the nursing 
education discipline long before medical education. To investigate the extent to which 
researchers in health professions education (including medicine, physician assistant, 
nursing, physical therapy, occupational therapy, etc.) education have used discourse 
analysis, Hodges (2017) conducted a quick inspection of the existing literature by 
entering the keywords “discourse analysis” + “education” in PubMed. The results 
brought up numbers of published papers as three in the 1970s, seven in the 1980s, 84 in 
the 1990s, 239 in the 2000s, and 393 from 2001 to 2016. These results proposed that 
there will be more than 750 publications involving some form of discourse analysis in 
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health sciences education available by the end of the decade. Hodges concluded based on 
the above results that health professions education “has gone from having absolutely no 
interest in discourse analysis to demonstrating an exponential rise in its use” (p. 235). 
Hodges ascribes the rise in use of discourse analysis partly to the effects of a new group 
of social scientists (e.g., sociologists, anthropologists, linguists, etc.) getting involved in 
medical and other health professions education research lately (Hodges, 2017).  
More specifically, discourse analysis has been adopted in medical education 
research to address various educational and clinical topics. For example, Stone (1997) 
studied various discourses found in the education literature for diabetic patients–i.e., 
“patient self-care” and “autonomy”–versus the discourses found in medical literature in 
general–i.e., “compliance” and “adherence”. Shaw and colleagues (2005) performed a 
discourse analysis of the many ways in which the research itself can be defined (e.g., by 
lay people, by a medical editor, by hospital, etc.) showing how each of those definitions 
are linked to power relations and specific objectives of the institutions. In another study, 
Speed (2006) employed a critical discourse analysis to investigate how different 
discourses about modern mental health services construct individuals’ identities as 
“patients”, “consumers” and “survivors”; and how those discourses were supported by 
specific institutional practices. More recently, researchers in medical education have been 
using discourse analysis to study topics such as interprofessional education (Haddara & 
Lingard, 2013; Wong et al., 2016), validity (St Onge et al., 2016), international education 
(Ho, et al., 2015), professional behavior (Monrouxe et al., 2011), emotion (McNaughton, 
2013), caring (MacLeod, 2011) and even the entire corpus of the journal of Medical 
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Education (Rangel et al., 2016)3. Let us now focus on the Foucauldian discourse analysis. 
First, I will describe the structure of a discursive formation and explain how it relates to 
discourse and to archaeology as developed by Foucault.  
What is a Discursive Formation?  
A discursive formation is a vehicle for discourse. In other words, it is the system 
of formation according to which all statements in a particular discourse are organized. 
According to the discourse theory, a group of statements is considered a discourse so long 
as they belong to a particular system of formation, which is also called a discursive 
formation. Discursive formation constitutes the law of discourse. Knowledge produced 
by the analysis of a discursive formation is a rather unique type of knowledge. Take 
medicine, for example. Contemporary medical discourse gives rise to a discursive 
formation which this study aims to analyze. The discursive formation of medicine 
comprises much more than merely scientific medical knowledge. An analysis of this 
discursive formation, then, attempts to define the elements in modern medicine that have 
become objects of enunciation, the forms of enunciation in medical discourse, the 
concepts that are employed in these enunciations, and the theoretical choices that are 
made in them (Foucault, 1972, p. 194). Therefore, describing the discursive formation of 
modern medicine, which is the central objective of the present study, would reveal a body 
of knowledge that is regularly formed by the discursive practice of contemporary 
medicine. 
                                               
3 The studies mentioned here are based on the structuralist frames of formal linguistic discourse 
analysis, empirical discourse analysis, and critical discourse analysis, which are very different from a 
Foucauldian discourse analysis that is the focus of the present study. To the best of my knowledge, a robust 
Foucauldian analysis of discourse has not been yet published in medical education research. 
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A discursive formation not only demarcates the discursive elements (i.e., objects, 
modalities of enunciation, concepts, and theories) that regularly emerge in a discourse, it 
also describes the relations between these elements. In the analysis of discursive 
formation (also known as archaeology), one looks to find patterns that emerge within 
these relations–also known as regularities. Regularities may appear in various forms such 
as: in the order between the elements, in their correlations with each other, and in each 
element’s position, function, or transformation (Foucault, 1972). A discursive formation 
is also subject to the rules of formation for each of its elements. These rules (and the 
relations among them) constitute the conditions of existence for their respective elements. 
Webb, 2013, p. 60). Ironically, the laws governing discursive events (rules of formation 
for discursive elements) are formed within the discourse to which they apply, and 
therefore, they are not preconditions for the discursive elements to emerge (Webb, 2013, 
p. 84). The rules of formation can never reach their “terminal stages” as they are 
constantly getting modified or transformed (Foucault, 1972). Being governed by a fixed 
number of specific laws, a discursive formation signifies only “a limited system of 
presence”, and as such, it does not represent a totality. In Foucault’s words, discursive 
formation is rather “a distribution of gaps, voids, absences, limits, [and] divisions” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 119).  
In the remainder of this section I will elaborate on the nature of discursive 
formations and discuss how they are different from sciences and disciplines, and the 
specific type of knowledge that they produce. I will then turn to elaborate on the 
difference between discursive and nondiscursive practices, explain how they are linked 
together and why these links need to be established by the analysis of discursive 
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formations. Further details about the discursive elements, rules, relations and conditions 
will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
Discursive Formation is Neither a Science nor a Discipline 
This study aims to define the discursive formation of modern medicine as a social 
practice. It is essential to understand the nature of a discursive formation before 
attempting to analyze it. Discursive formations, as defined by Foucault, are neither 
sciences nor disciplines. For example, the discursive formation of medicine is neither the 
same as modern medical science nor medicine as the discipline. Let us first elaborate on 
how discursive formations are different from disciplines. Foucault defines disciplines as:   
Groups of statements that borrow their organization from scientific 
models, which tend to coherence and demonstrativity, which are accepted, 
institutionalized, transmitted, and sometimes taught as sciences (Foucault, 
1972, p. 178).  
 
For example, the discipline of medicine, for instance, borrows from sciences though it is 
not a scientific discipline in the strict sense of the term. At any rate, discursive formations 
do not coincide with “disciplines of any sort” regardless of their scientific status (e.g., 
scientific, pseudoscientific, or prescientific) (Gutting, 1989, p. 250). Foucauldian 
methodology for the analysis of discursive formations, which he calls archaeology, does 
not analyze disciplines (Foucault, 1972, p. 178). Instead, archaeology analyzes discursive 
formations, which goes well beyond the boundaries of any single discipline and has a 
unique structure of its own.  
Let’s take the example of psychiatry discipline versus the discourse of madness to 
illustrate the point made above. In Madness and Civilization [MC] (Foucault, 1988), 
Foucault studied the history of madness in the Classical Age (from the mid-seventeenth 
century to the end of the eighteenth century) by analyzing the discourse of madness. As 
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expected, the discursive formation of madness was widespread and beyond the 
boundaries of psychiatry discipline. That was because the Classical discourse on madness 
not only included the scientific/pseudo-scientific psychiatric elements of psychiatry as a 
discipline, it also contained every other statement related to madness that was found in 
the literature, philosophy, political and legal texts as well as in daily life. Furthermore, the 
discourse on madness had existed way before the discipline of psychiatry was even 
established in the nineteenth century. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for 
instance, despite the fact that there were no established disciplines related to madness yet, 
the discourse of madness existed as a perfectly describable system of formation with its 
own regularities, rules, and conditions (Foucault, 1972, p. 179). In sum, discursive 
formations are not the same as disciplines. They are more extensive than any single 
discipline in any specific period of time would be able to cover, encompassing many 
possibilities, like popular texts, that are not part of disciplines. Furthermore, discursive 
formations neither have the same contents and internal organization nor the same 
practical functions as disciplines (Foucault, 1972, p. 179). Thus, a discursive formation is 
not the same as a discipline; however, all disciplines emerge out of their respective 
discursive formations.   
Now that the distinction between “discursive formations” and “disciplines” is 
established, let us turn to discuss how discursive formations are different from sciences. 
To begin with, it is important to distinguish between a scientific domain and an 
archaeological territory. As discussed in the example of madness above, an 
archaeological territory (defining the limits a discursive formation) incorporates not only 
scientific statements but also statements found in the literature, philosophy, and even 
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daily life, so long as they are related to that particular discourse. Furthermore, it is 
important to understand the unique relationship that exists between discursive formation 
and science. According to Foucault,  
discursive practice does not coincide with the scientific development that 
it may give rise to; and the knowledge that it forms is neither an 
unfinished prototype nor the by-product to be found in daily life of a 
constituted science (Foucault, 1972, p. 184). 
 
In other words, a discursive formation is not a science, but it is a precondition for a 
science to emerge. That is, sciences emerge from the discursive formations, not the other 
way around. Though discursive formations give rise to sciences, they do not become 
sciences themselves no matter how much and for how long they develop. They are not 
some scientific prototypes on their way to become sciences. Rather, discursive formations 
are unique structures encompassing a lot more than their related science alone.  
Another interesting aspect of the relationship between discursive formation and 
science is signified by the fact that a single science can be formed by borrowing elements 
from several discursive formations at the same time. Let’s look at the example of 
“biology” here, which appeared as a science for the first time in the nineteenth century 
(Foucault, 2010). To constitute the new science of biology, elements were borrowed from 
various discursive formations at the time, such as the Natural History of the Classical 
Age, Analysis of Reflex Movements that was present in seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, theory of germs, and what was known about animal and vegetal growth to that 
date. All these elements were combined to make up the single science known as biology 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 180).  
It should be noted, however, that the fact that discursive formations are not the 
same as sciences does not mean they are exclusive of science as a structural component 
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as well. The example of discursive formation of medicine can demonstrate this point 
well. We know that clinical practice does not comply with the level of rigor that is 
expected from robust sciences such as chemistry and physics. Rather, it is comprised of 
an amorphous mass of “empirical observations, uncontrolled experiments and results, 
therapeutic prescriptions, and institutional regulations” (Foucault, 1972, p. 181). 
Nonetheless, clinical medicine is not exclusive of sciences either. Various sciences such 
as physiology, chemistry, microbiology, and anatomy are obvious parts of the clinical 
medical practice.   
A few questions that arise here are: if discursive formation is neither a discipline 
nor a science, what type of knowledge does archaeology produce by analyzing it and 
what is the significance of producing such knowledge anyway? What good can be 
expected of the elaborate apparatus of discursive elements (i.e., objects, enunciations, 
concepts, and theoretical choices), their relations and the rules governing them? To 
answer these questions, one needs to understand the two general forms of knowledge, 
namely, Savoir and connaissance. These two French terms are both translated as 
“knowledge” in English. To avoid unnecessary confusion, I will use the original French 
words when referring to them in this study. The good news is that an archaeological 
analysis of discursive formation does not merely create some heterogeneous items of 
knowledge that are piled up together. Rather, it begets the highly practical and functional 
type of knowledge that Foucault refers to as the savoir. Savoir refers to the “knowledge as 
the outcome of linguistic practices” that stands for a more general form of knowledge 
(Gutting, 1989, p. 256). It is the type of knowledge that is neither transcendental nor 
empirical. It does not signify “a lived experience, still implicated in the imagination or in 
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perception” (Foucault, 1972, p. 182). Furthermore, savoir is not the sum total of 
everything that is said in a discourse; it’s rather a set of rules and sites into which new 
statements can always be added.  
The savoir of clinical medicine, for instance, consists of various groups of 
statements such as those generated by observations, interrogations, decipherment, 
recording, and decisions made by physicians in the clinic (Foucault, 1972) as well as 
statements that are related to biomedical sciences. In Foucauldian archaeology, it is 
believed that knowledge (savoir) can be found not only in experience (e.g., empirical) but 
also in “fiction, reflection, narrative accounts, institutional regulations, and political 
decisions” (Foucault, 1972, pp. 183-184). In contrast to savoir, which is the knowledge of 
the discursive formations, a second form of knowledge is referred to as the connaissance. 
Connaissance denotes the knowledge of science and disciplines, such as, knowledge of 
nuclear physics, mathematics, geology, medical sciences, and so forth. As opposed to 
savoir, connaissance signifies the achievements of “individual or a group consciousness”, 
and therefore, is a “subject-centered enterprise” (Gutting, 1989, p. 256). Here is how 
Foucault explains his usage of the terms savoir and connaissance in the context of 
discursive formations: 
By connaissance I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the 
formal rules that govern it. [Whereas,] savoir refers to the conditions that 
are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to be 
given to connaissance and for this or that enunciation to be formulated 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 15). 
 
Thus, savoir precedes and enables connaissance. 
The central point to make here is that a discursive formation can exist with or 
without a science or a discipline; but no science or discipline can exist without a 
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discursive formation to give rise to it. In this sense, savoir constitutes the condition of 
possibility for disciplines and sciences (connaissance) to emerge (Scheurich & McKenzie, 
2005). In other words, “a discursive formation provides the pre-knowledge (savoir) 
necessary for the knowledge (connaissance) achieved by a science” (Gutting, 1989, p. 
263). Let us look at a couple examples here to illustrate the distinction between savoir 
and connaissance in practical terms. Going back to the example of madness in the 
Classical Age, the scientific knowledge of mental disease comprising the discipline of 
psychiatry was the connaissance, whereas the knowledge comprising the discourse of 
madness was the savoir. Likewise, the bioscientific knowledge of medicine represents the 
connaissance whereas the knowledge comprising the discourse of medicine in general is 
the savoir. In the same way a specific relation between connaissance (knowledge of 
science/discipline) and savoir (knowledge of discursive formation) can be found in any 
discourse. The goal of the present archaeological analysis is to depict the savoir of 
medicine as a discursive formation. Owing to its disciplinary/scientific and subject 
centeredness, connaissance is not the type of knowledge that archaeology tries to achieve.  
In this final part of the present section on discursive formations, I would like to 
define two important terms, archive and episteme, merely for the sake of completion. 
Foucault has named the complex that is composed of all discursive formations that exist 
in a given “society, culture, or civilization” the archive. As such, for a given society or 
culture the archive constitutes “the law of what can be said” (Foucault, 1972, p. 129). 
Without being a transhistorical condition on the history; the archive merely stands for the 
compendium of existing discourses at a particular point in time. Episteme, on the other 
hand, is the sum total of knowledge [savoir] that is produced by discursive formations of 
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a period. It is, thus, impossible for us to define the episteme of our own time as “it’s from 
within those rules that we are speaking” (Foucault, 1972, p. 130). 
To summarize, it is important to note that there are unique relations between the 
savoir and the connaissance related to a specific subject. The two different forms of 
knowledge are not exclusive of each other. As argued above, savoir can exist independent 
of the connaissance, but there can be no connaissance without a related savoir (Foucault, 
1972). A Foucauldian archaeological analysis must demonstrate how connaissance 
functions in the element of savoir. Thus, this study is tasked to outline the ways in which 
biomedical science functions in the discursive formation of medicine. Moving forward, 
let us now address the question of why would one need to know about the structure and 
knowledge of discursive formations at all. 
Why Do We Need to Know About Discursive Formations? 
Just to reiterate, studying and understanding discursive formations are important 
because they provide the basic knowledge (savoir) that is the precondition of any 
formal/scientific knowledge (connaissance). As was discussed in the previous subsection, 
discourse is the ontological condition of thought, knowledge, and language in a specific 
culture such as that of medicine. It provides the grounds of possibility for the science and 
disciplines to grow. Take discursive formation of medicine as an example, which 
constitutes the basic framework on which emerges the possibility of certain ways of 
thinking, speaking, and acting. In other words, elements of medical discourse affect 
medical science, what medicine is about, and how it is taught, learned, and practiced - all 
of which define medical professionalism. Discursive formation of medicine provides the 
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forming elements of medicine as a subject to teach and a profession to practice, and as 
such, it cannot be ignored by medical education research.   
What is the Difference between Discursive and Nondiscursive Practice? 
In this section, I specify what is meant by the term “nondiscursive’ and how it 
compares to discursive practices. We will also see how discursive and nondiscursive 
practices are linked together in real life and why it is important to distinguish between 
them. First of all, let us clarify some common terms that are often used in relation to 
nondiscursive domains. Nondiscursive domains are inclusive of nondiscursive structures 
where nondiscursive practices are carried out. An example of nondiscursive domains 
related to medicine are the “institutions” that include medical schools and hospitals. 
Nondiscursive structures within medical schools and hospitals include rules and 
regulations regarding doctors, patients, supplies and so on; whereas nondiscursive 
practices include all bureaucratic administrative work. A discursive practice is always 
housed within a nondiscursive structure and, as such, surrounded by nondiscursive 
practices. Nondiscursive domains include institutions, political events, as well as 
economic practices and processes in a particular period of time. The connection between 
discursive and nondiscursive then is inevitable to the point that the nondiscursive may 
form part of the discourse itself. While archaeology focuses on discursive formations, it is 
also, to some extent, concerned with connections between discursive and nondiscursive 
practices (Gutting, 1989, p. 256). In other words, 
archaeology is concerned not just with a given discourse in its strict sense, 
but also with ‘a set of events, practices, and political decisions, a sequence 
of economic processes that also include demographic fluctuations’ and 
many other ‘nondiscursive’ elements that feed into discourse in its wider 




It is not until Discipline and Punish (1977b) in Foucault’s own work that he begins 
directly addressing interrelations between discursive and nondiscursive structures. In his 
three preliminary archaeological studies, namely, MC (Foucault, 1988), BC (Foucault, 
1975), and OT (2010), Foucault does not seem to be comfortable dealing with the issue 
of nondiscursive domain and establishing archeological links (that are different from 
causal links) between discursive and nondiscursive practices. In BC, he provides an 
epistemological analysis of clinical medicine without challenging the scientific status of 
medical knowledge itself. Furthermore, the one discursive element he focuses on is the 
concepts–and so there is not much discussion about the objects, modes of enunciation, 
and strategies related to the discourse of clinical medicine in the seventeenth century. 
Thus, Foucault refrains from discussing connections between clinical medicine and 
nondiscursive structures (e.g., institutions such as medical school and hospital) in the 
Classical Age. In The Order of Things (Foucault, 2010) too, Foucault is attending 
exclusively to the internal analysis of discourse. Although Foucault’s early archaeologies 
were not comfortable discussing the place of nondiscursive practice in relation to 
discourse, according to the methodological reflections he provides in AK (Foucault, 
1972) considering the interrelations of discursive with the nondiscursive practice is an 
essential part of the archaeological analysis (Gutting, 1989, p. 138) and so it will be 
carried out–to the extent possible–by the present study4.   
                                               
4 Foucault does not elaborate on the nature of the difference between discursive and nondiscursive 
practices in AK (or his other archaeologies prior to the AK). The main sources consulted in this study, 
including Gutting (1989) and Webb (2013), are not clear about the nature of this difference either. Foucault 
begins to take the nondiscursive domains seriously only in Discipline and Punish (1977b), as he begins to 
get engaged with the interrelations of knowledge and power, and his methodology changes from 
archaeology to genealogy then.  
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My position in the present study is that the nondiscursive structures are part of the 
life of a discourse and thus they cannot be ignored. Take clinical medicine for example. 
The discourse of modern medicine has been contemporary with a number of political 
events, economic phenomena, and institutional changes ever since its birth at the end of 
the eighteenth century. As a result of this coexistence, there are certain links between the 
way medicine is taught and the political nondiscursive events of the time. Likewise, the 
way medicine is practiced in a society is also linked with the economic spirit of that 
specific time period in which it exists. The question is not whether such exist; it is rather 
how one might explain these links at a level that is proper to the analysis of discursive 
formations. Let us take a quick look at two analytical approaches that Foucault mentions 
in AK: 1) symbolic analysis, and 2) causal analysis (Foucault, 1972). These analytical 
approaches are often used by scholars to explain the links between discursive and 
nondiscursive domains.  
If I were to use symbolic analysis in this study, it would have required me to 
assume that modern medicine and contemporary political and economic events all share a 
common meaning. That is due to symbolic analysis seeing discursive and nondiscursive 
events as symbolizing and reflecting each other, like two mirrors “whose meanings are 
caught up in an endless play of reflection” (Gutting, 1989, p. 256). In the present study, 
this would have led to the supposition that administration of medicine corresponds to the 
political and economic phenomena of the contemporary society in order to both reflect 
them and be reflected in them (Foucault, 1972). On the other hand, employing a causal 
analysis in this study would have led me to find out to what extent nondiscursive domain 
(e.g., political and economic phenomena) can determine the consciousness of physicians, 
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“the horizon and direction of their interest, their system of values, their way of perceiving 
things, [and] the style of their rationality”. (Foucault, 1972). 
Neither of the above analytical methods function at a level that is proper to the 
Foucauldian account of discourse. Thus, this study is employing archaeological method 
of analysis to partially explain the links between discursive and nondiscursive domains as 
they relate to modern medical discourse. In contrast to both symbolic and causal 
analyses, archaeology does not assume that the power of empirical events alone can 
determine the “structure and development of thought” in people (Webb, 2013, p. 135) 
Rather, archaeology suggests that relations between medical discourse and its related 
nondiscursive practices are more complex than a mere cause and effect process pointing 
to either direction (Webb, 2013). In Foucault’s words, archaeology 
wishes to show not how political practice has determined the meaning and 
form of ... discourse, but how and in what form it takes part in its 
conditions of emergence, insertion, and functioning (Foucault, 1972, p.  
163). 
 
In archaeology, one neither treats the discursive and nondiscursive domains as “great 
cultural continuities” nor does one seek to establish a casual mechanism between them 
(Gutting, 1989, p. 138). Rather, one tries to determine the link between rules of formation 
of discursive elements and their related nondiscursive systems. Furthermore, one looks to 
reveal specific forms that such relations may take within a discourse. One does not allege 
that economic and political motives are running the show behind the framework of 
modern medicine. It is important to acknowledge that nondiscursive practices, such as the 
business-based model of administering medical services, do not bring about the modern 
medical discourse; they are merely part of it. Archaeology sees discursive and 
nondiscursive domains as inextricably bound to each other, while the relations between 
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them are considered to play a significant role in formation of discursive regularities 
(Foucault, 1972). Not to forget, in every discourse, there is a point at which the 
nondiscursive becomes discursive itself by becoming part of the discourse.    
The relations among science, ideology, and discursive formations are also 
important to be considered. In Foucauldian archaeology one does not assume that 
ideology belongs to a sort of middle ground between scientific and nonscientific (Webb, 
2013, p. 146). Rather, Foucault deems ideology as a natural companion of science. It is 
ironic that both science and ideology (e.g., political, religious thought) as nondiscursive 
practices can arise from the same discursive formation. Therefore, serious similarities as 
well as significant practical connections between science and political, economic, and 
religious ideologies of an era are inevitable. In summary, there are certain links between 
concurrent discursive and nondiscursive systems in every society. These relations are 
more complex than a causal or symbolic analysis could explain. In this study, it is 
important for us to understand how discursive practice of modern medicine is linked to 
contemporary nondiscursive practices such as political and economic phenomena as well 
as the ideologies of our time. Describing these relations is a significant part of 
archaeological analysis of modern medical discourse. In the next section, I will attempt to 
explain archaeology in some detail in order to denote its basic principles as they relate to 
the present study. For a full discussion of archaeological methodology see AK (Foucault, 
1972). 
What is Archaeology?  
We know that the term discourse has been used in so many different ways by 
different theorists and authors. A Foucauldian account of discourse describes the term in a 
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completely different sense compared to other theorists, however. Naturally, Foucault’s 
unique treatment of discourse required a unique methodology too for analyzing it. He 
became occupied with developing his new methodology for a good part of his scholarly 
life (1960 to 1972). This new methodology was named archaeology “in virtue of its need 
to discover structures beneath the surfaces open to ordinary historical scrutiny” (Gutting, 
1989, p. 102). Foucault wrote three consecutive books, namely, Madness and Civilization 
(1988), The Birth of Clinic (1975) and The Order of Things (2010), signifying his initial 
attempts in characterizing this new methodology. It is only in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge (1972), however, that Foucault provides a detailed account of archaeology as 
a full-scale methodology for the analysis of discourse. He finally commits himself to 
lavishly defining the “enterprise” of which he says his earlier books were “very imperfect 
sketches” and “attempts that were carried out, to some extent, in the dark” (Foucault, 
1972, pp. 15, 16).  
AK (Foucault, 1972) introduces methodological signposts that are no doubt 
crucial for the notion of discourse as well as its analysis (Gutting, 1989, p. 102). 
Archaeology describes the occurrence of discourse. What archaeology articulates as a 
result is the discursive formation for a particular discourse. Archaeological analysis of 
discourse is important because people do not experience a discourse as a whole (Webb, 
2013, p. 115). They only see bits and pieces of it depending on their own positionality as 
one string in the fabric of discourse. Archaeology puts the pieces together to illustrate a 
map of discourse, which is called a discursive formation. Further, archaeology is a 
methodological technique that works with both texts (e.g., written, spoken, or observation 
data) and practices. It is designed to be capable of functioning at a level that is “other and 
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more fundamental than those of ordinary hermeneutics, which seeks the meaning of 
individual utterances and actions” (Gutting, 1989, p. 102). Archaeology also “has a 
certain openness and revisability built into it.” (Webb, 2013, p. 46). As Foucault puts it,  
the horizon of archaeology, therefore, is not a science, a rationality, a 
mentality, a culture; it is a tangle of interpositivities whose limits and 
points of intersection cannot be fixed in a single operation (Foucault, 
1972, p. 159). 
 
Archaeology sees discourse as a historically constructed process that is open to inspection 
(Webb, 2013, p. 128). On the other hand, archaeology is not independent of the events 
and processes that it investigates. An archaeological analysis establishes rules that 
emerge from the data itself, and conditions that do not precede their conditioned events. 
Thus, it counts as a methodology that is both dependent and “responsive to the domain in 
which it is applied” (Webb, 2013, p. 134).  
Archaeological scrutiny begins with suspension of the unquestioned unities in a 
discourse. This is considered a necessary step for letting go of the “careless assumptions 
of other forms of analysis” (Webb, 2013, p. 128). Examples of unities needing to be 
suspended in medical discourse include “medical professionalism” and “medicine’, as 
these are unities that do not have well-defined boundaries. As Foucault explains,  
we set out with an observation: with the unity of a discourse like that of 
clinical medicine … we are dealing with a dispersion of elements. This 
dispersion itself - with its gaps, its discontinuities, its entanglements, its 
incompatibilities, its replacements, and its substitutions - can be described 
in its uniqueness if one is able to determine the specific rules in 
accordance with which its objects, statements, concepts, and theoretical 
options have been formed: if there really is a unity, it does not lie in the 
visible, horizontal coherence of the elements formed; it resides, well 
anterior to their formation, in the system that makes possible and governs 




In the remainder of the discussion above, Foucault makes an effort to clarify that 
synthetic unities are not suspended with the intention to banish them “as if they were 
illegitimate illusions whose removal would clear a path to the truth” (Webb, 2013, p. 53). 
Rather, archaeology is interested in “how they came to be there, by what means they are 
sustained in existence, and with what effects” (Webb, 2013, p. 53). At any rate, for 
archaeology to be able to reveal the facts of discourse, it is essential to look at a set of 
events and their relations in their “non-synthetic purity” (Foucault, 1972, p. 26).  
Suspending synthetic unities is a rewarding enterprise because as soon as one 
suspends them, there emerges an entirely new field of possibilities where it becomes 
possible to think again (Foucault, 2010). Archaeology can then begin to establish 
discursive elements (i.e., objects, modalities of enunciation, concepts, and theoretical 
choices) and the rules of formation for each of the four elements. Next, “archaeology 
follows suit in recognizing that the rules which govern a discourse, and the changes that 
shape it, are formed within the discourse itself.” (Webb, 2013, p. 132). Lastly, 
archaeology attempts to highlight relations between discursive and nondiscursive 
practices. According to Foucault, nondiscursive practices include elements such as “an 
institutional field, a set of events, practices, and political decisions, a sequence of 
economic processes that also involve demographic fluctuations, techniques of public 
assistance, manpower needs, different levels of unemployment, etc.” (Foucault, 1972, p. 
157). Further details on how archaeological analysis is carried out as a step-by-step 
procedure is provided in Chapter 3. In the next section, I turn to discuss the chief 
principles of archaeology as a Foucauldian research methodology. 
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Chief Principles of Archaeology 
Foucauldian archaeological studies adhere to the following seven principles:  
1. suspension of transcendence 
2. locality and relativity 
3. having no claims on causality 
4. decentralization of subject 
5. treating language as a factual event 
6. temporal pluralism 
7. acknowledging discontinuity 
The remainder of this section containing description of each principle is based on 
Foucault’s discussions on archaeological methodology in his various archaeological 
studies (Foucault, 1988, 1975, 2010, 1972). These principles are interwoven with one 
another to the point that, more often than not, each one references the other(s) upon 
further scrutiny. Dividing them up into seven sections below is a compromise with the 
twofold aim of highlighting each point as well as putting them into a more graspable 
form. 
Suspension of Transcendence: A Different Sense of History.  In archaeology, 
one does not merely trace the continuity of a concept through time in order to determine 
its history. Moreover, the commonsensically familiar assumption that all concepts have a 
certain point of origin - where they were first born in their pure form - and have 
continuously progressed ever since needs to be suspended. In Foucault’s words,  
the history of a concept is not wholly and entirely that of its progressive 
refinement, its continuously increasing rationality, its abstraction gradient, 
but that of its various fields of constitution and validity, that of its 
72 
 
successive rules of use, that of the many theoretical contexts in which it 
developed and matured (Foucault, 1972, p. 4) 
 
Thus, a different sense of history is required in archaeology; one that not only believes in 
historicity of concepts but also looks beneath solid continuities and searches for 
interruptions. Archaeology proposes to “move from a linear to a tabular model of history” 
(Webb, 2013, p. 45), which is, at the same time, a move from “total history” to a rather 
“general history”. A total history organizes its observed phenomena around a single 
center (e.g., scientific progress, elaboration of maturity, advancement of mankind), 
whereas a general history embraces multiplicity and complications, following its 
observed phenomena through “the space of a dispersion” (Foucault, 1972, p. 10). 
Developing a sense for the latter type of history is only possible by  
suspending the continuous assimilation of knowledge, interrupt its slow 
development, and force it to enter a new time, cut it off from its empirical 
origin and its original motivations, cleanse it of its imaginary complicities; 
they direct historical analysis away from the search for silent beginnings, 
and the never-ending tracing-back to the original precursors, towards the 
search for a new type of rationality and its various effects (Foucault, 1972, 
p. 4). 
 
Though archaeology suspends all types of transcendental conditions in discourse, it does 
not imply that analysis of discursive formations needs to be empirical either (Webb, 2013, 
p. 110). The word transcendental refers to transcendental idealism of Kant (see Stang, 
2016, for more). In a few words, transcendental refers to the objects or practices that are 
beyond the ordinary and everyday experiences; things that are spiritual, otherworldly, 
pure, and beyond the physical realm. Thus, the discursive practice lies neither at “some 
deep, original level” of transcendence nor “at the level of lived experience” of empiricism 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 191). It is important to understand that rules that relate the elements 
of archaeology and govern discourse emerge from within the discourse itself. They do not 
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have transcendental connections and therefore do not and cannot seek to produce ideality 
(attaining a quality that is characterized by ideals such as purity and perfection). 
On the other hand, discursive events should not be treated as lived experiences of 
the subject who enunciates them either. In Webb’s words,  
discourse, then, is not the signification of what is, and its rules of 
formation do not follow the outline of some deeper ontological truth. Yet 
neither is it grounded in the speaking subject. All aspects of discourse will 
instead be regarded as constructions, the rules of which are the outcome of 
a complex historical process that is not just found in discourse but is the 
very condition of discourse itself.” (Webb, 2013, p. 85) 
 
Furthermore, in archaeology one does not look for the precondition of ideality in lived 
experiences when collecting one’s data. To be precise, archaeology seeks to determine 
the precondition of discourse within the discursive events. As Webb puts it, “the axis that 
runs from consciousness through knowledge to science is thereby replaced by another 
which runs from discourse to knowledge to science.” (Webb, 2013, p. 144). The point I 
am trying to make here is that the novelty of an archaeological analysis lies in its effort to 
show that knowledge of the discursive formation is irreducible to either the 
transcendental or empirical knowledge (Webb, 2013, p. 154). Archaeology seeks to 
delimit discourses “in their specificity” and show how the rules governing them are 
“irreducible to any other” (Foucault, 1972, p. 139).  
Let us now turn to discuss how this chief principle relates to the present 
archaeological analysis of the modern medical discourse. The first and foremost 
implication of suspending transcendental conditions in the history of medicine is to 
accept the impossibility of the ideal and/or pure medical practice at any point along the 
trajectory of a human history. That is because, as we have seen, archaeology rejects the 
idea of continuity in discourse. Archaeology does not see medicine as a transcendental 
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unity which has travelled through time in a linear, continuous, and coherent manner and 
has reached our time as a perceptible totality. In other words, one does not assume that 
the discourse of medicine simply began at some point of historical origin, has 
progressively developed and refined its concepts and practices ever since, and therefore 
holds the potential to reach its stage of true fulfillment at some point in the future. Rather, 
medicine is seen as a local construction of discursive events caught up in relations with 
an accumulation of previous statements - all of which determine the existence of 
medicine as a discursive formation. In this view, medicine does not have a point of 
genesis in the history, it does not grow coherently and continuously, and therefore does 
not form a transcendental totality. As can be expected, archaeology also rejects any idea 
that implies medical discourse either began with - or has ever reached - its full potential 
at some point in the history. It’s not that medicine is deteriorating in its purity and ideality 
with time. The point to be noted is that, there is no ideal stage of fulfilment possible for a 
discourse. That is because discourse, as described by Foucault, is inseparably bound to 
the “reality it constructs” (Webb, 2013, p. 135) and the reality is never perfect. As Gutting 
affirms, there is no such thing as the “ideal form” of a discourse (e.g., ideal medicine) 
that can be compared to the real-life exemplification of it (e.g., modern medicine) 
(Gutting, 1989, p. 216). I repeat, a pure, ideal form of medicine has never existed nor it 
can ever exist in the future.  
Like any other discourse, medicine is believed to be a thing of this world and 
constructed by the people of this world. People and their actions are neither pure nor ideal 
because they always occur under specific worldly conditions that cannot be deemed as 
universally ideal. Medicine takes place under conditions defined by its time and place. 
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Moreover, being a social exercise, medical practice is executed by people who only work 
within the limits of their morality, personal judgments, and ideological assumptions. 
There has never existed a medical practice, nor a doctor, independent of the ideological 
and political conditions that are set by society in which they existed. Such conditions, 
therefore, are considered intrinsic regularities (or formative elements) of medical 
discourse and, as such, part of its discursive formation. Archaeology does not treat these 
conditions as externally imposed on an ideal body of medicine. In other words, they are 
not seen as external events disturbing the purity and ideality of medicine; rather, these 
conditions are deemed as formative elements of the medical discourse itself. To think that 
these societal conditions may “limit” or “restrict” medical discourse is to assume that 
there is a medical discourse that can exist separately from–or outside of–these conditions, 
which is against the archaeological principle denying transcendentality. Being an 
archaeological analysis, this study does not provide an account of medical discourse as a 
linear, chronological grouping of events. Rather, it analyzes medical discourse on the 
basis of its intrinsic regularities. Conditions making these intrinsic regularities possible 
are already blended in them and, as such, they are also analyzed as forming elements in 
the discursive formation of modern medicine.   
Locality and Relativity.  It is important to keep in mind that archaeological 
analysis does not deliver “exceptionless empirical generalizations” (Gutting, 1989, p. 
105). As Foucault puts it, “far from wishing to reveal general forms, archaeology tries to 
outline particular configurations” and as such, “archaeological comparison is always 
limited and regional” (Foucault, 1972, p. 157). Archaeological findings are local, 
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provisional and relative due to archaeological elements–and their relations–also being 
specific, relative and locally constructed. That is because,   
every discourse is local, in the sense that it constitutes a number of cases, 
statements and events within a neighborhood that is discursive but also 
historical. Some discourses stretch to include more than others, but none 
has any claim to universality (Webb, 2013, p. 139). 
 
Thus, rules established by archaeology are also local and specific to the discursive 
formation which it analyzes. Archaeology does not allow easy passages from particular to 
the general, and from local to the global (Webb, 2013, p. 133). As Webb puts it, “the 
pursuit of the unity of discursive forms does not translate into the pursuit of universal 
rules” (Webb, 2013, p. 77) in archaeological analysis.  
Furthermore, archaeological analysis is not abstract because it is born out of the 
particular discourse it analyzes. In this study, for example, my analysis does not account 
for complexity and diversity of attitudes toward medicine throughout the modern society. 
As a matter of fact archaeology is not alone in being locally constructed and relative 
among other analytical approaches. If there are ever any analyses that actually claim 
universality, their “usual, simple unifying schemata do not sustain detailed scrutiny of the 
historical record.” (Gutting, 1989, p. 105). Finally, it is important to understand that 
archaeological description is an undertaking that can never be “completed” or “wholly 
achieved” (Foucault, 1972, p. 131). It will always have room for revision and 
modifications. The reason for this is the fact that discourse, as Foucault describes it, is 
dynamic. Thus, discursive elements and relations between them are not fixed and static. 
Discursive regularities can never reach a stage of completion, calcification or termination 
because they are constantly changing and transforming, even “without appeal to an 
external cause” (Webb, 2013, p. 109). Consequently, discursive regularities (e.g., 
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elements, relations, rules and conditions) established by archaeological analysis are “only 
ever partial, provisional, and already, if imperceptibly, in transformation” (Webb, 2013, p. 
127).  
Having No Claims on Causality.  In a way, archaeological findings deliver a 
cross-sectional history of a certain concept at a certain point of time. However, it is very 
different from a standard history in the sense that archaeology does not explain political, 
social, and economic causes for the events of interest. Political, economic, and 
ideological phenomena are considered nondiscursive practices. While archaeology 
acknowledges the existence of links between discursive and nondiscursive structures, it 
has no claim on causality of any sort (Webb, 2013). This is not because the question of 
causality is considered to be “pointless or unanswerable”. Rather, it is because Foucault 
thinks a phenomenon such as discourse must be described at a sufficiently deep level 
before its causes can profitably be sought out (Gutting, 1989, p. 163). Otherwise, an 
“historical explanation that traces causal links between empirical events will inevitably 
be shallow and ill-conceived” and cannot help but overlook the “layers of complexity that 
contributed to the events it purports” (Webb, 2013, p. 79). Thus, archaeology does not 
reject the question of causality, it only puts it in brackets. Alternatively, an archaeological 
analysis such as one conducted in the present study aims to determine the conditions of 
possibility for intrinsic elements of the (medical) discourse itself. A more detailed 
discussion of these conditions will be provided in Chapter 3.   
Decentralization of Subject.  Typically, qualitative (and quantitative) research 
tends to explain the world on the basis of individual human thoughts, beliefs, intentions, 
motivations, and meaning-making processes. Archaeology, on the other hand, is not 
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concerned with the consciousness that underlies individual’s beliefs and intentions. Thus, 
it decentralizes the human subject from playing a pivotal role in discourse. For Foucault, 
the 
unquestioned acceptance of man as the ineluctable focus of philosophy is 
a new form of dogmatic slumber ("the anthropological sleep," 340). Our 
awakening from it requires the uprooting of anthropology through the 
elimination of man as a ruling category of our thought (Gutting, 1989, p. 
207). 
 
Decentralization of the subject in archaeology is an imminent but also promising act. 
Foucault sees it as a way for “exceeding a limit that defines the current possibilities of 
thinking” (Webb, 2013, p. 161). Hence, archaeology does not see the world through 
people’s beliefs and intentions. Once these are suspended, the “void left by man’s 
disappearance” becomes “the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to 
think” (Foucault, 2010, p. 342). Archaeology operates in that space.  
Thus, decentralization of the subject is necessary in archaeological analysis. If 
one looks closely, though discursive formations have their own defined aims and systems, 
it is not a decidedly conscious process that sets them up. It is not a consciousness (single 
or collective) that gives rise to a discourse. Rather, discursive events happen according to 
discursive laws that consist of their rules of formation and conditions of their possibility 
and existence. In Foucault’s words,  
enunciative domain refers neither to an individual subject, nor to some 
kind of collective consciousness, nor to a transcendental subjectivity; but 
that it is described as an anonymous field whose configuration defines the 
possible position of speaking subjects. Statements should no longer be 
situated in relation to a sovereign subjectivity, but recognize in the 
different forms of the speaking subjectivity effects proper to the 




Therefore, in archaeological analysis one does not see the world as expressions of some 
consciousness. One does not think in terms of a particular subject enunciating a 
statement. The statement is seen as a result of someone stepping into a position which 
already existed in the discourse. It is the discourse that creates and constitutes these 
positions, with the speakers completing the pattern for discursive regularities. In 
archaeology, then, one looks at the “various patterns into which they [statements] 
spontaneously fall or can be fitted”. (Webb, 2013, p. 43). As Foucault puts it, in 
archaeology, 
one would not need to pose the psychological problem of an act of 
consciousness, instead, one would analyze the formation and 
transformations of a body of knowledge (Foucault, 1972, p. 194). 
 
Hence, archaeological disregard for the psychological state of the speaker’s mind (e.g., 
feelings, intentions, and motivations) is justified based on the principle of 
decentralization of the subject in the discourse.  
Furthermore, given the long-existing philosophical tension between the status of 
man as an object in the world, and at the same time, as a subject constituting that world 
(Gutting, 1989, p. 212), archaeology proposes a move from the philosophy of the subject 
to the philosophy of the concept (Webb, 2013, p. 50). According to Webb, 
where connections are to be drawn, they should be between the works 
themselves and the ideas and patterns of thought that run through them; 
the connections need not pass through the subject as the ground of the true 
meaning of the work (2013, p. 51). 
 
Archaeology favors what has been deemed as the “death of man as the central figure” in 
constitution of knowledge in the modern time (Webb, 2013, p. 158). The goal, however, 
is not to exclude the subject from discourse. It is only to recognize that the subject is not 
playing the central role either as a transcendental or empirical consciousness (Foucault, 
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1972)). It is important to note that Foucauldian discourse is not simply language spoken 
by a subject. In Foucault’s words, 
discourse, at least as analyzed by archaeology, that is, at the level of its 
positivity, is not a consciousness that embodies its project in the external 
form of language; it is not a language, plus a subject to speak it. It is a 
practice that has its own forms of sequence and succession (Foucault, 
1972, p. 169). 
 
To conclude, in archaeology one believes that displacement of the role of subject in 
discourse not only makes new forms of inquiry possible, but also by modifying both 
position and function of the subject in relation to the discourse, it leads to what can be 
deemed as a somewhat radical freedom of thought (Webb, 2013, p. 153).  
Treating Language as a Factual Event.  In archaeology, the analyst is interested 
in the fact of the language and, as such, appreciates language in terms of construction, not 
disclosure (Webb, 2013, p. 33). Language is not seen as a representation of the mind of 
the subject who speaks it. Rather, it is assumed that statements occur as part of a 
discourse, and their 
occurrence is not linked with synthesizing operations of a purely 
psychological kind (the intention of the author, the form of his mind, the  
rigor of his thought, the themes that obsess him, the project that traverses 
his existence and gives it meaning) (Foucault, 1972, p. 28). 
 
Archaeology operates at a level that is fundamentally different from that of hermeneutics 
and the analyses of thought that include all forms of interpretive activity. In analyses of 
thought, the question is always what is being said in what is said, and therefore, 
one tries to rediscover beyond the statements themselves the intention of 
the speaking subject, his conscious activity, what he meant, or, again, the 
unconscious activity that took place, despite himself, in what he said or in 





Thus, the analyst tries to discover what animates the language from behind, to read the 
invisible words that run in between the sentences and, in short, to discern the meaning 
that is implied by the text.  
Archaeology, on the other hand, moves in the opposite direction. An archaeologist 
is not concerned with the question of “what is speaking through language”, rather, one is 
concerned with “what language itself says” (Webb, 2013, p. 99). Language, then, is seen 
as the surface of discourse with the acknowledgment that there are no hidden truths lying 
behind or beneath it (Webb, 2013, p. 99). Discourse is the same as its surface, and, 
therefore, archaeological analysis refuses to be “allegorical in relation to the discourse 
that it employs” (Foucault, 1972, p. 27). The important task in archaeological analysis is 
to look for “relations and regularities within what is said” (Webb, 2013, p. 108), and one 
needs to do so “without reference to a cogito” (Foucault, 1972, p. 122). As Foucault puts 
it: 
this task presupposes that the field of statements is not described as a 
‘translation’ of operations or processes that take place elsewhere (in men's 
thought, in their consciousness or unconscious, in the sphere of 
transcendental constitutions); but that it is accepted, in its empirical 
modesty, as the locus of particular events, regularities, relationships, 
modifications and systematic transformations; in short, that it is treated not 
as the result or trace of something else, but as a practical domain that is 
autonomous (although dependent), and which can be described at its own 
level (Foucault, 1972, pp. 121-122). 
 
Hence, in archaeology one does not look beyond language of the statement in an attempt 
to reveal what might be concealed or secretly implied by that language. Rather, 
statements themselves are what constitute the discourse. In Webb’s words, one sees 
discourse “as language in act, in itself, and not as something to be understood in terms of 
that which produced it (the subject), or which it produces (meaning)” (Webb, 2013, p. 
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99). This is probably the most distinguishing feature between Foucauldian archaeology 
and what is known as the “hermeneutics of suspicion” associated with analytical works of 
writers such as Marx, Nietzsche and Freud (Webb, 2013, p. 121).  
Archaeological treatment of language is not the same as the structuralist or 
formalist linguistic analysis either. That is because, first, Foucauldian discourse is more 
than language; and second, analysis of discursive formations takes more than the analysis 
of language alone. In Webb’s words, 
discourse carries out the ordering of word and thing and situates the 
subject in relation to what is said about them, and as such discourse cannot 
escape its function. Language apart from this ordering would not be 
discourse (Webb, 2013, p. 100). 
 
Moreover, Foucault, like Heidegger, sees discourse as the ontological condition of 
language, thus language is the site of construction of what actually is (Webb, 2013, p. 
99). It is the discourse that makes, unmakes, and remakes the worlds with nothing else 
lying behind or anterior to it. Just like Foucault, I  
would like to show that ‘discourses’, in the form in which they can be 
heard or read, are not, as one might expect, a mere intersection of things 
and words: an obscure web of things, and a manifest, visible, colored 
chain of words; I would like to show that discourse is not a slender surface 
of contact, or confrontation, between a reality and a language, the 
intrication of a lexicon and an experience; I would like to show with 
precise examples that in analyzing discourses themselves, one sees the 
loosening of the embrace, apparently so tight, of words and things, and the 
emergence of a group of rules proper to discursive practice (Foucault, 
1972, pp. 48-49). 
 
Although language is “a system for possible statements, a finite body of rules that 
authorizes an infinite number of performances”, discourse is not the same as language 
since the field of discourse consists of a group of events “that is always finite and limited 
at any moment” (Foucault, 1972, p. 27). In Foucault’s words,  
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the question posed by language analysis of some discursive fact or other is 
always: according to what rules has a particular statement been made, and 
consequently according to what rules could other similar statements be made? 
The description of the events of discourse poses a quite different question: 
how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another? (Foucault, 
1972, p. 27) 
Thus, there is a fundamental difference between the basic question that linguistic analysis 
and analysis of discursive formation pose as analytical fields. 
Temporal Pluralism: A Different Sense of Time. Time is not directly addressed 
in the analysis of discursive formations. In other words, archaeology does not group 
events together based on their location on a predetermined timeline (Webb, 2013, p. 140). 
Moreover, discursive events are not lined up “immediately below one another” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 171) following a chronological theme of succession or simultaneity. In 
archaeology,  
time is avoided, and with it the possibility of a historical description 
disappears. Discourse is snatched from the law of development and 
established in a discontinuous atemporality. It is immobilized in 
fragments: precarious splinters of eternity. But there is nothing one can do 
about it: several eternities succeeding one another, a play of fixed images 
disappearing in turn, do not constitute either movement, time, or history 
(Foucault, 1972, pp. 166-167). 
 
Instead of grouping events based on their linear temporality, archaeological analysis 
seeks to discover the “general rules that will be uniformly valid, in the same way, and at 
every point in time” (Foucault, 1972, p. 166). It is important to understand that what is 
suspended by archaeology is not the sense of time itself, but the use of a calendar to 
formulate temporal relations between events (Foucault, 1972, p. 167). Hence, discourse is 
not “timeless”, it’s only that “temporality of discourse is not derived from a general and 
all-encompassing structure [time] to which events must conform.” (Webb, 2013, p. 131). 
In archaeological analysis time is considered to be “a sporadic, local and ultimately 
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variable order established between the elements in question” (Webb, 2013, p. 142). In this 
sense, discursive formation is “not an atemporal form, but a schema of correspondence 
between several temporal series.” (Foucault, 1972, p. 74).  
Michal Serres (2011), who studied temporal pluralism as a central theme in 
several of his works, argues that we often confuse time with the measure of time, as 
though time only conformed to the single scale that we apply to it. For instance, two 
events that seem to be distant from each other might turn out to be close if time was 
measured according to a different scale. In archaeological analysis, how far or close 
discursive events are from one another depend on the pattern of regularity to which they 
belong (e.g., objects, concepts, relations between concepts and statements, etc.). 
Moreover, time as a unity is secured by the experiences of the subject, whereas, as we 
have already observed, the human subject does not play a central figure in the analysis of 
discursive formations. Therefore, “if discourse is not the expression of events in 
consciousness, then the time of discourse is not modelled on the time of consciousness” 
(Webb, 2013, p. 108). According to Webb, this “makes possible the reconfiguration of 
experience, and even the modification of its ontological conditions.” (Webb, 2013, p. 
153). One might object that regardless of our refusal to deal with it directly, time still 
operates as the transcendental condition for all discursive processes. However, Foucault 
rejects the very assumption of there being only a single form of time underlying all types 
of events. In archaeology, 
we must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its sudden 
irruption; in that punctuality in which it appears, and in that temporal 
dispersion that enables it to be repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, 
utterly erased, and hidden, far from all view, in the dust of books. 
Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but 




Thus, in discourse, one speaks of local discursive temporalities and recognizes time not 
as a liner continuity, but “as a pure multiplicity, as a patchwork or mosaic” (Serres, 1997, 
p. 116). For example, the modern discourse of medicine lives and exists only in the 
present; “a present that is fractured, complex, and about which we can know something, 
but not everything.” (Webb, 2013, p. 119).  
As argued above, in archaeology the flow of time is not linear; it is rather 
“complex, disordered and sometimes chaotic” (Webb, 2013, p. 110). Time can take 
different temporal forms “which may overlie one another and intersect, or just run 
parallel, and which together make up the temporal pluralism of discourse” (Webb, 2013, 
p. 131). As Webb puts it,  
time features in archaeology as an immanent property of a discourse, 
arising from the forms of relation by virtue of which it coheres internally, 
and by which it is linked to its own iterations, and ultimately to events at 
its borders and beyond. As such, archaeology is characterized by temporal 
pluralism (Webb, 2013, p. 123). 
 
In a discursive formation time does not precede the formation of its regularities. A good 
example of this can be seen in the relationship between discursive conditions and events 
that are conditioned by them. In Foucault’s account of discursive formation, “what is 
produced becomes in turn a condition, modifying, disturbing or even destroying the 
patterns of statements in which they occur” (Webb, 2013, p. 119). In this sense, 
conditions are formed, reformed, deformed, and unformed in a sort of cycle that feeds 
back to itself.  
The arguments made above do not mean archaeology is indifferent to the fact of 
succession (Foucault, 1972). What is rejected is rather the idea of succession as an 
absolute–suggesting there is only one form and one level of succession in the discourse. 
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As an alternative to the linear sense of succession, archaeological analysis can reveal 
various forms of succession superposing one another in a discourse. Archaeology also 
provides an alternative to the way in which successions are articulated (Foucault, 1972, p. 
169). While in the linear model of speech and writing, all events succeed one another 
without providing any information about coincidences and superpositions, in archaeology 
one must find a principle of articulation - other than chronology - to connect a series of 
discursive events. This principle is determined by regularities between elements in the 
discursive formation (Foucault, 1972, p. 169).  
For example, to explore the history of medicine in a linear way would be to 
follow the traditional history of ideas aiming to answer questions such as: where, when 
and how did medical practice first begin, how did it spread, who invented what first, how 
every invention added to what was there before, and how it took a cumulative human 
effort to get medicine where it is now. In short, this type of empirical history “aims to 
trace when a new object has arisen, or when a new concept with which to present reality 
has appeared, and so on” (Webb, 2013, p. 124). One problem with this type of history is 
that, as Foucault identifies, 
the mapping of antecedents is not enough, in itself, to determine a 
discursive order; on the contrary, it is subordinated to the discourse that 
one is analyzing, at the level that one chooses, on the scale that one 
establishes. By deploying discourse throughout a calendar, and by giving a 
date to each of its elements, one does not obtain a definitive hierarchy of 
precessions and originalities; this hierarchy is never more than relative to 
the systems of discourse that it sets out to evaluate (Foucault, 1972, p. 
143). 
 
Thus, one cannot capture the discursive practice by mapping it on a calendar. It cannot be 
forced to fit in a chronological order. Since discursive practice does not follow a linear 
process and its time is not the same as our time, it does not matter which regularity 
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happens first and, therefore, chronological hierarchies are rather irrelevant in 
archaeology. The second problem with traditional history is that it tends to divide time 
into crude historical periods that encourages a selective reading of events (Webb, 2013, p. 
127). Historical periods are at best “confused unities” ((Foucault, 1972, p. 148) that may 
provide us with a viewpoint from the distance; whereas, a “closer inspection” such as that 
of archaeology “will reveal threads of continuity and frayed ends that turn the borders of 
such periods into complex spaces.” (Webb, 2013, p. 127) 
Acknowledging Discontinuity.  Letting go of continuity as an underlying 
condition of discourse is a fundamental principle in archaeology (Webb, 2013, p. 138). 
One way of establishing continuity is to search for the origin of discursive elements, 
which Foucault explicitly rejects. He proposes to disconnect with “the unquestioned 
continuities by which we organize, in advance, the discourse that we are to analyze” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 25). We must renounce the idea, he says, “that beyond any apparent 
beginning, there is always a secret origin” and save the analysis from being led “through 
the naivety of chronologies” (Foucault, 1972, p. 25). Even though archaeology provides a 
historical account of discursive formations, it does not create this account by returning to 
the origins. In Foucault’s words,  
the description of statements and discursive formations must therefore free 
itself from the widespread and persistent image of return. It does not claim 
to go back, beyond a time that is no more than a falling off, a latency, an 
oblivion, a covering up or a wandering, towards that moment of 
foundation when speech was not yet caught up in any form of 
materiality… It does not try to constitute for the already said the 
paradoxical instant of the second birth; it does not invoke a dawn about to 
return. On the contrary, it deals with statements in the density of the 




It is important to note that searching for origin is not the only manifestation of a tendency 
to seek continuity in discourse. According to Foucault, “we must rid ourselves of a whole 
mass of notions, each of which, in its own way, diversifies the theme of continuity” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 21). Some of these notions may not be big enough to hold rigorous 
conceptual clarity but, regardless of how big or small they are, such notions play a “very 
precise function” that is seeking to maintain continuity in discourse (Foucault, 1972, p. 
21).   
One of the most obvious forms of continuity is one that is drawn by history. Most 
historians pick up the raw material in the form of dispersed events and weave them 
together in accordance with a transcendental, logical, and chronological sequence to form 
a unity (Webb, 2013, p. 44). It is the job of a good historian to build relations between 
what seems to be desperate events, as though they were expressions of a single 
consciousness, the follow up of a single goal, or manifestations of some eternal truth that 
connects all events to one another. Traditional history not only tends to “attribute to the 
discourse it analyzes a basic coherence” (Webb, 2013, p. 129), it also tends to maintain 
that coherence and to dismiss any contradictions that might come across as provisional 
and unimportant background noise. In traditional history, contradiction is something that 
needs to be resolved in order for us to see the underlying coherence of events. Therefore, 
this type of history is “bound within a circular practice that aims to restore a cohesion that 
it assumes was there at the beginning” (Webb, 2013, p. 129). Traditional history holds 
three major assumptions regarding contradiction: 1) Contradiction is believed to be 
always coming from outside of a discourse - as a foreign agent - to interrupt the ideality 
of discourse; 2) Contradictory text or speech is seen as unintentional or accidental 
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expressions that cannot challenge the underlying coherence of the discourse; and 3) 
Discontinuities are considered to be adding up toward an end goal of cohesion and 
progress in discourse, as though they were “a series of incremental changes, all 
contributing toward a finally achieved enlightenment” (Webb, 2013, p. 129). The basic 
assumption, in any case, is that individual events cannot lie outside the historical 
continuity without sharing a common principle or some hidden meaning that connects 
them to one another. 
In contrast to traditional history, archaeology suggests a fundamentally different 
approach for looking at the history. It suggests looking deeper (at an archaeological level) 
into the events and acknowledging the disagreements, errors, dispersions, and 
discontinuities–taking them just as seriously as we take continuities. In this manner, 
archaeology 
seeks rather to untie all those knots that historians have patiently tied; it 
increases differences, blurs the lines of communication, and tries to make 
it more difficult to pass from one thing to another (Foucault, 1972, p. 170) 
 
Taking contradictions seriously also requires approaching any ready-made unities with a 
different sense of the history and a different sense of time. (Webb, 2013, p. 51). 
Archaeology tends to break the magical cage of assumed unities, such as medicine, rip 
them off of their synthetic coherence, and thus disrupt their illusive totality. According to 
Foucault, after breaking free from the “ready-made syntheses” one can finally grasp that 
in reality “they concern only a population of dispersed events” (Foucault, 1972, p. 22). It 
will become obvious that their continuity is more synthetic than natural.  
In sum, archaeology does not give way to any synthetic unities - including a 
historical linearity of events. It describes discursive events as constructed experiences and 
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not as some fixed external realities (Webb, 2013, p. 44) holding their own hidden 
meanings and continuity. According to Foucault, it is not only possible but necessary for 
archaeology to see events in their “pure dispersion” and without putting the mask of any 
synthetic continuity on them. (Foucault, 1972, p. 121). As a matter of fact, archaeology is 
willing “to speak of discontinuities, ruptures, gaps, entirely new forms of positivity, and 
of sudden redistributions” (Foucault, 1972, p. 169). In Foucault’s words: 
Archaeology is a comparative analysis that is not intended to reduce the 
diversity of discourses, and to outline the unity that must totalize them, but 
is intended to divide up their diversity into different figures. 
Archaeological comparison does not have a unifying, but a diversifying, 
effect (Foucault, 1972, pp. 159-160). 
 
Hence, archaeology analyzes discourse in search of “points of divergence and 
discontinuity, and the patterns of regularity that produced them.” (Webb, 2013, p. 102). 
How is Archaeology Different from Other Analytical Approaches?  
In a nutshell, archaeology is a research methodology that is radically different 
from other approaches to research (Scheurich, 1994). Archaeology stands on the ground 
that it has discovered by itself and uses it as a platform for realizing its own destiny 
(Foucault, 1972). In archaeology, “one is forced to advance beyond familiar territory, far 
from the certainties to which one is accustomed” (Foucault, 1972, p.39). The goal is to 
produce 
a sort of great, uniform text, which has never before been articulated, and 
which reveals for the first time what men ‘really meant’ not only in their 
words and texts, their discourses and their writings, but also in the 
institutions, practices, techniques, and objects that they produced 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 118). 
 
Archaeology offers to provide an account of the facts lying well “beyond the grasp of 
contemporary research” (Foucault, 1972, p. 43). In fact, the problem archaeology is 
91 
 
concerned with “is how to decide what made them [contemporary research] possible, and 
how these “discoveries’ could lead to others” (Foucault, 1972, p. 43). Archaeology works 
at the more fundamental level of defining basic objects and concepts, cognitive authority 
of the scientists, and the social function of science. Moreover, compared to most other 
analytical approaches, archaeology employs a relatively heavy machinery of 
philosophical thought and analytical skills. No doubt it is new, unfamiliar, and overly 
complex at times, but it is worth the hardship,  
for however disorienting and unfamiliar the space may turn out to be, it 
will be full–of unexpected relations, fleeting objects, different subject 
positions, and concepts drawn more finely than before (Webb, 2013, p. 
62). 
 
No wonder Foucault devoted the first half of his author’s life (1960 to 1976) to the 
development of this new and exciting methodology.  
Let us now discuss the questions of “what, then, can this “archaeology” offer that 
other descriptions are unable to provide?” and “what are the rewards for such a heavy 
enterprise?”, as Foucault puts them (Foucault, 1972, p. 136). To begin with, archaeology 
claims to describe the “differences passed over or concealed by other forms of analysis, 
interpretation and history” (Webb, 2013, p. 155). As an archaeological analysis of the 
modern medical discourse, this study aspires to get entangled with structures lying 
unnoticed or beneath those elucidated by standard research techniques (Gutting, 1989, p. 
109). I have come to believe that the regular common quantitative and qualitative 
analyses are not adequate for the primary purpose of describing the complexity, diversity, 
and discontinuity of the modern discourse of medicine. Standard casual approaches in 
research, for instance, cannot provide a description of discursive formations as illustrated 
by Foucault. (Gutting, 1989, p. 210), Because other forms of qualitative research, such as 
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ethnography, fall short on analyzing discursive formations due to their treatment of 
human agent as the central figure in the analyses, archaeology is the only analytical 
approach that advocates for the move from a philosophy of the subject to a philosophy of 
the concept. This makes it the only methodology that is compatible with the theories of 
discourse proposed by Foucault (Webb, 2013, p. 81).  
There are other ways to analyze discourses, of course. The orthodox approach to 
the analysis of discourse is the linguistic structural method, which seeks to discover the 
meaning of texts “and sub-textual groupings, institutions and practices extending beyond 
texts and between them” and charts the relation between these meanings in an attempt to 
create larger configurations (Webb, 2013, p. 105). In structuralist discourse analysis, the 
goal is to determine the totality of possible meanings in a given text. However, the space 
for interpretation is both limited and continuous. That is, the same text can be endlessly 
searched for new meanings through time but within the range of possibilities that is set by 
the language of that certain text. Moreover, “to choose one meaning is to deny existence 
to a second, or even to many others” (Webb, 2013, p. 105). Thus, structural linguistic 
analysis of discourse offers a field of endless - yet limited - possible configurations 
(Webb, 2013, p. 105). Structuralist discourse analysis cannot function at a level in which 
archaeology operates. Most importantly, the term discourse as defined by the structuralist 
linguists is not congruent with the Foucauldian theorization of the discourse, which 
makes up the foundation of the present study.  
One can safely argue that by introducing archaeology, Foucault proposed what 
has been called a “radical change” to the usual conception of discourse analysis (Webb, 
2013, p. 154). Archaeology is geared toward an entirely new dimension of discourse 
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which was opened up by the advent of archaeology itself. The goal was to develop a 
method that is “neither formalizing nor interpretative” (Foucault, 1972, p. 135); one that 
could navigate the path between structuralism and hermeneutics (Webb, 2013, p. 120). 
Moreover, Foucauldian archaeology lies in the common ground between the 
transcendental and the empirical, functioning as a “medium of their relation to one 
another” (Webb, 2013, p. 76). Foucault also sees human sciences–as opposed to natural 
sciences–to be “the primary source of contemporary constraints on human freedom” 
(Gutting, 1989, p. 4). By “human freedom” here Foucault means the freedom of thought, 
which he thought was trapped in the deadlock of modernist philosophical treatment of the 
subject as the center of all discourses. Thus, according to Gutting, the ultimate project of 
Foucault’s archaeology is two-fold: “to show how particular domains of knowledge have 
constrained human freedom and to provide the intellectual resources for overcoming 
those constrains” (Gutting, 1989, p. 2).  
In archaeology one is concerned with the dubious self-understanding of the 
human science subjects (Gutting, 1989). Foucault used archaeology in his subversive 
study of the modern experience of madness (Foucault, 1988) because he was suspicious 
of faulty self-understanding of the psychology and psychiatry disciplines. Based on my 
personal experience and following the Foucauldian notions of discursive formations, I too 
am suspicious of faulty self-understandings of medicine by medical professionals in 
modern U.S. society. Hence, this study is an attempt to describe dubious self-
understanding of human sciences such as professionalism and medical ethics - as they 
relate to modern medical discourse. I follow Gutting in believing that,  
a correct grasp of the significance of these disciplines will not be 
forthcoming from a straightforward study of the concepts and theories 
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they put forward. Such a study would remain at the surface and fail to 
uncover an underlying structure that reveals, beneath their scientific 
pretensions, the true nature of modern psychology and psychiatry [and, in 
the case of the present study: medicine]. Foucault's project therefore 
requires an archaeological approach (Gutting, 1989, p. 88). 
 
It is worth reiterating here that the present archaeological analysis is not a challenge to 
the objective truths of medicine as a discipline (e.g., medical scientific knowledge). 
Rather, throughout the analytical procedure, I remain concerned with questioning the self-
understanding of medicine as a discipline by following the discourse of those who are 
involved with it (e.g., physicians, medical students, patients and so on).  
In this chapter, I have reviewed the literature related to theoretical, substantive, 
and methodological bases of the present archaeological study of modern medical 
discourse. This study analyzes contemporary discourse of medicine that is currently at 
work in the context of a medical school and the way in which it ultimately constitutes the 
professional identity of future doctors. The goal is to define the unity of modern medicine 
as a discursive formation. This is done by deploying a Foucauldian archaeological 
methodology in this study. Having reviewed the relevant literature in this chapter, I now 
turn to explore archaeology as a hands-on methodology for analyzing the discourse of 
medicine by setting out to demonstrate the system of relations that govern formation of 




Chapter 3: Methodology 
This research aims at defining the discursive formation of modern medicine as a 
social discourse. The Foucauldian archaeological methodology and analytical approach is 
chosen to investigate the structural elements, rules, and conditions that determine the 
formation of modern medicine as a discourse at Indiana University School of Medicine, 
Indianapolis campus. Perhaps the most important characteristic of social discourses is 
that they constitute the social identity of those who are subjected to them. That is, it is 
expected of the current discourse of medicine to determine medical students’ professional 
identities. It goes without saying that physicians’ professional identity is closely related to 
their professional behavior and ultimately the medical care delivery.  
In this chapter, I will discuss the methods and procedures that were used to 
conduct this study. I will begin by introducing Foucauldian archaeology as the research 
methodology used in this study and will go on by defining concepts such as the 
statement, enunciative function, discursive elements, discursive rules, relations and 
regularities, and discursive conditions. Next, I will provide a description of the study 
setting, study participants and participant selection methods, and the data collection 
methods used in the present inquiry. Lastly, I will provide a statement of my positionality 
as a qualitative researcher to conclude this chapter.  
Archaeology Methodology 
Archaeology is a methodology that defines its own analytical method. It analyzes 
synthetic unities, such as that of social “medicine” that are often accepted without 
question. In Foucault’s view, these ready-made unities reinforce the constraints within 
which modern thought and thinking is entrapped (Webb, 2013, p. 48). In archaeology one 
96 
 
seeks to reveal the construction and transformation of these unities with the goal of 
describing them at a level that is often hidden under a façade of unquestioned concepts 
and assumptions. This study is using archaeological methodology to explore how 
medicine presents itself as a discursive formation at Indiana University School of 
Medicine.  
Archaeological methodology essentially owes its existence to Foucault’s concern 
about not only changing the content of thought but also the terms and conditions 
according to which one thinks (Webb, 2013, p. 161). He wrote three books (MC, BC, and 
OT) that were claimed to be archaeologies before writing his detailed methodological 
account of archaeology in AK. Though not a unified project from the beginning, the three 
prior books gradually developed what became a distinctive approach to inquiry. After 
Foucault’s death in 1984, archaeological methodology has received relatively less 
attention from the scholarly community, owing, to some extent, to its inherently 
complicated structure and Foucault’s philosophical and uncommon use of language in 
describing his methodology. However, Scheurich and McKenzie (2005) contend that 
Foucault himself, till the end, considered archaeology to be important and relevant and 
that the scholarly community is making a mistake in devaluing or ignoring archaeology.   
In a nutshell, archaeology seeks to define the four elements of a discursive 
formation, namely, objects, modalities of statement, concepts, and theoretical strategies; 
the rules for their formation; the relations between these elements and their rules of 
formation; and the conditions that make their existence possible. The analytical 
information collected in this manner then illustrates the discursive formation pertaining to 
a particular discourse (such as that of medicine, which is the focus of analysis in this 
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study). Foucault’s conceptions of “discourse” and the “archaeological statement” are the 
foundations of archaeological analysis. Discourse is made up of a group of statements 
that belong to a single discursive formation. Archaeology is concerned with “actual 
occurrences [of these statements] and their effects” (Gutting, 1989, p. 228); it is obsessed 
with “the fact that words have happened” and that they have “left traces behind them” 
(Foucault, 1971, p. 201). Thus, statements are treated in a unique manner and with no 
regard for their hidden meanings, intentions, or motivation of the speaker.  
How is Archaeology Done? 
Archaeological inquiry begins by suspending the ready-made unities in discourse. 
To illustrate his point about what exactly is wrong about such unities, Foucault takes up 
the example of subjective unities such as that of the “speaking subject”, the “author”, the 
“book”, and the “oeuvre” and discusses them in detail. He argues that as soon as one 
questions an assumed unity such as that of a book, for example, it “loses its self-
evidence” (Foucault, 1972, p. 23). I this section, I will elaborate on the example of the 
book with the aim of showing how a simple unity (such as that of a book) can be 
questioned, analyzed, and suspended in order to reveal the complex relations hiding 
underneath its surface unity. 
Subjective unities and subjective means of transmission, such as books, are often 
seen as self-evident and unproblematic harmonies. Foucault challenges this notion and 
reveals that they are actually not as unproblematic and self-evident as they may seem at 
the first sight. For instance, one might be tempted to think of a fiction book - that one is 
holding in one’s hand - as a material unity residing within the parallelepiped5 that 
                                               
5 A solid body of which each face is a parallelogram. 
98 
 
contains it. One tends to assume that all parts of the book, even the smallest fragments, 
are “the expression of the thought, the experience, the imagination, or the unconscious of 
the author” (Foucault, 1972, p. 24). Upon closer scrutiny, however, one can see that 
beyond this apparent unity, the book is rather “caught up in a system of references to 
other books, other texts, other sentences … [and that] it is a node within a network” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 23). As Webb puts it, the human subject (that is, the author of the 
book, in this case) has thought using ready-made frames of mind in order to “organize an 
intention that is already there” (Webb, 2013, p. 157). He goes on to explain that  
to think [emphasis added] is to take part in a pattern of conceptual 
development, and to carry out the steps by which a demonstration unfolds 
or new concepts and objects are produced. As such, the act is itself 
conditioned by the history of the operation it performs, without being 
determined by it (Webb, 2013, p. 157). 
 
A book, in this sense, is merely one node in a network of references to other works.  
Networks vary in accordance with the kind of text (e.g., mathematical, literary, and 
philosophy). Seeing a book in this way makes the definition of “a book” as a unity rather 
problematic (Webb, 2013, p. 52). One might conclude that the unity of a book is at best 
variable and relative. 
The above discussion illustrates an example of our tendency to create face-value 
unities on regular bases. Thinking of events in terms of their surface unities blocks the 
possibility of exploring the actual complex relations that exist among them. There is a 
large number of historical, theoretical, and discursive unities constructed as part of the 
developmental process in social discourses. Foucault suggests suspension of such unities 
on the ground that they lack “a theoretical elaboration” (Foucault, 1972, p. 71). This is 
not to say that such unities are completely useless and should not be used in the literature 
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or practice. It is only to say that they require further theoretical elaboration so their limits 
can be defined at least at a local level (Webb, 2013, p. 80). In Foucault’s words, 
these pre-existing forms of continuity, all these syntheses that are accepted 
without question, must remain in suspense. They must not be rejected 
definitively of course, but the tranquility with which they are accepted 
must be disturbed; we must show that they do not come about of 
themselves, but are always the result of a construction the rules of which 
must be known, and the justifications of which must be scrutinized: we 
must define in what conditions and in view of which analyses certain of 
them are legitimate; and we must indicate which of them can never be 
accepted in any circumstances.” (Foucault, 1972, p. 26) 
 
Synthetic unities are often underpinned by assumptions about continuity, such as that of 
medicine with assumptions regarding its origin and the possibility of a transcendental, 
ideal, and pure form of medicine. Once such a unity is suspended, as Foucault writes, “an 
entire filed is set free” that is made of actually existing statements and their relations, all 
revealed under a new light (Foucault, 1972, p. 26). Suspending such unities allows one to 
explore complex relations that will otherwise remain concealed. Webb (2013) uses a 
metaphorical example to illustrate this point. He says, it is as if one were to adjust the 
focus of the lens in a camera “to resolve blocks of color into unexpected detail” (p. 52).  
Another way to imagine suspension of an established unity is to think of a 
building made of Lego pieces, as an example. The building may look like a single piece 
from a distance, but upon closer scrutiny, one would be able to detect the number, shape, 
and function of the Lego pieces that the building is made of. Moreover, one would be 
able to describe the relations between Lego pieces and reveal the often complex manners 
in which they are put together in order to build the unity of “the building”. That is exactly 
what an archaeological analysis would aim for. In the present study, for instance, the 
Lego building is the modern discourse of medicine and its building blocks are 
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archaeological statements. My goal is to adjust the lens through which I am looking at 
this building in a way that it enables me to see the building blocks as well as the relations 
among them. First, I will attempt to describe the smaller unities (e.g., a rectangular piece 
as the front door of the building, a circular piece on the side as the window, etc.) that are 
created by a smaller number of Lego pieces. These smaller unities would be the 
archaeological elements (also known as unities of discourse) that consist of the objects, 
modes of enunciation, concepts, and theoretical strategies emerging from the medical 
discourse. Next, I will attempt to describe the relations among these elements (e.g., that 
of a door with the window, the roof with the chimney, etc.). Lastly, I will seek to 
determine conditions that make the existence of these building blocks possible in the first 
place (e.g., some Lego pieces only fit with specific other Lego pieces); and the rules for 
formation of each element (e.g., doors and windows; such as, the door must be on the 
front and windows on the sides).  
Based on the discussion above, one can say that archaeology is a methodology 
through which it is once more possible to see each moment of discourse as a “sudden 
irruption” and following a certain punctuality (Foucault, 1972, p. 25). In other words, 
archaeology is a microscopic examination of discourse that “reveals many discrete events 
in even the smallest fragment”. In archaeology, one draws back a veil to find multiplicity 
beneath the surface unity of a discourse (Webb, 2013, p. 52). As Foucault puts it,  
by freeing them [statements] of all the groupings that purport to be natural, 
immediate, universal unities, one is able to describe other unities, but this 
time by means of a group of controlled decisions (Foucault, 1972, p. 29). 
 
Again, it is not that the ready-made unities have no legitimacy or use at all, it is only that 
we need to question the basis of their unity and the “links whose validity is recognized 
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from the outset” (Foucault, 1972, p. 22) In Foucault’s words, they need to be “driven out 
from the darkness in which they reign” (Foucault, 1972, p. 22). It is important to 
understand, however, that archaeology is not concerned with the legitimacy of the 
discourse it analyzes (Webb, 2013, p. 57). In archaeology one does not seek to validate 
the truth claims in archaeological analysis. This is not to say that all discourses are either 
legitimate or illegitimate. It is only to say that archaeology does not concern itself with 
verifying their legitimacy.  
In sum, Foucault takes up a critique of subjective unities in discourse and suggests 
their suspension to be the first step in an archaeological analysis. He recommends 
avoiding the use of unities “that are already overladen with conditions and consequences” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 38) and replacing them by discursive unites. Let us take the example 
of medical discourse here to illustrate this point. In an archaeological analysis of medical 
discourse, once the ready-made unity of medicine is suspended, the newly emerging field 
of dispersed elements would allow one to ask questions such as: What exactly is this field 
of related statements? How can one define the limits of this field? What types of rules are 
functioning to give rise to this dispersed mass of interrelated statements? What sub-
groups can this group of statements give rise to? What specific objects are being talked 
about? What types of statement are enunciated in this filed? And lastly, what concepts 
and themes are emerging from this field if one were to observe them and their relations 
closely enough - without regarding the synthetic unity of medicine to which they belong, 




Once the synthetic unity that binds them together is suspended, one is faced with 
a body of dispersed events. Thus, archaeology begins with a mass of statements piled up 
on top of each other as data. As Foucault puts it, “we must accept, in the name of 
methodological rigor, that, in the first instance, they concern only a population of 
dispersed events” (Foucault, 1972, p. 22). The point is that this field of dispersed 
statements about medicine requires a theory, and “this theory cannot be constructed 
unless the field of the facts of discourse, on the basis of which those facts are built up, 
appears in its non-synthetic purity” (Foucault, 1972, p. 26). The next step in the analysis 
would be to replaces synthetic unities by alternative, non-subject-centered categories 
known as the unities of discourse or discursive unities (see Chapter 1, AK, for more). The 
unity of a discourse as a whole, however, arises from the rules that govern emergence of 
discursive elements and relations that they are capable of having with one another. Thus, 
a discourse is not simply made by statements and discursive unities, but also the rules of 
formation for discursive unities and the relations among them. Moreover, the unity of a 
discourse is not given once and for all; it is not a fixed entity. Discourse is a highly 
proliferative field of new appearances, shifts, and transformations on a never-ending 
basis. The unity of a discourse arises from “the patterns of relations that establish how its 
various elements occur and combine” (Webb, 2013, pp. 81-82). After discussing synthetic 
unities and the need for suspending them in archaeology, I now turn to define the 
archaeological statement.  
What is an Archaeological Statement? 
A discursive formation is basically made of a group of related statements. It is 
through exploration of relations among these statements that one becomes able to define 
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the rules of formation for the objects, types of statement, concepts, and strategic choices 
in a discursive formation. Therefore, “the possibility of defining each area and level of 
regularity arises first of all at the level of statement” (Webb, 2013, p. 104). A key point in 
archaeological analysis is to be mindful of the fact that a statement can only exist and 
function in relation to other statements. In order to explain how statements become 
productive of various regularities, one must examine their positionality within the system 
in relation to which they function. Specific characterization of an archaeological 
statement, as is provided by Foucault in AK, is nothing less than a work of art. Foucault 
goes through painstaking explanations to make his point that what he means by the term 
statement is fundamentally different than the definition or usage of this term by linguists, 
logicians and analysts (Foucault, 1972, pp. 107-108). While I am summarizing the main 
points of his discussion below (see Foucault, 1972, pp. 80-87 for more).  
First of all, one needs to realize that a statement is not the same as a sentence 
(Foucault, 1972). While every sentence is a statement, not every statement needs to be 
sentence. A statement can be made up of any group of linguistic elements such as: an 
incomplete sentence like “This doctor!”, an adverb such as “Exactly”, and a personal 
pronoun such as “Me!”; each of which can be considered a complete and fully functional 
statement in the discourse. Other examples of statements that are not sentences include: a 
genealogical tree, a journal of accounts, the algebraic formula of the law of a triangle, a 
graph, a historical timeline, and a statistical distribution curve, each of which counts as a 
perfectly functional archaeological statement (Foucault, 1972, p. 82). One may provide 
sentences to accompany a graph, but they will be either the interpretation of or a 
commentary on the original statement that is presented in the graph itself.  
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Second, an assertion also does not need to have a logically sound meaning in 
order to count as an archaeological statement. That is, one may be able to recognize an 
enunciative function in a sentence that logically makes no sense. For example, the 
sentence “our blood is wine” does not contain logically true information. However, if the 
same sentence is part of a poem, is a film’s title, or is pronounced by a political group’s 
leader then it makes sense. Thus, this illogical sentence counts as an archaeological 
statement. Moreover, it is possible that two assertions that are logically saying the same 
thing play completely different roles within their own network of related statements. In 
that case, they would count as two distinct statements (Foucault, 1972, pp. 80-81). For 
example, the sentence “you did that!” is logically the same as “I know you did that!”, but 
they mean different things depending on whether or not the speaker actually knows it or 
is merely guessing it.  
Lastly, an archaeological statement is not the same as what English analysts refer 
to as a speech act. A speech act is simply an “act of formulation” with a clear function. 
However, speech act shares an extensive common ground with archaeological statement. 
Below are some of the similarities between archaeological statements and the speck acts 
as pointed out by Foucault:  
This term [speech act] does not, of course, refer to the material act of 
speaking (aloud or to oneself) or of writing (by hand or typewriter); nor 
does it refer to the intention of the individual who is speaking (the fact that 
he wants to convince someone else, to be obeyed, to discover the solution 
to a problem, or to communicate information); nor does it refer to the 
possible result of what he has said (whether he has convinced someone or 
aroused his suspicion; whether he was listened to and whether his orders 
were carried out; whether his prayer was heard); what one is referring to is 
the operation that has been carried out by the formula itself, in its 
emergence: promise, order, decree, contract, agreement, observation. The 
speech act is not what took place just prior to the moment when the 
statement was made (in the author's thought or intentions); it is not what 
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might have happened, after the event itself, in its wake, and the 
consequences that it gave rise to; it is what occurred by the very fact that a 
statement was made - and precisely this statement (and no other) in 
specific circumstances.” (Foucault, 1972, pp. 82-83).  
 
The only characteristic that defines a speech act differently than the statement is that 
there is usually more than one statement (often several sentences, gestures or 
expressions) that are required to produce a speech act, such as “an oath, a prayer, a 
contract, a promise”, each of which counts as a single speech act but consists of more 
than one statements (Foucault, 1972, pp. 82-83).  
Thus, an archaeological statement cannot be defined by the models provided to us 
by grammar, logic, or analysis, because it is not the same as a sentence, a proposition, or 
a speech act. Using the definition of each of those models would only unnecessarily 
limits the archaeological statement (Foucault, 1972, p. 84). An archaeological statement 
is not an “additional category of language to place alongside the sentence, the 
proposition, the speech act, or anything else of the kind” either (Webb, 2013, p. 91). The 
fact that a statement is not a linguistic unit at all is an important demarcation between 
archaeology and regular linguistic discourse analyses (Gutting, 1989, p. 239). An 
archaeological statement, then, can only be defined “as a series of signs, figures, marks, 
or traces - whatever their organization or probability may be” that plays a function within 
a system of other signs (Foucault, 1972, p. 84). In other words, “a series of sings is a 
statement only if it is related to other series of signs, which constitute the statement’s 
associated field” (Gutting, 1989, p. 239). As Foucault affirms,   
the statement is not therefore a structure… it is a function [emphasis 
added] of existence that properly belongs to signs and on the basis of 
which one may then decide, through analysis or intuition, whether or not 
they ‘make sense’, according to what rule they follow one another or are 
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juxtaposed, of what they are the sign, and what sort of act is carried out by 
their formulation (oral or written) (Foucault, 1972, pp. 84-87).  
 
Hence, one cannot define the structural criteria of unity for the statement, because the 
statement is not a structural unit. Rather, it is “a function that cuts across a domain of 
structures and possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time 
and space” (Foucault, 1972, p. 87).  
Although language provides the most common system for constructing 
statements, it is certainly not the only one. As Foucault observes, “sentences, 
propositions, graphs, diagrams, formulas, maps, pictures, mere sounds, could all be 
statements if they belong to an associative field that is governed by the rules of the 
discursive formation” (Foucault, 1972, p. 91). In addition, it is not enough for a series of 
linguistic signs to become a statement to simply appear as a material existence in a 
moment of time and a point in the space. For example, letters of the alphabet arranged on 
a computer’s keyboard do not constitute a statement –they are merely tools for producing 
statements. This is in spite of the fact that their materiality occupying space and volume 
is undeniable. However, the same order of letters A, S, D, F, G… written on the 
keyboard’s manual or copied by a person on a sheet of paper is considered a statement (of 
the alphabetical order adopted by modern computer keyboards). Similarly, a series of 
letters in a random order that is written by a person on a computer screen, and a table of 
random numbers drawn for statisticians’ use, each constitutes a statement. They are tables 
of elements chosen in a contingent way (Foucault, 1972, pp. 85-86).  
The statement, therefore, neither has to exist in the same way as language (made 
by certain linguistic elements and structure) nor as a perceivable object (having a certain 
materiality with spatio-temporal coordination). A statement is neither a linguistic unit nor 
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any kind of material unit with its own limits and independence. What matters in 
archaeology, then, is not to find out whether a statement is long or short, original or a 
copy, strong or weak, so on and so forth. Instead, what matters is to describe how each 
statement is related to other statements in its associated field, define the relations it is 
capable of having due to its unique positionality, and finally, define the outlines of the 
field itself (Foucault, 1972).  
As argued before, statements do not exist independently. In Foucault’s words, 
“there is no statement that is not surrounded by a field of coexistences, effects of series 
and succession, a distribution of functions and roles”, which allow statements “to follow 
one another, order one another, and play roles with respect to one another” (Foucault, 
1972, pp. 99, 100). The associated field, writes Foucault, is “a space in which they breed 
and multiply” (Foucault, 1972, p. 100). Just like any group of statements and the relations 
among them, the associated field is not a stationary body of objects and relations; rather, 
it configures itself a little differently with the emergence of each new statement. At some 
point, the reconfiguration would be enough to cause destabilization of an old regularity 
and emergence of a new one, in which case the new field of statements will have different 
conditions of existence, coexistence and exclusion (Webb, 2013, p. 110). Foucault also 
describes the associated field as  
a network in which each point is distinct, distant from even its closest 
neighbors, and has a position in relation to every other point in a space 
that simultaneously holds and separates them all (Foucault, 2019, p. 149). 
 
The associated field is also where one can find language in its “pure dispersion” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 121). This field is where statements are examined in their purity and 
at a level before they even adopt their discursive function (Webb, 2013, p. 110). It is 
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important to note that Foucault’s usage of the terms “pure” and “purity” in relation to 
statements is not a reference to the formal a priori of Kant. It is rather consistent with his 
own description of historical a priori as described in AK (Webb, 2013, p. 54). 
In relation to the associated field, a statement can be compared to a particle. A 
particle exists only in relation to a configuration of other particles and so does a 
statement. It is these relations that define and sustain their existence in the first place. 
Furthermore, each individual particle is a condition of existence for the unity that the 
system gives rise to, just like every statement is a condition of existence for the discursive 
patterns (regularities) that emerge on the surface of a discourse (Webb, 2013, p. 87). 
Thus, statement is “a site of integration” already and therefore cannot be conceptualized 
as the smallest element of discourse that can only give rise to subsequent relations. 
Statement is not the atom of discourse as it is already relational at the moment it begins to 
exist and, as such, already discursive (Webb, 2013, p. 89). 
The definition of the associated field as described above bears some serious 
consequences for archaeology. First, one can say a statement belongs to a certain 
discursive formation only if that statement can find a place for itself within the associated 
field of other statements belonging to this discursive formation. There are no predefined 
limits based on the necessities specified by the ideal or empirical forms of a discourse 
that hold the right to either include or exclude a statement from being part of a discourse. 
It is rather the discursive rules that govern relations between existing statement that can 
either allow or dispose of a statement depending on the position they occupy within the 
structure of an existing discursive formation (Webb, 2013, p. 70). It is the law of 
governing this positioning that is sought to be outlined by archaeology. Second, the 
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meaning of a statement is judged entirely by its function as part of an associated field. 
Foucault provides an example of the sentence “the present king of France is bald” to 
illustrate this point. If examined as an individual assertion, the above phrase is 
meaningless in terms of its factual information as it has no referential in our time. 
However, if the same sentence were to be examined as part of a history book that 
documents the days of Charles the Bald, or part of a fictional work such as a novel or a 
movie, or part of a mad man’s assertions, or part of a dream, then it becomes perfectly 
meaningful. In Foucault’s words, 
the referential of the statement forms the place, the condition, the field of 
emergence, the authority to differentiate between individuals or objects, 
states of things and relations that are brought into play by the statement 
itself; it defines the possibilities of appearance and delimitation of that 
which gives meaning to the sentence, a value as truth to the proposition. It 
is this group that characterizes the enunciative level of the formulation, in 
contrast to its grammatical and logical levels (Foucault, 1972, p. 91) 
 
Thus, one can locate a referential for the above sentence only if one examines it as a 
statement playing its part in relation to an associated field.  
The third consequence of defining the associated field in this manner is that the 
value of the statement is also entirely judged by the role it plays within its associated 
field. For example, a statement that has been originally enunciated might have the exact 
same archaeological value as its repetition several centuries later. Establishing the truth 
about who said what first is irrelevant to archaeology. What might interest archaeology 
instead is to seek whether the same rule(s) of formation gave rise to both the new and the 
old statements, and whether it was the same regularity that brought them both into 
existence (Webb, 2013, p. 125). In sum, what defines the existence, meaning, and value 
of a statement is the function that it plays within its associated field. In Foucault’s words,  
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instead of giving a ‘meaning’ to these units [statements], this function 
relates them to a field of objects; instead of providing them with a subject, 
it opens up for them a number of possible subjective positions; instead of 
fixing their limits, it places them in a domain of coordination and 
coexistence; instead of determining their identity, it places them in a space 
in which they are used and repeated. In short, what has been discovered is 
not the atomic statement - with its apparent meaning, its origin, its limits, 
and its individuality”. (Foucault, 1972, p. 106) 
 
Despite the fact that the associated field is a condition of existence and transformation for 
the statements, it does not determine their identity once and for all. This, according to 
Webb (2013) is the most decisive difference between associated field and what is 
conventionally defined as context (p. 96). 
The question is, then, how is one to perform an archaeological analysis of the 
statements? It is important to note that archaeology is tasked to describe statements with 
regards to their positivity (Webb, 2013, p. 111). Although Foucault often refers to 
discursive formation as a positivity, discursive formations do not reflect either “objective 
data” or “real practices” (Foucault, 1972, p. 194). Foucault explains positivity of a 
discursive formation in terms of rarity, exteriority and accumulation of its statements 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 125). Rarity of the statements comes from the fact that at a certain 
point in time and in a certain discursive formation; there are only a limited number of 
statements that can emerge in discourse. In Foucault’s words, “at a given period, there 
are, in total, relatively few things that are said” (Foucault, 1972, p. 119). Archaeology 
opts to analyze this rarity instead of searching for totalities (Foucault, 1972, p. 125). As 
Foucault puts it,  
the analysis of statements operates ... without reference to a cogito. It does 
not pose the question of the speaking subject ... it is situated at the level of 
the ‘it is said’- and we must not understand by this a sort of communal 
opinion, a collective representation that is imposed on every individual 




Archaeology sees statements as rare events and explores “the occurrence that 
allows them to emerge to the exclusion of all others” (Foucault, 1972, p. 119). The 
principle according to which only a specific group of statements that were enunciated 
could appear is called the “law of rarity” (Foucault, 1972, p. 118). Exteriority, on the 
other hand, signifies the fact that statements are examined from the exterior since 
archaeology is not interested in transcendental qualities or forms that might be hidden 
within them (Foucault, 1972, p. 120). Archaeology does no attempt to discover what lies 
beneath the surface of language, which ensures maintaining the exteriority of 
archaeological statements. Lastly, accumulation points to the fact that discursive practices 
are “shaped by the history of their own construction” (Webb, 2013, p. 107). Archaeology 
tries to describe this constructedness, instead of searching for origin of the statements 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 125). In sum, archaeological analysis illustrates how a particular 
discourse presents itself as a positivity. 
In archaeology, every statement is a “strange event” with a function. (Foucault, 
1972, p. 28). Every statement is unique and yet “subject to repetition, transformation, and 
reactivation” (Foucault, 1972, p. 28). Furthermore, archaeological statements are not only 
linked to their immediate situation but also to their preceding and following statements 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 28). The statements are not linked to one another at the semantic, 
logical or psychological levels. That is, in archaeological analysis one does not try to 
group statements based on sharing a common syntactical structure (same words or 
grammatical appearance). Similarly, one does not attempt to establish coherence of 
meaning among a dispersed group of statements, nor group statements together based on 
the psychological status of the writer/speaker (e.g., categorizing data into: groups of 
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positive and negative comments, comments by those who experienced condition X more 
than Y times, comments by those who maintained their original stance on the matter X in 
more than Y encounters, comments by those who were able to think clearly versus those 
who were tired or angry at the time of the interview, etc.). Instead, in an archaeological 
analysis, 
one defines the set of rules common to all their associated domains, the 
forms of succession, of simultaneity, of the repetition of which they are 
capable, and the system that links all these fields of coexistence together… 
one can define the general set of rules that govern the status of these 
statements, the way in which they are institutionalized, received, used, re-
used, combined together, the mode according to which they become  
objects of appropriation, instruments for desire or interest,[and] elements 
for a strategy (Foucault, 1972, p. 115). 
 
Thus, to define a discursive formation one “divides up the general plane of things said at 
the specific level of statements” (Foucault, 1972, p. 116). One needs to focus on the 
function that a statement fulfills in relation to other statements (that is, the statement’s 
enunciative function), which consists of four specific domains: formation of objects, 
formation of subjective positions, formation of concepts, and formation of strategic 
choices (Foucault, 1972, p. 116). I would like to conclude this section with the following 
passage by Foucault that succinctly sums up our discussion of the archaeological 
statements here:  
In examining the statement what we have discovered is a function that has 
a bearing on groups of signs, which is identified neither with grammatical 
‘acceptability’ nor with logical correctness, and which requires if it is to 
operate: a referential (which is not exactly a fact, a state of things, or even 
an object, but a principle of differentiation); a subject (not the speaking 
consciousness, not the author of the formulation, but a position that may 
be filled in certain conditions by various individuals); an associated field 
(which is not the real context of the formulation, the situation in which it 
was articulated, but a domain of coexistence for other statements); a 
materiality (which is not only the substance or support of the articulation, 
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but a status, rules of transcription, possibilities of use and re-use) 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 115). 
 
Having laid down the basics of an archeological statement, I now turn to a more detailed 
discussion of the enunciative function of the statements in the next section.  
The Enunciative Function 
A statement is that which has an enunciative function and belongs to an 
enunciative field. In this section, I will try to further elaborate on these enunciative terms 
(for a more detailed discussion see AK, pp. 88-105). The enunciative function of 
statement, just like the definition of statement itself, is a novel and complicated concept. 
The foremost important thing is to understand the relation of an archaeological statement 
with its subject. First, the subject of an archaeological statement is not the first-person 
grammatical element within the sentence. As discussed earlier, an archaeological 
statement is not the same as a sentence and, as such, it does not follow grammatical rules. 
Moreover, sentences with no fixed first- or second-person grammatical elements still 
have a subject. For example, the statement of “I had two cups of coffee this morning” can 
have different subjects depending on whether my friend tells it to me, or I read it in a 
book.  
Moreover, the subject of a statement is not necessarily the same as the person who 
proclaims it (Foucault, 1972, p. 92). For example, an actor who is performing as 
Shakespeare’s Juliet on the stage is not the subject of every statement that she asserts. 
That is because she did not, write those lines and, as such, she “is not in fact the cause, 
origin, or starting-point of the phenomenon of the written or spoken articulation of a 
sentence” (Foucault, 1972, p. 95). To take this problematization another step further, the 
person who wrote those lines (Shakespeare himself) cannot be regarded as the subject of 
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those statements either; since he wrote them with the intention to express thoughts of his 
fictional character, a 13-year-old girl, Juliet. The question is, then, how can one define the 
subject of these statements? The answer lies in the chief principle of archaeology that 
advises us to shift the analytical attention away from the subject and towards the function 
a statement plays in relation to other statements within its associated field. According to 
Foucault, “the subject of the statement is a particular function… it is an empty function, 
that can be filled by virtually any individual when he formulates the statement” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 93). To further explore the notion of subjectivity in statements let us 
now take the example of a mathematical statement, such as: 9 x 7 = 63. The subject of 
this statement is a strictly defined function that can be occupied by anyone who proclaims 
it. In other words,  
the subject of the statement is the absolutely neutral position, indifferent to 
time, space, and circumstances, identical in any linguistic system, and in 
any code of writing or symbolization, that any individual may occupy 
when affirming such a proposition (Foucault, 1972, p. 94).  
 
As has been argued before, questions such as who came up with this mathematical 
proposition first, what is its origin, whether the information represents original or copied 
work by the enunciating subject, and even, whether or not the statement is true, are not 
relevant to the archaeological level of analysis.  
It is important to understand that the original author of a statement does not 
remain the only subject of that statement through eternity. One may wonder, then, if a 
seventh-grade student is describing the second law of Newton, is that a statement? 
Definitely. Who is the subject of this statement, the student or Newton himself? The 
answer is: neither one of them. As explained above, the subject of an archaeological 
statement is not a person, but a function that can be assumed by anyone at different times. 
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This enunciative function was assumed by Newton at one point in the past and is now 
being assumed by a seventh-grade student. Foucault describes the subject of statement as  
a particular, vacant place that may in fact be filled by different individuals; 
but, instead of being defined once and for all, and maintaining itself as 
such throughout a text, a book, or an oeuvre, this place varies - or rather it 
is variable enough to be able either to persevere, unchanging, through 
several sentences, or to alter with each one (Foucault, 1972, p. 95). 
 
Finally, let us take one last example of an academic paper here. Many authors write some 
version of the sentence “as we have shown before” in their research manuscripts. 
However, it would be a mistake to assume that the enunciative subject of this statement–
the person who wrote the manuscript–is the same as the subject of the act of “showing”. 
Whether she is referring to her own work done in the past or conclusions reached by 
others in the literature review section of her paper, she is not the lone subject of the act of 
showing. In either case, the author is stepping up to fill the “empty function” of showing 
something. The statement conveys the meaning that it does precisely because its 
functional vacant spot was claimed by this particular author. As Foucault points out,  
if a proposition, a sentence, a group of signs can be called ‘statement’, it is 
not therefore because, one day, someone happened to speak them or put 
them into some concrete form of writing; it is because the position of the 
subject can be assigned (Foucault, 1972, p. 95).  
 
The same sentence would have a different meaning and would count as a completely 
different statement if a different person referring to a different set of literature were to 
state it. This takes us to the next characteristic of the enunciative function, which is its 
ultimate dependence on a preexisting associated field (Foucault, 1972, p. 96).  
As we have seen already, an archaeological statement can only exist in relation to 
other statements in its associated field. For example, if two people were to proclaim the 
exact same sentence, it will produce two different statements because it is not the factual 
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content of an assertions but the associated field of each enunciation that defines its 
emergence as part of a discourse (Foucault, 1972, p. 89). The associated field of a 
statement, however, is not the same as what is traditionally referred to as a context. A 
context is “all the situational or linguistic elements, taken together, that motivate a 
formulation and determine its meaning” (Foucault, 1972, p. 97). A context is usually 
indispensable for examining the truth/validity of an assertion or for telling what it means. 
Archaeology disregards this type of context as it is not relevant to the analysis of 
discursive formation (see chief principles of archaeology, in Chapter 2, for more). The 
enunciative function does not come from individual statements–whether they are true or 
not and whatever their meaning maybe. Hence, the context of an archaeological statement 
cannot be explained simply in terms of the experience of the speaker, and 
the precedents of which they are conscious. Its conditions extend further 
than that, since the way that statements present themselves to the subject 
and are arranged, remembered or forgotten will itself depend on pre-
existing demarcations between contexts (for example, conversation, 
science, literature), which are themselves determined discursively; that is, 
on the basis of rules of formation arising from the relations between 
statements (Webb, 2013, p. 95). 
 
Again, we know that no statement exists in isolation; rather, it is always part of an 
associated field that defines both its status and meaning. A traditional context may help in 
establishing truth and meaning at the level of isolated sentences and propositions, but 
archaeology denies the existence of isolated statements altogether. In archaeology it is the 
“associated field that turns a sentence or a series of signs into a statement, and which 
provides them with a particular context, [and] a specific representative content”. 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 98). So it is the associated field that makes a context possible in the 
first place.  
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In addition to figuring out the subject of statements, it is also crucial to understand 
the difference between the enunciative function (subject of the statement) and enunciative 
subject (the person who speaks the statement). For instance, establishing the identity of a 
statement through its various forms, repetitions, and transcriptions can be very confusing 
if one does not distinguish between the statement itself and multiplicity of its 
enunciations. According to Foucault, “an enunciation takes place whenever a group of 
signs is emitted… The enunciation is an unrepeatable event; it has a situated and dated 
uniqueness that is irreducible” (Foucault, 1972, p. 101). Let us take some examples here. 
When two people are pronouncing an exact same sentence at the exact same moment, we 
will have two distinct statements and two distinct enunciations, each spoken by a 
different person. Similarly, if the same person repeats an exact same sentence ten times 
over, we will have ten enunciations that are distinct in time. However, it needs to be noted 
that the statement itself cannot be reduced to the event of enunciation. One does not 
produce ten distinct statements when one repeats the exact same enunciation ten times 
over. Then again, the same sentence spoken by ten different people under different 
circumstances can still constitute a single statement.  
Though identity of a statement is “susceptible to differences of material, 
substance, time, and place” (Foucault, 1972, p. 102), the unique materiality of statements 
is such that it permits certain special types of repetition. Let us take a few examples to see 
how identity of a statement can remain the same through multiple events of enunciations. 
If one writes the same sentence on five separate pieces of paper, the statement remains 
the same though it goes through five different enunciations. The same can be said about 
multiple copies of a book. Whereas each copy of a book is a distinct event of enunciation, 
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it continues to convey the same set of statements. Even though certain aspects of 
materiality changes with each copy (e.g., ink and paper etc.), for Foucault, “these ‘small’ 
differences are not important enough to alter the identity of the statement and bring about 
another” (Foucault, 1972, p. 102).  
Identity of a statement is also dependent upon institutional and economic 
conditions. The fact that a set of statements belong to a single book creates an 
institutional authority that permits for multiple repetitions without change of identity for 
those statements. Further, as Foucault suggests, “the materiality of the statement is not 
defined by the space occupied or the date of its formulation; but rather by its status as a 
thing or object” (Foucault, 1972, p. 102). This status is always relative and dependent 
upon its special relations with the institutional and economic phenomena. For example, a 
copy of a book printed with a foreword from the author is privileged by a higher status 
compared to another copy of the same book that is published after the death of its author. 
Similar relations can be spotted among different copies of historical, religious and legal 
texts. This leads us to the conclusion that there is a difference of status between “the 
statements themselves” and “their reproduction” based on their relations with institutional 
and economic conditions (Foucault, 1972, p. 103). This only confirms that, 
instead of being something said once and for all - and lost in the past like 
the result of a battle, a geological catastrophe, or the death of a king- the 
statement, as it emerges in its materiality, appears with a status, enters 
various networks and various fields of use, is subjected to transferences or 
modifications, is integrated into operations and strategies in which its 
identity is maintained or effaced. Thus the statement circulates, is used, 
disappears, allows or prevents the realization of a desire, serves or resists 
various interests, participates in challenge and struggle, and becomes a 




Thus, it is safe to say that the statement cannot be identified with a certain piece of 
matter; rather, the identity of statement varies in accordance with the role it plays in 
relation to different material institutions. For example, a statement spoken by a medical 
student in this study remains the same statement when one listens to its audio recording 
(no matter how many times over) or when one transcribes it on several sheets of paper for 
analysis. Identity of the statements do not simply change by multiplicity of their 
enunciation and by a change in the material medium that conveys them. The role they 
perform in this study as data and the relations they have with the institutional and 
economic circumstances remain the same no matter how many times one reproduces 
them. Therefore, materiality of statement is a special type of materiality that “cuts across 
the categories of form and matter as traditionally understood” (Webb, 2013, p. 97). 
Let us now look at an example of how identity of a statement changes when it is 
transplanted to a different associated field that would, in turn, change its role and 
institutional relations. A sentence spoken by a writer at the dinner table is not the same 
statement as when he writes that sentence in his novel and attributes it to a fictional 
character. The entire field of associated statements, the role and relations of the statement 
with other statements will be changed; and these changes are important enough to alter 
the identity of the statement and bring about an entirely new statement (Foucault, 1972). 
Foucault also discusses how, for example, the affirmation that “the earth is round” does 
not give rise to the same statement before and after Copernicus. The two affirmations 
constitute two distinct statements. Thus, identity of the statement changes because of the 
change in “the relation of these affirmations to other propositions, their conditions of use 
and reinvestment, the field of experience, of possible verifications, of problems to be 
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resolved, to which they can be referred” (Foucault, 1972, p. 103) . Similarly, the sentence 
“medicine is all about helping people” has been repeated through centuries. The 
affirmation of this sentence by an Arab physician in the eleventh century is not the same 
statement as the affirmation of it by a medical student at Indiana University School of 
Medicine in 2019. One can justify two distinct statements here because their “schemata 
of use, the rules of application, the constellations in which they can play a part, [and] 
their strategic potentialities” are completely different between now and then (Foucault, 
1972, p. 103). As Foucault points out, 
the constancy of the statement, the preservation of its identity through the 
unique events of the enunciations, its duplications through the identity of 
the forms, constitute the function of the field of use in which it is placed 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 104).  
 
Lastly, it is possible to have multiple enunciations - with different words, syntax and 
language - giving rise to only one and the same statement. For example, a paper written 
in French and its translation in English contain the exact same set of statements. Another 
example is printing a company’s brochure in three different languages, which still contain 
“a single group of statements in different linguistic forms” (Foucault, 1972, p. 104). 
Foucault also provides the example of a certain piece of information transmitted in 
multiple ways including words, a simplified syntax, and in a code. He argues that “if the 
information content and the uses to which it could be put are the same, one can say that it 
is the same statement in each case” (Foucault, 1972, p. 104).  
One important condition for a series of signs to be regarded as a statement is that 
it must have material existence. A sentence is not considered a statement unless it is 
spoken, written, or embodied by some element perceivable to the senses (Foucault, 1972, 
p. 100). Sentences that are thought out but were never spoken or those that reside in 
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someone’s memory are not archaeological statements. The point is, unless somebody 
assumes the subjective position for an enunciative function, there cannot be a statement. 
In other words, not only is the enunciative function dependent upon the materiality of 
statements, it is also shaped, altered or transformed by it. As Foucault indicates,  
even if a sentence is composed of the same words, bears exactly the same 
meaning, and preserves the same syntactical and semantic identity, it does 
not constitute the same statement if it is spoken by someone in the course 
of a conversation, or printed in a novel; if it was written one day centuries 
ago, and if it now reappears in an oral formulation (Foucault, 1972, p. 
100). 
 
Thus, the repeatable materiality of the enunciative function characterizes the statement as 
what Foucault calls “a paradoxical object” (Foucault, 1972, p. 105). The statement, then, 
is neither an event which is bound to occur in a particular time and place, nor is it an ideal 
function “that can be actualized in any body, at any time, in any circumstances, and in 
any material conditions” (Foucault, 1972, p. 104). In Foucault’s words, the statement is 
too repeatable to be entirely identifiable with the spatio-temporal 
coordinates of its birth (it is more than the place and date of its 
appearance), too bound up with what surrounds it and supports it to be as 
free as a pure form (it is more than a law of construction governing a 
group of elements), it is endowed with a certain modifiable heaviness, a 
weight relative to the field in which it is placed, a constancy that allows of 
various uses, a temporal permanence that does not have the inertia of a  
mere trace or mark, and which does not sleep on its own past (Foucault, 
1972, pp. 104-105).   
 
Thus, archaeological statement is an object that is produced, manipulated, used, 
transformed, exchanged, combined, decomposed and recomposed, and possibly destroyed 
by people along the course of their history (Foucault, 1972). 
Having discussed the statement and the enunciative function, I now turn to 
discuss how statements are treated in archaeology with the goal of revealing their 
grouping patterns that give rise to formation of discursive regularities (e.g., discursive 
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elements). It is the enunciative function that relates various units such as sentences, 
propositions, series, signs, and fragments to “objects, subject positions and domains of 
coexistence in which they could be used and repeated” (Webb, 2013, p. 98). Plus, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, no statement can be deemed as a pure creation of 
genius as it always belongs to a certain regularity that gives rise to it and, in one way or 
another, makes it possible for the statement to say what it says (Foucault, 1972, p. 146). 
One might conclude that, 
what we have called ‘discursive practice’ can now be defined more 
precisely… it is a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined 
in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given 
social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the conditions of 
operation of the enunciative function. (Foucault, 1972, p. 117) 
 
It is these conditions of operation (existence) that archaeological analysis aims to 
describe.  
Archaeological Treatment of the Statements 
Archaeological treatment of data begins with the analysis of the statements. To 
describe a statement, however, one does not examine it in isolation (attempting to discern 
its meaning, context, truth, or where it came from). Instead, one is to look at the 
statement as part of an associated field and seek to define the set of conditions that has 
made it possible for this statement to exist and have an enunciative function. One looks at 
a statement as something more than “the result of an action or an individual operation… 
as more than an organic, autonomous whole, closed in upon itself and capable of forming 
meaning of its own accord, but rather an element in a field of coexistence” (Foucault, 
1972, pp. 108-109).  
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Furthermore, the analysis of statements is “a description of things said, precisely 
as they were said” (Foucault, 1972, p. 109). It analyzes statements at the level of their 
existence and without worrying about the hidden intentions and meaning that might be 
buried in them. Archaeological analysis “avoids all interpretation” (Foucault, 1972, p. 
109), and instead, tries to answer the question of existence for the statements: “what it 
means to them to have come into existence, to have left traces… what it means to them to 
have appeared when and where they did - they and no others” (Foucault, 1972, p. 109). 
At the same time, the analysis of statements is not confined to the fact of the statements 
that were actually spoken, written or traced. Rather, archaeology is interested in the 
“analysis of their coexistence, their succession, their mutual functioning, their reciprocal 
determination, and their independent or correlative transformation” (Foucault, 1972, p. 
29). As Foucault points out,   
we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; 
determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its 
correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show 
what other forms of statement it excludes (Foucault, 1972, p. 28). 
It is important to remind ourselves that a statement is not a unity of any kind, 
grammatical, propositional, or analytical. Therefore, archaeology “characterizes not what 
is given in them, but the very fact that they are given, and the way in which they are 
given” (Foucault, 1972, p. 111). Analysis of the statement does not aim - like a 
linguistic/textual analysis - to question the language of research data in terms of “what 
particular words mean or how particular statements are logically or rhetorically 
connected” (Gutting, 1989, p. 243). Rather, the analysis of statement operates at the 
enunciative level, “it defines the modality of its appearance: its periphery rather than its 
internal organization, its surface rather than its content” (Foucault, 1972, p. 112). 
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On the other hand, the nature of language is such that it designates objects and 
refers back to subjects even if that subject is not present in the language. It “always seems 
to be inhabited by the other, the elsewhere, the distant; it is hollowed by absence” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 111). However, in the analysis of the statements, one questions the 
very existence of the statement’s language itself. One aims to  
question language, not in the direction to which it refers, but in the 
dimension that gives it; ignore its power to designate, to name, to show, to 
reveal, to be the place of meaning or truth, and, instead, turn one's 
attention to the moment - which is at once solidified, caught up in the play 
of the ‘signifier’ and the ‘signified’ - that determines its unique and limited 
existence (Foucault, 1972, p. 111).  
 
Archaeology is also sensitive to the question of enunciative homogeneity (sameness) 
among statements. On one hand, it is totally acceptable if one decides verbal formulations 
that are linguistically and logically similar are giving rise to distinct archaeological 
statements. On the other hand, analysis of the statements “may ignore differences of 
vocabulary, it may pass over semantic fields or different deductive organizations, if it is 
capable of recognizing in each case, despite their heterogeneity, a certain enunciative 
regularity” (Foucault, 1972, p. 146). Given the central role of preserving discontinuity in 
discourse, archaeology does not follow the lead of traditional history of ideas in 
chronological organization of thought. Therefore, “the order the archeologist discovers in 
a set of statements may not correspond to the order in which the statements appeared 
temporally” (Gutting, 1989, p. 243).  
All in all, the analysis of statement examines the statement in relation to the 
associated field to which it belongs, and which “it is able to reorganize and redistribute 
according to new relations. It constitutes its own past, defines, in what precedes it, its 
own filiation, redefines what makes it possible or necessary, [and] excludes what cannot 
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be compatible with it” (Foucault, 1972, p. 124). Let us now turn to examine how 
statements relate to one another in order to form larger groupings (discursive unities) that 
are known as discursive elements.  
Discursive Elements 
Archaeological analysis begins with collection of spoken or written statements as 
data. Statements belong to and are subject to the rules of a particular discursive 
formation. Discursive formation, on the other hand, is a vehicle for discourse (e.g., 
discursive formation of modern medicine for modern medical discourse). The term 
discursive element does not refer to the individual statements happening in a discourse; 
rather, an element is a group of statements that have a specific relation with one another 
and thus form a discursive unity. So, a discursive element is a discursive unity of more 
than one, related statements. Archaeological analysis is tasked to outline the discursive 
elements of a particular discursive formation. That is,  
one shows how the different texts with which one is dealing refer to one 
another, organize themselves into a single figure, converge with 
institutions and practices, and carry meanings that may be common to a 
whole period (Foucault, 1972, p. 118). 
 
According to Foucault, a discursive formation consists of four basic elements:  
A. Objects: constitute what the statements of a discursive formation are about. 
B. Enunciative modalities: refer to the kind of intellectual status and authority 
that the statements have. 
C. Concepts: those ideas on the basis of which statements are formulated as well 
as the notions that they draw from. 




The first step of archaeological analysis, after statements have been collected, is 
to define the discursive objects. In Foucault’s words,   
to define a group of statements in terms of its individuality would be to 
define the dispersion of these objects, to grasp all the interstices that 
separate them, to measure the distances that reign between them - in other 
words, to formulate their law of division (Foucault, 1972, p. 33). 
 
One needs to note that archaeological objects are merely social constructs and, as such, 
they are neither discovered nor invented by the discourse. Objects are constructed via 
operations performed by statements and the relations among them. Thus, the conditions 
of existence for any given object are at once specific, local and historical. The appearance 
of objects (and other discursive elements) are always independent of both empirical and 
transcendental condition (Webb, 2013, p. 67). It is rather “the interplay of the rules that 
make possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time” (Foucault, 1972, 
p. 33). Furthermore, it must be noted that the unity of a discourse “is based not so much 
on the permanence and uniqueness of an object as on the space in which various objects 
emerge and are continuously transformed” (Foucault, 1972, p. 32). 
The next step in archaeological analysis would be to define the modalities (types 
or styles) of statement. Again, this becomes possible by identifying “a group of relations 
between statements: their form and type of connection” (Foucault, 1972, p. 33). 
Modalities of statements that Foucault found in his archaeological study of the clinical 
discourse in the nineteenth century (Foucault, 1975) included “qualitative descriptions, 
biographical accounts, the location, interpretation, and cross-checking of signs, reasoning 
by analogy and deduction, statistical calculations, experimental verifications” as well as 
“many other forms of statement” (Foucault, 1972, p. 50). Questions that Foucault asked 
about these modalities of statement were: “What is it that links them together? What 
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necessity binds them together? Why these and not others?” (Foucault, 1972, p. 50). After 
identifying the objects and modalities of statement, archaeological analysis proceeds to 
deal with the question of what concepts are the statements in this discursive formation 
based on/drawing from. In this process, it is important to understand that one does not 
aim to outline a concept that is “sufficiently general and abstract to embrace all others”, 
rather, one would seek to describe and analyze the interplay of “appearances and 
dispersion” for a range of existing and possible concepts within the same discursive 
formation (Foucault, 1972, p. 35). 
Lastly, after establishing objects, modalities of statement, and concepts, one needs 
to look for the theoretical strategies/themes that are emerging on the surface of a 
discourse. As Foucault states,  
such discourses as economics, medicine, grammar, the science of living 
beings give rise to certain organizations of concepts, certain regroupings 
of objects, certain types of enunciation, which form, according to their 
degree of coherence, rigor, and stability, themes or theories: the 
theme…Whatever their formal level may be, I shall call these themes and 
theories ‘strategies’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 64). 
 
In archaeology one does not assume that themes and opinions can exist permanently 
through time. Moreover, different themes can coexist within the same discursive 
formation. It is possible for the same theme to be based on “two sets of concepts, two 
types of analysis, [or] two perfectly different fields of objects” (Foucault, 1972, p. 36). 
Before marking out the “dispersion of the points of choice” and defining thematic 
differences, one must try and define the “field of strategic possibilities” (Foucault, 1972, 
p. 37). This field is the discursive formation itself which is governed by the rules that 
make existence of such dispersion possible.  
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 Thus, a discursive formation is defined by “the way in which these different 
elements are related to one another” (Foucault, 1972, pp. 59-60). It is important to 
understand that discursive formation provides a configuration in which different and even 
conflicting sets of elements are allowed to coexist (Gutting, 1989, p. 232). Put in another 
way, discursive formations constitute “systems of dispersion” for its elements (Foucault, 
1972, p. 173). Moreover, the rules that govern formation of various elements are derived 
from the discursive formation itself. This study analyzes the discursive formation of 
modern medicine. It is crucial to note that discursive formation of medicine includes 
various scientific (e.g., biomedical) and nonscientific (e.g., legal, literary, philosophical, 
and commonsensical) statements that are all related to medicine as a social and discursive 
practice and, as such, archaeology deems “medicine” as much more than a merely 
scientific discipline.  
Rules for the Formation of Discursive Elements  
Once the elements are defined, analysis of discursive formation classifies the rules 
for formation of each element. Hence, there are four general categories of rules to be 
established.  
Rules for the Formation of Objects.  These are divided in three types: 
1. Rules associated with social loci (e.g., family, classroom, and workspace), also 
known as the surfaces of emergence: these rules derive from social norms, 
“whereby objects characterized in a certain way are separated off from a social 
context and transferred to the domain of the discursive formation” (Gutting, 
1989, p. 234).  
2. Rules associated with authorities of delimitation. 
129 
 
3. Rules associated with Grids of specification, which is the system whereby 
discursive formation classifies and relates different kinds of an object.  
The above three groups of rules are not independent of one another. One may discover 
various types of interaction including a hierarchical relationship among them. The 
relations between the rules need to be established by archaeological analysis. As Webb 
points out, defining a discursive formation begins with defining a field “in which objects 
are formed and their relations are established” (Webb, 2013, p. 62). Again, a discursive 
object is a group of statements that forms a discursive unity based on certain relations 
that connect them. The unity of this group, however, is not the same as ready-made 
unities that were described before. Foucault problematizes the unity of the object [as a 
group of related statements] by “shifting attention from the object to the rules of its 
formation” (Webb, 2013, p. 63). The rules for the formation of objects are local yet 
sufficiently general “to define the appearance of a group of objects within that locality” 
(Webb, 2013, p. 63). 
For an object to receive attention and begin producing significant effects, it needs 
to be taken seriously by the “authorities of delimitation”. In other words, only authorities 
of delimitation can establish existence of an object as a discursive element. Examples of 
authorities of delimitation that Foucault found in his study of madness in the nineteenth 
century include medicine, religious authorities and literary criticism (Foucault, 1988). 
Madness would not have become a significant object of discourse in the nineteenth 
century if it did not receive the attention and definitions that it did from these authorities. 
Thus, madness was taken seriously by society because social institutions such as 
medicine, religion, and literary critiques were providing commentaries on it and were 
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defining its limits. The purpose of the present study is to define such authorities of 
delimitation for each of the objects in modern medical discourse. Interestingly, the only 
qualification required for becoming an authority of delimitation for a certain object is to 
have the power to assert itself as such, and that “its doing so is accepted and taken up by 
others” (Webb, 2013, p. 65).  
The last rule for formation of discursive objects involves the grids of specification 
for each specific object, which refers to a system by which different kinds of an object 
“are divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, [and] derived from one another” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 42). In case of medicine for example, if one assumes a certain disease 
to be an object of a local medical discourse, medical science and knowledge would 
constitute the grids of specification for recognizing that disease, contrasting it from other 
similar conditions, relate it to other similar conditions in terms of its etiology or 
treatment, classify its types, and so on. It is important to understand that by going through 
all of the above-mentioned processes of formation, “the discursive object is both 
constructed and real in the highest degree” (Webb, 2013, p. 67). Furthermore, the three 
rules involving surfaces of emergence, authorities of delimitation, and grids of 
specification make up a “positive” set of conditions that are “open to clear and direct 
examination–if one knows how to look” (Webb, 2013, p. 67). Even so, one needs to 
realize that asking questions such as “what led to the introduction of a particular object” 
(as though attempting to establish causality) and whether the same condition(s) can be 
reproduced elsewhere (worrying about empirical/objective generalization) are not 
relevant to archaeological level of analysis (Webb, 2013, p. 63). The question which 
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interests archaeology, instead, is: How is it that an object could appear within a particular 
discursive field? And the bounds for that field need to be established as well.  
The point to be noted here is that the three types of rules described above do not 
by themselves create a “fully formed and armed” discursive object (Foucault, 1972, p. 
42). For that to happen, relations among the three groups of rules need to be established 
as well. In Foucault’s words, formation of an object is made possible “by a group of 
relations established between authorities of emergence, delimitation, and specification” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 44). Moreover, it is important to show how this group of relations can 
give rise to different types of objects at once to appear in the same field of discourse. In 
other words, one needs to define the conditions of existence for every object (Webb, 
2013, p. 65). Furthermore, relations among different objects emerging from the same 
discursive formation also need to be established. Relations between two objects that arise 
from the same surface of emergence (e.g., both arising from family) are not necessarily 
the same as the relations between two objects that appear on different surfaces of 
emergence (e.g., one arising from family and other from the workspace). Establishing 
relations between the latter pair tend to be more complex and even problematic at times 
(Webb, 2013, p. 65). In addition, it is important to note that “relations supported by the 
surfaces of emergence are local, with this locality giving rise to a complex space when 
viewed across a larger scale” (Webb, 2013, p. 65).  
Perhaps the most important point to be noted about relations is that discursive 
“relations are not internal to the object, defining its ‘internal constitution’, but are rather 
the conditions of its existence alongside other objects, in relation to them” (Webb, 2013, 
p. 67). In summary, discursive objects are neither things that can be obtained by 
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analyzing empirical experience, nor substances that can exist independently of their 
relations. Rather, discursive objects exist and are defined only in relation to other things. 
As Webb points out, “the conditions of their emergence locate them [objects] in a group 
of relations to other things, each of which in turn exists only in relation to the phenomena 
with which they are placed” (Webb, 2013, p. 67). This is what Foucault refers to as being 
placed “in a field of exteriority” in discourse (Foucault, 1972, p. 45).  
Rules for the Formation of Enunciative Modalities.  In Gutting’s words, “a 
statement’s modality is a function of the context from which it originates” (Gutting, 
1989, p. 235). Three types of rules govern the formation of enunciative modalities: 
1. The rules defining certain people to have the right of using a certain mode of 
speech. For example, only doctors can prescribe drugs and only judges can 
issue a legal sentence.  
2. Rules of the institutional site from which a statement originates. For 
examples, doctors need to obey the rules designated by hospital, pharmacy, 
laboratory, etc.  
3. Rules that define position of the subject making the statement in relation to the 
objects of the discourse.  
Even though archaeology decentralizes the role of human subject in analysis of discursive 
formations, it is still very much interested in “the way individuals become subjects, and 
in the form and texture of the experience given to a subject” (Webb, 2013, p. 69). To 
answer the question of how is it that different modalities of statements appear in the same 
field of discourse, archaeology poses three other questions: 1) Who is speaking? 2) From 
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what institutional site? 3) What is the subject’s position in relation to the objects of 
discourse?  
It is important to determine who is speaking (enunciating) the statement. As was 
briefly indicated in Chapter 1, there are only certain people in a society who have been 
given the status and the rights necessary to make certain statements in discourse. For 
example, only a physician can issue a medical prescription and only a judge can put 
someone to prison simply by asserting certain statements. Let us follow up with the 
example of physician here. It needs to be noted that the authority of the doctor is not 
simply stuck to their person; rather, it is the effect of the “doctor’s position in a network 
of institutional and social relations, including legal conditions and criteria of knowledge 
and competence” (Webb, 2013, p. 70). Regardless of the difference in place, time, culture 
and historical settings, physicians in various societies hold a certain type of authority. 
There is a certain degree of internal consistency that leads to secure the authority of the 
doctor even when they are using quite different methods and operate based on different 
theoretical backgrounds (Webb, 2013, p. 71).  
Furthermore, the institutional site from which the doctors draw their authority are 
also important to be established. The authority of medical discourse in general is 
associated with the institutional sites such as hospitals, private clinics, and labs–with each 
of them playing a different role in maintaining the internal consistency of medical 
discourse and therefore developing various types of relations with discursive elements. 
The institutions (which are, of course, nondiscursive structures) as well as the types of 
relations they develop regarding medical discourse are always local and can change over 
time as the new methods and practices modify or replace the old ones.  
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Lastly, the position of subject in relation to the objects of discourse needs to be 
analyzed by archaeology. For example, it is important to establish whether the statement 
is a perception, a conclusion reached based on evidence, a speculation made based on a 
theoretician’s authority, by a doctor, by a classroom teacher, by librarian, etc., because 
there are certain rules defining and delimiting each of these positions. The speaker of a 
statement can assume the position of a “questioning subject”, a “listening subject”, a 
“seeing subject”, and so on in relation to the object they are taking about. Furthermore, a 
subject maybe in a position to use certain instruments or develop certain perspectives in 
relation to the object in question. As Webb puts it,  
it may have different roles in the exchange of information about the object, 
preparing or receiving a variety of documents, and disseminating 
information and knowledge in a variety of ways to a variety of other 
parties (Webb, 2013, p. 71).  
 
Thus, the special position of the enunciative subject regarding the object(s) of the 
discourse must be established by archaeological analysis. It is important to note, however, 
that subjective positions and roles in medicine are updated over time “as new methods or 
instruments are introduced, new systems of classification are adopted, and new kinds of 
relation to other theoretical domains or institutions are established” (Webb, 2013, p. 70) 
The point to be noted is that, throughout the analysis, the goal is not to reduce the 
“disparity” of statements and their modalities of enunciation, as archaeology does not 
seek an organizing principle to give the scattered statements “their element of intrinsic 
necessity” (Foucault, 1972, p. 54). The necessity that binds these statements together 
“does not come from within, or from their adherence to a prescribed form, but from their 
relations to other statements, groups of statements and nondiscursive  events” (Webb, 
2013, p. 71). As a final point, the three types of rules for the formation of enunciative 
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modalities are also related to one another and so relations between them need to be 
established by archaeology.  
Rules for the Formation of Concepts. These are also divided into three types: 
1. Rules that establish logical, methodological, or other types of 
ordering/succession among statements.  
2. Rules related to forms of coexistence among statements in a discourse. These 
are rules that accept or reject classes of statements by defining the following 
fields for the statements of discourse:  
a. Field of presence: classifies a range of statements as accepted, another 
range as rejected, and a third range of statements as needing to be 
critically evaluated before being accepted. 
b. Field of concomitance: consists of a range of statements that are 
borrowed from other discursive formations (e.g., models that are 
borrowed from business administration in medical care delivery).  
c. Field of memory: consists of a range of statements that are no longer 
accepted but still have historical connection with the accepted 
statements (e.g., using certain herbs to treat ailments that are no longer 
used by modern medicine). 
3. Rules that specify various procedures of intervention, which may be applied to 
the statements in a discursive formation in order to produce new statements. 
Procedures of intervention include:  
a. Techniques of rewriting statements (e.g., from linear to tabular form) 
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b. Techniques of transcribing statements (e.g., into a formalized 
language) 
c. Techniques of translating statements (into quantitative or qualitative 
form) 
d. Methods of approximation, techniques for limiting the domain of a 
statement’s validity, procedures for applying a statement to a new 
domain, and methods of systematizing statements. 
Thus, the field of statements needs to be described in three parts that are concerned with 
1) orderings of series of statements, 2) forms of coexistence that are in turn divided into 
fields of presence, concomitance and memory, and, 3) procedures of intervention.  
Rather than attempting to discern the “deductive architecture” of a discourse, 
archaeology looks for different ways to establish order among various statements “by a 
succession of conceptual systems linked by a continuity in the problems they address; by 
a law that might account for the “emergence of disparate concepts”; and by a system that 
was not strictly logical (Foucault, 1972, p. 56). It’s important to understand that what 
Foucault refers to as positivity applies at the level of the rules organizing a discourse, not 
at the level of the contents of discourse. The closer one looks at the data the more obvious 
it becomes that there is no possibility of discovering a unifying principle for the 
distribution of various statements in the field of discourse. In fact, Foucault uses this 
“dispersion” itself as a form of organization (Webb, 2013, p. 74). The main purpose 
behind establishing these rules, in Foucault’s words, is rather to define 
a set of rules for arranging statements in series, an obligatory set of 
schemata of dependence, of order, and of successions, in which the 
recurrent elements that may have value as concepts were distributed 




Furthermore, it needs to note that, just like the rules for the formation of objects and 
enunciative modalities, the rules for the formation of concepts arise from within the 
discourse itself. In archaeology, one attempts to relate these rules neither to a “horizon of 
ideality, nor to the empirical progress of ideas” (Foucault, 1972, p. 63). Similar to the 
analysis of the enunciative modalities, the analysis of concepts is neither referred to “a 
formal account of the knowing subject, nor to a psychological individual” (Webb, 2013, 
p. 77). 
Rules for the Formation of Strategies.  As Gutting points out, “the range of 
possible theories in a discursive formation is specified by rules that underlie and 
implicitly control the efforts of individual thinkers” (Gutting, 1989, p. 249). Furthermore, 
the range of theoretical alternatives are determined by various points of diffraction found 
in a discursive formation. A point of diffraction is born when two or more strategies that 
are mutually exclusive of each other (both cannot be accepted at the same time) are 
present on the same level and are equally permitted by the rules of discursive formation 
(e.g., theory of evolution and the Christian idea of creationism). Often times, one does 
not find many points of diffraction in a discourse because there are factors and/or 
authorities that limit the number of alternative thinking in a discursive formation.   
Rules that govern the formation of strategies are divided into two types: 
1. Rules pertaining to the economy of the discursive constellation to which a 
particular discursive formation belongs. Several contemporary discursive 
formations belong to the same constellation; hence they serve one another as 
models of application (e.g., business administration theories adopted in 
medicine). According to Gutting (1989), “such relations may lead to the 
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elimination of points of diffraction that would otherwise exist within a 
discursive formation” (p. 249).  
2. Rules pertaining to the nondiscursive structures: A second limiting factor for 
the formation of theoretical strategies is the fact that discursive formations are 
housed in a field of nondiscursive practices and structures (e.g., medicine is 
housed in a hospital structures, medical science is housed in medical school 
structures, etc.). A nondiscursive authority may limit the number of theoretical 
choices that can arise within a discursive formation.  
It is important to understand that the above “authorities” should not be regarded as 
“disturbing elements” that are faltering the structure of an intrinsically complete 
discursive formation such as medicine. Rather, they are to be seen as “formative 
elements” of the discursive formation itself (Gutting, 1989, p. 238). 
Moreover, theoretical strategies are forms of regularities that “establish lateral or 
diagonal relations between different discourses” (Webb, 2013, p. 77). Three basic 
features for the formation of themes are as follows. First, when two discursive elements 
(objects, modalities of statement, or concepts) are incompatible with one another, they 
become the starting points for divergent strategic choices within the discourse. 
Nonetheless, one can still draw the lines of relation between such elements by 
archaeological descriptions. Second, the particular location of a discourse within a 
constellation of other discourses in the same time and space can limit the number and 
types of diverging strategies in a discourse. In other words, a number of diverging 
strategies may simply not emerge because their emergence was restricted by what 
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Foucault calls the “economy of the discursive constellation” (Foucault, 1972, p. 66). Here 
is how Webb (2013) explains the term: 
the discourse studied may be based on a model of some kind, or have been 
developed in opposition to another discourse, or alongside another 
discourse, and these factors will influence the formation of the discourse 
studied from the subgroups it brings together (p. 78). 
 
Thus, the interrelations between a cluster of discourses that belong to the same 
constellation can restrict the formation of certain statements in a certain discourse and 
therefore exclude them from being a part of the discourse in question. In other words, 
discourse is constrained by other discourses around it in a way that they do not allow it to 
give rise to certain types of objects, statement types, concepts, and themes that it might 
otherwise have done.  
In this sense, then, every discourse "is essentially incomplete, owing to the system 
of formation of its strategic choices” that do not let it ever become complete to match 
with its actual potential (Foucault, 1972, p. 67). It is important to bear in mind that the 
constellation itself is   
formed by these relations [among its constituting members] and is not 
dependent on a predetermined space. Because the strategy of a given 
discursive formation is shaped by relations between existing discourses 
and their subgroups, it does not have its roots in anything that precedes 
discourse (Webb, 2013, p. 78). 
 
This constraint is taking part in the formation of discourse by creating conditions in 
which only a specific form of discourse can emerge. That is why discourses change their 
form if they are transplanted in a different constellation. Take the discourse of medicine 
for example. It has a certain form in United States only due to its specific relations with 
other discourses in its constellation (e.g., capitalism, and business administration). 
Discourse of medicine located in a different constellation, for example in Afghanistan, 
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has a different set of objects, modes of enunciation, concepts, and theoretical strategies 
due to the absence of both capitalism and the use of business model for medical 
administration. This happens 
not because implicit content that was somehow there all along has found a 
voice for the first time; rather, the discourse itself has been modified due 
to a change in the exclusions and permissions in operation (Webb, 2013, p. 
78). 
 
Lastly, the third feature for the formation of theoretical strategies indicates that strategies 
and points of divergence that emerge in a discourse are also dependent on the field of 
nondiscursive practices to which they are related. Examples of nondiscursive structures 
that house discourses within them include medical schools and hospitals for medical 
discourse. These nondiscursive practices determine the way a discourse can function 
within them, the way it is perceived by society, and whether or not it is desirable - and by 
whom (Foucault, 1972). It is worth reemphasizing here that these factors are not extrinsic 
to the discourse, causing it to become something like a “secondary distortions of its true, 
real and always possible form” (Webb, 2013, p. 79). One must realize that in archaeology 
a “discourse only exists in its actual form and these factors contribute to making it” 
(Webb, 2013, p. 78).  
In summary, emerging themes/strategies in a discourse are the consequences of 
the way discourse negotiates its form in relation to its neighboring discourses as well as 
its surrounding nondiscursive practices. In this sense, a theme is not “the expression of a 
worldview” nor of “an interest masquerading under the pretext of a theory” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 69). Whereas certain interests that are served by a certain strategy may play a 
role in its formation, they are definitely not the only factors defining that theme (Webb, 
2013, p. 79). Before ending this section, I would like to emphasize the fact that discursive 
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unities (elements) do not “spring into life fully formed”; rather, they are often made by a 
dispersion of subgroups within them (Webb, 2013, p. 79). Moreover, discursive elements 
that emerge on the surface of a discourse can be numerous and dispersed; thus, one will 
be faced with what seems to be an irreducible multiplicity of objects, statements, 
concepts and themes (Foucault, 1972, p. 72). There is no simple fusion that can 
synthesize them together in a way to get rid of their dispersion in discourse. The elements 
thus formed, come together to form a discursive formation.  
Discursive Relations, Rules, and Regularities 
Although the terms discursive relations, rules and regularities have been discussed 
throughout this chapter, I have not had an opportunity to discuss them specifically 
enough until now. This section is dedicated to explaining how these three terms define a 
discursive formation. Let us first define what exactly is meant by relations in 
archaeology. Foucault considers three types of relations to be relevant to archaeological 
analysis: primary, secondary and discursive relations. Primary (real) relations are those 
that exist between “institutions, techniques, social forms, etc.” independent of all 
discourses (Foucault, 1972, p. 45). One example of primary relations is the relations 
between government and free market capitalism, which can be analyzed in its own right 
and independent of medical or any other discourses. Primary relations do not necessarily 
contribute to formation of relations that make the discursive objects possible. Secondary 
(reflexive) relations, on the other hand, are those that are formulated within the discourse. 
Secondary relations reflect what can be said about primary relations from within a 
discursive field. For example, doctors’ statements about how relations between 
government and free market are affecting “medicine” give rise to a group of secondary 
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(reflexive) relations. This type of relations does not “reproduce the interplay of relations 
that make possible and sustain the objects” of medical discourse (Foucault, 1972, p. 45). 
The third type of relations, which is rather specific to the analysis of discursive 
formations, is called the discursive relations. These are relations that specify a discursive 
formation by essentially producing its objects. In Foucault’s words,  
they offer it objects of which it can speak, or rather … they determine the 
group of relations that discourse must establish in order to speak of this or 
that object, in order to deal with them, name them, analyze them, classify 
them, explain them, etc. These relations characterize not the language used 
by discourse, nor the circumstances in which it is deployed, but discourse 
itself as a practice (Foucault, 1972, p. 46) 
 
Archaeological analysis is tasked to describe the discursive relations as well as the 
interplay among the discursive, primary, and secondary relations as it relates to the 
discourse (Foucault, 1972, pp. 45-46).  
Discursive relations are divided into four fundamental forms, all of which need to 
be established by archaeology: 1) relations between statements (that give rise to 
formation of elements such as objects and concepts), 2) relations between groups of 
statements (e.g., between various types of objects, between objects and concepts, etc.), 3) 
relations between statements and groups of statements (e.g., between a statements and a 
discursive object), and 4) relations between statements, groups of statements, and 
nondiscursive events (e.g., between a  discursive object and its surrounding nondiscursive 
practices). Before moving on, let us back up a little in order not to lose the big picture 
here. In archaeology one collects data in the form of text–both spoken and written–
statements. Once data is collected, analysis begins by getting rid of the synthetic unities 
that hold the statements together. This step is necessary for revealing forms of relations 
among statements that have previously been hidden from view. The next step is to 
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explore the (discursive) relations among statements with the aim of identifying a group of 
elements (objects, modalities of enunciation, concepts and strategies) and establishing the 
rules of formation for each one of them. The next level at which one analyzes the 
(discursive) relations is the level of relations among individual elements (e.g., relations 
between various objects) and relations between groups of elements (e.g., relations 
between objects and concepts).  
Discursive relations also include relations among the rules of formation for 
discursive elements. Archaeological analysis is tasked to specify interconnections among 
various systems of rules (e.g., relations between surfaces of emergence and the authorities 
of delimitation) as well as interrelations between the four groups of rules for formation of 
elements (e.g., relations between rules for formation of objects and rules for formation of 
concepts). To give an example, Foucault suggests that the points of divergence in 
strategic choices are “determined by points of divergence in the groups of concepts” and 
“theoretical choices exclude or imply … the function of certain concepts” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 72). This shows a set of reciprocal relations between rules of formation of 
concepts and rules of formation of theoretical choices (Foucault, 1972, p. 72). Similar 
patterns of interrelation among other pairs of systems of rules of formation for elements 
must also be specified (Webb, 2013). The point is to reveal regular patterns of relations 
that occur both within and between certain levels of discourse (e.g., objects, concepts, 
their rules of formation) (Webb, 2013, p. 140).  
It is important to note that archaeology not only describes relations within the 
discourse but also relations between discourse and nondiscursive practice such as 
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“technical, economic, social, political” events (Foucault, 1972, p. 29). As Foucault 
affirms,  
to reveal in all its purity the space in which discursive events are deployed 
is not to undertake to re-establish it in an isolation that nothing could 
overcome; it is not to close it upon itself; it is to leave oneself free to 
describe the interplay of relations within it and outside it (Foucault, 1972, 
p. 29). 
 
This is also to reemphasizes the fact that archaeological analysis extends beyond merely 
linguistic forms to generate an account of regularities emerging in different dimensions of 
life (Webb, 2013, p. 55). Thus, all these various groups of relations get together to form a 
system that governs the formation of the discourse in question. It must be noted that 
discursive relations are not empirical findings. They are not the outcomes of human 
experience; they rather form those experiences and therefore cannot be established by 
empirical data and analysis (Webb, 2013, p. 74).  
Having defined what is meant by “relations” in archaeology, the next term I 
would like to define here is discursive rules. As discussed before,  
archaeology defines the rules of formation of a group of statements. In this 
way it shows how a succession of events may, in the same order in which 
it is presented, become an object of discourse, be recorded, described, 
explained, elaborated into concepts, and provide the opportunity for a 
theoretical choice (Foucault, 1972, p. 167). 
It is important to note that rules governing a discursive formation do not constitute the 
conditions of possibility for the statements to emerge in a discourse. Rather, “the rules of 
the discursive formation are simply the description of the existing relations–thus they 
cannot exist before the rise of the statements themselves” (Gutting, 1989, p. 216). 
Moreover, “each statement contributes to the rule that governs its own existence” and 
therefore the rules of a discursive formation are “neither fixed, nor stages on the way to a 
final destination” (Webb, 2013, p. 127). Archaeological analysis tends to move “from 
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unity to multiplicity, from things to their relations, and from a defined form or relation to 
a variety of relations” in every step (Webb, 2013, p. 60). Moreover, the rules governing a 
discourse tend to change - and sometimes transform - with time. To illustrate this point, 
Foucault provides an example of how the hospital field changed after clinical discourse 
developed its relations with the laboratory in the nineteenth century (BC, 1975). He 
argues that the “body of rules that governed its working, the status accorded the hospital 
doctor, the function of his observation, [and] the level of analysis that can be carried out 
in it, were necessarily modified” (Foucault, 1972, p. 75) with the change of relations 
between clinical practice and laboratory in the modern age. It must be noted is that unity 
of a discourse lies in the discursive rules that emerge from it. In short, one can say that 
a group of relations can function as a rule in so far as they establish a 
regularity in the formation of objects (enunciative modalities, concepts or 
strategies) but at the same time they can be regarded precisely as the 
outcome of a regularity in the elements whose relations they describe (or 
determine). In this sense, a system of formation, viewed as a whole, is 
defined by a rule. But at the same time it owes its existence entirely to the 
series of interlacing regularities (rules) in the ‘lower’ level orders of which 
it is itself the rule. One consequence of this way of treating rules is that 
they do not precede the order to which they ‘apply’ but rather emerge from 
it (Webb, 2013, p. 83). 
Just like discursive relations, “the rules cannot be determined empirically because they do 
not themselves have the status of things, or of phenomena, and they cannot be abstracted 
from experience because they are responsible for the construction of that experience” 
(Webb, 2013, p. 112).  
The final term I would like to define in this section is discursive regularity. 
Regularity simply means existence based upon a “set of conditions” and also having “an 
effective field of appearance” (Foucault, 1972, p. 144). In other words, “a regularity is a 
pattern of consistency within a discourse” (Webb, 2013, p. 78). In archaeology one 
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defines these patterns as discursive elements, their rules, and relations. It is these 
regularities that make it possible to say what one says in a discourse (Webb, 2013, p. 
103). Similarly, it is these regularities that “allow for significant variation in the 
boundaries of medical discourse and the rules governing the practice at any time” (Webb, 
2013, p. 72). Regularities make up the law of discourse, which emerges from the existing 
relations in that discourse. We know that relations among statements change over time 
and so do the regularities that form based on those relations. Thus, the law of the 
discourse cannot be binding since it owes its existence to the very statements that it 
applies to (Webb, 2013, p. 75). A statement belongs to a discursive formation the way a 
sentence belongs to a text and a proposition to a deductive whole (Foucault, 1972, p. 
116). Whereas the law of grammar determines the regularity of a sentence and the law of 
logic determines the regularity of a proposition, the regularity of a statement is 
determined by the fact of its belonging to the discursive formation itself. Further, one 
needs to note that “the fact of its belonging to a discursive formation and the laws that 
govern it are one and the same thing” (Foucault, 1972, p. 116). 
It is crucial to understand that the term “regularity” is not defined as opposed to 
the “irregularity” of what might be called deviant statements (e.g., abnormal, 
pathological, or the product of genius). There are no irregularities in a discourse as that 
term would suggest presence of events that are not “rule based” as opposed to those that 
are “rule based” (Webb, 2013, p. 125). Furthermore, a regularity is not an “index of 
frequency or probability”; rather, it designates a set of conditions for the existence of 
every statement whether it is “extraordinary or banal, unique in its own kind or endlessly 
repeated” (Foucault, 1972, p. 144). As Foucault puts it,  
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every statement bears a certain regularity and it cannot be dissociated from 
it. One must not therefore oppose the regularity of a statement with the 
irregularity of another (that may be less expected, more unique, richer in 
innovation), but to other regularities that characterize other statements 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 144). 
 
It might be difficult, however, to establish all discursive regularities for a certain 
discursive formation as there are different kinds and degrees of regularity to be found in a 
discourse (Webb, 2013, p. 126).  
I would like to emphasize that all regularities arising on the surface of a discourse 
have the same status and none of them have any type of privilege over the others. No 
regularity is absolute either. (Webb, 2013, p. 126). Ironically enough, discursive 
formations not only give rise to regularities that end up constituting rules governing the 
discourse, they also give rise to oppositions to those regularities, which are known as 
contradictions in a discourse. Contradictions emerge from specific forms of discursive 
relations, just like regularities do (Webb, 2013, p. 131). To conclude this section, let us 
say that it is the discursive relations, rules, and regularities that together define the unity 
and specificity of a discursive formation. In Foucault’s words,   
whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a 
system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, 
concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, 
correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), we will say, for 
the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive formation 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 38) 
 
Therefore, to define a discursive formation, one needs to establish the discursive 
regularities that emerge from it in the form of elements, rules and relations.   
Discursive Conditions 
As argued before, archaeological study of medicine goes beyond asking what it 
means for medicine to be a science. The main question here is to look for conditions by 
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virtue of which it exist as a science at all (Webb, 2013, p. 150). In general, there are two 
levels of conditions that are relevant to archaeological analysis: 1) conditions of 
existence, and 2) conditions of possibility. Conditions of existence are the same as rules 
of formation for the discursive elements. In Foucault’s words, “the rules of formation are 
conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification, and 
disappearance) in a given discursive division” (Foucault, 1972, p. 38). As we have seen 
already, they do not define what is possible to emerge in a discourse but “frame precisely 
the conditions of what has occurred” (Webb, 2013, p. 62). Moreover, like all discursive 
rules and relations, conditions of existence can change over time. For example, we know 
that medicine always takes place under strictly rule-governed conditions. Therefore, if the 
time and place change it will no longer be possible for medicine to work under its former 
set of rules and conditions. This means that conditions of existence of a discursive 
formation are sensitive to temporo-spatial changes and therefore they are constantly 
being updated.  
Conditions of possibility, on the other hand, are to some extent determined by the 
positivity of discursive formation and what Foucault calls the historical a priori. Whereas 
no one can determine the exact statements which may or may not arise in a particular 
discourse, the law of coexistence as defined by positivity of a discourse can predict what 
may or may not fit within that particular discourse. Positivity of a discourse ensures that 
future subjects will be at least talking about the same things, will place themselves at the 
same level or at the same distance, will use the same conceptual filed, or oppose one 
another on the same grounds (Foucault, 1972, p. 126). In Foucault’s words, positivity 
“defines a field in which formal identities, thematic continuities, translations of concepts, 
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and polemical interchanges may be deployed” (Foucault, 1972, p. 127). Hence, positivity 
of a discursive formation makes it possible only for certain types of objects to arise, 
certain positions to be assumed by subjects, and certain conceptual fields to be espoused. 
As such, positivity of discourse plays the role of what Foucault calls a historical a priori 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 127). It is the “historical a priori that determines the formal 
designation of the conditions of a discourse” (Webb, 2013, p. 118).  
Foucault’s usage of the term a priori is different from Kant’s, however. What 
Foucault depicts is an 
a priori that is not a condition of validity for judgments, but a condition of 
reality for statements. It is not a question of rediscovering what might 
legitimize an assertion, but of freeing the conditions of emergence of 
statements, the law of their coexistence with others, the specific form of 
their mode of being, the principles according to which they survive, 
become transformed, and disappear (Foucault, 1972, p. 127). 
 
For Kant, a priori knowledge constituted the basic understanding humans can reach 
through reasoning alone and without depending on prior empirical experience. The a 
priori knowledge typically consisted of human intuitions about time and space and 
categorization of human understanding. Kant assumed the a priori knowledge to be the 
product of “pure” reason and not a synthetic construction of prior empirical experiences 
(Webb, 2013, p. 54). To avoid any confusion with formal a priori as conceived by Kant, 
Foucault affirms that the two forms of a priori conditions - historical and formal - are 
neither of the same nature nor they belong to the same level. They occupy two different 
dimensions that may intersect at times (Foucault, 1972, p. 128). Foucault’s historical a 
priori,  
is defined as the group of rules that characterize a discursive practice: but 
these rules are not imposed from the outside on the elements that they 
relate together; they are caught up in the very things that they connect… 
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and are transformed with them… The a priori of positivities is not only the 
system of a temporal dispersion; it is itself a transformable group 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 127). 
 
Thus, positivity of a discourse and the historical a priori can define only the most general 
characteristics of the “observable structures and the field of possible objects” in a certain 
discourse (Foucault, 1972, p. 147). Furthermore, it is the law of coexistence, not a 
condition of possibility that determines whether or not a statement is part of the 
discursive formation (Foucault, 1972). 
Let us take an example here to illustrate how the law of coexistence among 
statements works. Imagine two physicians talking about a wildfire in California or the 
quality of Jimmy John’s sandwiches. One can tell that these statements do not belong to 
medical discourse even if they are spoken by doctors inside a hospital. But how exactly 
do we know that? It is probably because we know that, in general, there is not enough 
talk about wildfires and sandwiches in medicine so they cannot be objects of a medical 
discourse. To be more precise, because these statements are not bound with other similar 
statements in a field of coexistence, medicine does not determine their mode of being nor 
the principles according to which they survive and, reciprocally, medicine is not affected 
by their transformation or disappearance. Thus, the law of coexistence cannot justify their 
status as belonging to medical discourse. However, this is an oversimplified example. It 
is not always easy to dismiss all objects, especially those that are more complex, as either 
belonging or not belonging to medical discourse. An archaeological analysis of modern 
medical discourse can enhance these conversations by defining the field of coexistence 
where various statements can find a place.  
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It is worth reiterating here that archaeological conditions lie in sharp contrast from 
both empirical and transcendental conditions. Empirical conditions are assumed to come 
before the conditioned– according to a certain temporal scale. Hence, the “temporal 
priority of condition over conditioned, and the irreversibility of their relation” is assumed 
(Webb, 2013, p. 114). Transcendental conditions too precede the empirical reality they 
condition. In either case, the condition not only precedes the conditioned but also exists 
independently of the conditioned and remains insulated from its feedback effects (Webb, 
2013, p. 114). Archaeological conditions, on the other hand, not only coincide with what 
they condition (and thus do not precede or follow it), they are also not immune from the 
feedback effects of what happens with the conditioned. In Webb’s words, “the 
‘conditioning’ regularity falls together with the ‘conditioned’ regularity because a 
regularity as formulated in a law or rule is merely descriptive of the regularity that has 
emerged” (Webb, 2013, p. 104). Thus,  
any discontinuity or deviation in the regularity as it occurs will have an 
immediate impact on the law (or the principle of construction): there is no 
separation between them, or no separation that is not bridged by events. 
This can only happen because there is a two-way communication between 
conditions and conditioned (Webb, 2013, p. 104). 
 
Thus, a key difference between archaeology and both empirical and transcendental 
conditions lies in the relation between the condition and what it conditions. 
On the one hand, we know that in a discursive formation statements contribute to 
the regularities that they give rise to. Therefore, even the most general rules in 
archaeology have antecedent conditions (e.g., statements making conditions of existence 
for regularities) so “there can literally be no ‘first principle’ or necessary point of 
departure” (Webb, 2013, p. 127). On the other hand, what Foucault calls the “higher 
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order” regularities condition the coexistence of individual statement (see the law of 
coexistence as part of the discussion on historical a priori earlier, in this section, for 
more). In either case, the conditions do not exist in advance of what they condition; 
rather, they are situated at the same level as that of statements and the relations among 
them (Webb, 2013, p. 117). One can see that neither of these constitute conditions for the 
possibility of what is regulated since these conditions themselves are “caught up in the 
very thing that they connect … and are transformed with them” (Foucault, 1972, p. 127). 
One might therefore conclude that discourse “avoids both the priority of conditions over 
conditioned and the irreversibility of their relation” (Webb, 2013, p. 117). 
Archaeology is also distinguished from an empirical history by the fact that the 
latter often relies on formal and even transcendental conditions for the possibility of 
experience (Webb, 2013, p. 124). In contrast, archaeology looks at the conditions of 
actual existence, not of possibility (Foucault, 1972). It sees discourse as “a complex 
configuration of relations in which events feed back into their conditions” (Webb, 2013, 
p. 134). In other words, and as explained above, discursive conditions coincide with the 
events they condition. In conclusion, the unity of a discourse is delimited by its 
conditions. In search of this unity, archaeology does not seek the “unity of an origin, but 
the complexity of the historical relations that constitute discursive formations” (Webb, 
2013, p. 150). The unity of a discursive formation “defines a limited space of 
communication” (Foucault, 1972, p. 126) which is defined in itself by a set of 
describable, discursive relations. It is not expected of the subjects to know exactly what 
they are talking about since they are not the “masters” of their discourse and are rather all 
caught up within “a web … of which they cannot see the whole” (Foucault, 1972, p. 126. 
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Thus, discursive relations can be spotted, traced and described regardless of “who knew 
what about whom and when” (Webb, 2013, p. 111). At the end of the day, it is the 
positivity of a discourse that “defines the thematic continuities, the translation of 
concepts, and even the space within which such disputes and engagements can take 
place” (Webb, 2013, p. 111). Again, it is these conditions that are set up by positivity of a 
discourse that Foucault calls a historical a priori for the discursive formation.  
Study Setting 
The primary study setting in this project was Indiana University School of 
Medicine, Indianapolis campus. Before moving on, I would like to provide some 
contextual information about the school itself. Indiana University School of Medicine 
was first established in 1903, in Bloomington, Indiana. It became first accredited by 
Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LCME) during WWII. Today, Indiana 
University School of Medicine is the largest accredited school of medicine among 135 
others nationwide. It includes nine medical school campuses located within the host 
schools in Bloomington, Evansville, Fort Wayne, West Lafayette, Muncie, Gary, South 
Bend and Terre Haute. All campuses offer third and fourth-year clinical work as well as 
the beginning two years of preclinical education. More than half of all physicians 
practicing in the state of Indiana have been trained as students and/or residents at Indiana 
University School of Medicine.  
In the year 2019, 365 students (out of 6,683 who applied) were admitted to the 
MD program at Indiana University School of Medicine. This year-one student body 
consisted of 186 males, 179 females, and 58 members of the underrepresented minorities. 
Among them were 285 in-state and 80 out-of-state students. The average student GPA for 
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the class enrolled in 2019 was 3.81, with the average MCAT score being 511. In 2019, the 
distribution of total enrolled medical student body at Indiana University School of 
Medicine–across all nine campuses–was as follows: 848 students in Indianapolis, 85 in 
Bloomington, 65 in Evansville, 84 in Fort Wayne, 60 in West Lafayette, 54 in Muncie, 76 
in Gary, 88 in South Bend, and 76 in Terre Haute, making up a total student body of 
1,436 medical students across all nine campuses (according to the IUSM Fact Sheet 
2019-2020).  
The MD program’s annual tuition is ~$35,503 for in-state students, and ~60,811 
for out-of-state students. Indiana University School of Medicine houses 94 accredited 
residency and fellowship programs where 1,216 residents and fellows are currently being 
trained. There are 2,840 full-time faculty, 336 part-time faculty, 3,450 volunteer faculty, 
and 2,023 staff members currently employed at the Indiana University School of 
Medicine. The school also houses an array of research programs with most of them being 
located at or around the Indianapolis campus. The grants awarded to research projects at 
Indiana University School of Medicine–for IU fiscal year ending June 30, 2019–
amounted to $362,115,081 (IUSM Fact Sheet 2019-2020) 
Indianapolis campus, located within the Indiana University Purdue University 
Indianapolis (IUPUI) campus in downtown Indianapolis, hosts the largest number of 
medical students, faculty, and staff. All the same, medical education curriculum across all 
nine campuses share the same program objectives. Furthermore, medical students, faculty 
and staff in any of the nine campuses statewide adhere to the same policies and standards 
established by the school administration. At Indianapolis campus, classrooms range from 
large lecture halls to small-group study rooms. This campus has a convenient proximity 
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to some of the largest teaching hospitals and patient care facilities in the state of Indiana, 
where the clinical education portion of the medical curriculum, including third- and 
fourth-year clerkships and electives for those enrolled in the Indianapolis campus are 
currently being taught.  
The point of providing a relatively thick description of the study setting, in 
general, is twofold: 1) lessening the issues of representation (Coffey, 1999), and, 2) 
enhancing transferability of findings to other similar settings (Mertens, 2015). It is a 
qualitative research tradition to provide as much contextual information as possible so 
that the readers can judge for themselves that in what ways and to what extent is another 
similar setting different from the one used in the current project. Hence, the burden of 
evidence is being put on those who might claim other medical students are different than 
those enrolled at Indiana University School of Medicine, and as such, the conclusions we 
draw from studying Indiana University School of Medicine’s students do not have 
important implications for other medical students across the U.S. (Becker et al., 1961; 
Mertens, 2015).  
Study Participants and Participant Selection Methods 
All medical students enrolled in Indiana University School of Medicine, 
Indianapolis campus–regardless of the year of their study–were invited to participate in 
this study via email (see Appendix B). The goal was to recruit a total of 20 students for 
face-to-face interviews and a total of up to 28 students to participate in 4 focus groups. 
Having participated in a face-to-face interview was not used as an exclusion criterion 
against those who were willing to participate in a focus group as well. A copy of the 
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Study Information Sheet (see Appendix A) along with further information was sent to all 
actively enrolled medical students at the Indianapolis campus.  
Self-selected volunteers who participated in face-to-face interviews included 8 
MS1, 3 MS2, 5 MS3, and 4 MS4 students. Interviewees consisted of 12 men and 8 
women (as self-reported by participants). According to their self-reported data, the 
race/ethnicity breakdown of the interview participants were as follows: 12 Caucasian, 2 
South Asian, 2 African, and 4 multiracial students. Participants reported their social 
economic class as follows: 3 upper class, 1 upper-middle class, 10 middle class, 3 
middle-lower class, and 3 lower class. All one-on-one interviews were conducted in 
February 2019 with the exception of one that was conducted in March 2019 (see Table 
3.1). All interviews were held in a conference room on the Indianapolis campus and 
lasted for at least 60 minutes. Free lunch was provided to all participants.  
Table 3.1 





Gender Race/Ethnicity Social Class INT date 
1 004 MS4 M Caucasian Middle class Feb 13, 2019 




Feb 4, 2019 
3 023 MS3 F Caucasian Middle class Feb 20, 2019 
4 034 MS4 M Caucasian Middle class Feb 11, 2019 
5 043 MS3 F Caucasian  
and Latina 
Middle class Feb 11, 2019 
6 051 MS1 F Caucasian Lower class Feb 20, 2019 
7 063 MS3 F Caucasian Middle class Feb 13, 2019 
8 072 MS2 M Caucasian Middle class Feb 4, 2019 
9 081 MS1 M Hispanic and 
Caucasian 
Middle class Mar 29, 2019 
10 093 MS3 F Caucasian Middle class Feb 11, 2019 
11 103 MS3 M Caucasian Middle-lower 
class 
Feb 13, 2019 







Gender Race/Ethnicity Social Class INT date 
13 121 MS1 M African 
American 
Upper class Feb 4, 2019 
14 134 MS4 M Caucasian Middle-lower 
class 
Feb 13, 2019 
15 141 MS1 M South Asian Middle-lower 
class 
Feb 25, 2019 




Upper class Feb 27, 2019 
17 161 MS1 F Caucasian Lower class Feb 18, 2019 
18 171 MS1 F Filipino and 
White 
Upper class Feb 4, 2019 
19 184 MS4 M African Lower class Feb 18, 2019 
20 191 MS1 F South Asian 
American 
Middle class Feb 11, 2019 
Note. The information about gender, race/ethnicity, and social class were documented as 
self-reported by participants. 
A total of 4 focus groups were also held on campus in the same conference room 
with each session lasting for at least 60 minutes. Participants in each focus group session 
consisted of: 7 MS1 students in first focus group (total of 7), 7 MS2 and 1 MS1 students 
in second focus group (total of 8), 2 MS3, 1 MS1 and 1 MS4 in third focus group (total of 
4), and, 5 MS4 students in fourth focus group (total of 5). The initial plan was to hold one 
focus group session with each of MS1, MS2, MS3, and MS4 students due to ease of 
scheduling and creating a group interest for students to feel comfortable with other 
students from their own cohort. However, students who volunteered to join another 
cohort instead of their own were also welcomed [e.g., MS1 student joining MS3 focus 
group session because the date and time for MS3 session worked better with their 
personal schedule]. A total of 24 students participated in focus groups with each session 
lasting for at least 60 minutes. Focus group participants consisted of 14 men and 10 
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women (as self-reported by participants). According to their self-reported data, the 
race/ethnicity breakdown of the focus group participants were as follows: 13 Caucasian, 
3 White Middle Eastern, 3 South Asian, 2 African American, 2 multiracial, and 1 Asian 
American students. Three out of four focus groups were conducted in April 2019 and the 
fourth one was conducted in March 2019 (see Table 3.2). Each focus group participant 
received a $10 Amazon.com gift card as an incentive. Thus, a grand total of 44 students 
enrolled at the Indiana University School of Medicine, Indianapolis, participated in 
interviews and focus groups.  
Table 3.2 
Focus Group Participants’ Gender and Race/Ethnicity 
Session Date No. Year of Study Gender Race/Ethnicity 
FG Cohort: MS1 
Apr 11, 2019 1 MS1 M Multiracial 
2 MS1 F White, Middle Eastern 
3 MS1 F White, Middle Eastern 
4 MS1 M Multiracial 
5 MS1 M Caucasian  
6 MS1 F Caucasian 
7 MS1 M South Asian 
FG Cohort: MS2 
Apr 11, 2019 1 MS2 M Asian American 
2 MS2 F Caucasian 
3 MS2 M Caucasian 
4 MS2 F Caucasian 
5 MS2 M Caucasian 
6 MS2 M South Asian American 
7 MS1 F African American 
8 MS2 M Caucasian 
FG Cohort: MS3 
Apr 2, 2019 1 MS3 F Caucasian 
2 MS3 F Caucasian 
3 MS4 M Caucasian 
4 MS1 M Caucasian 
FG Cohort: MS4 
Mar 28, 2019 1 MS4 M White, Middle Eastern 
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Session Date No. Year of Study Gender Race/Ethnicity 
2 MS4 M Caucasian 
3 MS4 F Caucasian 
4 MS4 M South Asian American 
5 MS4 F African American 
Note. The information about gender and race/ethnicity were documented as self-reported 
by participants. 
This study also employed direct observation as an additional method of data 
collection. Direct observations were conducted at various educational settings including 
lecture halls, small-group study sessions, laboratories, and hospital rounds. No specific 
participants were recruited for the observational activities. A total of 60.5 hours were 
spent on direct observations, out of which 40 hours were spent at the Family Medicine 
Department, IU Methodist Hospital, 10 hours at the Surgery Department, IU Health 
University Hospital, 7 hours at IU Health Simulation Lab, and 3.5 hours were spent 
observing surgery clinical lectures at IUSM, Indianapolis campus. Direct observation of 
these sites were conducted between January and July 2019. Table 3.3 summarizes the 
information about the sites and dates of the direct observations conducted in the present 
research.  
Fieldnotes were written either on site (when possible and permitted by clinical 
circumstances) or immediately after leaving the site. A total of about 120 pages of 
fieldnotes were produced during this activity. With the goal of this study being to define 
the discursive formation of modern medicine at Indiana University School of Medicine - 
Indianapolis, it was considered to be rewarding to have student participants at all stages 
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of their medical training (MS1, MS2, MS3, MS46, Residents) as well as other participants 
including but not limited to medical educators, physicians, nurses, patients, and patient 
families.  
Table 3.3 
Direct Observation Sites and Dates 
 
                                               
6 Some of the MS3 and MS4 students participating in this study spent their first two years of study 
at one of the regional IUSM campuses and came to Indianapolis only for their clinical years 3 and 4. I do 
not classify my MS3 and MS4 research participants based on whether they were a student at Indianapolis 
since the beginning of their training or came to Indianapolis as an MS3 student. Making a distinction like 
that would be irrelevant to the present study because this study is looking at the discourse of medicine at 
Indianapolis campus in 2019. All of my MS3 and MS4 student participants were there in 2019 and were 





Family Medicine,               
IU Methodist Hospital 
 
40 June 3-14, 2019 
Between 6:30 AM and 2:30 PM 
Surgery, IU Health 
University Hospital 
10 Jan 8-9, 2019 
Pre and Post-Operative Ward 
8:00 AM-12:00 PM (8 hours) 
 
May 1, 2019: Morning Rounds with 
Surgery Team 
5:00 AM to 7:00 AM (2 hours) 
 
IU Health Simulation Lab: 
Fairbanks Hall 
 
7 June 6, 2019 
8:00 AM to 3:00 PM 
Surgery Clinical Lessons, 
Walther Hall 
3.5 May 3, 2019 
12:30-2:00 PM: Admission Orders 
(Lecture) by Nurse Educator 
2:00-4:00 PM: Gall Bladder Disease 
(Case Studies) by Surgeon 
Total Hours: 60.5 
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Data Collection Methods 
Data was collected from a heterogeneous sample of medical students through one-
on-one interviews and focus groups, and, through direct observation of a variety of 
educational and clinical settings. Multiple sources were used to elicit various types of 
data including observational, verbal, and textual information. In other words, I have used 
observational fieldnotes as well as interview and focus group transcripts as data for the 
present archaeological analysis. Data consisted of both monological data (collected 
unobtrusively through writing observation fieldnotes) and dialogical data (collected via 
interviews and focus groups in collaboration with study participants) (Grbich, 2013, p. 
57).  
Interviews 
Procedure. A total of 20 interviews involving students from each of the years 
MS1, MS2, MS3, and MS4 were conducted in this study (see Table 3.1). The interview 
format was semi-structured (Mertens, 2015; Seidman, 2013). That is, although a set 
number of questions were asked of all students to guide the discussion, participants were 
allowed to talk about things that mattered to them even if they were not on the interview 
protocol (see Appendix C). Each interview consisted of two roughly divided parts. The 
first ~10 minutes were spent on building rapport between interviewer and the 
interviewee. Questions asked during this time mainly focused on student’s demographic 
information and educational background. Remainder of the time (~50 minutes) was spent 
in discussing participant’s views on the topics related to identity, professionalism, and 
medicine as a social practice. All interviews were audio recorded using Zoom 
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conferencing tool (https://zoom.us/) and were transcribed verbatim by myself at a later 
time. INT transcripts used in this study consisted of approximately 200 pages of data. 
Rationale. Identities are constructed within medical interactional settings as we 
recount the events to ourselves and others (Monrouxe, 2009a; Monrouxe, 2009b; 
Clandinin & Cave, 2008; and Monrouxe & Sweeney, 2010). Further, as we try to make 
sense of previous events by telling a story, our identities emerge in those stories. In these 
narratives we position ourselves according to cultural and social expectations displaying 
the performative aspects of our identity (Schiffrin, 1996). Therefore, the concept of a 
narrative is a powerful way to understand how identities are shaped and re-shaped as 
people provide a sense of coherence to their lives by telling a story (McAdams, 2006) and 
recounting their actions and behavior (Ricoeur, 1992). It is not difficult to see the 
conventional codes and the allegiances to socially constructed discourses in anyone’s 
speech when they are talking about themselves and others (Butler, 2002). For example, 
narrating stories about how they became interested in medicine as a profession, students 
made statements referencing several of the objects, modes of statement, concepts and 
theoretical strategies that are prominent in discursive formation of modern medicine. In 
these interviews, students also signified their views on what enables and what constrains 
actions in the face of a particular practice or event, which entailed further details about 
the rules and relations in medicine as a discursive formation.  
Goals. The purpose of holding one-on-one conversations was to collect student 
statements regarding the discursive structure of medicine and how this structure is 
constituting their professional identity.  
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Protocol. The interview protocol designed and used in this study is provided in 
the Appendix C section of this dissertation. 
Focus Groups 
Procedure. A total of 4 focus group sessions were conducted in this study (see 
Table 3-2). Focus groups were held after all one-on-one interviews were completed. The 
discussion format was semi-structured. That is, although a set number of discussion 
prompts were provided in each meeting, participants were allowed to talk about things 
that they thought were important even if they were not on the meeting protocol (see 
Appendix D). Student discussions focused on the topics of medical identity and 
professionalism, as well as medicine as a social practice. All meetings were audio 
recorded using Zoom conferencing tool and transcribed verbatim by myself at a later 
time. FG transcripts used in this study consisted of approximately 150 pages of data.  
Rationale. Similar to one-on-one interviews, this data collection method also 
aimed at collecting medical students’ statements on discursive formation of medicine and 
students’ professional identities through analysis of talk. As other researchers have found, 
narratives that instantiate identities do not just happen when we are recounting “big 
stories” about our lives. Such illuminating narratives can also be found in fleeting 
moments of ordinary conversational context (Monrouxe et al., 2009; Rees & Monrouxe, 
2009; de Fina et al., 2006; and Georgakopoulou, 2007) as we establish our positionality 
toward an instantaneous prompt in a group discussion. It was these fleeting moments of 
rather natural conversation that I was aiming to reach by holding focus group meetings. 
The focus was on capturing the micro-processes that occur within and through language 
use. For example, Monrouxe (2009a, 2009b, 2010) shows that medical students draw on 
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a number of master narratives as they describe everyday events. These included “the 
privilege narrative” (the privileged position of being a doctor or future doctor), “the 
healing doctor narrative” (where the role of the doctor is to cure the sick) and “the 
detached doctor narrative (where the doctor is somewhat confused about his/her exact 
role and identity) (Monrouxe, 2010, p. 47; Monrouxe, 2009a; Monrouxe, 2009b). Careful 
analyses of the ways in which students talk about medicine as a profession also casted 
light on the process of developing their professional selves and achieving a medical 
identity through their interactions with medical school and hospital environments.  
Goals. The purpose of holding conversations with groups of medical students in 
focus groups was to incite more students’ statements regarding the discursive structure of 
medicine and show how those structures constitute their professional identities through 
archaeological analysis of the discourse. 
Protocol.  The focus group protocol that was developed and used in this study is 
provided in the Appendix D section of this dissertation. 
Direct Observations 
Procedure. Observations were performed in various educational settings such as 
lectures, labs, small-group study sessions, and hospital rounds. Random student groups 
from different cohorts (MS3 and MS4) were observed in didactic and/or clinical settings–
on a random schedule. The observation focused on events that involved professional 
behavior of medical students as they go about their daily interactions in the medical 
school environment. Informal chatting with students, faculty, staff, physicians, and 
patients were had at times when the opportunity arose naturally. On other occasions, I 
was silently observing the overall setting and (sometimes) documenting the observation 
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in the form of fieldnotes. OBS fieldnotes used in this study consisted of approximately 
120 pages of data. 
Observations were performed either in overt or covert mode depending on the 
circumstances in different settings. Whenever possible, the observational data was 
collected through an overt process. That is, students, faculty, patients, physicians, and 
others present in the scene were notified of my identity as a researcher and the purpose of 
my presence, which was conducting my Ph.D. dissertation research (e.g., in the Family 
Medicine Ward at IU Methodist). Individuals present on site did not need to do anything 
to help with the process. They were asked to go about their routine as usual. However, 
there were times when this was not easy to do. For instance, when observing a hospital 
wards, there were too many people including physicians, staff, student trainees, patients, 
patients’ family members, etc. who were in constant transit. Plus, the population in the 
scene tended to change partially or sometimes entirely every few minutes as I moved 
from one patient to another with the medical care team. In those circumstances, it was 
next to impossible to make sure everyone knew who I was and what I was doing - at all 
times. Furthermore, I wanted to cause as less of a disturbance to the normal clinical 
procedures as possible. When I went on morning rounds with teams of physicians and 
residents, I was quietly following the team trying my best to stay almost invisible to 
everyone. The last thing I wanted to do was to remind them of my presence every minute 
and distract them from their intensely focused job. The patients and patients’ families 
often thought I was part of the team of doctors as I was wearing a lab coat and scrubs the 
entire time while I was at the hospital. Therefore, the observation process was at times 
covert (not everyone was aware of my identity as a researcher and/or that I am observing 
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them for research purposes) and unstructured descriptive data was more attainable in 
those situations (Grbich, 2013). One advantage of the covert observation is that 
researcher’s presence becomes unobtrusive and thus observation of the authentic form of 
routine activities in social settings is a more likely outcome. In an overt observation, 
sometimes those present in the field consciously or unconsciously lose their natural 
contour due to the feeling of being observed (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005). When 
observing overtly, I was using paper and pencil to document fieldnotes during the 
observations. When it was not possible to observe overtly, the observation was still 
carried on in a covert mode in which case I had to write my fieldnotes after leaving the 
setting. 
I believe that there is no one “natural”, “correct”, or “best” way of writing what 
one observes when it comes to writing fieldnotes. I also agree with Emerson et al. (2011) 
that writing fieldnotes is not a matter of passively copying down “facts” about “what 
happened” (p. 9). Indeed, describing a setting involves selection and emphasis upon 
different features and actions while either consciously or subconsciously leaving out 
others. It goes without saying that different people have different ways of filtering and 
processing an exact same event, which is due to every individual relying on their personal 
lens to interpret, frame, and represent what they see. Besides, there are no absolute 
standards for determining a point after which one can say one has documented “enough 
detail” about a certain event (Emerson et al., 2011, p. 18). How closely one looks and 
describes a setting or event depends on what is “of interest”, which varies according to 
researcher’s positionality and theoretical concerns of their study. This is precisely why 
researcher’s positionality matters in qualitative research. 
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While in the field, I paid special attention to processes and interactions through 
which members of a particular social setting create and sustain specific and local realities 
(Emerson et al., 2011). Writing authentic fieldnotes in this study was a way to capture 
and preserve the indigenous language of the statements circulating in the air. I made an 
effort to limit myself writing about preconceptions I had about the field members’ roles 
and activities and rather attempted to capture what the field members were actually 
saying and doing. One well-known limitation of direct observation as a method of data 
collection is its character of being selective. The action and talking that occur in a social 
setting are always part of a “multi-channeled event” (Walker, 1986, p. 211), whereas 
writing is linear in its very nature and, as such, it can handle only one channel at a time 
(see Azim, et al., 2020, for more). The researcher has no way but to pick and choose 
among the multiple events all of which are happening at the same time (e.g., multiple 
people might be talking and multiple actions might be taking place simultaneously, yet, 
only one conversation thread or action can be documented in writing, which means 
having to leave others irretrievably out of the fieldnotes). 
Rationale. It has been argued that identities are constructed and co-constructed 
within medical interactional settings as medical students go about the details of their 
daily routine (Lingard et al., 2003; Monrouxe et al., 2009; Rees & Monrouxe, 2009; 
Atkinson, 1995; Holland et al., 1998). With the focus of the present study being on the 
discursive structure of modern medical discourse and how it constitutes the professional 
identify of medical students, a direct observation of the details of the daily work within 
the medical interactional settings was necessary.  
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Goals. The purpose of observing small groups of medical students and other 
healthcare professionals within an interactional social setting was to get a feel for the 
situations and contexts medical students are getting exposed to in their daily encounters. 
Besides, direct observation of educational settings helped exposing many of the 
discursive regularities emerging in the discourse of medicine.   
Data Management  
Each interview participant was assigned an identification code to protect their 
identity. Any student, faculty, staff, doctor or patient names mentioned in the data 
presented in Chapter 4 are pseudonyms. However, names of those who neither 
participated in interviews nor were observed directly are left unchanged (e.g., if a student 
is talking about their mentor as their role-model and mentions that mentor’s name]. All 
age-related information provided for patients are pseudo numbers. No Patient specific 
information or Protected Health Information (PHI) that could help identify individual 
patients are part of the data presented in this dissertation. All patient information was 
protected in accordance with Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPPA). A Microsoft Word document containing the information about ID codes and 
pseudonyms for the study participants was stored under a random file and folder name in 
a secure Indiana University Box account. All data including audio-recordings of the 
interviews and focus groups were stored in a password-protected personal laptop 
connected to a personal Microsoft OneDrive (https://onedrive.live.com/) account that can 
only be accessed by myself as the researcher.  
169 
 
Researcher Positionality  
Maxwell (1996) argues that “what the researcher thinks is going on with the 
phenomena” is brought to the study and that influences not only the purpose of the study, 
but also “what literature, preliminary research and personal experience” the researcher 
draws on in conceptualizing the study (p. 4). In other words,  
research is always carried out by an individual with a life and a 
lifeworld…a personality, a social context, and various personal and 
practical challenges and conflicts, all of which affect the research, from 
the choice of a research question or topic, through the methods used, to the 
reporting of the project’s outcome (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998, p. 4). 
  
Indeed, making even the smallest observation requires the acceptance of some 
background assumptions and some system of beliefs to organize what one is seeing. The 
claim here is that social research is a value-laden process. Application of a positivist logic 
to qualitative data with the expectation that the data directly support the hypotheses, or in 
the case of the present study, theory, would be a mistake. The fact is that data does not 
speak for itself (Luttrell, 2010). Ironically, the same data can be used to support 
contradictory hypotheses made by different researchers who are pursuing different 
purposes. The type of connections that are made between data and hypothesis/theory 
depends on the background assumptions underpinning the researcher’s analytical 
approach (Longino, 1989). My assumptions in this study come from philosophical 
underpinnings of social constructionist and postmodernist research paradigms. The 
constructionist ontology, relativist epistemology, and value-laden axiology of the above 
two paradigms are making the backbone of the present work. 
In social sciences research, the researcher cannot be separated from her 
background, life experiences and belief systems that inevitably filter impressions of the 
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actions and behavior of others (Grbich, 2013). It is crucial to recognize that researchers 
are human beings with their own life histories. As such, no researcher comes into their 
research study as a clean slate, and thus they all end up exerting an influence on their 
research processes. We interact, react, incorporate and shift in a never-ending process 
during every moment of our lives, which includes the time we spend in the research field. 
While tracking all aspects of one’s person would be next to impossible, identifying a few 
major lines to draw a rough sketch of one’s positionality in the world for the consumers 
of one’s research is strongly recommended in qualitative research (Mertens, 2015; 
Denzin & Lincoln, 2018; Luttrell, 2010).  
In this study, I am not claiming to speak from a position of “truth”, as I am aware 
of the fact that I myself am subjected to social discourses and so am able to speak only 
within the limits of those discourses that are present in my corner of the world. That does 
not mean that I cannot be critical of my own surroundings as a researcher. What it does 
mean is that there are limits to my thinking, speaking, and writing, inside which I as the 
researcher am trapped–either knowingly or unknowingly. Providing a statement of 
positionality will help the reader understand some discursive limits that are determining 
my mode of existence. In the next few pages, I will talk about myself with the aim of 
exposing my personal “web of situated positionality” (Pillow, 2003, p. 187) to the reader. 
Identifying myself as a 37-year-old, lower-middle class, white, Middle Eastern, 
heterosexual woman who is a medical educator and an anatomist, I would like to 
expound on: how I perceive my own positionality in the field, how I think others perceive 
me in the field, and whether I recognize any biases in myself that might be playing a hand 
in the process of conducting my research. I was born in a Muslim family in Afghanistan. I 
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am not a Muslim myself nor do I practice any other religions–based on personal and 
specific philosophical reasons. I am not an atheist, however. I have a firm belief in God 
though not in religions. I went to schools which were much different from those in the 
Unites States in terms of their available facilities, cultural context, and educational goals. 
I am not a native English speaker either. My first language is Farsi (Persian). I have been 
using English as my academic and social means of communication only since 2012 when 
I first came to U.S. Putting all these lines of difference on the paper, it’s tempting for me 
to think I may be just too different from the people in this study; yet, I find it in my heart 
that this is not true–at least according to the way I understand the world. 
I have a few links that connect me with the U.S. academia and social context, 
which have been strong enough to not let me feel “different” from others, especially 
among student population I have been involved with. The first and foremost link is 
created by the fact that I deeply respect any individual human being (though not 
humanity in general). That is one reason I see myself as a citizen of the world and not 
belonging to any specific group(s) of people. I do not find myself fitting in any particular 
boxes. I have serious problems with the notion of nationalism and ideological thought, as 
well as the politicization and social networking of religion. I do not mind communicating 
and even thinking in a language that is different than the one my parents taught me. In 
fact, my first language is something I have passively inherited, whereas my second 
language is what I have actively and willingly adopted as a result of my decided 
interactions with the world. I do not mind using any languages as long as I am saying and 
thinking the same things. I do not believe human beings are chained to the cultural 
context they were born in to. Besides, culture is not a static set of values, beliefs, and 
172 
 
habits that we inherit. I see culture as a rather fluid process of human development, and it 
does not need to be a group-entity. Culture can be individually defined and thus actively 
chosen–instead of being imposed upon one by others. 
My life experiences are technically not as modern and comfortable as many 
people in the U.S., but this very fact makes them vividly rich. Having to leave my home 
as a 9-year-old in the middle of a dark night in order to cross an illegal border under the 
bombard of hundreds of missiles, I have experienced deep unsettlement and anguish that 
is unfortunately not uncommon in the world today. Growing up in what I like to call an 
eternally immigrant status, I have felt the emptiness of the ideas that I was supposed to 
cling to in order to remain loyal to the tribe both in Afghanistan and in the U.S. My life 
experiences have shaped me in a way that I now feel like I am able to connect with 
anyone in the world regardless of their race, gender, religion, culture, class, age, sexual 
orientation, and other social constructs, and I am happy to do so. In my mind, the only 
real connections between human beings are bridged by thoughtfulness and empathy for 
the suffering of one another.  
Like many others, I am sensitive towards social injustice and oppression. I might 
be biased in sniffing for some sort of power dynamic playing a hand in almost any social 
practice, including education. Education, of course, is always political. I do not believe 
there exists/has ever existed a time and space where education is/was not political. This is 
one reason I am drawn toward Foucauldian analysis of the relationship between power 
and knowledge, which makes up the foundation of both his archaeological and 
genealogical methodologies as well as his general philosophical worldview. This specific 
outlook leads me to see students as generally playing a lower-hand in the practice of their 
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own education as opposed to educators and administrations who are often playing the 
upper-hand. Although I strongly believe in the discourse theory, I would not attempt to 
impose the theory on my data. Nonetheless, my results are bound to be value-laden due to 
my ontological, epistemological, and axiological stances based on the research paradigm 
I have chosen for this study. This is inevitable because it is simply impossible to separate 
how I feel and what I believe in my person from the ways in which I conduct my research 
and analytical work. It would be like asking my mind to analyze for somebody else’s 
mind who wishes to remain value-neutral. The readers would have to judge for 
themselves as to how well the theory is connected to the actual data as I have provided 
thick descriptions of my data wherever possible. The readers also have a right to judge 
whether the results and conclusions I have drawn in this study make sense to them–
bearing in mind that I claim neither objectivity nor value-neutrality in the research 
process.  
Having provided a brief individual and social background of myself, I now turn to 
reflect on my positionality regarding my present research field, the Indiana University 
School of Medicine, Indianapolis campus, where I have been pursuing my second 
doctoral degree for the last 5 years. While I am familiar with the settings and the local 
culture, I am not a medical student myself, nor am I taking any classes with any of the 
four years cohorts as part of my Ph.D. program. Thus, being an “indigenous” to the 
setting itself, my position in relation to the medical student population who participated 
in this study is one of an “outsider’s” (Banks, 2010, p. 46). I hold an M.D. degree but I do 
not practice as a physician. Hence, my position with regards to the population I observe 
at the hospitals is also one of an “outsider’s”. Not being a medical student, I do not have 
174 
 
any conflict of interests that could create bias when doing research that involves medical 
students’ identity formation. The only formal contact I have had with two of the cohorts, 
the current MS1 and MS4 students, was as a gross anatomy instructor in the anatomy 
dissection laboratory (teaching medical gross anatomy to them in 2015 and 2018, 
respectively). I know some of the students by name and they still say hi (or sometimes 
just smile at me) when we see each other in the hallways. I was not assigned as an 
instructor in any of the courses they were taking, however, during the timeframe I was 
collecting data for the present study. Thus, there was no power asymmetry in my 
relationship with them as a researcher in this study that could have had the potential to 
affect their social or academic standing as medical students at Indiana University School 
of Medicine. I have not had any contacts with the two remaining cohorts throughout the 
time I have been at Indiana University School of Medicine (Aug 2015–Dec 2019). 
In conclude, I would like to reference Grbich’s (2013) interesting discussion on 
reflexivity here. She proposes three types of reflexivity to be practiced in qualitative 
research: 1) reflexivity as self-critique, which includes discussions of history, power, 
class, experiences, and so forth relating to the self, 2) reflexivity as a process, which 
emphasizes on diversity, connectedness and intertextuality, and, 3) subjectivist reflexivity, 
which references an epistemological positioning (p. 113). I would think (and hope) that 
my discussion of reflexivity in this section has involved at least some of these aspects.  
Ethical Considerations  
This study was reviewed and granted the “exempt” status by the Institutional 




Chapter 4: Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter contains the archaeological analysis of modern medical discourse at 
three different levels: the level of statements, the level of discursive elements, and the 
level of discursive relations. The analysis at the level of the discursive elements in turn, is 
divided into four major sections: objects, modalities of statement, concepts, and 
theoretical strategies. Each section begins with description of a specific discursive 
element (e.g., discursive object) and then variants of that element are recognized (e.g., 
four different objects found in medical discourse: disease, body, doctor, sick person). 
Next, the rules of formation for each variant (e.g., the sick person) and relations between 
those rules are established. Lastly, the conditions facilitating the appearance of that 
particular variant on the surface of discourse (known as the conditions of existence) are 
discussed. Figure 4.1 is a simplified archaeological model of analysis that is employed in 
this chapter.  
Data Presentation 
Exemplary data provided in this chapter that are ending with a 3-digit number 
inside square brackets (e.g., [072]) are data that were collected through one-on-one 
interviews with medical students. The 3-digit number is a personal code that was 
assigned to each of the 20 students who were interviewed in a one-on-one format. The 
last digit of this number stands for the year of training that student was in when data was 
collected. For example, [072] was an MS2 and [004] was an MS4 student in Feb of 2019.   
Exemplary data ending with MS1, MS2, MS3, and MS4 inside square brackets (e.g., 
[MS3]) are data collected through focus groups with the respective student cohorts. For 
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example, [MS4] is a fragment of the data that was collected via focus group with mainly 
MS4 students. Lastly, data ending with [Obs] are data that were collected through direct 
observation conducted by myself in various educational and clinical settings. These 
pieces are pulled out of the field notes that were written during the observations. It needs 
to be noted that I have chosen only 2-3 exemplar data pieces related to each section in 
most places to illustrate the point. That is, the amount of data presented in this chapter 
makes up only a small portion of the original data pool that were used in the present 
archaeological analysis. Table 4.1 contains information about the eight headings levels 
that are used in this Chapter.  
Table 4.1 
Headings Levels Used in Chapter 4 
Level Format 
1 
Centered, Bold, Title Case Heading 
          Text begins as a new paragraph. 
2 
Flush Left, Bold, Title Case Heading 
           Text begins as a new paragraph. 
3 
Flush Left, Bold Italic, Title Case Heading 
           Text begins as a new paragraph. 
4 
            Indented, Bold, Title Case Heading, Ending With a Period. Text begins 
on the same line and continues as a regular paragraph. 
5 
            Indented, Bold Italic, Title Case Heading, Ending With a Period. Text 
begins on the same line and continues as a regular paragraph. 
6 
Flush Left, Underlined, Title Case Heading, Ending With a Period. Text begins on 
the same line and continues as a regular paragraph. 
7 
Flush Left, Underlined, Title Case Heading, Ending With a Period. Text begins on 
the same line and continues as a regular paragraph. 
8 
             Indented, Underlined, Title Case Heading, Ending With a Period. Text 
begins on the same line and continues as a regular paragraph. 
Note. The first five levels are adapted from publication manual of the American 
Psychological Association (APA), 7th edition, 2020. The remaining three levels are 
developed by myself. 
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Archaeological Analysis at the Level of the Statements 
Here, I would like to outline the process through which discursive elements 
emerged from the data at the level of the statements. Data analysis began with spotting 
and reorganizing the statements that had a special relationship with each other. This step 
was necessary in order to identify and define the elements of discourse, i.e., discursive 
objects, modalities of statement, concepts and themes. In other words, related statements 
were grouped together in order to identify discursive elements. As described in Chapter 3. 
Archaeological statements cannot be related to one another by grammatical (based on 
linguistic similarity), logical (based on coherence or conceptual connections) or 
psychological (based on the identity of speaker, constancy and frequency of her thoughts) 
links. Instead, statements were grouped together based on the associated field that they 
belong to, the common set of rules that govern that associated field, and the system of 
relations that link all associated domains together (Foucault, 1972, pp. 115-116). 
 This system is what defines the discursive formation of modern medicine. Thus, 
the goal of this chapter is to outline this system bit by bit and as divided into small 
comprehensible chunks that gradually give rise to the big picture of discursive formation 
of modern medicine. It is worth mentioning that the statements collected as data in this 
study were treated as functions rather than individual structural unities. The remaining of 
this chapter will talk about the fact of their existence, the conditions that make their 
existence and coexistence possible, the rules that govern their existence, and the general 






Simplified Archaeological Model of Analysis 
 
Archaeological Analysis at the Level of the Discursive Elements 
Objects 
In a most general sense, the objects of discourse are what the statements in a 
discursive formation are about. Statements collected as data in this study were 
referencing the following four objects: A) disease and its treatment, B) the doctor, C) the 
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human body, and D) the sick person (see Figure 4.2). In this section, I will describe each 
of these objects and outline the rules governing their formation.  
Figure 4.2 
Archaeological Model of Analyzing the Objects of Modern Medical Discourse 
 
Disease and its treatment.  A large bulk of statements in medical discourse is 
about diseases and treatments. This includes the talk about nature of the diseases, their 
prevalence and prognosis; the talk about various bacteria and viruses; about various 
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drugs, their indication and dosage, etc. Examples of such statements are found in medical 
research reports, clinical textbooks, clinical lectures and podcasts, teaching materials 
across all four years of medical school, student assessments and board examinations; 
majority of talk in both didactic and practical clinical teaching and learning that happens 
at the hospital settings; as well as daily interactions between doctors, doctors and 
patients, and patients and their families inside the hospital. Since archaeological analysis 
is tasked not only to identify the objects of discourse but also outline the rules of their 
formation. There are three categories of rules that need to be established for each object 
of discourse: rules about the surfaces of emergence, rules about the authorities of 
delimitation, and rules related to the grids of specification. 
Surfaces of Emergence. These are the social loci/norms that designate something 
as an object of discourse and justify the talk about it within that discursive formation. In 
other words, they characterize something in a certain way in order to turn it into an object 
of a specific discourse. Surfaces of emergence for disease and its treatment (as an object 
of medical discourse) include individuals, families and communities, where the signs and 
symptoms of a disease are first noticed. Social norms that assign the status of disease to 
certain characteristics of the way the body acts include certain degrees of rationalization, 
conceptual codes, and theories that are used by surfaces of emergence (Foucault, 1972, p. 
41). Let us look at an example for the degrees of rationalization here. If you happen to 
sneeze once or twice today, according to your immediate social norms, it might be seen 
as normal. However, if you sneeze fifty times in a day while you are hanging out with 
your family or are sitting in a classroom at school, according to common social norms 
you will be considered sick. Likewise, when a child’s growth chart does not match those 
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of her peers at school, the child’s parents often see it as a problem with her growth. A 
family-friend suggests there might be a hereditary problem since one of her grandparents 
was also of a short stature. In this example, parents and the family friend are using certain 
conceptual/theoretical codes in order to assign the status of disease to a certain way the 
human body is acting. The social conceptual codes used in this example include “a 
normal child’s growth chart should match that of her peers at a certain age”, and, “when a 
child shows the same type of growth problem as one of her grandparents, a hereditary 
disease should be suspected”.   
It goes without saying that social norms can be different depending on the society 
and time period. However, they all have a designated threshold beyond which a certain 
behavior of the body will be accorded the status of signs and symptoms of a disease. In 
the United States 2019, sick persons who go to the doctor do so because either they 
themselves or someone in their family or immediate community notices something 
abnormal in them. The aberrant behavior can range from an unusually red eye or a 
paralytic arm to a major deviance from the commonly accepted social norms. Imagine if 
an adult person keeps jumping up and down in a formal setting and for a long period of 
time, they will be considered to have a mental problem by people around them. Not that 
there is anything wrong with the act of jumping itself, rather, the problem is that it is 
against the accepted social norms of a modern society for an adult to do that in a formal 
setting. Whereas surfaces of emergence characterize certain acts and behaviors of the 
body as the signs and symptoms of diseases, the burden of cure or at least explaining the 
condition is usually transferred from the surface of emergence (individual, family, 
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community, and society in general) to medicine, which is commonly perceived as a well-
established and trusted institution in modern U.S. society.   
Authorities of Delimitation. These are authorities that validate the existence of 
something as an object of a specific discourse. They give it attention and provide 
definitions for it. In the case of disease and its treatment, authorities of delimitation 
include doctors; other health professionals, such as nurse practitioners and physician 
assistants; lab and imaging technicians who validate the signs and symptoms and confirm 
the presence of the disease; biomedical research; media (television, newspapers, popular 
blogs that provide info as well as statistics such as mortality rate of a specific disease, 
etc.); and even politicians that give disease and its treatment enough attention to validate 
its significance as an object of medical discourse. The attention paid and definitions 
provided by the above entities make the disease and its treatment important to the society 
and urge people to take it seriously. Authorities of delimitation also includes practitioners 
of alternative medicine such as acupuncture, yoga, and natural healing techniques. It is all 
these authorities combined that define the limits of disease and its treatment as an object 
of medical discourse. It goes without saying that each authority of delimitation functions 
based on its own rules that are developed by the group of people who are involved with 
that specific authority and the body of knowledge and practices that justify its authority. 
Some of these authorities are only recognized by public opinion (e.g., an internet blog 
that talks about disease and treatments) whereas others may also be recognized by the law 
and government (e.g., physicians and medical scientists). 
Perhaps the most interesting thing about the authorities of delimitation is that they 
do not need any qualifications in order to become an authority of delimitation for a 
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discursive subject besides having the power to assert themselves as such and the people 
who accept their authority. For example, a natural healer who claims to understand the 
signs and symptoms of certain diseases and their treatments, and has an entire village 
believing in his claim, is considered no less of an authority for delimiting, designating, 
naming, and establishing a certain way of treatment than a peer-reviewed medical 
research report–according to archaeological analysis of medical discourse. That is 
because archaeology is not after validating any of the authorities and the truth behind 
them. Rather, the purpose here is to merely acknowledge what is being practiced as 
medicine in real time. 
Grids of Specification. These are systems according to which different kinds of 
an object are classified, related, and contrasted (Foucault, 1972, p. 42). For disease and its 
treatment, grids of specification include medical science (and knowledge) that recognizes 
and classifies different types of diseases and their treatments, relates them to other similar 
conditions in terms of a common etiology or treatment, contrasts between similar 
conditions, and so on. The excerpt below comes from my field notes observing an 
educational session that was led by an attending physician for his residents. The entire 
passage is referring to disease and its treatment as the object of medical discourse. 
Furthermore, it is a good example of how medical science has set up well-established 
grids of specification for certain diseases and their treatments.  
There are five types of viral infections of the liver - classified as hepatitis 
A, B, C, D, and E. A different virus is responsible for each type of virally 
transmitted hepatitis ... Treatment options are determined by the type of 
hepatitis and whether the infection is acute or chronic ... viral hepatitis 
must be differentiated from autoimmune hepatitis. Corticosteroids are 
used in the early treatment of autoimmune hepatitis. They’re effective in 
about 80% of patients. Azathioprine suppresses the immune system, so it 
184 
 
is often included in treatment - it can be used with or without steroids. 
[Obs] 
 
The more details you add to this information, the more precise the grids of specification 
for the viral hepatitis and its treatment will become. For instance, you can add more 
details about the choices of treatment for every type; the common medications used to 
treat every type; the indication, contraindication, and dosage for each drug, their side-
effects, and so on. Fortunately for our generation, the modern medical science often 
provides precise grids of specification for most of the diseases and their treatments in the 
form of well-established scientific knowledge. Again, the rules based on which medical 
scientific knowledge classifies, relates and contrasts the disease and its treatment can be 
different than, let us say, the rules of medical knowledge used by an alternative medical 
practitioner for the same purpose. 
Conditions of Existence for Disease and its Treatment as an object of medical 
discourse. Archaeological analysis not only defines the rules of formation for every 
single object, but also establishes the relations between those rules. Carrying out the latter 
task results in defining the conditions of existence for that specific object. There is a 
hierarchical relationship between the three rules of formation above. Grids of 
specification that is set by peer-reviewed scientific knowledge is considered to be the 
highest authority when it comes to disease and its treatment. Medical knowledge is often 
deemed as the most accurate way of recognizing, confirming, and categorizing diseases 
and their treatments, which is trusted by all authorities of delimitation (healthcare 
professionals, researchers and media) as well as surfaces of emergence (individuals, 
families and communities). In other words, the rules set by grids of specification bear the 
most weight among the three rules of formation for the disease and its treatment as an 
185 
 
object of medical discourse. The next most trusted set of rules are those that are set by 
authorities of delimitation (e.g., doctors).  Finally, the last set of rules in terms of their 
accuracy and trustworthiness are the norms that are used by surfaces of emergence in 
order to recognize, confirm, and categorize the diseases and their treatments (e.g., 
degrees of rationalization, conceptual and theoretical codes used by family of the sick 
person). A summary of analysis for disease and treatment as a discursive object is 
presented in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 




The Doctor. Another large group of statements in medical discourse are about the 
doctor. For instance, majority of statements about medical professionalism refer to the 
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doctor as a significant object of modern medical discourse. Questions such as how should 
the doctors act as professionals, how should the doctor present themselves to their 
patients, how should the doctors establish the right type of relationship with their 
patients, what are the professional responsibilities of the doctor in clinical settings, what 
are the qualities of a good doctor versus a bad doctor when it comes to professionalism, 
and so on and so forth. This type of talk is relatively less blended in common scientific 
teaching sessions, didactic teaching materials, or summative student assessments.  
Surfaces of Emergence. The formal surfaces of emergence, where individuals are 
trained and characterized to become doctors in the modern society are medical schools 
for their first four years of undergraduate medical training, and hospitals for their 
residency training (typically, three to five years, depending on the residency). Both 
localities characterize individuals who enter them in a certain way and put them on the 
path to become doctors. The combination of all norms in medical school and hospital 
gives rise to the emergence of what society accepts as the doctor. Again, the local norms 
include degrees of rationalization, conceptual codes, and theories that are used in these 
localities in order to assign the status of doctor to certain individuals. In this section, I 
will provide a general survey of the rules and regulations in the surfaces of emergence for 
the doctor that consist of the medical school and hospital environments. The data 
collected in this study mainly focused on three areas when it comes to rules and 
regulations in the above two localities: rules delineating the medical school environment, 
rules defining who is considered to be a good medical student, and rules outlining student 
relationships with the faculty. Figure 4.4 (at the end of this section) presents a summary 
of the analysis of the surfaces of emergence for the doctor as a discursive object.   
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Rules Delineating the Medical School Environment.  
A. Medical school environment was considered to be overall welcoming, but not 
to everyone. This was mainly because students are classified into two major 
groups: those who know each other hang out in small groups, which results in 
collaboration and great friendships among them, and those who do not mesh 
well. The latter group contains some interesting character types. Personality 
clashes often happen between members of this group and they result in 
creating a sense of isolation and competition in the general school 
environment. Let us look at some data examples signifying the above themes.  
a. Students who know each other hang out in small groups, which results in 
collaboration and great friendships among them: 
Med school is much more like a high school where everyone kind of 
knows everyone. Like, I know the names of all my classmates. It’s very 
intimate and you just kind of get in the same couple of groups with people 
and you become very close. ... My friends in med school are definitely 
closer to me than anyone else. There are people now here who went with 
me to IUB but I did not know them there, now we are very close. [012] 
 
I had the luxury of coming with a lot of people whom I knew from 
undergrad, I knew most of the class coming here, and so like out of 15 
people that I was close to in the undergrad, like 10 of them are here with 
me in the class. I already had a fully developed support system, but at the 
same time, it was kind of hard to branch out from those people, toward the 
new people. [103] 
 
b. Students that do not mesh well as a group. This results in creating a sense 
of isolation and competition in the general school environment: 
Because I lived and worked here in Indiana for a year already, so for me it 
was a little easier. It was harder in the first year to get used to 9 hours of 
work a day, and friendships kind of under pressure and low commitment. 
Also getting used to that new culture of med students. ... So, within the 
IUSM you kind of get 3-4 different groups that do not mesh, you find 
people from IUB, Purdue, people from right around here, and then 
188 
 
students who come from far away. I was fortunate that I already had a lot 
of friends coming from IU. [004] 
 
People in my class did not mesh well… There were a lot of strong 
personalities and there was tons of competition, there was a sense of “I am 
gonna do better than you because I am using this resource and not that”, 
so, very early on we kind of separated into our own smaller groups and 
never really came back together. [134] 
 
Personality clashes often happen between members of this group. The reasons students 
provided in this study include: cocky and standout-ish personalities, competitive and 
high-schooly behaviors, social class differences, racist behaviors, and macho/masculine 
student culture. Below are exemplar pieces of data pulled from one-on-one student 
interview transcripts.  
i. Cocky, standout-ish personalities 
 
The first week of MCT course, and that’s where I could see that they were 
already different cause that was the class where we had to interact with 
each other. And I had two white guys in our group and I could see that 
they were just ...  they were so cocky, for sure. In other schools you kind 
of get that feeling that you’re all students so you are all equal, but in med 
school I feel like people are cocky. They like to kind of do their own thing, 
and do not talk to each other, they like to be more independent, I guess. 
Like very condescending, like those two white guys that I remember from 
the MCT course. They like, finished quickly, they did not wait for 
anybody, and so the rest of the group worked together but they did not, 
and I could see that in my other classes too, like, there are people who you 
could feel that they are like flying up high, even though we are all in the 
same thing, like we are equal, we are all students. Like, I did not notice 
things like this in college or when I was taking my master’s classes here at 
IU. [161] 
 
I guess the big thing that kind of took me by surprise was that… I did not 
really expect some of the med students to be like standout-ish or leaders, 
so to say, because we are all on the same boat now. Like, no matter what 
your GPA or MCAT, and what you did in college or anything, well, we are 
all here! Like, it’s a blank slate again, whatever happened in college, it did 






ii. Competitive, high-schooly 
 
[Did you find other students warm and well coming?] No, not as well. 
More workload, and studying, you do not have a lot of time to socialize in 
med school. Culture-wise, I think early on there is kind of a competitive 
mood among med students, people want to do well, and sometimes that 
kind of comes on the way of social interactions. I think there were some 
difference between my master’s in public health and medical classes’ 
cultures. 1) Everyone was busier so you have less time to socialize. 2) You 
are like on a competitive edge ...  I think it’s a combination of things. I 
think it’s also the students themselves, everyone is like…. So, I felt the 
culture was almost similar to high school, besides it’s kind of weird, you 
are working hard just so that you can get competitive grades, you know. 
So, I think med school is more kind of, more cliquish, more high-schooly, 
and most of them are non-traditional students, or maybe I just was an old 
man [laugh]. So, to summarize, I’d say, less welcoming, more competitive. 
[184] 
 
iii. Social class differences 
 
A lot of people came from IU so they just obviously knew each other and 
they are all from Indiana. I did not know a single person here. But I know 
there is a lot of people like me who did not really know anyone. And 
plenty of people are from out of state. The culture is different for me being 
a person from the country. When I got here in med school, everyone here 
either have parents who are doctors or… and I was like, I have no idea on 
how to ... like, I was surprised by everything and I never knew what 
everybody else already knew. So that’s just how I felt. It was just hard to 
find people who were probably kind of like me when everything is new. 
[051] 
 
iv. Racist behaviors 
 
I had a good friend from Hispanic descend, and one of the first questions 
she was asked was: oh, so you are an illegal?! It was a student from 
Indiana coming from a very privileged family who asked her that. To me, 
that’s shocking, it’s appalling… so I can see, depending on who you meet 
and depending on your cultural background, you know ... This friend had 
parents of Mexican origin and she had no control over that ... And she is a 
wonderful person. And it’s a shame that someone from my home area 
can’t figure that out. It’d be different for a Caucasian from California, for 
example, to them it’s all friendly, and there is no racial interaction, so it’s 






v. Macho/masculine behavior - gendered environment 
 
In the first year, I felt some of the gendered aspects of being in med school 
already. I felt like there was this culture among students that, like, you 
have to wanna use the scalpel a lot, and you can never be grossed out or 
nervous, and every part of [cadaver] body is the same to cut through. Like, 
I mean this is not what people said directly, but that’s what they are 
saying. ... It’s like if you acted that way then you cannot be a surgeon. And 
the students have to act that way. If you want to be at the top of your class 
then you have to act that way. And then it’s not a gender thing, anyone can 
act that way but there is this macho behavior that really got me sometimes. 
[171] 
 
One donor actually recorded a video prior to her death, and that was 
played for all of us on the first day of anatomy… it would almost be like, 
weird, or would have been perceived as odd for someone to walkout. So, if 
I was the one who felt uncomfortable, I would not want to walkout, 
because I would be afraid of the perception of my classmates. Like, what 
would they think of me? Like, am I not strong enough to see this, am I 
weak? [134] 
 
It’s like this thing in medical culture that we are like, too scared to seek 
help because it would seem weak. It’s so ironic. It’s like the most 
ridiculous thing. ... We are afraid of like, showing any weakness. People 
forget about that we are still human. Partly because of the social hierarchy 
or whatever. I believe we are just regular humans and that’s why I do not 
want to be defined by my profession. [023] 
 
B. Medical school bringing all super-smart students together in one place, which 
creates high pressure and high anxiety in the overall environment  
Med school is terribly different. So much more pressure than other 
schools ... You are in a cross section of people that is very hard to keep up 
with, unless you’re just naturally brilliant. [034] 
 
So, everyone has been like very nice, it’s just the stress though, which is 
my favorite part, like, oh my gosh! Lots of anxiety. It was common also 
amongst top students in college, in pre-med and undergrad. So, when you 
have all of those people who are used to doing well and getting high 
grades, and who used to be like the top 10% of their class in undergrad 
courses, and then you put all those people in one place, and they basically 
take every class together and they spend so much time together, the 
anxiety has gone way up ... So, I was kind of expecting it, but I think it 
[students’ anxiety level] was way more up than I thought it was gonna be 
like. It was like WOW!! Even some of my really good friends, I mean, I 
191 
 
love them to death, but I needed to space myself from them especially on 
the exam weeks. Like, in the week of anatomy finals I did not associate 
myself with most of them because it was like, aah! So, in my view this 
whole stress thing, I mean like, of course it’s stressful, the workload ... it’s 
been a surprise for me too, but like, a good surprise. But I think a lot of 
people, like, when they say “oh, I am stressed out”, I think they are trying 
to get away with “oh you’re stressed too so I’m not alone in this. Let’s all 
complaint together”, which is fine, I mean a vent session is fantastic, I do 
it all the time with my friends, but I think it becomes toxic when it spills 
around so much where everyone feels stressed because of it. Stress is not 
really healthy; I do not think it is. So, I want to tell some of them like, hey 
you need to chill, you need to relax, you are stressing out and you are 
actually just wasting more time. So that’s been a negative, a bad surprise 
for me. I mean just the amount of it, like, WOW!! [151] 
 
C. A lot of medical students cannot make time to do anything but study 
 
So not what I expected, all you do every day is studying and there is not a 
lot going on. Especially for the first and second years… First year, it’s like 
you are in a room with the book. And that was like all your life. [043] 
 
In undergrad I had time to do [extracurricular] stuff, but here in med 
school I am barely getting enough sleep at night. Every other moment of 
my day I think about some exercise to better myself but I did not have 
time to do the social studying, group studying. [034] 
 
In undergrad I always had a job and was part of a sports team ... but in 
medicine it’s just so hard to add anything else because it already sucks so 
much time ... In med school, it’s like all about medicine. [043] 
 
D. Medical school is generally a closed environment. Everyday it’s the same 
people, same topics of discussion, same activities. 
One thing that I kind of overlooked was that, hey you’re gonna be 
spending 4 years with the same 140 people in my cohort. I mean it’s great, 
but when you all are doing it all and it’s the same every day, I am like, I 
need some variety! In undergrad I had friends from my pre-med and I also 
had many other friends from my other classes, so it was great, like, we did 
not have to talk about medicine all the time… But here, like, I am not 
from here so I do not really have any other friends because I do not know 
anybody outside of school … I mean we are all in medicine now, but if I 
was in the law school too, everybody talking about the law all the time, I’d 
be like, ooh… just give me something else for a variety, just something 
else so I do not have to talk about medicine, just anything, like, trees, and 




Sometimes it’s like us talking about medical stuff among a group of 
friends from college, they are like, ok you can’t talk about this, and no one 
knows what we were saying. So, sometimes I think there is a little bit of a 
barrier between us now. [093] 
 
E. With people outside of medical school, students often like to show off how 
cool and smart they are but not anything that makes them look like they are 
emotionally vulnerable. Even when that’s the truth.  
[Did you ever share your experiences with your family and friends?] I told 
my parents some things. So, my parents and I do not share that much 
about our personal things, but I started to tell them about some things that 
excited me in the [anatomy] lab… So, I only tell my mom some positive 
things from school. I never really tell her anything about those negative 
aspects… But with friends outside of medical school, no, I do not think I 
wanna share the emotional part. I think the only thing they are interested 
in is like, “oh, you guys get to dissect people?!” and “how cool!” stuff like 
that. “Like, does it scare you?” And I feel like you put up that act to non-
med students, like, “oh no, I am fine” [laughing]. Literally, I know that’s 
not true but I do not feel like talking to people outside any other way. 
Cause that’s what they are looking for [171] 
 
I talk to my one friend that I have though. So, when he was using the 
bathroom or something, I pulled up a dissection video on his computer. 
And he walked in and he is like, “Oh my god! What are you watching? 
This is horrible”. And I am like, “I am just studying”. And he’s like, “this 
is disgusting” And then I talk to him about the difference between things 
and really kind of bragging to him about how good of a job I did on my 
dissection, how I was able to “de-glove” the guy, which is where I 
removed the skin from his hand all in one piece. So, it was just like a 
glove. [081] 
 
Rules That Determine Who Gets to be Seen as a Good Medical Student by Their Peers.   
A. Students who demonstrate knowledge competency and are honest about what 
how much they know. 
There is two sides to being a good medical student, like, being smart, on 
top of their stuff, organized, good at clinical stuff, good at the medical 
knowledge which is a big part of being a good student. Like, the 
traditional meaning of being a good student is “to know stuff” and be able 
to perform. But I think also as a medical student you need to be able to 
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work as an underdog in the team and to appreciate that you do not know 
everything, and you have a lot to learn and you are there to learn. [023] 
 
Specific to first 2 years, simply having a good memory. Gosh, that’s gonna 
help you do so much better on your boards ... I am a very conceptual 
person. It took so much out of me to do well on the boards because I do 
not have a brain that just holds on to everything. [034] 
 
There are always things that you do not know. So, I think showing that 
you’re willing to either look it up or ask about it, like, being honest about 
what you do and do not know. [063] 
 
Like, has the ability to study and retain the information. Someone who can 
continually do that and stay on top of the material. [004] 
 
B. Students who understand that school and hospital are two very different 
localities of education. Those who demonstrate adaptability and compliance to 
the rules in clinical settings.  
The second 2 years are clinical so you have to have a different personality 
to excel in that. The school and the clinic are two very different localities 
of education… I think the best 3rd-year student would be someone who is 
ready at all times and is not seen until they are called upon. So, if you are 
told to stay out then just stay out of the way until you are needed. And 
when you are needed, you are prepared for whatever they need you for.  
[171] 
 
Third year is less dependent on your memory and more dependent on your 
adaptability… So, [a good medical student in 3rd year is] someone who 
can take feedback in the clinical setting from an attending or resident, and 
incorporate that and actually change the way that they come up with a care 
plan or whatever it might be, not just spinning the wheels and get that over 
and over again. Being very dynamic and changing what you think you are 
supposed to do into feedback that they are getting from these experts. And 
trying to become more like them. I think that adaptability is a big part of 
becoming a good clinician.  [034] 
 
I think I find more value in how you perform in the clinic rather than on 
the exam. There is a lot of people who get high scores on the exams but 




C. Students who demonstrate good people skills, such as: passion/motivation, 
good communication, professionalism, collaboration, respect, care, human-to-
human skills, and other personal traits- especially in the clinical settings.  
It’s someone who not only has the academic excellence but also a 
collaborative nature. Also, there needs to be a greater calling, like, a 
service to your community, or something beyond your community. [141] 
 
Having medical knowledge is one large component of being a good 
student, like, you have to know what you are talking about, but 
communication skills, professionalism, such as showing up on time, 
responding to emails, all of those things are also very important. Two key 
components would be medical knowledge and communication ... here are 
people who are brilliant medical students but they really struggle with 
human interaction in the later years. [004] 
 
Good medical students dedicate a good portion of time to study. Beyond 
that, they also have to have people skills. There are people that I know 
who just study all the time, they go to whatever is required and then they 
go home, and they are by themselves and they do all the studying there. It 
might help them with learning the base knowledge, but I think a lot of 
what being a doctor goes into is interacting with other people ... A good 
med student makes sure to work with the team, making sure that everyone 
learns, and in the end it’s a team sport ... So, a good medical student is 
able to have those people and team skills and is also smart and able to 
maintain the knowledge that they have been learning. And respect. [012] 
 
D. Students who can create and maintain a good work-life balance. 
 
I think a good balance is very important, I think it’s been underestimated. I 
do wanna say that a good medical student is the one who studies the most, 
but it’s also about incorporating part of that balance, for example, how 
much you study per day, and per week, and kind of… I know it’s 
important to study but I know some people who study like 25 hours a day 
but they are like, you can just kind of see that it’s had a toll on them 
because their hair is all crazy and they do not talk to any other human 
being outside of computers… So, I think what makes for a good student is 
that you do need to be on top of your game, but at the same time just 
understand that it’s okay to have a life outside of medicine. [151] 
 
Someone that has balance, as far as you can put in the time to do well in 
the class, but you do not let it consume you all. You are able to separate 
school, as school is just a part of your life rather than it being all 
consuming. And so, I consider a good medical student as someone who 
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does the hard work when needed but also knows how to relax and also be 
supportive of others. [112] 
 
Rules Outlining Student Relationships with the Faculty in both Medical School and 
Hospital. For the most part, students define their relationship with faculty as good 
experiences. In general, faculty members are willing to teach and support them, are 
humble and do not exercise authoritarian power over them. Nevertheless, dealing with 
some faculty members have been a difficult experience for the students. Students 
characterize these faculty members as mean and belittling people who provide subjective 
evaluations of them that can negatively affect their grade and therefore ranking as 
medical students. The most common strategy of resistance against the latter group of 
faculty among students is anonymously reporting the negative behavior of the faculty on 
student evaluations. Students are afraid of “creating waves” and get their feet wet in such 
circumstances. 
A. For the most part, students define working with faculty as good experiences 
due the following reasons:  
a. In general, most faculty members at the hospital are willing to teach 
and supportive of students 
The physicians that I have been working with are very patient, do 
genuinely seem to be listening to me, making the best offer to teach me. I 
have found to be really appreciative of them. So, I’d say there is a lot of 
them, the people who’d rather sit down with me listen to how I feel and 
then tell me how to improve, rather than just walk by and pass me. [103]  
 
For the most part everybody has been really good about that like, I never 
felt like, oh you are an early medical student, I am a resident, or I am an 
attending like, I am gonna make you suffer ... no, everybody’s like, really 
good in that part. Everybody seems to be aware of that kind of stereotype. 
Like, current residents are like, I do not wanna be like “that guy’ who 
makes you suffer just because I suffered. Because that’s a terrible strategy, 




b. Many faculty members are humble; there is a minimum exercise of 
power over students. Below are exemplar data pieces pulled from the 
observation field notes collected via direct observation of the Family 
Medicine team.  
Resident asks the attending about a patient. Attending is sitting behind a 
computer on the same row with his residents. There is an inner room for 
the attendings with computers and a mini conference table provided but he 
is not using that room today. He is laughing and joking with his residents. 
Attending gets up, calls about a patient himself instead of asking the 
residents who are normally supposed to do it. [Obs] [p. 28] 
 
In the hallway before going on the morning rounds, attending is talking to 
the entire team [residents, interns, third-year medical students, and me] 
about personal things: “it said it’ll be raining the whole week but it was a 
flawless sunshine this morning!” She is laughing with her residents on a 
joke someone makes. Asks one of the residents about his 3-year-old son’s 
sleeping habits, talks about her own 3-month-old baby and issues she is 
facing with breast feeding. [Obs] [p.46] 
 
B. On the other hand, working with some faculty can be a very difficult 
experience for students. Below are a few examples of difficult working 
relationships between students and faculty members.  
a. Faculty who are mean and belittling to students.   
I have heard of people who’ve been yelled at, cursed at, and thrown out of 
the OR [004] 
 
Any issues? More than we have time to talk about. I have had everything 
from faculty that was harsh, and it was difficult for me to be excited and 
enthusiastic around them, I felt like they were just correcting me at every 
stage, never getting positive reinforcement for the good things I did. At no 
point in medical school I have just been totally wrong, I guess. Like, even 
if I did not get everything great, I believe there was something I did that 
was worth reinforcing. But that faculty, he was just very focused on the 
negative and never told you a good thing. [034]  
 
This one time on my surgery rotation - and this person is just known for 
that - it’s an attending who does not learn your name, does not care who 
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you are, won’t say hi in the hallways. In the OR, won’t acknowledge you, 
won’t refer to you, essentially you should just know what you are doing or 
he will yell at you, if anything. That’s just how he is. He just yells at the 
residents, and everyone is like, what’s going on… And he is just known 
for that. So, I did not learn anything on that rotation. The resident was too 
scared to teach me, or even pay attention. I am guessing he is getting bad 
reviews but he is one of the best surgeons there is so ... I know that he has 
made people cry before and they reported him and they said he will be 
talked to. But I cannot really explain it ... like, the resident just said “ok”, 
and she just moved on.  [063]  
 
So, what I have heard is, it’s mainly the attendings who I think just do not 
want to have medical students with them; so, when they are with them, 
just everything they do is wrong. Some people are just getting trenched in 
their ways, medical students sometimes do some things differently, they 
cannot be bothered, and some people just do not like to teach. So, if 
someone does not know something, they get very annoyed with that. Like, 
“why don’t you know everything?!” [063]  
 
I think med school has kind of a high-tolerance culture. Like, things that 
are not generally accepted in society outside medical school are actually 
accepted here. So, some of the hierarchy and the way people choose to 
impose that, to me it’s like, this is pure fantasy! You can’t do this, literally, 
in the parking lot.  Like, the way some surgeons behave, the way they 
behave towards resident or whatever ... so like, what you do right now you 
can’t take this outside and say like, because it’d be as if you lied. So, in a 
sense, it feels as though in this space, the rules are maybe different… At 
least to me it seems like most of what happens inside could not possibly 
happen elsewhere. I think it’s a culture thing, in this culture the rules and 
thresholds are a bit different than the world outside, I’d say. And again, it’s 
not just me. [121] 
 
b. Students are graded and ranked based on subjective evaluations by 
clinical faculty, which can negatively affect their grade and perhaps 
future chances in getting admission to the residency programs of their 
choice. 
As a student, your academic achievement is how you are defined. I would 
not say it’s the same as a doctor. I kind of feel like the education is not 
very indicative of what your work as a doctor is gonna be like. I mean, as 
a student, you are graded, right? You are graded, it’s a scale, and you’re 
ranked. So, it’s all about your scores. [So that’s like the most important 




I had an attending who kind of works hours to actually belittle people, and 
that was the hardest month in my medical school career and it almost 
drove me away from the field I am going to. He took every opportunity to 
chew me out and spit me out, I was already fearful of his evaluation of me. 
I probably should not have because it was going to be crummy anyways, 
as it was more dependent on him than it was on me… So, we are getting 
evaluations from our attending and it’s probably like half of our grade. For 
a lot of the clerkships it’s like 90% of the grade. It’s like I will perform the 
exact same, but one attending will give me 2 while another will give me 5 
out of 5. They [the administration] do try to control for it, but people are 
people. When you are not using actual outcomes-based measurements, 
then you can’t totally deal with subjectivity. [034] 
 
c. Student survival strategies include: trying not to make waves, 
compliance with rules and regulations, and anonymous reporting with 
no tangible results. 
If someone treats you differently, I feel that it kind of makes you, like, it 
almost freezes you, in a way ... [in the past] I have been like, I am gonna 
stick up to myself, and I’m gonna be like making raids and getting people 
who were doing unethical things and were in positions above me, you 
know… but now in medical school, if somebody’s mistreating me, like, I 
do not know, I sort of ... I do not know, I have done it more anonymously, 
I guess you can say. But I have not like confronted anyone face to face ...  
in med school, no, I do not wanna do that. I am a little bit afraid of making 
waves, you know… I had a mentor who told me that you cannot do that in 
med school; just keep your head down and, you know, you just gotta lick 
their boots if they want you to. I would not confront them directly ...  
because unless there is something that is really really wrong and you are 
sure about that, you are gonna lose that battle every time. It’s like a police 
officer. So, if you go to a police officer and you say, I do not like how you 
did that, you know, it’s gonna be like, it’s not gonna end well for you 
unless he is doing something really wrong, like absolutely wrong. And 
then you just report him. It’s better that way, and he does not have a 
chance to retaliate against you at that moment necessarily; so, I would go 
the anonymous reporting way when I really think that there is a serious 
abuse of power going on. [081] 
 
My strategy has generally been like, just do your job, and move on. But if 
it goes beyond the limits then I usually go higher up to the person who can 
do something about it [so have you ever done that, here?] No, not here in 
med school. [Why not?] Ahh… [Uncomfortable] I think in med school it’s 
basically like, you do not want your feet to get wet, so, so long that it’s not 
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out of the ordinary and not enough to hit the threshold, like, things that I 
consider to be inappropriate so much. [121] 
 
Figure 4.4 
Rules Related to Surfaces of Emergence for the Formation of the Doctor as an Object of 
Modern Medical Discourse 
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In those situations [of being mistreated] we usually kind of talk to 
ourselves… Yeah, but I can’t think of anyone who actually stood up and 
resisted something in public. So apart from evaluations that are done 
anonymously, people do not often stand up and resist, at least I have never 
seen an incident like that personally. [184] 
 
Authorities of Delimitation. These include all entities that validate and define the 
position and function of the doctor, such as: professional bodies like Liaison Committee 
on Medical Education (LCME), senior physicians, hospital administration, insurance 
companies (they often have the final say to allow a physician to do a procedure – and 
whether they are willing to pay for it), and federal laws such as Medicare and Medicaid. 
Authorities of delimitation also include those who pay serious attention to the doctor and 
define doctor as someone who should possess a number of specific characteristics (e.g., 
patients, and society in general). Obviously, the doctor is recognized as a unique 
professional authority in the clinical settings. They are also recognized as highly 
respectable individuals in common society. In fact, the highly prestigious and 
authoritative figure of the doctor is much more attended to in common social settings 
compared to the clinical settings. Common folks in the modern U.S. society admire the 
doctor’s position regardless of their own level of education and social class. Many 
parents have a preference for their children to become doctors when they grow up. 
Doctors are also looked upon as extremely smart individuals who often serve as role 
models for young people in their families and immediate communities. The role of the 
doctor in modern healthcare system is often defined by many positive - and sometimes 
negative - characteristics not only by their patients but also by society as a whole. 
Based on this description, the most important authorities of delimitation for the 
doctor–from general to more professional–include common society, communities, 
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families, parents, younger individuals, patients, medical students validating the 
attendings, attending physicians validating residents, and hospital administration. 
Whereas theoretically it is possible for each of the above authorities to characterize the 
doctor in positive or negative ways, here is what generally happens: common society, 
communities, families, parents, and younger individuals often characterize and define the 
doctor in a positive way. On the other hand, patients, medical students, attendings and 
hospital administration characterize the doctors in both positive and negative ways 
depending on specificities of the matter (e.g., which doctor, which authority, which 
patient, what kind of experience, etc.) Below, we will look at a few examples of how data 
in this study support the above-mentioned points.  
Let us first look at a few exemplar data pieces denoting the social prestige of 
being a doctor as perceived by medical students.  
I think the social prestige is definitely a big deal. I mean, you can help 
people in other roles as well, you know, you can be a nurse, you can be a 
respiratory therapist, a social worker ... and those are all fantastic and they 
help people - but social prestige does not come with it. And I’d be lying if 
I said that I had not thought about that. [134] 
 
I remember when I was a kid, during the civil unrest in Nigeria, both sides 
had casualties and needed doctors … and that’s why everybody respected 
the doctors. There was this kind of a societal need that made them very 
important people. [184] 
 
Regardless of their own levels of education, social class and cultural 
background, parents across the board get excited for their kids to get 
admitted to a medical school and be put on the path to become physicians.  
We are a middle-class family, and we do not have a physician so my 
parents are excited for me becoming the first doctor in the family. [023] 
 
Growing up, my parents always wanted me and my brother to become 
doctors, he did not end up getting into med school ... he is 5 years older 
than me… I found that I did like sciences and I was good in my academics 
in school, so I kind of stuck to it going to college taking medical science 
classes knowing that I am going to med school… If I were to fail in med 
202 
 
school and go back home, my parents will be very disappointed because I 
know they have very high hopes for me like, “oh, he’s gonna do what we 
wanted for both our kids to do, so there is the pressure on me in that sense. 
[012] 
 
I know that traditional South Asian families want their kids to be only 
doctors, engineers and lawyers [laugh] ... Definitely like, the societal 
culture, like, in some cultures medical doctors and lawyers, and engineers, 
those are the things that they want you to become when you grow up. 
[141] 
 
If your parents are, like saying that you should become a doctor… or 
maybe you have other friends whose parents are doctors… it’s really kind 
of easy to be influenced at an early age. [MS3] 
 
Physicians are often perceived as very smart individuals with above the average level of 
intelligence and abilities in general society. Lay people create myths about doctors as 
somewhat extraordinary people.  
Before coming to med school, I definitely imagined that there will be a lot 
of studying, I had heard some crazy stories like studying 12 hours a day, 
and not getting to see anyone and not getting any sleep, etc. [012]  
 
I remember being a pre-med before becoming a medical student. So, they 
all seemed so put together, they seemed so much more advanced than 
me ... I had that perspective, that I always thought that doctors know just 
so much that it’s incredible! I was like, how am I ever supposed to be that 
smart? So, the more I learn that perspective is kind of changing. So, they 
do know a lot but it’s not actually as what I thought before, like, I thought 
they were geniuses, on a whole another level, and so impossible. So [being 
in med school now] you learn that it’s actually not that incredible. [043] 
 
I think a lot of pre-meds are under the assumption that you have to study 
24/7 and you have to eat like an hour a day… I think there is also a 
misconception from the general society that doctors are supposed to know 
everything. They should know as much as they can, but hey, we are human 
beings too, we make mistakes just like you do, unfortunately. [151]  
 
Doctors in the family or even in community often serve as a role models for the younger 
individuals. Here, authorities of delimitation are the younger individuals, and again, 
society in general. 
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In my experience, kids that age [12-year-olds] who want to become a 
doctor have had some prior experience with doctors and kind of like how 
respected they are. So, as a kid, I mean it can be really inspiring, you 
know, seeing that people look up to you [as the doctor]. They see the 
doctor as someone who is really smart, knowledgeable and successful. 
And when you are that young, you do not kind of know what goes into 
it ... like all the effort that goes into it, all the long hours that they work as 
a doctor and all. As a kid you will just see a doctor and think like, okay, 
this is somebody that I want to be like when I grow up. Almost like a hero 
that you want to be like. [MS3] 
 
The next authority of delimitation for the doctor as an object of medical discourse is the 
patient. Patients may characterize the doctor in both positive and negative ways–based on 
their own unique experiences. In the excerpt below, a patient is indirectly defining the 
position of a doctor in certain ways such as: the doctor should not be rushed, they should 
look you in the eye and let you talk, they should give you a minute to relax before/after a 
procedure, etc.  
I just hated physicians, I wanted to become a physician to do it right. One 
of the experiences was my first pap-smear ... I was in college before they 
changed the regulations. The physician was clearly very stressed, very 
over-worked, very rushed, when she came in. And, I hated her ... she 
barley looked me in the eye, did not let me talk, and it [the procedure] was 
extremely painful. She did not give me a minute to like, relax, did not talk 
to me… I obviously did not ever go again there though… So, ah, I mean 
the whole thing was a disaster. It was awful. [043] 
 
Medical students can also be the authorities of delimitation for the doctor as an object of 
medical discourse. The student below is characterizing his pediatrician as someone who 
was unable to teach, understand, and empower his patient:  
My own experiences with my pediatrician growing up, I did not feel 
taught by him, I did not feel understood by him ... and so, I want to be the 
pediatrician in somebody’s future that can really empower people. [103] 
 




I have seen primary care physicians who have been seeing patients for a 
long time, and it’s just very different ... they know things about each other, 
like, “how is your wife and kids?”, “oh you went on a vacation recently so 
how was that?” There is like, a lot of back and forth, and they are like 
friends. [012] 
 
Below is a medical student evaluating the doctors’ attitude toward time management and 
efficiency in seeing patients:  
What bothers me the most is how little time is there, I feel like it’s so 
expensive, and the reason my parents never want me to go to the doctor is 
that it’s so expensive. The person who has done 18 years of training to be 
here serves you for 5 minutes. And I have been to my gynecology 
rotations, so the residents would do everything that the OBGYN does, and 
then they come in for like 1 minute and then leave again. So, if that was 
me as a patient, that would bother me cause I am here for you, I am paying 
cause of you, for your opinion ... so, just like, 5 minutes, just sit down. 
And so, I think as a patient what’s the most frustrating is the clear message 
of “I am busy, and I need to go see the next patient” that you get from the 
doctor ...  And so, if I think that someone did not do their best, I am like, 
why did they even come? Why did I even spend like $500 for this hour? 
So, I think even when clinics are behind and it’s late, it’d be nice if the 
doctor spends like 10-15 minutes talking to the patient. Even if it’s not 
about their clinical condition, if it’s about their sister’s farm or something 
like that…  I know that nurses and others are doing what they have to do, 
but I still think that patients come for the doctor, so what bothers me is 
that they are just in and out. [063] 
 
Here is another medical student characterizing the doctor as someone who should not use 
his/her professional authority to influence common people in matters that are irrelevant to 
a medical profession: 
So, I know some doctors who are like, when they make a reservation in a 
restaurant, they are like, “hi, this is dr. so and so”, or when buying tickets 
for concerts ...  So, I am not really criticizing them, like, I am not saying 
how dare you do that, but my deal with that is like, well, how is your 
degree related to something that’s not… if you are like calling the 
restaurant and think that those two letters after your name is gonna 
influence something that matters? [151] 
 




We have an attending at Eskenazi whom everyone loves. He is extremely, 
sort of humanistic. I mean, he just cares about people. I heard stories from 
other people about how he has changed the culture by being honest, kind, 
friendly, gentle, not hiding or drifting away from correcting what needs 
correction, by showing people this is how you do the procedure better ...  
but he does it in a way that people know he is only trying to make them 
better, and he cares about them. And he has transformed people around his 
workspace, by being who he is. [034] 
 
Medical students may also evaluate residents and other doctors:   
 
Most residents are not trying to be overbearing or paternalistic towards 
students. They are just trying to do their job, part of which is teaching 
students what’s right and what’s wrong, and teaching them how to be 
safe ...  And residents especially, they are very very busy. They are only a 
year separated from us now, and I feel like that could sometimes be 
stressful and they do not wanna seem like overbearing to us or 
paternalistic. Or like setting expectations to us. Some do, definitely… But 
at the end of the day, it’s their job. They are being paid to be there and 
teach you but also that means that they are responsible and reliable to a 
degree. Accountable for whatever goes on with their patient, so that’s 
accountable to the law, to the hospital, and kind of the all the staff that 
they are working under. [103] 
 
The next important authority of delimitation–especially for residents and junior doctors–
are the attending physicians. The attendings can characterize the doctor either in a 
positive and supportive way or criticize them in negative and dejecting way. Examples of 
attending physicians validating their resident’s opinions:  
Resident describes patient’s case for five minutes outside the patient’s 
room in the hallway. The entire team listens to him attentively–including 
the attending. At the end of his case presentation he suggests a course of 
treatment: “Does that sound good?” he asks, somewhat hesitantly. 
Attending: “You tell me, you’re the boss!” giving him confidence. [Obs] 
[p.18] 
 
 Attending discusses the case and consults with everybody. Resident takes 
the lead on the case. Attending seems to appreciate her taking over. 
Resident also leads the team on the visit. Attending does not interfere but 
curiously observes and checks oxygen and vitals machines as resident is 





In sum, the point of this section is to demonstrate the absolute chaos created by 
dispersion of opinions regarding who the doctor is, what the doctor should do and should 
not do, how the doctor should act toward certain things, etc. The public is quite confused 
when it comes to answering these questions. There are no standard answers since modern 
medicine is not theorized by the literature in any standard way–especially when it comes 
to defining the human traits of the doctor and the way to go about medical 
professionalism. There are thousands–if not millions–of rules being set in place by 
various authorities of delimitation in our society, with everybody expecting the doctors to 
be responsive to them. Figure 4.5 summarizes the authorities of delimitation for the 
doctor as a discursive object. 
Figure 4.5 
Rules Related to Authorities of Delimitation for the Formation of the Doctor as an Object 




Grids of Specification. These are written and unwritten rules based on which 
different kinds of doctors are classified, related, contrasted, and grouped. Written rules 
include normative documents (e.g., the American Medical Association [AMA] guidelines 
for medical ethics and other similar documents) as well as formal discussions on medical 
professionalism held in school and clinical settings. The unwritten rules regarding 
different kinds of doctors (e.g., good doctors, caring doctors, busy doctors, humble 
doctors, etc.) include statements defining different kinds of doctors that are spoken by 
medical students, doctors, hospital administration, business administration, patients, and 
society in general. Either formal or informal, written or unwritten, all of the above 
statements contribute in forming modern medical discourse on a daily basis. In this 
section I will establish three broad categories of rules based on which doctors are being 
classified as part of the modern medical discourse: 1) Rules classifying, relating, and 
contrasting doctors based on their personal traits; 2) Rules classifying, relating and 
contrasting doctors based on whether they attend to the person of the patient in addition 
to caring for her body; 3) Rules classifying, relating, and contrasting doctors based on 
how they deal with issues caused by nondiscursive structures.  
Rules Classifying, Relating, and Contrasting Doctors Based On Their Personal Traits. 
A. Doctors who listen, communicate things efficiently, and educate the patient.  
[A good physician is] someone who takes the time with patients, talks to 
them and listens to their questions, and educates them. A lot of times 
patients I have seen in the clinic or on rounds ... you can tell that they have 
these questions and they do not really understand remedies and if you 
could take like 5 minutes to explain it to them really well, the relationship 
they are having with you, the trust that they have in you, it will be really 
enhanced. So, I would like to spend time, knowing them and educating 
them ... I just want to be the kind of physician that my patients say: “yeah, 
she is a great doctor because she listens to me” ... It is a way to show your 




I want to do pediatric palliative care, and I’d like to practice patient-
centered care in which, like, you need to fully listen to the patient. Like, I 
do not want them to feel that I do not really have time to get to know my 
patients and establish relationships. [093] 
 
Communication is important, especially with kids. If they do not know 
what’s going on, they won’t even care and they won’t take your medicine. 
If you tell them that: hey, we are doing this so you can do that again, 
would you be ok with this? Then they’d be like, yeah. Then ok, good ...  
But if you speak in the hallway and you come in and like, alright, this is 
what we are gonna do, the kidos do not know what’s going on. [063] 
 
B. Doctors who are humble versus doctors who are not. 
So, like, you can tell who is not humble. They are like, I’m a big shot, like 
a surgeon or whatever. So, I get it that they are good and passionate or 
whatever but they are also that stereotypical personalities. So, I wanna be 
a doctor that shows patients that care and listens to them. I am not defined 
by my job, by my profession, like, I am just a person outside of my job 
just like anyone else is, the same as the person who works at McDonald’s. 
But I’d like to use my profession as a physician as one of the main ways 
that I share myself with the world and try to use the gifts that God has 
given me to improve other people’s odds through my job. [023] 
 
So, as though there is something in med school that goes right into your 
head ... like, I have seen some really cocky residents. I know you sleep 
less; yes, you’re tired; yes, you deserve the position you have; but you do 
not have to shove it into people’s faces as though you’re a freaking god or 
something. [161] 
 
Oh yeah. Specially surgery. WOW! A lot of surgeons do not think they are 
human, they think they are gods and I find that just odd… [043] 
 
Below are examples of attending physicians being humble in the clinical setting: 
 Attending talks and laughs with third-year medical student in the hallway.  
[p.20] 
 
Attending holds the door for the entire team every time we enter or exit a 
stairwell on the way to the morning rounds. [p.5]  
The team leaves the patient’s room after the morning visit has ended. After 
a few steps, the attending stops and goes back towards the patient’s room 
as though he has forgotten something. He goes into the room and asks: 
“Do you want me to shut off the light for you? Do you want the tray next 
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to you?” the patient nods: “yes please”. He fixes both and leaves the room 
with a smile. [p.16] 
 
Patient is an 80-year-old man, hard of hearing. Attending is squatting on 
the floor to get at the level of the patient’s head and talks to him: “Any 
pain? What are you feeling?” [p.38] 
 
C. Doctors who are personable versus doctors who are not.  
There is a lot of people who get high scores on the exams but they do not 
care about people, they can’t talk to people, and it’s like, well, no matter 
what you know if you’re not gonna treat your patient well they are not 
gonna like you, that’s the point. And then you can’t really be helping. 
[043]  
 
I think to the average person it’s really important if the doctor is 
personable - who knows what they are doing but it does not need to be the 
world’s best cancer researcher or something, you know. People do not 
know what you are talking about so you being super smart is not very 
helpful to them, but you being able to speak to them and having a 
conversation is I think more important. [063] 
 
I like pediatrics ... so like, the kids are scared, parents are terrified, they 
don’t wanna be there. If you can get the kids to like you and trust you, the 
easier it is to get things done in terms of their treatment. And to me that’s 
what is exciting about being a doctor, I don’t care about writing notes, 
that’s not fun… that’s why I am hanging out with patients. I think if you 
don’t wanna do that then, being a doctor is kind of really ... you’ll end up 
like a mean attending who is not fun being around. [063] 
 
D. Doctors who are competent but also have a team-mindset versus doctors who 
are competent but do not have a team-mindset. 
So, to me a successful physician is someone who does well for their patients but 
also to other doctors. If they have issues or questions they will go to that person 
and that person is an authority figure, or they have a knowledge that can really 
help out. Other people are gonna need it… It’s never gonna be a one-person show, 
like, patients are gonna come to you and you’re gonna have the answer because 
you have been reading a book ... You also have to have a good relationship with 
your colleagues and kinda know when to pass it on.  So, they [good physicians] 
have a team-mindset. The patient is also part of the team. You can’t be like, oh, I 
know you have concerns, I am gonna look it up on my own to get you the 





E. Doctors who are fair and impartial in treating their patients versus those who 
are not.    
It’s hard, but theoretically, I would like to say treating everyone with the 
same respect. You are not saying like, oh you get a certain amount of time, 
versus another person who will get a different amount of time. I think 
everyone deserves the same amount of respect, same amount of attention, 
I can’t really think of how I am going to implement this [as a doctor] or … 
But just like, whatever I do, I want to treat them with respect, I would 
want to go to them with a great attitude, a smile on my face ... So, like ...  
instead of saying “Hi, I am a doctor and you are the patient and that’s it”, I 
wanna say, “Hi, I am a person too”. [151] 
 
Interpersonally, treating them with human dignity regardless of who they 
are. Like being an alcoholic does not dissuade you from giving them the 
proper treatment because you think they are not worth it. I do not think 
that’s professional. Funding is a different issue. Like is it the most cost-
effective thing to do, like how you deal with the resources that you have 
available, it’s a discussion worth having but I am not gonna have it right 
now. But not letting your personal treatment of a patient be affected by 
some of the ways that you do not think like it’s worth your time. [034] 
 
F. Doctors who speak ill of their patients, use prejudice to judge them, or be 
dismissive of what they believe to be true versus those doctors who do not. 
There are a lot of physicians who make fun of their patients or complaint 
about how they had their … before going into the room and then 
afterwards - of course, not in front of them. I do not think that’s 
professional. You kind of lose your whole perspective of why you are here 
and what you are doing. [043]  
 
So, one time, back home [in Nigeria] the doctor was doing H&P [history 
and physical exam]; they asked me if I was sexually active, and I said no. 
And he did not believe me because of my age. I was like: you asked a 
question, and I said no. So that’s like, you know, you have this opinion in 
your head, and it does not mean that everybody will need to fit into that… 
[184] 
 
In college, I just had a concern and wanted to get checked out. It took a 
while to get the appointment and when I finally go, I felt like the doctor 
did not take me seriously, did not even evaluate me to the degree that I 
kind of wanted ...  and just kind of dismissed it like it was nothing. [072] 
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Rules Classifying, Relating and Contrasting Doctors Based on Whether They Attend to 
The Patient As a Whole Person.  
A. Doctors who acknowledge the patients as whole persons versus those who do 
not. 
I want to have long term relationships and following them [kids] as they 
grow up, kind of checking in and being very cognizant of the fact that it’s 
a full person, instead of treating just the disease.  [103]  
 
It [patient centeredness] means considering what the patient’s needs are 
and not just focusing on your specific goals as physician. Like a lot of 
specialties do. They focus on rheumatology, only focus on that alone. So, 
if they [patient] have something more pressing in their life going on at this 
moment I feel like that should be important to you and you should 
recognize that ...  And deal with the crazy surgeons, ah ... I don’t really 
understand but I think they have a lack of perspective. Like, you need to 
step back and see the bigger picture of a person, the patient. They only 
care about surgery, and it may not even help your patient the way they 
wanted. [043] 
 
Well, you should be a really good doctor, you should not miss things, get 
the procedures quickly and accurately. But then, the other half is making 
the patients feel like they are well taken care of; that they are not a cog in 
the medical machine, you know, they are not “pancreatitis in room 9”. 
They have 3 kids, and things like that ... even if you are just doing a 
procedure, like in a very short amount of time, just let them know that at 
least their physician cares about what’s happening to them. I think that’s 
just super important, but really sometimes lacking ... There is a huge 
difference in how the patients respond to that and how satisfying their 
work seems to be, you know. [072] 
 
I mean, [doctors] they should be efficient in terms of using their time, and 
respect my time too, but not so efficient where they would completely 
objectify me as something like a checklist of symptoms. Like, when I 
become CHF in room 11. [141] 
 
B. Doctors who are aware of the social issues as they relate to their patients 
versus those who are not.  
Someone who can think beyond the studying, someone who thinks about 
social issues, like what you could be doing as a medical student and as a 
doctor one day, and to think about the privilege that you are given by 
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society just by doing this ... So, to me, that’s what I’m looking for in a 
friend, and in myself, but I know there are plenty of “good” med students 
who are great on paper but do not care about these other issues. [171]  
 
I think it’s very important to address social issues with patients even if 
they are not the cause of the present issue at this precise moment ... If a 
homeless person comes in with a belly pain or something, I do not wanna 
send them away without seeing a social worker and talking to them about 
options where to go if they are experiencing homelessness. Or, a patient 
who is coming for a belly pain again, but we see in their chart that they 
were the victim of assault 2-3 years ago, like, I would not wanna just drive 
past them. Because I understand that a lot of times these patients only 
present to the emergency department, their only interaction with the 
medical field happens there and that’s where you need to catch them. Kind 
of make sure that they do not fall through the cracks, and so that’s one 
thing I have tried to tell myself that I am really good at as a physician and 
I am not gonna let people fall through the cracks to the best of my ability. 
[134] 
 
The vast majority of my experiences with patients have been at Eskenazi. 
It’s the county hospital for the most underserved population. I worked 
with people who were less fortunate and seen people whom it took them 
an hour and half just to get to the hospital. They are like, “I got on this 
bus, and then got this one, and tracked that one…” you know, they may 
not have the money for their medications. If you do not take the time to 
ask and you just move on from there then you’ll never find out that they 
are actually not taking it and their health is continuing to decline. Because 
they cannot afford the medication, or having to choose between 
medication and food, you know ... It’s been an eye-opening experience to 
how a lot of the world lives. The type of decisions people have to make, 
and how you can help. I cannot directly make them to go to resources, but 
building a knowledge catalogue of what resources are available in your 
community and help best to get person X to resource Y for treating Z, it’s 
a lot more interesting than “oh, so you’ve got a sinus infection, here are 
the antibiotics, go on to work.” [004] 
 
C. Doctors who build a human-to-human relationship with their patient in order 
to makes it easier for patients to open up, versus doctors who do not. 
One thing that I [as a doctor] would pride myself on would be 
professionalism. I like to think that I am good at talking about any topic 
that a patient might want to discuss with me. So, I need to be able to 
establish that trust between me and the patient so they can feel 
comfortable talking to me about anything related to their health, as 
opposed to like, hiding something because they did not feel comfortable ...  
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if anything, just giving them that level of trust that I do not have to ask 
like 20 questions to learn about the information that they want to tell me. 
It’d rather need to be upfront, like, hey, I have been having a problem with 
my relationship, you know, something like that. A personal topic that kind 
of is related to the rest of the information and their health condition. [112] 
 
So, like, exploring the patient’s perspective, someone who cares, and asks 
personal questions, creates an environment where they can share what’s 
going on. It is good because they will be more comfortable to share more 
with you, so they are not gonna give you just short pieces of what’s going 
on - they are gonna give you the actual story of what’s happening because 
they trust you. And they feel cared for, which is a huge thing in medicine. 
[072] 
 
D. Doctors who put themselves at the service of the patient versus those who do 
not. 
I am a big proponent of like, if that patient needs a sandwich and a pair of 
socks, I’ll go get them a sandwich and a pair of socks, I will not bother the 
nurse or anybody to go get that for me. I know where the juice is, I know 
where the water dispenser is, like, I can do that. [Mindful of how others 
perceive you?] I think yeah, I am always mindful of how people perceive 
me and I think that’s something that is very important, because the ER is 
such a collaborative space ...  your role as a team leader and medicine as a 
whole depends on how others perceive you ... Would I be perceived as the 
doctor who is only good for giving someone a juice? You know the way to 
solve that is to be a strong physician, and to have that perception of being 
a strong leader is going to value the collaboration of all the team members, 
but also be able to do these other things [134]  
 
I enjoy the service industry aspect of medicine, to think of the physicians 
as personal health consultants almost ... I’d say that’s not a totally accurate 
analogy, but I’d enjoy being at the service of the patient. I guess, like, that 
kind of relationship [112] 
 
Resident is fixing the tray table for patient: “you want brown sugar? Yeah? 
Here is sugar ... oh, you are picky” patient is smiling at him. Attending 
takes the empty sugar packets from the patient’s hand and puts them in the 
trash. She also puts a fork in her plate while the resident takes a listen to 
her lungs. Patient is a 50-year-old African American woman; she seems to 




Rules On Classifying, Relating, and Contrasting Doctors Based on How They Deal with 
Issues Caused by Nondiscursive Structures. 
A. Doctors who create a balance between their personal values and time 
efficiency as proposed by hospital administration versus those who do not. 
And there is even some of it that’s beyond doctors alone. There is 
definitely issues with the system, where like, doctors have less time with 
patients and they are spending a lot of time on other things like charting 
etc. They are kind of being rushed and forced to see as many patients as 
possible, to kind of increase the efficiency [emphasis added] because that’s 
how hospitals make money. And I think that ends up leading to error. 
Obviously if every doctor spent like, as much time as they wanted with a 
patient, error rates will drop but then, you know, [enough] patients won’t 
be seen. So, I guess like there is some societal changes that we need. We 
need to make sure that ... the administration as a whole is willing to work 
with doctors to make sure that they are not just like, trying to get as much 
money as possible, but also are trying to do what’s best for the patients. 
[MS2] 
 
And then, they [the doctors] should have values. I know this one is a little 
bit more abstract as to what does it mean to have values ... So, some 
medical places that I used to work with were at times kind of too efficient. 
In one place, for example, so it’s like, I go get a history of the illness, I get 
the chief complaint and then get out of there, then I summarize and kind of 
distill that information and give it to the physician–so that the physician 
has an idea of what’s going on and what to do next. And I get that it all 
makes for an efficient system, but ... I think there needs to be a tension 
between being too efficient and also taking the time and being able to 
espouse those values of yours with an efficient practice. [141] 
 
Growing up, my siblings and I were all very healthy, so I just remember 
the pediatrician coming and be like, is everyone good? Okay. Good. So, 
we would be waiting there for like an hour to be seen and then we’d be 
finally face to face with our doctor… I guess, my frustration as a child was 
kind of having to be there and wait so long, and I could see my mom being 
frustrated at times cause she felt like she was going at it alone, did not 
have support from our doctor. I now have a doctor here, and she is great. I 
love her. So, I definitely see the difference between a good doctor and a 
busy doctor. [And a busy doctor is not a good doctor?] No. [Is there 
anything that the doctor can change?] I think you can change things, like, 
you can say, okay, so if you book me for 3 patients every 15 minutes, 




B. Doctors who are aware of socioeconomic resources available to the patients 
and make an effort to make sure patients get connected to the right resource, 
versus doctors who do not.  
In whichever field I’d be, I’d be more socioeconomically informed. So, 
like, I know in the emergency department for example they send people 
like that to a social worker who could introduce them to appropriate 
resources and all that, but I guess what I would like to do personally is to 
first make sure that the referrals are worth the time and the resources, and 
it’s actually informative and beneficial to my patient. So, do not just send 
them through a black hole ... Like, once there was this victim of domestic 
violence, and the doctor is like, “okay, send them to the social worker” and 
I am like, “how do you know that the social worker is actually able to do 
anything with this?” Because if that person drops the ball, it’s not only 
gonna look bad on the social worker but it’s also gonna look bad on me 
cause I was the last person who checked this patient and that person did 
not come back to me because of the quality of help the social worker was 
able to provide ... sometimes they are like, “oh, you are smoking, so you 
need to quit that”, and just like that ... cause they are trying to check the 
boxes for every patient and I do not think that’s the kind of care I want my 
patients to be referred to. [141] 
 
Figure 4.6 summarizes the grids of specification for the doctor as a discursive object. 
Conditions of Existence for the Doctor as an Object of Medical Discourse. 
Again, archaeology is not only tasked to establish the rules of formation for every single 
object, but also to outline the relations between those rules. In other words, we need to 
establish the conditions of existence for the doctor as a discursive object. While there is 
no hierarchical relationship between the three rules of formation for the doctor which I 
have established above, there are certainly other more subtle relationships between 
different parts of these different rules. For example, the hidden curriculum (Hafferty & 
Franks, 1994) consisting of all non-written, non-formal rules and regulations in medical 





 Rules Related to Grids of Specification for the Formation of the Doctor as an Object of 
Medical Discourse 
For instance, how students are treated by senior faculty at the hospital will partly 
shape the way they understand the authority function of medical profession. Thus, 
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surfaces of emergence for the doctors can influence both the rules that the doctors will set 
in place as authorities of delimitations in the future (e.g., medical students’ understanding 
of who the doctor is and what responsibilities he/she has), as well as the rules that they 
will set in place as grids of specification for the doctors (e.g., the way medical students 
evaluate, classify, and categorize the functioning of the doctor in society). In sum, the 
rules in the surfaces of emergence (for the doctor) can play an influencing role in shaping 
the rules for both authorities of delimitation and grids of specification by the doctors.  
The present section describing the doctor as an object of discourse partially 
explains how discourses in medical school may impact the professional identity 
formation process in medical students. It is true that medical students and doctors are not 
the only authorities of delimitation to define the function of the doctor in society, but they 
are the most impactful ones as they are really the ones who embody their own 
understanding of their role as the doctor in their clinical practice. Thus, they are the most 
powerful authorities of delimitation for defining the function of the doctor, compared to 
other authorities such as patients, communities, etc. That is because students are future 
doctors, they are the only authorities of delimitation that will get to put the rules they 
make about the doctor in actual practice.  
The Human Body. The next object of medical discourse we will discuss is the 
human body. The talk about human bodily structure and function occupies a large space 
among the statements in modern medical discourse. Just like disease and its treatment, 
statements about the human body can be easily spotted in medical and clinical research 
reports, medical textbooks, both basic science and clinical lectures and podcasts for 
medical students, all didactic teaching materials, student assessments and medical board 
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examinations, discussions in both didactic and practical clinical teaching and learning 
that happens in the hospital setting as well as daily interactions between doctors in the 
clinical settings. 
Surfaces of Emergence.  Again, these are the social loci/norms that designate 
something as an object of discourse and justify the talk about it within that discursive 
formation. In other words, they characterize something in a certain way in order to turn it 
into an object of a specific discourse. Surfaces of emergence for human body (as an 
object of medical discourse) include individuals, families and communities, where signs 
of an abnormal bodily behavior are first noticed. As soon as the body is believed to be 
acting abnormally in any way, it becomes the object of medicine. Social norms that 
assign the status of abnormal to specific ways in which body acts include certain degrees 
of rationalization, conceptual codes, and theories that are used by surfaces of emergence. 
Let’s look at an example here. If you wake up one morning with a lower back pain that 
then gradually decreases during the day and disappears by night time, according to your 
immediate social norms it might be seen as normal. However, if you happen to have the 
same problem for extended periods of time during the day and if it tends to stay with you 
for a whole week, according to common social norms, the way your body is acting will 
be considered abnormal and thus it automatically becomes an object of medical 
discourse. The simple rule that suggests “when someone’s back constantly hurts for an 
entire week they need to go to the doctor” designates your body as an object of medical 
discourse. Rules such as these functions as the cultural norms in a particular society. They 
involve certain degrees of rationalization, as well as conceptual and theoretical codes on 
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the part of the surfaces of emergence: individuals, families, communities, and society at 
large.   
Again, it goes without saying that social norms can be different depending on the 
society and the time period we live in. However, they all have a designated threshold 
beyond which a certain behavior of the body will be accorded the status of abnormal and 
thus the body is automatically enrolled by the surfaces of emergence to become an object 
of medical discourse. Whereas surfaces of emergence characterize certain acts and 
behaviors of the body as abnormal/sick/diseased, the burden of cure or at least explaining 
the condition is usually transferred from the surface of emergence (individual, family, 
community, and society in general) to medicine, which is commonly perceived as a well-
established and trusted institution in modern US society. Besides, medicine has always 
been about the body. Perhaps the body is the most natural object for the medical 
discourse due to the nature of the profession itself.  
Authorities of Delimitation. Again, these are authorities that validate the 
existence of something as an object of a specific discourse. They give it attention and 
provide specific definitions for it. For human body (as an object of medical discourse), 
authorities of delimitation include: doctors, other health professionals such as nurse 
practitioners and physician assistants, lab and imaging technicians who confirm and 
validate the presence of abnormality in the body, biomedical research, and media 
(television, newspapers, popular blogs that educate the public about basic abnormal 
bodily structure and function, etc.). The attention paid and definitions provided by the 
above entities make the abnormalities of the human body important to the society and 
urge people to take it seriously. Authorities of delimitation for the human body also 
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includes practitioners of alternative medicine, such as acupuncture, yoga, and natural 
healing techniques. It is all these authorities combined that define and characterize the 
human body as an object of medical discourse. It is worth reiterating here that each 
authority of delimitation functions based on its own rules that are developed by the group 
of people who are involved with that specific authority and the body of knowledge and 
practices that justify its authority. Some of these authorities are only recognized by public 
opinion (e.g., an internet blog that talks about abnormal body functions) whereas others 
may also be recognized by the law and government (e.g., physicians and medical 
scientists). 
Grids of Specification. These are systems according to which different kinds of 
an object are classified, related, and contrasted. For human body, grids of specification 
include medical science (and knowledge), which recognizes and classifies different types 
of normal and abnormal behaviors in the body, relates them to other similar conditions in 
terms of a common etiology or treatment, contrasts between similar conditions, and so 
on. Again, the rules based on which medical scientific knowledge classifies, relates and 
contrasts the normal and abnormal behaviors of the body can be different than, let’s say, 
the rules of medical knowledge used by an alternative medical practitioner for the same 
purpose. 
Rules that characterize the human body in order to classify it in different types 
also come from the culture of the immediate society. Common people follow cultural 
trends for classifying human bodies in to categories such as: male, female, tall, short, big, 
skinny, white, black, so on and so forth. Whereas medical knowledge follows some of 
these classifications, such as that of the male and female, it does not always use the 
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cultural categories for classifying human bodies. In general, medical knowledge classifies 
the human body into two broad categories when it comes to studying their features as 
objects of medical discourse: the normal/ healthy bodies versus 
abnormal/pathological/diseased bodies. You can add details to any of the two major 
categories above, such as, different structures of the healthy body (anatomy), different 
functions of the healthy body (physiology), different structures and functions of an 
abnormal body or body part (pathology), and so on. Anatomy, physiology and pathology 
are but a few examples of how medical knowledge delimits (classifies, relates, and 
contrasts) the structure and function of the human body as an object of the modern 
medical discourse. Figure 4.7 summarizes the analysis of human body as a discursive 
object.  
Figure 4.7 





Conditions of Existence for Human Body as an object of medical discourse. 
 There is a hierarchical relationship between the three rules of formation above. 
Grids of specification that is set by peer-reviewed scientific knowledge is considered to 
be the highest authority when it comes to setting up rules about defining the human body 
in medical discourse. Medical knowledge is often deemed as the most accurate way of 
identifying, analyzing, and explaining human bodily structure and functions, which is 
trusted by all authorities of delimitation (healthcare professionals, researchers and the 
media) as well as surfaces of emergence (individuals, families and communities). In other 
words, the rules set by grids of specification bear the most weight among the three rules 
of formation for the human body as an object of medical discourse. The next most trusted 
set of rules are those that are set by authorities of delimitation (e.g., doctors and other 
healthcare professionals). The last set of rules in terms of their accuracy and 
trustworthiness are the norms that are used by the surfaces of emergence in order to 
identify and explain the human bodily structures and functions (e.g., degrees of 
rationalization, conceptual and theoretical codes used by family of the sick person). 
The Sick Person.  Talking about the sick person - that is, addressing the patient 
as a whole person and not just as an objectified body that needs fixing - also happens in 
modern medical discourse. This type of talk is not common but it is there when it comes 
to specific types of discussions in medical discourse. For example, the bulk of statements 
in discussions related to medical ethics and patient-centered care address the patient as a 
person. However, statements about the sick person is almost never found in medical and 
clinical research reports, medical textbooks, and basic science teaching material. They are 
sometimes found in clinical teaching materials, student assessments, and medical board 
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examinations. Such statements are very rare in both theoretical and practical bedside-
teaching and learning as well as daily interactions between doctors. In doctor-to-doctor 
interactions in the clinical settings, talking about the patient as a person is quite rare. At 
best, there might be some talk about patients’ socio-economic conditions as they relate to 
their medical situation. This is not the same as talking about a patient’s feelings, for 
example, as a person. It needs to be noted that the phrase “sick person” is used in this 
study in order to make a distinction between the common term “patient” and the person 
of the patient. It often happens that medical professionals talk for hours about the signs 
and symptoms of a disease, its treatment options, and various physiological or 
pathological characteristics of the body as related to a patient. In such circumstances, 
they are technically talking about the patient, but not about the sick person. To make this 
distinction possible, I am using the unusual phrase of the “sick person” instead of the 
patient7.  
Surfaces of Emergence. These are the social loci and norms that designate the 
person of the patient as an object of medical discourse and justify the talk about that 
person within the discursive formation of modern medicine. Surfaces of emergence for 
the sick person include patients, patients’ families and communities, as well as the 
hospitals, doctors and other healthcare providers especially nurses at the hospital. These 
are surfaces where concerns about the person of the sick are developed, discussed and 
addressed as part of the medical talk. The norms used in these surfaces include certain 
degrees of rationalization, conceptual codes and theories that are used to assign the status 
                                               
7 I realize that not everyone who goes to the doctor is sick, as, for example, pregnant women or 
kids who come for their normal pediatrician checkup may not be sick. However, in this study the term “sick 




of an object to the person of the patient. Some such norms that emerged from the data 
collected in this study are as follows. 
A. Patients are likely to be attended to as a person at the hospitals by healthcare 
providers.   
Below are exemplar pieces of data from the direct observation of clinicians at the 
hospital that indicate patients were received as whole persons there, and not as mere 
bodies needing to be fixed or diseases needing to be treated. The way nurses are talking 
about their patients suggests that they see more than a body that is lying on a bed as a 
regular object of medicine. They see a person there, who needs to be comforted and cared 
for, who belongs to a culture where they come from (in case of the Punjabi lady), which 
needs to be respected if they are to have a productive relationship with the patient. Even 
when patients are semiconscious or unconscious, the healthcare team tends to keep in 
mind that the patient lying on the bed is still a person and needs to be treated like that.  
Nurse speaks to the patient in English even though she knows the patient 
can’t understand it. “She can tell I care!” says the nurse to a resident that 
looks at her with enthusiasm. Nurse asks the resident who can speak the 
patient’s native language, Punjabi: “tell her I am gonna take good care of 
her today”. Resident translates the message to the patient but the patient 
does not even look at her. Patient follows the nurse with her gaze around 
the room, but does not respond to the doctors’ prompts. She is 
semiconscious. [Obs] [p.5] 
 
Nurse is talking about the patient during morning rounds: “he is got such a 
sweet face, doesn’t he? His hairs are so soft” Attending looks at the patient 
kindly and agrees. Patient is a 60-year-old African American male, and is 
semiconscious. Attending says to the patient: We’d like to talk to you but 
we understand it is tiring to be here”, petting him on the head. We leave 




B. Concerns about the person of the patient are rarely raised in doctor-to-doctor 
conversations but they almost always appear in doctor-to-patient interactions.  
Concerns about the person of the patient remains on the outskirts of what is 
perceived to be the “hard” science of medicine - that is, the application of medical 
scientific knowledge on the patient. Once it comes to the conversation among the doctors 
themselves, it is pretty much all about the signs and symptoms, lab tests, and imaging 
reports. The discourse becomes limitedly scientific, value-free, and (trying to be) 
objective. (I put “trying to be” because medical practice is really never objective). 
Doctor-to-doctor conversations about a patient sound altogether detached from the human 
being that the entire talk is about. Do clinicians believe that it is somehow more 
professional to remain at a value-free position with regards to the person of the patient? It 
is a question worth exploring but is out of the scope of the present study. Concerns 
reappear when it comes to picking the right choice of treatment for the patient and talking 
to them about it during a doctor-patient interview. The exemplar quotes below 
demonstrate how the person of the patient is acknowledged during discussion of the 
choice of treatment.  
Patients are in control of their body, they are autonomous in that they have 
the right to refuse medical treatment, even if medical science says that this 
is what you should do ... But I completely understand, and I do not think it 
should change. I think patients should still be in control of their own 
health. [012] 
 
Patient does not want the female catheter. Resident: “that’s totally alright. 
It's your choice”, petting her on the hand. Resident explains a different 
choice and its pros and cons to the patient. Patient is convinced to choose 
the next option. The resident pets her on the back of her hand again, 




C. Are doctors really concerned about this patient or are they just pretending to 
be so? Both scenarios are equally possible.  
A few questions that are worth pausing over are as follows: Is it that the concerns 
for the sick person is genuinely in there but physicians are actively trying to hide it when 
they are among themselves? Is it a medical cultural thing? Or, is it that they do not really 
care about the persons they are supposed to care for, they only put on a mask and play the 
role of a caring physician when interacting with the patient? But why do they need to put 
the mask at all - societal norms and pressure, or again, just a cultural thing? Does this 
have anything to do with the way they are being trained at the medical school on how to 
care for their patients? Providing an answer to each of these questions is beyond the 
scope of the present study. However, I will make an attempt here to briefly address the 
very last question: Does this have anything to do with the way they are being trained at 
the medical school on how to care for their patients? 
One way students learn how to put on the mask of a “concerned face” when they 
are interacting with patients is through simulation trainings. Having to give an acting 
performance in full doctor-patient encounter sessions, they learn from each other that it 
counts as “good” practice if you can look and sound genuinely concerned when you are 
interacting with patients. They practice pretending to be concerned when interacting with 
patients, even when the patient is a SimMan® 3G–the patient simulator. Below are 
exemplar pieces of data pulled from direct observation field notes of the surgery 
simulation trainings for third-year medical students.  
Setting: IU Health Simulation Center, Fairbanks Hall. Simulation room is setup like an 
actual hospital room. A bed with a mannequin lying on it is standing in one corner. The 
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mannequin is hooked up to multiple machines. In the room next door, Hector is setting 
behind a desk with his head-phones on and looking into the simulation room through the 
glass window. The two rooms share a huge glass window that allows seeing only from 
one side. Hector can see the simulation room but staff in there cannot see him. Hector 
provides a voice for the mannequin so it can interact with students. On a desktop screen 
there is a window projecting from the conference room where 6 third-year medical 
students are seated at a round table. They are waiting for their turns to practice a 
simulation patient visit. They will be watching their peers’ performance in simulation 
room through a screen provided form them in the conference room. Rachel (pseudonym), 
a surgery nurse educator, is leading the session. She is acting as the RN in the room.  
Student 1 enters the room. She starts with physical examination of the 
patient (mannequin that is being voiced by Hector from the other room). 
Hector is singing “I believe I can fly…” Student tries to sound like a 
doctor but seems to be nervous. After the first couple of minutes she 
succeeds to put on a concerned face. Hector shrieks abruptly: “my side 
hurts!” Student responds with a kind voice: “I am sorry, I know it hurts” 
Hector continues mumbling and singing. Student can’t prevent herself 
from laughing but pulls herself together and puts on the concerned and 
caring face back. She asks Hector things about his condition and sighs in 
response–her facial expression of concern looks perfectly natural ... Time 
is up and student returns to the conference room, high-fives with others. 
One student tell her: “Good job!” 
 
Student 2 enters the room. Rachel describes the patient and asks “what can 
you do for me doc?” “I will go ahead and see him”, says student. She 
seems to be calm and normal. Begins physical exam. Hector is completely 
silent. Student faces the RN and says “I am concerned about his BP”, with 
a very concerned face… Student tries to take his pulse but can’t find it, 
laughs with embarrassment. RN helps her find the pulse… Student returns 
to conference room. Other students: “that was fantastic!” 
 
Student 3 enters the room and goes straight to the mannequin: “Mr. 
Hector, how’re you doing for me, sir?” Student seems shy but is smiling 
awkwardly at the mannequin. He begins doing physical exam… Student 
returns to the conference room; looks a bit embarrassed. After almost an 
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entire minute another student says “it was good”. Student 3 shrugs his 
shoulders and smiles. 
 
Student 4 enters the room: “Hey Mr. Hector, how are you doing?” She 
sounds confident. Begins physical exam by telling the mannequin: “it 
might be a little cold, so just that you know” referring to the stethoscope. 
Student continues: “So they told me that you do not wanna be here?” 
Hector: “Nobody wants to be in here”. Student does not follow up with the 
latte statement. She seems concerned and looks at mannequin’s face 
attentively but Hector starts wheezing abruptly in a funny voice. Student 
laughs but quickly pulls herself together again… Student returns to 
conference room. Others clap for her. One student: “you really nailed it!” 
 
Student 5 enters the room. She seems nervous and is clearly blushing. 
Tries to sound confident asking mannequin for his permission for 
performing physical exam on him. Hector: “You can’t listen or look at 
me.” Student looks at mannequin disconcertedly. Hector starts singing 
“Macarena” and makes a barking-like sound every few seconds. She 
begins doing the physical exam despite the patient telling her not to do it. 
Hector does not object. Student is trying to hold it together but still unable 
to put on the right face. She does not look confident at all, is still blushing 
and smiling for no reason ... Student returns to conference room. Others 
smiling at her as though trying to provide encouragement.  
 
Many students believe that the ability to put on faces when needed has to be “part of your 
toolkit” as a physician. In the examples below, medical students are advocating for the 
physicians’ ability to pretend in certain situations, their ability to put on a face and play 
the role even when you are “screaming on the inside”.  
I think external confidence is incredibly important, patients need that, they 
need to believe in you as a medical professional. Even when you are 
screaming on the inside, it’s only having them believe in you and that’s 
important for the physician-patient relationship. So, being able to be 
confident. So, you’ll have to learn to put that confident face when you 
need it. It has to be part of your toolkit. [134] 
 
And there is also this, especially for doctors, like, you have to think like, 
… I do not know, it’s like, we can act, I mean, if the physician is the 
leader at that situation, so like, act like you know what’s going on, or it’s 
ok to say if you do not know what something is, but you have to act like ... 
you have to be the one that’s like, okay. You have to be the one who’s 




It’s like, when you have a role, and sometimes you have to stay in that 
role. What I mean by that is, you call me into your office, and you walk 
me to the patients’ room, for example, and patient is being absolutely 
ballistic. You are a human being and they should not be doing that to you, 
but you are also a doctor and as doctor you now have to stay in that role. 
And your role is to stay calm, and all of a sudden you are like, oh they just 
crossed me out, and you know that you have been sitting in that room 
completely calm and play the role. [184] 
 
Let us also look at the exemplar excerpts below that are pulled from direct observation 
data at the hospital: 
Patient with stage 4 cancer does not seem very happy. Resident says: “it 
was a pleasure taking care of you!” in a tone that does not sound very 
genuine. Patient says “thank you” after a brief pause, rolling her eyes at 
him. “Take care of yourself, okay?” says the resident. “I will”, says the 
patient, sounding somewhat defensive. Resident: “you’re doing better than 
before you came here”.  Patient: “I did not have any of these problems 
before I came in here.” No one follows up with this last statement. Silence 
for a minute. Resident begins to talk about technicalities of the patient 
getting discharged that afternoon. [Obs] [p.20] 
 
Resident tries speaking in Punjabi, the patient’s native language. Patient is 
not responding to commands and is apparently semiconscious. Resident is 
trying to make her smile by making a joke in her native language but the 
patient does not respond. Resident looks genuinely concerned, worried 
faces, sighs ... Resident is holding the patient’s hand… Attending asks the 
nurse to get her something to change sooner in order to minimize the 
infection. The team leaves the room. Resident remains in the room for 
another minute, looking at the patient with a concerned face. [Obs] [p.5] 
 
In the first scenario, the resident talking to the discharging cancer patient sounds like he 
is pretending to be concerned toward his patient. However, the resident in the second 
scenario sounds like she is genuinely concerned about the patient because she is working 
with a patient who is semiconscious–so, she does not need to pretend if she did not feel 
genuinely concerned about the patient. The patient or patient family or relatives were not 
there in the room to hear her or see how she acted toward the patient, which makes the 
genuineness of the concern quite obvious. The problem is, it is not always obvious to tell 
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whether someone is showing a genuine or a fake concern. There are more subtle 
situations where it is next to impossible to tell whether the doctors actually are concerned 
about the sick person that is in front of them or are they just pretending to be so. 
Authorities of Delimitation. Concerns about the sick person are validated and 
taken seriously by the patients themselves, their families and communities, society in 
general, sometimes media such as TV and newspapers, and also by scholars who publish 
research about medical humanities (e.g., medical ethics, medial anthropology, medical 
sociology, etc.). These entities often generate critical views about modern medicine for 
not caring enough about the person of the patients. Concern about the sick person can 
also come from the doctors and the hospital administration. There is no standard rule 
about this though. Different doctors deal with this issue differently, depending on their 
own cultural background and personal codes of morality. Sometimes compassion for the 
sick person is related to humanistic values, sometimes to faith, and other times to the 
nature of medical profession itself. Let us look at some exemplary data coming from 
medical students that are divided in to two categories: 1) statements coming from the 
doctor’s position; 2) statements coming from the patient’s position (in which students talk 
about their own experiences as patients).  
A.  Concerns about the sick person can come from the doctor’s position 
For me, patient-centered care is thinking about the whole patient. Not 
seeing them just as a body in the bed and a disease that needs to be treated. 
But seeing them as a human being, that has a mother, a father, children, 
uncles, aunts, a community they come from and their own problems. They 
are coming to you. Yes, you do not have a magic ball to solve everything, 
but I think it’s your job to make sure that patient as a person is at the 
center and not patient as a disease ... Being an MT prior to med school, I 
saw some really sad things ... Like, we were going in to patients’ homes 
where they did not have hot water or heat even in the winter, and I think 
through that I developed kind of a sense of that a patient is more than what 
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you see in the hospital, you know. They are always coming from 
somewhere. [134] 
 
I think, remembering that it’s another human being coming to you, talking 
about very personal things, and not ever making it seem like trivial, 
because it’s the 3rd call that you are working to… for that person, maybe 
it’s their first call in the last 10 years. It’s very important to them ... It may 
be difficult to find a meeting point - for physician it’s the 60th patient that 
they are seeing this week whereas for the patient this might be the first 
time in 20 years that they are in the hospital so it’s such a big deal for 
them while totally commonplace for the physician.  [184] 
 
Residents are discussing the patient on the phone, talking about whether 
the patient can afford a 90-days insurance: “Can they afford that? Yeah, 
how much is it? That’s not too bad, are they okay with it?” [Obs] [p.1] 
 
Doctors who care about sick persons may develop strategies of their own to resist the 
restrictions imposed on them by the system–that is, the nondiscursive structures–in an 
attempt to stay true to their personal values regarding ethics and morality. Some doctors 
care about the patient’s perception of how much time the doctor spends with them. This 
is an example of how some doctors attempt to find ways to compromise with the system 
that does not bend enough to allow doctors to spend more of their actual time with 
patients:  
In the emergency medicine, you’re very limited on your time for 
interactions. I have been researching techniques for building better rapport 
within that timeframe with patient. Most physicians get to have only 5-10 
minutes with their patient and you not only need to get a ton of 
information in that time to find out why they are here and how best to treat 
them, but also make sure they trust you and you are acknowledging that 
you are dealing with another human being. [004] 
 
There are ways that you can do that. For example, when you go in the 
room, if you set down, they are gonna think you stayed there longer 
compared to if you were just standing up the whole time. Or if you stand 
on the opposite side of the bed, in the hospital room they think you stayed 
longer even though you are spending the same amount of time, cause if 
you are standing by the door, they think you’re gonna run off ... So, like 




Example of resisting the system based on personal code of morality: 
 
Being able to practice in a way that is consistent with my faith. Not to 
force it on anyone, but it’s not infrequent that people are struggling 
emotionally. If it’s a place where they tell me that we are not comfortable 
with you praying with them but the patients want me to pray with them 
that would be an impasse for me. That’s a place I am not comfortable 
working. If a place said that I have to perform a certain procedure but I 
think that procedure harms somebody and they force me to do that I would 
not practice in that context. I have my own conscience. [034] 
 
B. Concerns about the sick person that come from the patient’s position 
 
The comments below demonstrate patients’ expectations from the doctor to see 
them as persons, ask them personal questions and build a human to human relationship 
with them rather than acting “like a machine or something”. These comments clearly 
show the patients’ desire for their personality details to be noticed and acknowledged by 
the doctor at every encounter. These comments voice the silent struggle on the part of the 
patients for being recognized as human beings by their doctors.  
This is just something that’s important to me, but they always say the 
wrong year of school I am in, they always ask the wrong things, like ...  
and so if you have read the chart then maybe you should know who I am 
as a person. And that’s my primary physician, yeah. And also, the dentist 
for example, you do go to them like twice a year, you know. They are 
always wrong. So, like, “you just graduated from college, right?” And I 
am like, “no, that’s 2 years ago”. [063]  
 
So, there was this one time that I got a diagnosis and I really resisted the 
diagnosis, you know ... So, I was just sitting there and the doctor just kept 
going… I think it was a good opportunity for a physician to kind of have a 
more human to human interaction ... So, in my head I was like, you are 
talking to someone who knows about this condition. So, I did not feel like 
at any point my being a med student came up in our conversation. And 
they knew I was a med student and they knew my year and all. But they 
did not address that, and it was more like a, ok, ok, ok… and keep going 
about their own thing ... It was just like, “hey here is your diagnosis”. And 
I am like, “uh… it’s not that… really?” And also, I knew that the 
medication for that condition was very expensive, and I could not afford 
that at that time, but the doctor did not seem to care, he was just like, “this 
is the diagnosis and this is the medication for it”. And I am like, “OKAY!” 
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… I did not like what that physician did to me, not because their diagnosis 
was wrong or anything, but because I wanted him to talk about what that 
diagnosis meant to me. [184]  
 
He [my doctor] did not ask me any personal questions, like how I felt or ...  
And I do not like it to be that way, you know ... It did not seem like he was 
rushed; he did sit there and all. But he just did not ask me any personal 
questions. He did not ask me like, “you are going for the procedure, are 
you nervous?” He did not seem like he really cared where I was coming 
from, he just kind of wanted to get to do the thing and move on, you know. 
[072] 
 
Grids of Specification. These are rules based on which different types of sick 
persons (referring to their personal characteristics) are classified, related, contrasted, and 
grouped into categories. Making a personal judgment is required in order to classify 
patients in this manner. Doctors have to do this on a regular basis as they navigate 
through their busy schedules trying to prioritize which patient needs the most urgent help. 
Examples of common categories (which come from the data collected in this study) 
include: angry patients, nice patients, respectful patients, deserving patients, more 
important patients, less important patients, and so on. Societal norms in general and 
personal preferences in particular - on the part of the doctor - feed into the decision- 
making process in order to classify patients into different categories. This is besides the 
common perceptions that doctors do not judge their patient, and one who goes to the 
doctor should rest assured that they are not going to be judged by their doctor.  
Below, a medical student is using his personal judgment to categorize patients as 
happy, unhappy, disrespectful, demanding, and angry. He thinks these categories have 
more to do with the patient as a person. Just to reiterate, this study is an archaeological 
analysis and the point here is not to accept or reject the truth of these claims (e.g., 
whether the patients were actually angry and disrespectful or not), or criticize the 
234 
 
student’s behavior for talking about patients in this manner. The goal here is rather to 
report, as accurately as possible, the types of statements that are happening in real time as 
part of the medical discourse concerning the person of the patients. 
So, I was like in charge of the patients’ history and ... for the most part 
patients were happy. But there was a few that were not happy. I thought 
there were some who were even disrespectful to physician. I think, it had 
more to do with who the patient was as a person, because, they were just 
demanding everything, and I was trying to help them as I could ... I do not 
know, all I saw was an angry patient. Like, every time I would enter their 
room, they’d be like, “why did it take you so long to bring that?” And then 
like, “oh, this is the 5th time this month I have been to ER, why can’t you 
guys fix me?” And I was like, oyeeee, I’m out… [151] 
 
Below is a couple of student responses to a discussion prompt presented in a focus group 
(see prompt # 3, FG Protocol, Appendix D). The prompt went as follows: “You are a 
resident and have 10 minutes before participating in a surgery you have been looking 
forward to. There are 3 patients who need your urgent attention: A) an 80-year-old 
woman who has been throwing diapers at junior doctors recently. She is the wife of an 
important physician at your hospital. B) A 25-year-old patient who takes good care of 
himself. His mother sued the hospital last year. C) A 55-year-old homeless patient who 
has been admitted 3 times over the last month with no improvement because he keeps 
discharging himself. You have enough time to visit only 1 of these patients and leave the 
other two to your interns. Which patient would you choose and why?” Students 
responded as follows:  
I would not choose the homeless guy because he is noncompliant. Even 
though I worked with homeless people, I mean, you can’t help somebody 
who does not want to help himself. And between the other two, chance of 
getting sued or upsetting the attending physician ... Ummh ... Being 
completely honest ... I’d probably sit down with the 80-year-old woman 




 I’d lean towards C; but also, I’ve shadowed in emergency rooms, when 
you are triaging a disaster for example ... I know I have seen people sort of 
downgrading the priority of a patient being seen based on the 
understanding that there is not really much that they can do for them. And 
so, I can imagine somebody to whom C would not be a high priority for 
someone who is qualified, and they would sort of put them off to be seen 
by interns [MS1] 
 
The above students are classifying a patient as: homeless, noncompliant, person who does 
not want to help himself, and person who is less worthy of a senior doctor’s time and 
attention. Again, they are using their own best personal judgment to come up with these 
categories, and I am not here to say whether their judgments are right or wrong. The point 
I would rather wish to emphasize is that doctors do need to classify, relate, contrast, and 
group their patients into categories according to their best personal judgment–based on 
the patients’ personal characteristics. Of course, classification of patients by the doctor 
who is using their professional judgment based on the medical condition of the patients 
(e.g., urgent patient, medically complicated patient, elderly versus young patient and how 
that affects their survival from a specific disease, etc.) is not part of the present 
discussion.  
Conditions of Existence for Sick Person as an object of medical discourse. 
Again, conditions of existence for an object includes defining the rules of 
formation for each object which we did above, as well as characterizing the relations of 
those rules with one another. While there seems to be no obvious hierarchical relationship 
between the rules associated with the surfaces of emergence, authorities of delimitation, 
grids of specification for the sick person, there are certainly other more subtle relations 
that connect these rules with one another. The relations between parts of the above three 
rules are such that makes them dependent on one another. In a way, some of these rules 
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are determined and defined by other pieces within the three sets of rules of formation for 
the sick person as an object of medical discourse. Figure 4.8 summarizes the 
archaeological analysis of the sick person as an object of medical discourse.  
Figure 4.8 
Summary of Archaeological Analysis for the Sick Person as an Object of Modern 
Medical Discourse 
 
For example, doctors being formally taught to pretend being concerned about a 
patient as part of their medical training, the local medical culture allowing only minimal 
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talk about patients as whole human beings when doctors are among themselves, and, lack 
of a formal requirement in place for doctors to attend to the person of their patients, are 
linked at the level of their very nature that denies the significance of acknowledging a 
patient as a person and a full human being. The latter two rules also reinforce one 
another. The often-silent struggle for being noticed and recognized as a human being and 
not merely a patient by the doctor–on the patients’ part–further attests to the effects of 
this culture of denial on the way patients perceive the quality of medical care they receive 
in modern clinical settings.  
Doctors having not only the choice but also the authority of categorizing patients 
based on their personal characteristics is another rule that further reinforces the culture of 
denial toward recognizing patients as human beings. Even though at times inevitable, 
categorizing patients based on their personal characteristics can have detrimental effects 
on the delivery of medical care by the doctors–as was demonstrated by a few examples of 
the data above. If the doctor thinks you are less deserving of their care, then you are 
likely to be affected by this decision in several ways, including but not limited to being 
denied the care that you would otherwise receive - based on who you are as a person. 
What makes the situation even more alarming is the fact that doctors classify patients 
only based on their personal code of morality. Thus, depending on your luck, you may 
encounter a doctor who has true Christian values and will not discriminate against you as 
a person, or, a doctor who simply follows his/her own personal upbringing and the values 
hailed by their family or immediate social circle. If you encounter the latter, there is no 
guarantee you will not be “othered” by that doctor in a way that will seriously affect the 
time, amount, and quality of medical care that you receive. 
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 It is remarkable that nobody teaches the doctors how to adopt a personal code of 
morality that will be harmless for their patients during medical school training. Having an 
inclusive code of morality, a narrow one, or not having any codes of morality at all is a 
personal choice that medical students enjoy. They are never required to share that code 
with anyone. Therefore, there really are no standards for having it, and no penalties for 
not having it. The question is: does having or not having certain codes of morality on the 
part of the doctor tend to affect the delivery of medical care? Based on the data collected 
in this study, I would affirm: yes.   
Enunciative Modalities 
In the previous section we discussed the objects of modern medical discourse as 
they emerged from the data collected in this study. In other words, we determined what 
people involved in medical discourse talk about when they talk about “medicine”. We 
found medical discourse mostly consists of the talk about some kind of disease and its 
treatment, the human body, the doctor, and the sick person. Identifying these objects, 
outlining the rules for their formation, and establishing the conditions of existence for 
each of them constituted the archaeological description of the first of four elements in the 
discursive formation of modern medicine. In this section, I will attempt to analyze the 
second element of discursive formation of modern medicine, which is the modality of 
statements. In other words, now that we know what people talk about in medicine, the 
next step is to explore how they talk about those things. For example, given the first 
object of discourse: the disease and its treatment, first, I would like to establish what 
types of statements are most common about the disease (e.g., qualitative description of 
disease). Next, I will try to address the following three questions: 1) who has the right to 
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authoritatively speak about the disease and its treatment in modern medical discourse? 2) 
What is the institutional site from which this speaker is drawing his/her authority? 3) 
What is the specific position of this speaker vis-à-vis the diseases and their treatments, in 
general. The entire process will be repeated for each discursive object–four times in 
total–in this section.  
Unlike the discourse of medicine in the sixteenth or even eighteenth century, 
modern medical discourse is based upon a unified corpus of knowledge suggesting pretty 
much the same traditions that need to be followed everywhere. This includes similar 
ways of looking at the disease in general, similar ways of perceiving signs and symptoms 
of diseases and analyzing them, similar ways of documenting patient history and 
examination details, using same medical vocabulary (even when speaking in different 
languages) in relation to same human body structure and functions (unified anatomical 
and physiological understanding of the body across the board) and their pathological 
conditions. Therefore, one has to admit that modern medicine is no longer based on a 
group of diverse traditions, observations, and heterogeneous practices which would differ 
too much depending on which doctor, which hospital, and which state we are talking 
about. Even though all findings of this study are local and relative to the Indiana 
University School of Medicine as observed in 2019, building on the similarities in 
fundamental medical practice, they can be relevant to and/or insightful for other localities 
within the United States. 
 Modalities of Statement about Disease and its Treatment. Statements that are 
about diseases and their treatment options make up a large bulk of the talk in modern 
medical discourse. Types of archaeological statements referring to this object include 
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qualitative description, reasoning and analogy, and statistical statements. Below are a few 
examples of each type pulled out of the clinical observation field notes:  
Example of qualitative descriptions about disease and treatment: 
Patients stated that the pain began the day before and consisted of a sharp 
pain that lasted around 30 seconds, followed by a dull pain that would last 
around 2 minutes. The pain was located over his left chest area somewhat 
near his shoulder. He has never had chest pain in the past. He has been 
told “years ago” that he has a right bundle branch block and premature 
heart beats. He will be placed on a diabetic, heart healthy diet. He will 
need to be NPO after midnight for his nuclear stress test tomorrow. [Obs]  
 
Example of reasoning and analogy statements about disease and treatment: 
Attending talks about patient’s meds for 30 minutes with resident: type, 
choice of drugs, does, etc. … Resident talks back and challenges the 
attending’s choice of drug. Attending: “put her on 400 mg of …” 
Resident: “but she is already taking too much” Attending, after a minute’s 
pause from the other room: “alternatively, you can put her on Asmanex 
(medication)”. Resident: “I already put her on 400 mg of Atrovent”. [Obs] 
[p.13] 
 
Resident describes the patient to attending in the hallway outside patient’s 
door. Attending asks questions, residents struggle a bit. One resident 
speaks up and challenges the attending: “but there are studies that prove 
IV fluid does not do much in this case” additional 20 minutes’ discussion 
outside the door. They are talking about: viruses, CMV, mono, etc., trying 
to figure out the correct diagnosis. Attending: “I went to the literature 
twice because I was not sure of myself”. Resident provides few 
suggestions and asks question. Attending seems to appreciate it. [Obs] 
[p.15] 
 
Example of statistical computation statements about disease and treatment: 
 
Number of adults with diagnosed heart disease has reached 30.3 million 
that is 12.1% of the US population. Percent of office-based physician 
visits with coronary artery disease, ischemic heart disease, or history of 
myocardial infarction indicated on the medical record makes up 6.7% of 




Rules for the Formation of Statements about Disease and Treatment.   
1. Who has the right to authoritatively speak about disease and its treatment in 
modern medical discourse?  
Those who have this right includes doctors, residents and medical students–each 
with varying amounts of authority; other health professionals such as physician assistants 
and physical therapists – depending on the nature of the problem; also, medical textbooks 
and research papers from which the teaching materials (e.g., lectures, notes, and podcasts 
in medical education) are drawn.  
2. What is the institutional site from which this speaker draws his/her authority 
and what are the rules of this site regarding statements about disease and 
treatment? 
The institutional authority on which statements by doctors, residents and medical 
students are based (when they are talking authoritatively about the disease and treatment 
options) includes that of the medical school and hospital. Medical textbooks and journal 
papers, on the other hand, draw from the institutional authority of peer-reviewed 
academic practice as well as the institutional authority of their respective publisher or 
journal.  
3. What is the specific position of this speaker vis-à-vis the diseases and their 
treatments? 
In case of doctors: they often have a direct relationship with the disease and its 
treatment options based on first-hand experience with their patients. They are observing 
subjects of the disease through their contact with their patients. They are also listening 
and questioning subjects in relation to the disease through their relationship with their 
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patients. The qualitative description of the disease, reasoning based on analogy and 
deduction, and statistical information they provide as discursive statements in the clinic 
are either based on conclusions reached by others (e.g., medical researchers) or by 
themselves (based on the physical exam, lab tests and imaging tests they perform on the 
patient) and are often backed by well-established evidence. Doctors do not make baseless 
speculations about the nature of disease and their treatment in clinical settings. Put in 
another way, it’s their job to reach to the right conclusions based on supporting evidence 
in order to treat the patients. They need to do their job for personal, social and 
administrative reasons in order to remain a doctor and be endorsed as a competent 
professional by others in the field. They need to perform their job as accurately as 
possible to continue to receive all personal and social privileges that come with being a 
doctor (e.g., ranging between values such as financial stability, and feeling good about 
being able to help the patient).  
As for residents and medical students, their position is a little bit different. They 
are similar to doctors in terms of having a direct relationship with the disease and being 
the observing, listening, and questioning subjects. However, unlike doctors, the 
qualitative descriptions of the disease and treatment options, especially, clinical reasoning 
based on analogy and deduction that they provide are not always correct. This is partly 
due to the fact that residents’ and students’ perceptions are not always based on the first-
hand evidence, or simply the right type of evidence. Thus, conclusions they reach at can 
sometimes be pure speculations. This is tolerated in part because students - and even 
residents - do not share the same kind of responsibility as the attending physicians. What 
happens to the patient does not ultimately affect their professional status and future career 
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as a medical professional. Also, hospital administration does not rely on the accuracy of 
understanding and performance by medical students. Attending physicians and clinical 
faculty hold students responsible mainly for showing up, participating in patient care, and 
learning from others. It is not their job to make the right decisions in terms of diagnosis 
and treatment of the disease. Therefore, for students, it is not a matter of keeping their 
career, professional status, or financial privileges when they provide qualitative 
descriptions, statistical calculations, and/or reasoning based on analogy and deduction in 
relation to the diseases and their treatments in the clinical settings. A few examples from 
the data to better illustrate this point.  
Five minutes talking outside the door - not a deep level of discussion. 
Resident who described the case to the team did not do a good job of 
presenting at all. He describes the patient but skips some info, does not 
seem to be sure about anything he is reporting: “I do not know, I mean” 
Attending: “I wonder if tachy is because of his lobectomy?” The resident 
who is assigned to the patient shrugs his shoulders. The second resident 
adds something which is not important at this point. The team goes in. The 
first resident takes the lead. Patient is a 50-year-old man with small cell 
carcinoma. [Obs] [p.50] 
 
Here are a few exemplar statements from medical student interviews about their own 
position and responsibility in the clinic:  
Residents are being paid to be there and ... They are responsible and 
reliable to a degree; [they are] accountable for whatever goes on with their 
patient ...  A medical student really is not responsible. I mean we may get 
chastised if we do something grossly wrong, like negligence, but we are 
not gonna be yelled at. [103] 
 
And as a 3rd year [student], we have kind of the most freedom with the 
least responsibility. Technically, we do not do much so you can spend a lot 
of time with the patients. [063] 
 
In case of basic science medical educators who are not clinicians: Even though they 
provide qualitative description of some diseases and their treatments as they relate to 
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teaching their basic science subject, their position is completely different than that of a 
doctor in relation to this significant object of the medical discourse. First off, their 
relationship with disease and its treatment is not a direct one because basic science 
educators, often holding PhDs - and not MDs - do not come to personal contact with 
patients and therefore have little to no experience of observing the disease they are 
talking about. They are not the listening or questioning subjects either when it comes to 
the disease and treatment options. They are mainly reporting subjects whose speculations 
are based on the evidence provided and verified by others (e.g., medical textbooks and 
clinicians). Nevertheless, their positioning with regards to the statements they make about 
the disease is rather interesting. That is because their professional status as medical 
educators, their social prestige, career and financial security all depend upon the accuracy 
of the statements they make about at least two significant objects of the modern medical 
discourse (i.e., the diseases, and the human body). Even though untrained in the field, 
they cannot simply make baseless speculations in their statements about disease. Their 
statements tend to be as accurate as possible and backed by evidence (even if that 
evidence comes from all secondary sources). Hence, basic science educators need to stay 
engaged with disease and its treatment as an important object of medical discourse within 
the medical school for their own personal/professional benefit.  
Finally, in case of the medical researchers who also make all sorts of statements 
(e.g., qualitative descriptions, reason by analogy and deduction, and statistical 
calculations) about diseases and their treatments: often, if not always, they have a direct 
relationship with the diseases they are talking about as medical researchers. They are 
observing subjects but also, and mainly, the questioning subjects regarding specific 
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problems about the nature of diseases and their treatments needing to be researched. The 
statements they make, whether they are qualitative descriptions, statistical information or 
reasoning by analogy and deduction, are based on well-established and peer-reviewed 
evidence–and occasionally they may also include some theoretical assumptions and 
speculations. The position medical researchers assume when making those statements are 
very much based on their personal and professional interests–given the rules of academic 
institutions in the US. Medical researchers publish to get promoted and make themselves 
established in their field. This often leads to a significantly enhanced career and financial 
benefits for them in the long run. Some publish for the reason of doing a service to the 
profession itself. These are often people who are, in addition to being medical 
researchers, are often clinicians as well.  
Statements about diseases and their treatments (statistical calculations, in 
particular) also come from researchers in other fields such as public health, public policy 
etc. Research like that draws on the authority of academia and their certain publishers. 
However, their position regarding the disease and its treatment is completely different 
than others who are directly involved in clinical care (e.g., doctors, residents, students). 
An epidemiologist, for example, produces statistical results and conclusions about 
different diseases based on firsthand research. Nevertheless, they do not have a direct 
relationship with the disease, they are not observing or listening subjects, but can be a 
questioning subject in relation to the diseases and their treatment. Conclusions they reach 
are based on evidence and not mere speculations. One may wonder, then, why do they 
publish about disease when they do not have a direct relationship with it? The answer 
might that it is their job as epidemiologists to conduct research and publish in order to 
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receive all personal and social privileges as professional academics. They mainly talk 
about disease as an object of the public health discourse rather than clinical medicine. 
Figure 4.9 illustrates the archaeological model of analysis for modalities of statement as 
elements of modern medical discourse. 
Figure 4.9 





Conditions of Existence for Different Modalities of Statements about Disease 
and Treatment. There is a hierarchical difference in weight of the statements about 
disease and treatment depending on who enunciates them, what type of institutional 
authority the speaker draws from, and what their positioning related to disease and 
treatment (as an object of medical discourse) is. For example, a statement about clinical 
reasoning based on analogy and deduction made by an attending physician has more 
weight when compared to the same statement made by a resident or a medical student. As 
a rule, analysis based on analogy and deductive reasoning (clinical reasoning) is most 
endorsed if it is spoken by an attending physician. Residents and students also perform 
deductive reasoning in various clinical situations but their say - while deemed acceptable 
- has less weight than that of the attending physician.  
Interestingly, the patients are also allowed to make statements like that using their 
deductive reasoning, but their say has almost no value when it comes to deciding the 
diagnosis of the problem through clinical reasoning. Clearly, deductive reasoning is not 
the only modality of statements that is weighted hierarchically in medical discourse. 
Other modalities such as qualitative descriptions and statistical information about disease 
are also weighted differently in clinical medicine depending on who speaks them, what 
institutional authority that speaker draws from, and what their position is regarding the 
human body as an object of medical discourse. For instance, a 3rd year medical student 
reporting statistical information drawn from a peer-reviewed journal article carries less 
weight in the eyes of the patient and patient families compared to the exact same 
information coming from the same source, but spoken by an attending physician. 
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Modalities of Statement about Human Body. Types of archaeological 
statements referring to the human body as an object of medical discourse include 
qualitative description of the body; biographical accounts of how the body behaves over a 
specific period of its own history (patient history); statements about the location, 
interpretation, and cross-checking of signs in the body; reasoning that leads to predicting 
how the body will act under certain circumstances through an analogy and deduction 
(e.g., prognosis); statistical calculations about the body (e.g., mortality and survival rates, 
demonstration of correlation between certain causes and their effects on human body, 
etc.); and paternalistic statements by doctors in reference to the sick body. Let us observe 
some examples of the above modalities of enunciation below: 
Example of qualitative description statements about the body: 
In anatomy lab, we had a 90-year-old female cadaver who died of colon 
cancer. She had no fat, but muscles were not too good either, they were 
paper-thin. We also had a 29-year-old body-builder and you could see 
every muscle on his body. [004] 
 
Example of biographical history statements about the body: 
 
Patient: “my skin started itching over the forehead first. In a day or two I 
developed the rushes and then they started burning so bad. I also began 
feeling dizzy and feverish ... they told me it is a type of skin infection” 
[Obs].  
 
Example of statements locating signs and symptoms in the body: 
 
Resident is reporting patient’s lab values to his attending: “cholesterol and 
triglycerides were high in the blood, urine was clear. The AST (test for 
liver enzymes) results were messed up ... I have put in the order for a 
maxillofacial CT, will follow it up via phone right now… [Obs] [p.1] 
 
Resident calls another department about a patient’s biopsy and asks 
whether the patient needs to get one: “the mass is in the right iliac fossa 
and we are thinking of perhaps a lymphoma” ... he calls three other people 
about the same patient, following up with cardiologist, radiologist, etc., 
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“Can you send me the results of his coronary angiography and echo by 2 
PM today?” [Obs] [p.2] 
 
Example of statements predicting how the body would react under certain 
conditions: 
Attending is teaching the residents in the conference room during the 
education session: “Heart transplant recipients receive more aggressive 
immunosuppressant treatment during the early post-transplant period, 
incidence of non-Hodgkin lymphoma is five times higher after heart 
transplant than after kidney transplant. In short, the more aggressive 
immunosuppressant drugs you receive, the more likely you are to develop 
the cancer after the transplant.” [Obs] 
 
Example of statements about statistical information as they relate to the body:  
 
Resident: I looked this up last night and found a study that says among 
patients who received neoadjuvant therapy, the mortality rate for right 
pneumonectomy was 21.4%, that is, 3 in every 14 patients getting the 
surgery. [Obs] 
 
 Attending discussing the breast cancer patient with his residents: So, I 
read this somewhere that, the number of women with early stage disease 
in one breast who undergo removal of the unaffected breast has increased 
from 5% of total mastectomies in 1998 to 30% in 2011. [Obs] 
 
Example of paternalistic statements about the body: 
 
I tried to stop taking the medication that made me feel terribly nauseated 
but she (the doctor) said you’re not allowed to. I did not know what to do 
so I just stopped going to her anymore. She was like, whatever the 
insurance paid for I had to have it. I was willing to pay for another $20 if 
there was something else to help, I did not mind, but she was like just 
following the rules and not what I wanted. She was just trying to tell me 
what’s best for me and was not really understanding when I kept telling 
her that I was actually worse, I was worse than I ever was, so I just felt 
like she did not care. In our transitions-1 class they were telling us about 
the paternalistic model versus patient-centered model. She was definitely 
following a paternalistic model by just telling me what to do and what’s 
best for my body regardless of what I would have wanted as a person, 




Rules for the Formation of Statements about the Human Body.  
1. Who has the right to speak authoritatively about the human body in modern 
medical discourse?  
Those who have this right include the doctors, residents, and students; allied 
health professionals; the patient; medical texts and journals; and both clinical and basic 
science faculty in medical schools. 
2. What is the institutional site from which this speaker draws his/her authority? 
The medical care teams including doctors, residents and medical students draw 
from the authority of the hospital when operating in the clinical settings; the patient, on 
the other hand, uses the ownership authority over the body that she speaks about; medical 
texts and journals base their statements on the authority of academic medicine; and lastly, 
the faculty talking and teaching about human body base their assertions on the authority 
of medical school, as well as medical texts, and the hospital (in case of clinical faculty).   
3. What is the specific position of this speaker vis-à-vis the human body as an 
object of medical discourse? 
In case of doctors, residents and medical students, they all have a direct 
relationship with human body as an object of medical discourse. All doctors get trained in 
the anatomy of bodily structures often by means of dissecting human cadavers in medical 
school. Medical students typically develop their authoritative relationship with human 
body for the first time in anatomy lab. This can be a highly complicated and emotionally 
disconcerting experience for some, a mere learning experience for some others, and 
something in between those two extremes for the remaining majority of students. One of 
the coping strategies students tend to develop in the anatomy lab is desensitizing 
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themselves toward cadavers’ bodies in order to be able to work with them. In an attempt 
to not get overwhelmed by emotions, they try to distance themselves from the fact that 
the cadaver lying in front of them was a walking and talking human being that used to 
live among them not a very long time ago.  
We often called our cadaver our first patient. I get that, we appreciate it 
that they dedicated their body to us and everyone deserves respect and 
dignity ... however ... for me, I took it more as a learning experience. Like, 
when we were working on the face, it is a sensitive area, it’s at the end of 
the course, after bisecting the head when it does not really look like a 
human anymore… so that was the part for me where I was like, whoa! We 
just did that! If I did not desensitize myself, there comes almost a little bit 
of a paralysis of decision making, like, people who are in the surgery often 
experience that feeling ...You know that this person is not alive, but you 
still respect them. [004] 
 
If you are going to become a physician, and you need to desensitize 
yourself to a cadaver, then I think medicine will be very difficult for you. I 
think you can, if it helps you, but then how are you going to make it 
through a real person that’s alive than dead, you know, you have to be able 
to confront the fact that this was a real human being who was kind enough 
to dedicate their body to the education of stupid first-years who do not 
know how to use the scalpels, we are not doing a good job. [063] 
 
One of the problems often arising as a consequence of using a desensitization as an 
actively chosen strategy is an almost subconscious objectification of the human body on 
the part of students who try too hard to desensitize themselves. Whether students do it 
consciously or subconsciously, once they objectify the human body it makes it further 
difficult for them to treat their cadaver’s body with respect. This type of objectification 
might also have long-term effects on some students in terms of the way they perceive, 
observe, and touch the human body as a physician in the future. A more detailed 
discussion of this topic will be provided later in this chapter as we discuss the strategies 
related to the human body. Let’s look at the following example that describes medical 
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students who treat their cadavers’ bodies like an object–or even worse than a regular 
object such as a pencil.  
[In anatomy lab] mostly people were respective but there were also 
definitely people who would like, just let it drop, and not take the time to 
set it down gently, and were kind of rough with it [their cadaver’s body]. I 
do not know. Not caring about it ... I mean, I think it’s important to always 
be gentle, even if it was a pencil, I am not gonna throw it across the room. 
Just like, it’s a matter of courtesy… I do not know. It’s still someone 
donating their life to you… so if that was my body and a stupid med 
student is throwing my legs around, I would not be happy about it. I think 
the donors envision a medical student who would take care of them, or 
you would not give your body away if you knew that someone was gonna 
cut you up in three and throw around, mess around with you, you know. 
[043] 
 
In general, student comments became more sensitive to objectification of the cadavers’ 
body when they were asked whether they would be willing to donate their own bodies to 
anatomical education. Below is an excerpt from the interview conversation with a 
medical student who sounded pretty comfortable with the way bodies are currently being 
handled in anatomy lab. However, once I asked him if he would like to donate his own 
body to science then, his response was as follows: 
So, I remember saying no [to donating my body] when we were discussing 
this in the class, but it was a very quick talk and more of a gut feeling. I do 
not think I had really processed that enough before saying no ... cause, I’ll 
be like, almost a hypocrite, oh my God, like, I said, oh I myself had that 
mindful attention in treating them [the cadavers] as a person and… and I 
also said that there was a culture of self-correcting among students that 
helped reminding each other to stay ethically accountable toward our 
cadaver ... but, I do not know. I feel like I am not comfortable with that 
level of objectivity [if it is my body as the cadaver]. Like, I would want 
more mindfulness, I did not feel, like… so I know that students have to 
objectify in order to function, but I also feel like that would be like too 
much objectification for me to do it [donate my own body] and ... [But it’s 
only when it comes to your own body when you feel different?] YES, 
YES! That’s exactly what I wanted to say. Like, that’s the reason I am like 




In relation to the living bodies (of the patients), the positioning of doctors, residents and 
medical students is not much different either. They still have a direct relationship with the 
body through physical examination, which includes looking at, listening to, and touching 
of certain parts, or all, or any parts of the patient’s body. Medical practice is one that 
requires intimacy with the patient’s body in order for the practice to be effective. Doctors 
are privy to the things about their patients’ bodies that no one else, not even the closes 
people to the patient, often are.  
Attending is leading the session; he reads a patient’s case to the residents, 
word for word: “Mr. Smith is delivering normally-shaped stool, 4-5 times 
a day” Residents laughing: “oh, bless” [Obs] [p.30] 
 
Like, some patients will share with us things that they have never really 
shared with anyone else, and we are being trusted to carry that to the 
extent that our relationship with that patient holds up, in a more personal 
way. [MS2]  
 
I think overall the doctor has a more personal relationship, whether it’s 
due to the nature of the profession or not, but it’s a personal job. [MS3] 
 
Doctors are also able to observe the internal parts of the body via medical imaging such 
as CT and MRI that they order for their patients. Thus, the statements they enunciate 
about the human body are for the most part conclusions reached based on first-hand 
evidence. At times, these statements may also include theoretical speculations, especially 
when it comes to microscopic structures of the human body. In sum, doctors, residents 
and medical students are the observing, listening, questioning, and perceiving subjects in 
relation to the human body as an object of medical discourse.  
The medical team’s relation with a living human body is what I would like to call 
strictly professional in the sense that they deal with the body as part of their routine job. 
Dealing with human bodies is not a matter of life and death to them whereas how they 
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conduct themselves when handling human bodies maybe a matter of life and death to the 
patient. Below are some student comments in response to a movie trailer shown at the 
focus groups. To Err is Human (Eisenberg, 2018) is a documentary that focuses on 
preventable mistakes in the US healthcare system. Here a few examples of how students 
responded: 
So, I know sometimes they take out the wrong kidney from a patient for 
example, and that happens more than several hundred times every year. 
Does that mean they did not even communicate and make sure which side 
they needed to work on? [MS3]  
 
I think it’s something that we need to get better at, and the hospitals, they 
are working on that. Like, I know before surgeries for example, they 
always double check to make sure it’s the right patient, are we operating 
on the right place, or the right side, and they count the pieces of gauze to 
make sure they do not leave any inside the patient afterwards… so these 
are avoidable things, you know, that hospitals work on. I do not think we 
are perfect. I think we are still working on how to completely eliminate all 
of those errors. [MS2] 
 
Students also linked the doctors’ sometimes neglectful attitudes towards the human body 
(especially in cases of surgery) to the broader context of the hospital. The rules and 
regulations in the hospital, which is a nondiscursive institution, were directly related to 
the ways doctors and other healthcare professionals behave toward bodies. Here are a 
couple examples from the focus group data:  
I think part of it might be due to lack of a work-life balance, which does 
not exist a whole lot among physicians. So, if you are so fatigued all the 
time, then you are like, not aware of your tiny mistakes all the time, but 
those tiny things could have a grave impact on the patient. And that’s 
basically everyone who works in the healthcare industry. There might be 
very few people who work in the healthcare industry but are not tired all 
the time. [MS3]  
 
So, one remedy for this would be having more doctors, more resident 
positions available. If there are more doctors there will be more checks in 




Lastly, making paternalistic statements about the human body is common among doctors 
in general, and the attending physicians in particular. Something that often accompanies 
these statements is what Foucault calls the medical gaze, “the eye that knows and 
decides, the eye that governs” (BC, p89). The gaze is what tries to locate and define 
boundaries of a ghost (the disease) that has possessed a person’s body. Let’s look at an 
excerpt pulled from a patient’s treatment plan to illustrate this example:  
Patient was recently diagnosed with borderline diabetes and has been 
trying to control it with diet and exercise. Upon presentation in the ED his 
blood glucose level was found to be 280. We will place the patient on 
sliding scale insulin and will continue to monitor his blood sugar levels 
throughout his stay in the hospital. We will also obtain a hemoglobin A1C 
to get a sense of what his sugars have been over the past 3 months. We 
will encourage the patient to follow-up with his PCP about his diabetes 
since it appears that diet and exercise may have failed, thus requiring a 
medication to control his diabetes. 
 
One can see hints of a tone here that assumes that what is being referred to as “patient” 
here is a body that has been possessed by diabetes. An archaeological analysis does not 
commit to criticize the validity of any discursive practice. Therefore, I am not suggesting 
that what is happening in the above excerpt is wrong or defective in some way. Rather, I 
am simply reporting the existence of medical gaze on the part of the doctor, which 
consists of paternalistic statements regarding the patients’ bodies as part of the modern 
medical discourse.  
In the case of patients which is the next group of people who can speak 
authoritatively about the body: Whereas patients have a very direct relationship with the 
body they talk about (which is their own body), the statements they make about the body 
are often speculations and at best backed by evidence from the popular media and the 
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World Wide Web (unless the patient is a medical professional himself). Let’s look at an 
example here:  
Patient comes with like, 5 pain radiating down her hip. And he is a hip 
surgeon so she is thinking like, oh it’s a hip problem. So, he quickly does 
like an X-ray and notices that it is a back problem. So, he is like, I am not 
a spinal surgeon so, I can’t help this problem. She gets super upset, and 
like, I am very disappointed, I have come for this, and how could it not be 
my hip? I think she had a little bit of dementia herself; she was coming 
from the nursing home. So, he really explains and does a tracking, he goes 
through multiple times, and it’s kind of a difficult situation. He was kind 
of doing the best he could but there was no way to explain to ... he was 
kind of hitting the wall there, you know. [072] 
 
Clearly, that is because, unlike doctors, patients are not trained in observing the human 
body in general and from within. Their relationship with their own body–in a sense–is 
that of an observer from the outside. They are also the listening, questioning, and 
perceiving subjects regarding their own body as an object of medical discourse. 
Moreover, the only party that might have a life and death interest in the entire business of 
seeking medical care is the patient, whereas for others, it is mainly a matter of job 
requirement to deal with the patient’s body.   
In the case of medical textbooks and journals, their relationship with the human 
body is often a direct one, especially when they use firsthand research data and 
observations. In general, archaeological statements made in a medical textbooks and 
journals are conclusions backed by well-established, peer-reviewed evidence8. The 
                                               
8 Some medical textbooks and journals might contain data that were obtained through less than 
ethical means. For example, specific medical knowledge that is likely to have been the result of unethical 
experimentations conducted on prisoners of WWII and victims of concentrations camps. However, the 
means through which the data is obtained is beside the point in the present discussion. The point that I am 
trying to establish here is that the data in medical textbooks and journals are usually the result of a direct 
relationship between researcher and the human body, the accuracy of which is supported by hard evidence 
and peer-review. While it is highly important to discuss whether that relationship was established through 
ethical or unethical means, such a discussion is beyond the scope of the present discussion and not relevant 
to the level of the archaeological analysis. Archaeology neither looks for the origin of the statements, nor 
does it attempt to verify the legitimacy of the statements’ source.  
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authors of these documents mainly assume the position of the observing and questioning 
subjects. Again, the interests served by publishing about human body through research 
are broad, ranging from a degree requirement to an enhanced research career, 
professional development and financial outcomes. Serving these interests may also 
indirectly help a broad range of patients that are relying on constant enhancement of 
medical profession.  
Lastly, in the case of faculty who teach students about the human body: They 
might have a direct relationship with bodily structures they are teaching about (e.g., in 
case of the anatomists, pathologists, and clinicians). However, some faculty do not have a 
direct relationship with human body and the statements they make are mainly based on 
theoretical speculations that they draw from a mouse model, for instance. Therefore, 
members of the latter group may not be the observing subjects, but they are the 
questioning, and perceiving subjects who draw from authority of the academia to 
enunciate statements about human body as an object of the modern medical discourse. 
Faculty’s position regarding the human body are, again, defined by their job 
requirements, professional development and financial aspirations as employees. Their 
efforts in training future doctors indirectly affect and benefit patients in the future.   
Conditions of Existence for Different Modalities of Statements about the 
Human Body. Just like the relations between modalities of statements about disease and 
treatment, there is a hierarchical difference in weight of the statements about human body 
as well depending on who speaks them, what type of institutional authority the speakers 
draw from, and what their positioning related to the human body (as an object of medical 
discourse) is. For example, a statement about clinical reasoning based on analogy and 
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deduction made by an attending physician has more weight compared to the same 
statement spoken by a resident or a medical student. As a rule, analysis based on analogy 
and deductive reasoning (clinical reasoning) is most endorsed if it is spoken by an 
attending physician. Residents and students also perform deductive reasoning in various 
clinical situations but their say - while deemed acceptable - has less weight than that of 
the attending physician.  
Patients also make statements about their own body. What doctors are highly 
interested in is patient’s information about the symptoms and sings of diseases, which is 
valuable information for reaching correct medical diagnosis. However, patients’ own 
clinical reasoning and attempts in articulating statements about human bodily structure 
and function have little to no value when it comes to deciding the diagnosis of the 
problem through clinical reasoning. Again, deductive reasoning is not the only modality 
of statements that is weighted hierarchically in medical discourse. Other modalities (e.g., 
qualitative descriptions, patient history, interpretation of signs, and most of all, the 
paternalistic gaze are all statements that will be weighted differently in clinical medicine 
depending on who speaks them, what institutional authority that speaker draws from, and 
what their position is regarding the human body as an object of medical discourse. For 
instance, a medical student’s report of statistical information drawn from a peer-reviewed 
journal article carries less weight in the eyes of the patient and patient families compared 
to the exact same information coming from the same source, but spoken by an attending 
physician.  
Modalities of Statement about the Doctor. Modalities of statement that refer to 
the doctor as an object of medical discourse include: qualitative description of doctor, 
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biographical accounts of the doctors, and statistical statements about the doctors’ 
performance in the clinical settings. It is worth reiterating that the doctor here is not a 
person. It is a function, a position that anyone can step into. Also, it is not merely an 
individual function or position that is referred to in this section. Rather, the doctor that we 
discuss as an object of medical discourse is a node in the network of similar functions and 
always in relation to others, within the modern medical discourse. Let us now look at a 
few examples for each modality of statements about the doctor–as specified above.  
Example of qualitative descriptions about the doctor:  
These include descriptions of doctor in terms of their personal and professional 
characteristics, such as good doctor, bad doctor, caring doctor, patient-centered doctor, 
young doctors, paternalistic doctors, etc. (see grids of specification for the doctor as an 
object, in the previous section, for more). 
Example of biographical statements about the doctor:  
These could be positive or negative characterization of some physician that students have 
known in the past. They tend to describe interesting characteristics they have seen in 
those physicians to their peers all the time. This type of statements about doctors are 
pretty common among medical students, mostly during their training years in medical 
school. These statements are less common but are still present only in doctor-to-doctor 
private conversations, as seen in the quote below. 
I had an attending who kind of works hours to actually belittle people. 
That was the hardest month in my medical school career and it almost 
drove me away from the field I am going to. He took every opportunity to 
chew me out and spit me out, I was already fearful of his evaluation of me, 
I probably should not have because it was going to be crummy because it 




One thing I saw that was really great was that one time a physician was 
showing us something on a baby, and the baby needed to change the 
diaper and he changed the diaper. He did not make a nurse do it, he just 
did it himself. Afterwards, they were like, thank you! So, he’s like willing 
to help out the other staff… I think it’s that kind of behaviors that makes 
teams want to work well together. And the physician did that, you could 
kind of feel it in the air that they were in it together. [072]  
 
He is the chief of medicine at Eskenazi, he is a pulmonary critical care 
doctor. From all the interactions I’ve seen, I have not seen him yet in the 
actual practice, but from all the talks he has given and the classes he’s 
taught us, I really enjoy his demeanor and his approach to just life in 
general and to medicine. You can kind of tell he still has the passion for 
what he does, which is the good thing. He tells us the things that still 
fascinate him even though he has been doing it for years now… So just 
that, he is encouraging, he is uplifting to others, he has a positive outlook, 
and he is still excited about what he does. And is able to recognize ways 
that he still enjoys this job, I think that whole approach is something good. 
[112] 
 
I saw a physician who knew the janitors by name, on first name basis, 
that’s a really special work culture. So that janitor felt like they were doing 
something to contribute to the healthcare team. [034] 
 
Example of statistical statements about the doctor:  
About 58 percent are employed at a hospital or with a medical group, 
while about 31 percent are employed at a private practice. About 51 
percent of physicians would not recommend medicine as a career, where 
about 55 percent state that morale is very or somewhat negative due to 
stressors. About 54 percent of physicians in the country have stated that 
they have experienced burnout as of 2014. There has been an increased 
number of stressors such as the lack of a single payer system that has 
contributed to extensive insurance paper work and a decrease in 
independence for many physicians as hospitals purchase more private 
practices. Many, about 80 percent, also state that their workload is at their 
capacity or even overextended. Only about 11 percent of physicians spend 
25 minutes or more with their patients (Characteristics of U.S. physicians 




Rules for the Formation of Statements about the Doctor. 
1. Who has the right to authoritatively speak about the (function of the) doctor in 
modern medical discourse?  
Those who have this right include the medical school and hospital 
administrations, doctors, residents, medical students, and the patients.  
2. What is the institutional site from which this speaker draws his/her authority 
and what are the rules of that site regarding statements about the doctor? 
The administration members talking about the doctor draw their authority from 
the institution of the medical school and/or hospital. Doctors themselves, residents and 
students making statements about who the doctor is and what they should be like, base 
their statements upon the authority of the medical profession as an established institution 
in society, of which they are a part. For example, a doctor - or even a medical student - 
talking about what a doctor should be like is much more credible in the eyes of the 
society in general compared to a businessman or a middle school teacher talking about 
the same thing. That is because the doctor and the student are coming from a medical 
professional background that gives them the privilege of speaking more authoritatively 
about the function of doctor in medical discourse. Lastly, patients base their statements 
on the authority of the hospital, private clinic or any healthcare facility administration 
that values patient feedback and treats it as legitimate statements with possible 
consequences for healthcare providers.  




In the case of the administration members, they have a direct relationship with the 
doctors who work in their administrations, so they get to observe them, hear them, 
question them, and develop their own perception of how doctors perform their job. The 
administration members make statements about the doctor as part of their job as the 
observing managers. The statements they make about the doctor are often conclusions 
reached at based on the firsthand observation and data collection. However, the 
administration members also make a lot of statements about doctors that are merely 
theoretical speculations and/or wishful thinking. A couple examples:  
The medical profession has long subscribed to a body of ethical statements 
developed primarily for the benefit of the patient. As a member of this 
profession, a physician must recognize responsibility to patients first and 
foremost, as well as to society, to other health professionals, and to self 
(AMA Code of Medical Ethics, 2016). 
 
To function as a premiere medical school and continuously improve, IU 
School of Medicine requires exceptional and committed individuals. A 
working and learning culture that is based upon the school’s articulated 
core values and guiding principles is critical to attracting, retaining and 
nurturing members of the IU School of Medicine community. For this 
reason, and to warrant the trust of patients, families and society at large, 
all members of the IU School of Medicine community are committed to 
fostering and embodying professionalism (Indiana University School of 
Medicine Website; Mission, Vision, and Core Values, 2020) 
 
In the case of doctors, residents and students, for the most part, they have a direct 
relationship with the professional role of the doctor. They are observing, listening, 
questioning and perceiving subjects. The statements they make are sometimes theoretical 
and other times based on the firsthand experiences. Being assigned to get into the role of 
the doctor themselves, doctors, residents and medical students are seeing their own 
professional interest in defining who the doctor is and what it means to be (or become) 
one. For example, when students were asked about what professionalism meant to them 
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in this study, majority of the statements they made were about defining what the doctor 
should/should not do on a personal level (e.g., dress code, having time-management 
skills, responding to emails, etc.) to be considered a good professional. It rarely touched 
on the subject of how a doctor may serve the patient/sick person better as an outcome of 
possessing a good level of professionalism. Exemplar quotes below show how students 
focus on the person of the doctor–and not the patient–when talking about 
professionalism:  
And I kind of realized from friends of my own, that… I need to show up 
10 minutes early before their shift starts; so, recognizing that somebody 
holding a position higher than you told you to do something, you do it 
essentially immediately or at your earliest convenience. And you can’t just 
sit around with your phone all day, or studying at your own, like, the 
things that you think that you should be studying. So, my idea of being a 
professional person is essentially just being open and ready to learn at all 
times. [103]  
 
A part of the definition for professionalism is like, you know, you have to 
be like in formal attire, and like wearing your white coat, so you’re 
representing the medical profession and not just yourself, so you have to 
be very clean cut all the time. Be very polished. [012] 
 
As a doctor, just being confident. At least to give the aura of being 
competent and knowledgeable about whatever their expertise is… And 
kind of carrying themselves obviously with an air of being normal. You 
can’t show up to work as a doctor with your hair out of the place and 
wearing T-shirt and basketball shorts. Obviously, that’s not professional. 
[103] 
 
In the case of the patients: When patients talk authoritatively about their personal 
experiences with a doctor, they are often talking about a direct relationship they have had 
with a doctor in person. When providing their feedback, the patients assume the position 
of an observing, listening, questioning, and perceiving subject in relation to the doctor 
they had seen. The statements they make are mostly based on their firsthand experience 
and factual evidence, but they also make statements sometimes that are merely theoretical 
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speculations (e.g., the expectations of what an ideal doctor should do based on their own 
subjective understanding of the doctor’s job). Below is a couple example of the latter 
situation:  
Patient comes with like, 5 pain radiating down her hip. And he is a hip 
surgeon so she is thinking like, oh it’s a hip problem. So, he quickly does 
like an X-ray and notices that it is a back problem. So, he is like, I am not 
a spinal surgeon so I can’t help this problem. She gets super upset, and 
like, I am very disappointed, I have come for this, and how could it not be 
my hip? I think she had a little bit of dementia herself; she was coming 
from the nursing home. So, he really explains and does a tracking, he goes 
through multiple times, and it’s kind of a difficult situation. He was kind 
of doing the best he could but there was no way to explain to ... he was 
kind of hitting the wall there, you know. [072] 
 
Part of that subjective thing is, like, doing something that the other person 
is not ok with. Whatever that maybe, and it’s different for different people. 
So, if I am not okay with you standing close to me, then that’s 
unprofessional. I am gonna write it up, if you give me a survey, I’d say he 
was unprofessional, he stood too close to me. And then he [the doctor] 
goes to the next room and they would say, I like how he stood close to me, 
it made me feel important. [181] 
 
Unlike doctors and administrators, the patients make these statements without any 
pressure to secure their own employment, career, or financial security. Rather, they often 
share their perception of their doctor to either report an injustice, file a complaint, or to 
report appreciation and gratitude regarding the doctor’s behavior towards them. Let us 
look at a few examples of patients providing verbal and written feedback about the 
doctors that are taking care of them: 
Hallway pin board above the nurses’ counter is full of Thank You cards 
signed by patients and patients’ families. Countertop for nurses is also 
displaying several cards from the patients and their families thanking the 
entire staff for their dedication and hard work. [Obs] [p.36] 
 
There are about 6 people on the medical team during morning round. We 
all are about to leave the room after visiting a patient. Patient: “I like that 
you are in here, thank you for being there for me. See you all later!” She 




Small cell carcinoma patient, elderly male. He looks very happy today. “I 
could not have had a better team to take care of me”, he addresses the 
attending and looks at the entire team appreciatively. Patient’s wife: “He is 
writing “Thank You” notes to all his doctors and keeps them under that 
tray”. Patient: “I will make sure to add Dr. Longie’s name on the card!” 
says showing one of the cards that he just pulled from under his tray. 
[Obs] [p.18] 
 
Conditions of Existence for Different Modalities of Statements about the 
Doctor. There is a hierarchical difference in weight of the statements about who the 
doctor is and wheat he/she should be like, depending on who speaks them, what type of 
institutional authority this speaker draws from, and what their positioning related to the 
function of the doctor (as an object of medical discourse) is. For example, a statement 
about how the doctor should behave in the clinical setting that is coming from an 
attending physician has more weight when compared to the same statement made by a 
medical student. And then again, the same statement defining what a doctor should be 
like is more credible when coming from a medical student compared to the exact same 
statement coming from a grocery store owner.  
In clinical settings, patients and patient families also make statements about the 
function of the doctor. These statements include both positive (e.g., appreciative gestures 
and comments) and negative (e.g., criticism of the doctor’s behavior as a written 
feedback submitted to the administration). Patient’s feedback about the doctor’s 
performance counts as important data in the process of doctor’s evaluation by most 
hospital administrations. In this case, worrying about a patient’s evaluation is practically 
better justified for a doctor than worrying about some medical student’s evaluation of his 
performance in the clinic. Therefore, patient’s statements about the doctor carry more 
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weight that students’ or even residents’ statements about the doctor in the clinical 
settings.  
Qualitative description of the doctor’s function and performance is apparently not 
the only modality of statements that is weighted differently depending on who speaks it 
and what kind of authority they are drawing from in modern medical discourse. Other 
modalities including biographical accounts of the doctor’s life and behaviors, as well as 
statistical information about doctors’ performance in a certain area are also weighted 
differently in clinical medicine depending on who speaks them, what institutional 
authority that speaker draws from, and what their position is regarding the doctor as an 
object of medical discourse. For example, if a 3rd year medical student reports a certain 
statistics about the performance of the doctors in a certain field and at a certain locality, 
the statements are going to carry much less weight and consequence for the attending 
physician compared to the event where the exact same statistics are being reviewed and 
reiterated by the hospital administration. The same with biographical accounts, depending 
on who recounts them and by what type of authority, it will be weighed differently in the 
clinical settings.  
Modalities of Statement about the Sick Person. Types of archaeological 
statements referring to the person of the patient in medical discourse include, again, 
qualitative descriptions, biographical accounts of the sick person (e.g., talking about the 
patient’s family and social history), reasoning by analogy and deduction (e.g., making 
judgments about who the patient is, why were they treated in a certain way under certain 
circumstances, and how would they act under certain circumstances), statistical 
calculations (e.g., referencing the statistics of people belonging to a certain race or gender 
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acting in a specific way as patients), and paternalistic statements (e.g., talking about what 
is best for the patient and what they should do to help with their own treatment). Let us 
look at examples for each statement type below. 
Exemplar qualitative description statements: 
The patient was an African American woman in her early 20s. She had one 
child and was living with her brother and her boyfriend. I think like, four 
people lived there, and they reported low-income status. [141] 
So, this one woman comes in and she is in a diabetic coma, she was too 
poor to buy insulin, so she was rationing out her doses for the insulin to 
last longer, and so her blood sugar kept going higher. She was also on 
Medicaid, so she was brought in by her daughter who was maybe about 
35… so, she was literally saving her medication to keep it for longer, and 
that was just so sad… [141] 
 
Exemplar biographical accounts of the sick person: 
When I was at Methodist for a surgery rotation, we got an educated family. 
Their son had kidney failure as a child and now he was 35, still living with 
them as he goes to dialysis 3 times a week, just living with the condition, 
you know. So, he had a very acute abdomen and the question was whether 
we needed to operate. While our surgical team was the leader, he still had 
cardiologist, nephrologist, and the dialysis team coming by and palliative 
care was involved. So, there were tons of doctors but this educated family 
could not figure out who exactly is doing what. The mom was confused 
and so it finally took a family meeting. It’s like we were all on the same 
page, we knew what was going on, it was just a matter of communicating 
that to the family… but when you get all those doctors, sometimes they do 
not agree. So ... the family was lost. And I can imagine, like, the mom was 
there the whole time 2 weeks and dad would pop in from work; but a lot of 
other families do not have that kind of time or resources to dedicate and ... 
So, it can be very confusing. [004] 
 
Example of reasoning by analogy and deduction statements: 
It usually happens with my parents, like, they get frustrated with their 
healthcare experiences. They have a language barrier [parents are 
immigrants from Uzbekistan] … My mom has arthritis and her legs hurt 
like all the time, but she feels like wherever she goes they do not listen to 
her. Her doctor was a really demeaning person and she was just being rude 
to her… she was talking to her in a rude way. So, like, my mom kind of 
stopped going to the doctor anymore even when she had pain. And I felt 
like that should not happen… and so we had to change her doctor then… 
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Like, you are not supposed to be mean to your patient because you’re 
getting paid for what you’re doing. I feel like it happens most of the time 
to them, even to my dad, like, he does speak English but I feel like they 
treat him differently, and you can see that. [161] 
 
Excerpts below are pulled from the focus groups with medical students. These responses 
were provided as they were discussing prompt #3 (see FG Protocol in Appendix D)  
I’d go with C because that looks like it’s the most medically complex. As 
a resident I’ll be more experienced than the interns to deal with that type 
of patient. A, [laughing], I’d leave that to my interns because she might be 
mean but I think it may also be a good experience for them to understand 
some of the nuances of daily practice, I mean the patients are not always 
necessarily nice to you… B is almost an ideal patient, like, he is educated, 
there should not be any problem communicating with him. [MS1] 
 
I think I might choose B, because it says his mother sued the hospital last 
year, which means they probably thought that they were not treated well in 
this hospital. So, going to him and giving him this little bit of extra time, I 
think would actually be helpful in changing their perception in the long 
run. [MS3] 
 
I would not choose the homeless guy because he is noncompliant, even 
though I worked with homeless people ... I mean you can’t help somebody 
who does not want to help himself. And between the other two, chance of 
getting sued or upsetting the attending physician. Ummh ... Being 
completely honest ... I’d set down with the 80-year-old woman and chat 
with her, and try to make a good impression on her. [MS3] 
 
In the excerpts above, future doctors are making judgments about the sick people as they 
are trying to predict what each patient will do if they are treated and if they are not treated 
urgently. For example, it is being assumed that patient A is going to be mean again the 
next time medical staff contacts her, because B is educated, “there should not be any 
problems communicating with him”, and C “does not want to help himself” because he is 
homeless and noncompliant.  
Exemplar statistical statements about the sick person: 
Resident is explaining the case to the team in the hallway outside the 
patient’s room: “So, I looked it up yesterday and it turns out that glaucoma 
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is about 5 times more common in African Americans, and they are also 
about 6 times more likely to get blind because of it.” She suggests any 
plan of treatment for this patient should keep this information in mind. 
[Obs] 
 
Exemplar paternalistic statements regarding the sick person: 
 
I never really heard a whole from my mom, sometimes she would come 
home and complain about how hard of a time she has had. So, in her case 
being a pediatrician, she often times gets to suggest what is best for the 
kid, whereas parents have the autonomy over what happens with the kid ... 
so I knew from that aspect that sometimes patient-physician interactions 
can be frustrating, it can be annoying. There are times that patients do not 
go with science and what the medical profession recommends ... and you 
still have to be like, you have to still give the patient that autonomy. [012] 
 
If they do not want that shot, then, that’s a bit tricky to me ... I think I 
would be a little bit more pushy with that just because of the acquired 
immunity. And really trying to push them into taking the vaccination. So, 
I’d try to clarify what sort of misinformation they have heard. [103] 
 
Just making sure that you are effective at your job and hand the patient all 
the necessary information and ultimately let them decide, but I know a lot 
of times you kind of have to persuade them to your way of thinking 
because you know what is best for their health in those situations. But 
also, not forgetting that it’s ultimately their decision - but you still have to 
work to try to pull them in the right direction. [112] 
 
Rules for the Formation of Statements about the Sick Person.  
1. Who has the right to authoritatively speak about the sick person (the person of 
the patient) in modern medical discourse?  
Those who have this right include the doctors, residents and sometimes students 
too, patient families, and patients themselves.  
2. What is the institutional site from which this speaker draws his/her authority 
and what are the rules of this site regarding statements about the sick person? 
In case of the doctors, residents and students, they all draw from the authority of 
the hospital, medical school, and the institution of medicine in general when they talk 
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authoritatively about a sick person. In the excerpt below, the student is speaking on behalf 
of the hospital and drawing from that authority actually suggests to patients that they do 
not have to be there if they think hospital is trying to get their money.  
I think it has to do with the patients and the people outside the profession, 
so we have to be this way… and that’s how people interpret that… even 
patients now, are like, oh the hospital is only trying to get my money and 
whatever… I mean, if that’s true then you do not have to be here, you 
know. [MS4] 
 
In the above excerpt, the doctor is blaming patients and she draws from the authority of 
the hospital and the institution of medicine in order to do so. She needs that authority 
because what she is suggesting is not a personal opinion, rather, she is trying to speak in 
behalf of the hospital and the medical staff.  
I used to work at an urgent care so there was no real triage system. So, 
basically, they see people like, those who are actually your friends or 
families in the place of a patient who is supposed to be in chart. And one 
time they cut like 115 people in this g-technology device called a PPD, 
and he was like, oh, it’s just a PPD, so… yeah. [MS1] 
 
Here, the medical student explains how medical staff at the urgent care were drawing 
from the authority of the medical facility to deny care to some patients not based on 
professional medical judgments but based on who they were personally (whether they 
were friends or family to the staff or not). 
In case of the patients and patients’ family, they can speak authoritatively about 
the sick person drawing from the authority of their special position as direct beneficiaries 
of medical practice, which comes with certain rights and responsibilities. This authority is 
given by the institution of hospital and private clinics to people who fall under special 
categories of “patient” and “patient’s family” under the hospital regulations and the laws 
defining these categories in the healthcare system. Patients and patient families are 
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assigned specific rights which they can exercise when it comes to their relationship with 
healthcare professionals as well as the hospital administration (e.g., the right to discuss 
their personal history and other personal information about their family, social and 
economic circumstances, etc. as they relate to their present health condition, and the right 
to provide feedback and evaluate their experience with the healthcare team as well as the 
hospital administration). Below are three major rules regarding patient’s rights and that of 
their families that emerged from the data in this study. Examples of statements associated 
with each rule are also provided.  
A. Patients have the right to decline what the doctors may think is best for them, 
and the doctors need to acknowledge this right unless they are able to 
convince the patient to act otherwise.   
[What I would want from my doctor] from a patient’s perspective, I’d say 
is general respect. So, I want them [the doctors] to respect me and respect 
my choices, assuming that I am in a condition to make my own choices. I 
also want them to challenge my choices, like, I might not know enough 
about the consequences of a choice I am making and may end up not 
taking a medication that could have saved my life. So, like, if I have a 
terminal cancer and there is a drug that has a 40% chance of curing me but 
without it I would die for sure ... So, I might actually say that, you know 
what, I have been living a great life, I do not wanna pass through suffer 
cause of the side effects of chemo and everything. So, I want a physician 
that’s professional enough who is like, you know what, that’s your 
decision. As long as you are aware that you will die without it. [151] 
 
Patient: “I am ready to go home ... I do not want no food or nothing. I just 
wanna go home.” Resident does a good job of convincing her to stay: 
“you’re here for a reason, tests need to come before we can decide what to 
do.” Patient: “I've been here since yesterday, nobody did anything” 
Resident explains oxygen, blockage in her heart, why she has pain, what 
could happen if she leaves, etc. The patient seems to soften gradually. She 
does not insist on leaving anymore. Resident continues: “Sorry, our beds 
are not too comfortable ... we’re gonna get you some food now, okay?” 





B. Patients have the right to provide feedback regarding their care. This can come 
in multiple forms including, verbal sarcasm, gestures, written feedback, and 
more.  
Patient has stage 4 cancer, does not seem very happy. Resident says: “it 
was a pleasure taking care of you!” not very genuinely. Patient says: thank 
you, after a brief pause, rolling her eyes. “Take care of yourself, okay?” 
says the resident. “I will”, says the patient. Resident: “you’re doing better 
than before you came here”. Patient: “I did not have any of these problems 
before I came in here.” No one from the medical team follows up 
regarding this last statement. Silence for a minute. Resident begins to talk 
about formalities of the patient getting discharged that day. [Obs] [p.20] 
 
Patient: “so, when are they going to let me know about scheduling the 
procedure? Resident: I do not know, we called in the morning and they 
said they will call back. Patient giggles sarcastically as she is shaking her 
head. [Obs] [p.56] 
 
Simple gestures on part of the patients such as rolling their eyes or a sarcastic giggle can 
be regarded as statements of their feedback about the personal medical care they are 
receiving. 
Elderly female patient who told the attending yesterday: “you’re funny!” 
she has nausea today. Patient: “I have not seen the damn nurses for a 
while, where are they?” [Obs] [p.41] 
 
Patient is talking about his doctor: “Stupid freak cancelled the 
appointment on me… hahaha” [laughing]… Attending cuts him a couple 
times as he keeps talking about all sorts of stuff. “Dr. Anderson is an 
excellent doctor… every doc changes my medicine though; give me one 
right thing and stick the hell to it.” Attending explains why they changed 
his medicine very briefly in 1 sentence. Patient continues: “more 
experimentation then, huh?” He sounds frustrated. Attending explains a bit 
more. Patient’s gall bladder has been removed, has two hernias to fix, and 
he keeps talking about irrelevant things as the team prepares to leave the 
room. [Obs] [p.71] 
 
Patients may scold the healthcare personnel at times without really being held 
accountable for that behavior.  
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Small cell carcinoma patient, elderly male. He looks very happy today. “I 
could not have had a better team to take care of me”, he addresses the 
attending and looks at the entire team appreciatively. Patient’s wife: “He is 
writing “Thank You” notes to all his doctors and keeps them under that 
tray”. Patient: “I will make sure to add Dr. Longie’s name on the card!” 
says showing one of the cards that he just pulled from under his tray. 
[Obs] [p.18] 
 
Patients may provide verbal or written feedback to the doctors as often as they like and in 
any version that they prefer. Feedback could be given in the form of verbal or written 
comments or gestures as simple as smiling appreciatively at the healthcare team. 
C. Patient’s family has certain rights such as having access to patient 
information, providing feedback, and holding the healthcare team 
accountable. Doctors need to acknowledge these rights and be responsive to 
them.  
Cancer patient with mass in the neck, whose wife was in tears yesterday. 
She is so nice. Resident takes the lead, explains everything about the 
upcoming procedure to the patient and his wife. “Any questions?” petting 
her on the shoulder mildly. Wife begins talking, seems happy to be asked. 
She is so sad, you can tell from her eyes, but laughs with us. Attending is 
pulling up patient reports and images of the scans for her on the screen. 
“Can I get a picture of that with my phone?” she asks. “Our family are in 
CA and OH, will send it to them ...attending: of course, here I will hold 
them up so you can take pictures. “You guys are sweethearts! Oh, you 
really are!” she says. Attending: what other questions do you have? 
Explains more to her. [Obs]  [p.39] 
 
Patient is old lady came back from surgery. Attending smiles and pets her 
on the feet. Family asks: what’s a diverticulum? Right when the team is 
leaving the room. Attending stops, goes back and explains. Family 
member says thanks and clearly appreciates the gesture. Attending: thank 
you for asking! [Obs] [p.62]  
 
Back to our overdosed patient in the Progressive Care Unit. She went into 
a shock this morning due to taking more than regular dose of pain 
medications. She’s alert and almost sitting on her bed now. Attending talks 
to the family as he is sitting right next to the patient. Resident explains 
patient’s progress to the family. Patient: they told me I over-worked you 
guys!” attending: you gave us just enough excitement. Patient: thank you 
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guys, for doing everything for me… Attending along with his entire team 
head to the next room to meet with 10 family members. They are 
discussing the incident. Attending takes the lead on responding to their 
questions about how it all happened and what measures are being taken to 
take care of the situation. The entire team is sitting there silently, wearing 
a responsible look on their faces. [Obs]  [p.40] 
 
3. What is the specific position of this speaker vis-à-vis the sick person as an 
object of medical discourse? 
The doctors, residents and students, all have a direct relationship with the sick 
person. They listen to their personal information and respond to their requests as part of 
their job. However, do they care personally about those sick persons? In the following 
excerpts, students suggest that doctors do all of the above just because their job requires 
them to do it, not that they personally care to do it. 
 I mean, the point is like, so many doctors are there just doing their job. 
So, if they are asking for your detailed information it’s because they need 
it for the history not that they actually care, okay?! [MS2]  
 
I think some doctors, it’s sadly true that they get it done but they do not 
actually care about people. [MS2]  
 
The team is walking toward another patient’s room that is on the other end 
of the hallway. Attending is discussing a difficult and high-risk patient 
with her residents. No one looks really stressed, however. They are 
laughing and smiling as they are discussing the issue. Looks to me like a 
normal job. [Obs] [p.56]  
 
Nevertheless, a large portion of data in this study suggested another different outlook to 
this issue as well. In the following excerpts that are pulled from the direct observation of 
the clinical settings, one can clearly see that for some doctors, what they do is more than 
what their job technically requires them to do. One cannot fail to see the shadow of a 
human being who feels for those who are suffering; a human being and not just some 
machine who has been assigned to get the job done; a human being that actually cares.  
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Resident puts the nebulizer in patient’s mouth. Patient coughs a lot, can’t 
even speak a full sentence. Attending finds tissue and gives it to her. Still 
keeps looking until she finds another box, “here, this one is softer”. [Obs] 
[p.47] 
 
I said “good morning” as I walked past the resident sitting behind his desk 
on the 8th floor.  He was reading patients’ data on his computer screen. No 
response. After almost a whole minute, he said in a low voice: “good 
morning” as though he just heard me. A minute later he is talking to the 
other resident: “oh… [Deep sigh]. I wonder if Mr. Richardson [an elderly 
patient who has stage 3 cancer] will see the daylight today”. The other 
resident replies with a sigh: “it’s terrible…” [Obs] [p. 65] 
 
45-year-old female patient. She is not responding to questions. Resident 
tries speaking to her in her native language, Punjabi. Patient does not 
respond but looks at her and blinks. Resident sighs ... tries again to make 
her smile but it does not work. Resident looks concerned and, sad. Starts 
walking up and down the room in frustration. [Obs] [p.70] 
 
Some doctors/residents go beyond treating the body of the patient as an object of medical 
discourse and care about their person as well. This is not required by a specific law, 
however. The instructions on medical professionalism in the medical literature is pretty 
vague on itself, let alone the discussion of how to care for the person of the patient. In 
other words, if the doctor only does his/her job and attends to the body of the patient 
without caring about their person (feelings, perceptions, etc. as related to their condition) 
there is no law that would accuse the doctor for it. Medically, the job is considered to be 
done and that seems to be fulfilling enough for many doctors.  
I do not think it’s a necessity that you be friends with your patients 
though, I think you can do a good job without really being friendly. [MS3] 
 
So I, like, one hundred percent agree with the caring thing, but I know 
some pretty awesome physicians that are not - or do not seem to be - 
caring people. [MS1] 
 
I know, I have seen like, this very good doctor who is so capable, but does 





In case of medical students, however, it is a little different. They are really not required to 
attend to the sick person as a trainee beyond a bare minimum. In general, students are 
least responsible bodies for what happens with the patient at the hospital. As long as 
students are there and trying their best to learn the skills, they are not going to get in 
trouble with their superiors if anything goes wrong with a patient. Medical students who 
want to invest more time than they are required to with patients seem to be doing so for a 
couple of reasons: 
A. Medical students enjoy hanging out with patients, thinking that is what 
medicine is really about.  
The first two years of medical school were kind of isolating from what I 
wanted to do with my life, granted that I was still only around my cohort 
of students. And now I feel more isolated from my friends but more 
entrenched in the field. So, I would say that my support, like, the reason 
why I keep going through this is kind of small interactions with patients 
and make them feel listened to. I value feeling like I am making a 
difference for them.  [103] 
 
[What’s the value of spending more time with patients? It’s not going to 
enhance your grade so why do it?]: To me that’s what medicine is more 
about, to make them [patients] comfortable when they are at a worst time 
in their life. [063] 
 
I am excited to get in the clinic when the time comes and become 
automatic, like, you know, how to think through every part, so I could start 
to work more on what I think is the more satisfying part–which is being 
physician that cares and like ask about their perspectives and be friendly 
and have relationships ... So how I hope to do that is by having good 
mentorship relationships like, I meet with a physician every couple of 
weeks and just talk about things. And when I am on rotation, I will be 
really paying attention to what the physician does, but also like, “what a 
cool pair of shoes!”, or “how about that super bowl, hah?” things like that, 
you know. So hopefully getting better at this mastery because I want to be 
a good doctor, but also at the same time, being the doctor who is interested 




B. They think there is always more to learn so why should not you run the extra 
mile if you have the time with least responsibility?  
I guess a good medical student is someone who does not just try to get the 
work done but also get to spend time with the patients since you have time 
to do that. Like, residents work shifts, even the attendings switch but 
you’re like kind of the person who gets to spend the most time with the 
patient. A good med student can bridge good learning with using every 
opportunity to kind of see the patients and gain experience. [063] 
 
So, like, my parents [who are both physicians] chart until like 9 PM 
sometimes. And it makes them hate what they do ... Which is why I think 
being a med student is better because you do not have to do anything like 
that and instead you can just go and hang out with the patient ... So, the 
best time I guess for us in NOW. [063] 
 
In the case of patients and their families, again, they are the direct beneficiaries of the 
medical care. For patients, how their person as a whole is treated in medicine could be a 
matter of life and death. They provide information about it, talk about it as much as 
possible, and want everybody’s attention for this specific object of medical discourse. For 
patients’ families too, they are the direct beneficiaries of what happens to the sick person 
who is either a family member or a loved one. So, unlike the healthcare team, it is not 
their job to be around the patient and care for them. Rather, what drives them to make any 
statements regarding the sick person is their personal bond with that person that they care 
about–who happens to be the patient at this time.  
If I were the patient, I think, whenever we are in the same room, I’d want 
to be the main focus. I would not want them [doctors] to be distracted, or 
tied to their screen, or whatever, like they are often typing and also talking 
to the person sitting over there. I know I probably would not like that ... I 
think they have to be concise, but if I were the patient, then I’d want more 
time. A lot of times people are being cut off, like they are saying 
something within the first 10 seconds or something then they are cut off, I 
do not like that at all. Also, I’d like them to ask more things outside of 
your symptoms, like obviously the medical stuff is important, but more 
like, what’s going on in your life, trying to figure a general sense of 
things ... cause a lot of times an issue may seem like it’s medical but 
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maybe it has to do with their job environment or something like that ... I 
think if feels good, it’s just nice to be comfortable with someone, 
especially when they are dealing with stuff that’s so personal. So, I’d kind 
of want them to know me a little better versus seeming like a machine or 
something. [121] 
 
So, if I am the patient, then I would like my doctor to first of all be 
mindful as they are treating me as a patient. So, do not treat me like 
another reimbursement check–just treat me like a… in a way that honors 
my humanity. Secondly, I expect the physician to obviously know more 
than me. Although they know more about my condition, they would not 
force me to bias myself toward one thing. They would honor my choices. 
So, like, honoring the complexity of my humanity and not treating me like 
a mere disease; and honoring my choices as things that I need or want 
from my medical treatment. [141] 
 
I’d say, what I’d want from my doctor is being informative, respecting my 
choices, respecting me as a person, respecting me and my family, I’d say 
respecting me not just as a cadaver or a patient, but as a person. I do not 
see a lot of doctors doing that but at least is some TV shows and stuff, the 
general attitude of some doctors towards their patient is like, maybe not 
treating them as inferior but “hey you know what, I am the boss!” kind of 
a deal. So, like, it does not work like that. [151] 
 
Conditions of Existence for Different Modalities of Statements about the Sick 
Person. Similar to other three categories of statement modalities, there is a hierarchical 
difference in weight of the statements about the sick person depending on who speaks 
them, what type of institutional authority this speaker draws from, and what their 
positioning related to the sick person (as an object of medical discourse) is. For instance, 
a statement about the sick person that is spoken by an attending physician who is in 
charge of a certain patient weighs much more than the same statement if it were to come 
from a patient’s friend or family member. To illustrate this point let us say take the 
example of a negatively-biased statement regarding patient’s racial characteristic. The 
reason this statement carries more weight if it comes from the physician is that physician 
is the one who has the authority to make the kind of decisions that a patient’s life might 
279 
 
depend upon. For instance, if the physician has a racial bias against this patient, she can 
make a statement accusing the patient of faking his condition and therefore dismiss his 
symptoms. Such a doctor is likely to also pay less attention to the patient, which can be 
detrimental to the patient’s health. On the other hand, if the same racial bias and 
accusation for faking the symptoms comes from a distant family member who came to 
see the patient at the hospital, it will not be as consequential as the one coming from the 
physician, simply because this family member is not at a position to make decisions that 
can affect patient’s life and death at this point. And vice-versa: if a doctor is positively 
biased toward the person of the patient, she might pay more attention and take better care 
of that patient; whereas, if the same sentiments come from a family friend, it can’t have 
that kind of an impact on the delivery of care to this patient. Therefore, the rule of thumb 
is that statements about person of a patient that come from a physician carry much more 
weight in medical discourse than the same statements spoken by people outside the 
medical profession. 
By the same token, statements about the sick person coming from the residents, 
medical students and the patients themselves carry less and less weight, due to the level 
of impact they might have on real-life processes in the clinical setting. Reasoning by 
analogy and deduction is not the only modality of statements that is weighed differently 
depending on who speaks it and what kind of authority they are drawing from in modern 
medical discourse. Other modalities including, qualitative description of the personal 
characteristics of the sick person, biographical accounts of the patient’s life, statistical 
information about certain groups of people as patients, and finally, paternalistic 
statements about the sick person and what might be best for them are also weighed 
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differently in clinical medicine depending on who speaks them, what institutional 
authority the speaker draws from, and what their position is regarding the sick person an 
object of medical discourse. 
Concepts 
In the previous two sections, I discussed the objects and modalities of statement in 
modern medical discourse as well as rules for the formation of each of those elements. In 
this section, I will elaborate on the third discursive element, which is the concepts. 
Concepts are ideas/notions on the basis of which statements in a discursive field are 
framed. In other words, when saying something about an object of discourse, people draw 
from certain notions in order to be able to frame their opinions. It is worth mentioning 
here that dispersion of ideas and therefore concepts were fully welcomed in this study 
given the nature of the work being an archaeological analysis. No attempts were made to 
blend the dispersed ideas based on an underlying coherent theme as that would have been 
against the chief principles of archaeology explained in the previous chapters. In this 
section, I will describe the field of statements as divided into three parts that, in turn, 
mark the rules for the formation of discursive concepts (details on this will follow under 
Rules for the Formation of Concepts below).  
As a general remark, the basic locations where concepts were sought after in this 
study were the fields of: relations between rules for formation of the objects (e.g., 
relations between surfaces of emergence and grids of specification for different objects), 
rules for the formation of modalities of statements (e.g., relations between who has the 
right to speak with authority and what is the speaker’s position in relation to the object of 
discourse), and, relations between rules for the formation of objects and rules for the 
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formation of modalities of statement (e.g., relations between surfaces of emergence for a 
certain object and position of the enunciator of statement in relation to that same object). 
According to Foucault, it is such a group of relations that establishes a system of 
conceptual formation (Foucault, 1972).  
Rules for the Formation of Concepts. In archaeology, the field of statements 
needs to be divided into three divisions in order for it to be described in terms of its 
conceptual framework. The first division deals with ordering and succession whereas the 
second division represents forms of coexistence among statements. The latter field, in 
turn, is divided into three fields of presence, concomitance, and memory. The third 
division outlines procedures of intervention for working through statements in the 
medical discourse.  
Forms of Succession. Here, I will attempt to establish a number of rules that are 
at work to define the systems of ordering (including logical, methodological and other 
ways of ordering, as the system of ordering in real-world discourses is not always strictly 
logical) and types of dependence among statements. The point is to identify a series of 
statements that are linked by a continuity in the problem they address (AK). Next, I 
outline the forms of succession and dependence as well as illustrate what Foucault calls 
the rhetorical schemata (Foucault, 1972, p. 57). Rhetorical schemata are the network of 
rules according to which different groups of statements are brought together in a 
discourse. Possible forms of ordering and succession include describing the “order of 
inferences, successive implications, and demonstrative reasoning; or the order of 
descriptions, the schemata of generalization or progressive specification to which they are 
subject; the spatial distributions that they cover; or the order of the descriptive accounts, 
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and the way in which the events of the time are distributed in the linear succession of the 
statements” (Foucault, 1972, p. 56). And, various types of dependence of statements 
include “dependences of hypothesis/verification, assertion/critique, general law/particular 
application; the various rhetorical schemata according to which groups of statements may 
be combined (how descriptions, deductions, definitions, whose succession characterizes 
the architecture of a text, are linked together)” (Foucault, 1972, p. 57).  For instance, we 
will see how various types of statements (e.g., qualitative descriptions, deductions, 
statistical and biographical information) about a certain object (e.g., sick person) are all 
linked together according to a system of dependence. The aim here is to illustrate and 
describe this system of dependence itself.  
Concepts related to Disease and its Treatment. 
A. How various rules for the formation of the disease and its treatment (i.e., 
surfaces of emergence, authorities of delimitation, and grids of specification) 
are linked to each other, depending on each other or following a specific order. 
Peer-reviewed scientific medical knowledge is the highest authority for 
making credible statements about disease and treatment in modern medical discourse. 
Scientific knowledge of medicine sets up the grids of specification for disease and 
treatment as an object of medical discourse. Therefore, rules set by grids of 
specification bear the most weight amongst the other two sets of rules set by 
authorities of delimitation and surfaces of emergence, respectively.  
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B. How various types of statements about disease and treatment are all linked 
together according to a system of dependence. 
The three types of statements using which people commonly talk about disease 
and treatment include qualitative description, reasoning and analogy, and statistical 
statements. There is a system of dependence set by the scientific knowledge of medicine 
that ties them together. Statistical statements are used to produce or verify scientific 
medical knowledge about disease and treatment (e.g., identification or verification of 
survival rate in basal cell carcinoma amongst 60 to 70-year-old patients). Clinical 
reasoning and qualitative descriptions about disease and treatment too are based on the 
scientific medical knowledge; hence, the system of dependence among three of them are 
setup by the medical knowledge.   
C. How various rules for the formation of modalities of statements about the 
disease and its treatment (i.e., who is speaking, from what authority, and what 
is their position regarding the disease and its treatment) are linked together 
according to a system of dependence/specific law of order. 
Rules for the formation of statements have a hierarchical relationship among 
them. Regardless of the type, the most credible and trustworthy statements are those that 
are spoken by attending physicians who draw from the authority of the hospital and the 
institution of medicine itself when making statements about disease and treatment. Such 
statements also tend to be most accurate ones because it is the doctor’s job to make the 
most accurate statements about disease and treatment that are based on the most trusted 
scientific medical knowledge. The doctors tend to do their best in coming up with most 
reliable statements since their professional position as doctor is at stakes.  
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D. How various rules for the formation of disease and treatment as an object and 
for the formation of modalities of statements about the disease and treatment 
are linked together according to the system of dependence/specific law of 
order. 
As described above, credibility and trustworthiness of all statements about disease 
and treatment - either in medical school or clinical settings - are measured by the level of 
accuracy with which the statement is drawing from scientific medical knowledge. The 
more accurately and faithfully one reports the science-based facts of medical knowledge 
in one’s statement, the more credible one’s statements will be. The point is to use the 
scientific facts in one’s statement as objectively as possible and without any personal 
attempts on interpreting them. So, if a statement is spoken at a surface of emergence 
(patient’s family or community) but it is evidently based on peer-reviewed medical 
knowledge, it will be counted as credible. If the same statement about disease and 
treatment coming from the same source is spoken by a resident at the hospital though, it 
will be granted a higher status than the one spoken by patient’s family. This is because 
the latter statement’s speaker draws from the authority of the hospital and the institution 
of medicine in general.  
Concepts Related to the Human Body. 
A. How various rules for the formation of the human body (i.e., surfaces of 
emergence, authorities of delimitation, and grids of specification) are linked to 
each other, depending on each other or following a specific order. 
Again, peer-reviewed scientific medical knowledge is the highest authority for 
making credible statements about the structure and function of the human body in 
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modern medical discourse. Scientific knowledge of medicine sets up the grids of 
specification for the body as an object of medical discourse. Therefore, rules set by the 
grids of specification bear the most weight amongst the other two sets of rules set by 
authorities of delimitation (healthcare professionals, researcher, and media) and surfaces 
of emergence (individuals, families and communities), respectively. 
B. How various types of statements about the human body are all linked together 
according to a system of dependence.  
Various types of statements using which people commonly talk about the body 
include: qualitative description, biographical accounts, statements about location, 
interpretation and cross-checking of signs in the body, reasoning and deduction, statistical 
statements and paternalistic statements. There is a system of dependence set by the 
scientific knowledge of medicine that ties all these modalities of statement together. 
Again, statistical statements are used to produce or verify scientific medical knowledge 
about the body whereas clinical reasoning, qualitative descriptions and statements about 
location, interpretation and cross-checking of signs too mostly draw from scientific 
medical knowledge. All of the above statement types, even paternalistic statements about 
the body, if spoken by the doctors and healthcare professionals, will be based on 
scientific medical knowledge. However, if some of these statement types are spoken by 
lay people such as patients or patient’s families, they will not be based on medical 
knowledge and that is exactly why they have little to no credibility in modern medical 
discourse. For example, if a patient provides qualitative descriptions about his own bodily 
structures that is non-compliant with scientific human anatomy, physiology and 
pathology, those descriptions will have no value in medical discourse. Thus, scientific 
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medical knowledge not only sets up a system of dependence among various types of 
statements, it also creates a measure of credibility for all statements about human body. 
C. How various rules for the formation of modalities of statements about the 
human body (i.e., who is speaking, from what authority, and what is their 
position regarding the body) are linked together according to a system of 
dependence/specific law of order. 
Rules for the formation of statements have a hierarchical relationship among 
them. Regardless of the type, the most credible and trustworthy statements are those that 
are spoken by attending physicians who draw from the authority of the hospital, medical 
school, and the institution of medicine in general when making statements about the 
structure and function of the human body. Such statements also tend to be most accurate 
ones because it is the doctor’s job to make the most accurate statements about the body 
that are based on scientific medical knowledge. The doctors tend to do their best in 
coming up with most reliable statements since their professional position and social status 
as doctor relies upon accuracy of the statements they make both about disease and 
treatment and the human body as two major discursive objects that heavily draw from 
scientific knowledge of medicine.  
D. How various rules for the formation of body as an object and for the formation 
of modalities of statements about the body (e.g., grids of specification and 
who is speaking) are linked together according to the system of 
dependence/specific law of order. 
As described above, credibility and trustworthiness of all statements about the 
human bodily function and structures - either in medical school or clinical settings - are 
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measured by the level of accuracy with which the statement is drawing from scientific 
medical knowledge. The more accurately and faithfully one reports the science-based 
facts of medical knowledge in one’s statement, the more credible one’s statements will 
be. The point is to use the scientific facts in one’s statement as objectively as possible and 
without any personal attempts on interpreting them. So, if a statement is spoken in a 
surface of emergence (patient’s family or community) but it is evidently based on peer-
reviewed medical knowledge, it will be counted as credible. If the same statement about 
the body coming from the same source is spoken by an attending physician at the hospital 
though, it will be granted a higher status than the one spoken by patient’s family. This is 
because the latter statement’s speaker draws from the authority of the hospital and the 
institution of medicine, while the former speaker cannot. 
Concepts Related to the Doctor. 
A. How various rules for the formation of the doctor (i.e., surfaces of emergence, 
authorities of delimitation, and grids of specification) are linked to each other, 
depending on each other, or following a specific order. 
There is no obvious hierarchical system of ordering among the three rules for the 
formation of the doctor as a discursive object, but there is a critical system of dependence 
that relates the three sets of rules to one another. To keep it short, the rules set by both the 
authorities of delimitation and grids of specification about the doctor depend on the rules 
that are in place in the surface of emergence for the doctor. The rules and regulations of 
the surface of emergence for doctors, which is medical school, partly shape the 
professional identity of medical students as they go through their medical training. The 
way medical students understand who they are as authorities of delimitation and the way 
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they differentiate between different types of doctors (grids of specification) in the future 
all depend on what they are exposed to during their medical training at the medical 
school.  
B. How various types of statements about the doctor are all linked together 
according to a system of dependence.  
The three types of statements using which people commonly talk about the 
function of the doctor include qualitative description of the doctor, biographical accounts, 
and statistical statements about doctor’s performance in clinical settings. There is a 
hierarchical relationship among these three modalities of statement that ties them 
together. Statistical statements about doctor’s performance are usually provided by peer-
reviewed research that has the highest credibility in the medical community. Biographical 
accounts, however, are mostly produced by doctor’s themselves, medical students, and 
sometimes patients. These accounts are often produced in a story-format and they do not 
possess the same amount of credibility as the statistical data provided by a research study. 
Lastly, qualitative description of the doctor’s personal characteristics and clinical 
performance are mainly provided by patient’s feedback as they evaluate the quality of 
care they have received in a healthcare facility. Most healthcare facilities take patient 
feedback seriously as sometimes they become consequential for the doctors in terms of 
receiving some sort of punishment or reward for it if they receive a bad or a good review, 
respectively. Therefore, even though not scientific and not spoken by the medical 
professionals, qualitative descriptions of the doctor’s performance are deemed as 
necessary and important data needing to be collected in all modern healthcare facilities. 
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That is because patients are important authorities of delimitation when it comes to 
defining what a doctor should be like in modern medical discourse.  
C. How various rules for the formation of modalities of statements about the 
doctor (i.e., who is speaking, from what authority, and what is their position 
regarding the function of the doctor) are linked together according to a system 
of dependence/specific law of order. 
In terms of credibility and trustworthiness of the statements defining what a 
doctor should be like, statements spoken by individuals who are connected with the 
institution of medicine and can draw from its authority are deemed as most trustworthy 
and reliable in modern medical discourse. These individuals include all medical 
professionals including students, residents, and attending physicians. The way they define 
the function of the doctor in the clinic is considered the most credible by the surface of 
emergence as well as all authorities of delimitation. Therefore, there is a hierarchical 
relationship between statements defining the position and function of the doctor 
depending on who speaks them, what kind of authority they draw from, and what their 
position is regarding the doctor in general. As explained above, descriptive statements 
about the doctor’s performance coming from the patients are also deemed quite important 
and mostly credible by hospital administration. That is because patients hold a unique 
position regarding the doctor since they are direct beneficiaries of medical care that can 
have life or death consequences for them. Drawing from the authority of this unique 
position, which the entire medical institution depends upon, patients are amongst the 
most significant authorities of delimitation when it comes to giving feedback about the 
performance of the doctor in the clinic.   
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D. How various rules for the formation of the doctor as an object and for the 
formation of modalities of statements about the doctor (e.g., grids of 
specification and who is speaking) are linked together according to the system 
of dependence/specific law of order. 
As described above, credibility and trustworthiness of all statements about the 
doctor are measured by the level of connection between the speaker and the institution of 
medicine. For example, the most credible definitions of the doctor’s position and 
responsibilities are considered to be those that are provided by practicing physicians, or at 
least medical students who have been in the field and therefore must know all the 
nuances of holding a medical job. However, when it comes to practical impact and 
creating consequences for the doctors, patient’s statements in the form of feedback are 
deemed as the most important form of data that needs to be collected at all medical 
facilities as a way to evaluate the doctor’s performance.  
In sum, medical professionals in the surface of emergence (medical school) and 
hospital–who are also considered the main authorities of delimitation for the doctor - may 
or may not enunciate statements about defining the position of the doctor as practical data 
to evaluate the doctor’s performance. Therefore, while deemed credible, this type of data 
is not always present so grids of specification for the doctor cannot rely on them. The 
grids of specification are rather more practically setup by the statements about the 
doctor’s performance provided by patients as evaluation data. What a good doctor should 
be like and what things they should and should not do are mainly defined by patient’s 
statements in the clinical settings, so, this makes the patient an important authority of 
delimitation for defining the doctor’s position. Even though they do not have the kind of 
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authority that medical professionals have, their unique position regarding the function of 
the doctor (being the direct beneficiary of medical care and having to trust them with 
their lives) makes them eligible for being one of the most significant authorities of 
delimitation for the doctor.  
Concepts Related to the Sick Person. 
A. How various rules for the formation of the sick person as an object (i.e., 
surfaces of emergence, authorities of delimitation, and grids of specification) 
are linked to each other, depending on each other, or following a specific 
order. 
Again, while there is no obvious hierarchical system of ordering among the rules 
for the formation of sick person as a discursive object, there is a system of dependence 
that relates the three sets of rules to one another. The rules of the surface of emergence 
(medical school) about referencing the person of the patient reinforce each other about 
disregarding the eligibility of the sick person to join the list of popular and most obvious 
objects of medical discourse. Thus, the rules of the surface of emergence often shape the 
rules that appear among the authorities of delimitation and grids of specification for the 
sick person, that is, how doctors, patients, and other authorities talking about the person 
of the sick understand the nature and significance of this discursive objects and how they 
put this understanding in their daily practice. Here too, the rules and regulations of the 
surface of emergence for doctors partly shape the professional identity of medical 
students as they go through their medical training. The way medical students understand 
who the patient is (are they bodies to fix or whole persons to attend to) and the way they 
differentiate between different types of patients based on their personal characteristics 
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(grids of specification) in the future partly depend on what they are exposed to during 
their medical training at the medical school. 
B. How various types of statements about the sick person are all linked together 
according to a system of dependence.  
The five types of statements using which people commonly talk about the sick 
person in the clinic include: qualitative description of the sick person, biographical 
accounts, reasoning and deduction, statistical statements, and paternalistic statements 
about the sick person. There is a hierarchical relationship among these five modalities of 
statement that ties them together. Statistical statements about a certain group of people as 
patients are usually provided by peer-reviewed research that holds the highest credibility 
among medical community. On the other hand, biographical accounts of patients 
including their personal, family, and social history are mostly provided by patients 
themselves and are valuable as long as they help in making the correct diagnosis by the 
doctors. These accounts are often produced in a story-format and they do not possess the 
same amount of credibility as the statistical data provided by a research study, of course. 
The remaining three modalities are often informally provided by the doctors and other 
healthcare professionals in clinical settings. Qualitative descriptions of the patient’s 
personal characteristics, reasoning and deductions about who the patient is as a person, 
and paternalistic statements regarding the sick person and what is best for them are 
mainly produced by doctors and other healthcare professionals. Thus, there seems to be 
no obvious system of dependence among different modalities of statements about the sick 
person, but there definitely is a hierarchical system of credibility that can be spotted 
among them.  
293 
 
C. How various rules for the formation of modalities of statements about the sick 
person (i.e., who is speaking, from what authority, and what is their position 
regarding the sick person) are linked together according to a system of 
dependence/specific law of order.  
There is a hierarchical relationship between statements about the sick person 
depending on who speaks them, what kind of authority they draw from, and what their 
position is regarding the sick person in the clinic. The kind of impact a statement may 
have on the delivery of healthcare to the patient basically determines which statements 
about the sick person sit on the top of the hierarchical system. Statements spoken by 
individuals who are connected with the institution of medicine and can draw from its 
authority are deemed as most powerful and impactful in terms of affecting the quality of 
healthcare delivery to the patient. It is likely that negative or positive biases from the 
medical staff regarding who the patient is as a person can affect the delivery of healthcare 
to that patient in a negative or positive way, respectively. While the way medical 
professionals perceive, categorize and define the person of the patient may or may not be 
accurate, the statements they enunciate about the sick person can have detrimental effects 
on the condition of the patient, regardless of how true or justified they are. The same 
statements if spoken by a non-medical staff including patient’s family and community 
members will not have the same effect on the delivery of the healthcare to that patient 
and that is why they are less powerful statements. That is because the latter group of 
people cannot base their statements on the authority of medical profession, and, also, they 
do not have the same unique position (of being able to make life and death decisions 
about that patient) regarding the sick person as the doctor has.  
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D. How various rules for the formation of the sick person as an object and for the 
formation of modalities of statements about the sick person (e.g., grids of 
specification and who is speaking) are linked together according to the system 
of dependence/specific law of order. 
As described above, the significance of statements about the sick person is 
measured by the size of the impact they can have over the quality of care which a certain 
patient receives. For example, the most consequential statements about the person of the 
patient are considered to be those that are enunciated by physicians who are in charge of 
that patient’s care. In other words, these physicians can be considered the most powerful 
authorities of delimitation because they are eligible to draw from the authority of medical 
profession. Again, it is the effects of the rules and regulations in the surface of emergence 
(medical school) that partly shapes the professional identity of the doctor- the latter, in 
turn, plays the upper hand in the way doctor treats and addresses the person of the 
patients, and the way he categorizes them in various groups (grids of specification). In 
Foucault’s words, “there is a system of dependence between what one learnt, what one 
saw, what one deduced, what one accepted as probable, and what one postulated” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 57). And the way a doctor postulates thing related to the person of the 
patient, can have the most powerful effect on the way he treats and cares for them. 
Forms of Coexistence. These are rules based on which certain groups of 
statements are accepted or rejected in a discourse. Forms of coexistence are in turn 
divided into three fields: field of presence, field of concomitance, and field of memory.  
Field of Presence. Field of presence consists of statements that were originally taken up 
from elsewhere but have now become part of the modern medical discourse. These are 
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statements that are accepted as true and involve exact descriptions, well-founded 
reasoning, or necessary presuppositions (Foucault, 1972, p. 57). An example of this 
category of statements is scientific research. Everyone involved with modern medical 
discourse including healthcare professionals as well as patients seem to have unshakeable 
faith in what modern scientific research can offer. Here is an exemplar quote from an 
MS1 student.  
With the research coming up like, over the last couple decades, I definitely 
think it’s getting better, even looking for things like HIV, and the recent 
studies on the cures and even the prophylaxis prevention, and also with the 
technology in the recent years, in the modern medicine is helping like a lot 
of patients, which I think is really cool. [MS1] 
 
The field of presence also contains a range of statements that are subject to 
various levels of verification, presupposition and justification processes. In other words, 
they need to be critically evaluated before they can be accepted as true in. Such 
statements include those that are being criticized, discussed, and judged in modern 
medical discourse. Below, let us use alternative medicine as an exemplar topic to 
illustrate the diversity of statements in the field of presence and the resulting dispersion 
of its concepts. The following statements are pulled from the focus groups’ data about the 
topic of alternative medicine (see prompt #5, FG Protocol, Appendix D). The field of 
diverse statements about alternative medicine can be divided into various subfields of 
approved, justified, verification needed, criticized, and more. The example illustrates how 
these different types of statements can all coexist under the same conditions of existence 
in the field of presence, in modern medical discourse.  
First, let’s review statements that approve of the alternative medicine.  
Dr. Abraham B, he is a Stanford neurologist, had a really interesting talk 
about modern medicine; and he says that alternative medicine is kind of 
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filling the niche in modern medicine, which is scientific-based due to 
previous health records, and the direction that medicine has gone, doctors 
have kind of gotten away a little bit from the interpersonal, emotional, and 
even spiritual aspects of medicine. And alternative medications are kind of 
filling in that gap now, like chiropractors, acupuncturists they touch the 
patient. They put that other side of the interpersonal play that does not 
happen as much in modern practices. The attention of mindfulness in 
emotional health, that’s the alternative medicine’s brain to this kind of gap 
that maybe scientific medicine is experiencing now. [MS1]  
 
Yeah, so as I said before, we do it all the time, but we just do not say it 
that we too are using alternative medicine and that not everything we do is 
scientific. Cause even our mind-body medicine class is really alternative 
medicine. Just another way of approaching health issues. [MS1] 
 
The next subfield to look at here is one consisting of statements that are not only 
approving but also justifying the use of alternative medicine in the modern world: 
I think research is like that all the time, I mean, so for researchers, their 
findings ... ideally your finding is ought to be as spastic as possible, but 
when you are only recruiting certain type of people, or a certain gender, 
then your results become very narrow in a way. So, like, tradition does not 
pass down from generation to generation just like that, there is a power in 
that. So, I think the tension between bio-scientific medicine and alternative 
medicine is the tension between what we know and what we do not 
know… and it’s just like what we do not know we do not know. It’s easy 
to feel that, because there is a lot of things that we do not know, to feel 
that because we do not know, it has not occurred to many people. [MS1] 
 
So in one opioid lecture that we had that talked about how to move away 
from opioid addiction, physicians are now suggesting alternative 
medicine. So as we were just talking about it, for all that years they have 
been around but there was not like, enough research to back them up, but 
now that the opioid crisis has hit us they are like, oh, how about you try 
this to take care of your pain. So, we are actually, as medicine we are 
shifting, trying to get away from opioids at least in pain management. And 
that definitely switches. But I do not know if the research in medical 
chemical drugs is as much as in cultural, and others… so maybe those 
things have been useful all along, we just do not have enough research 
backing them up. [MS1] 
 
Next is the subfield of statements that require proper verification of the alternative 
medicine techniques before they can be either accepted or rejected: 
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I think there are a lot of random stuff out there and FDA does not 
necessarily have any control over them, so there is a lot of things that 
might harm patients as well, so there is this gray area… where you are not 
always sure what the side effects of something is and what the negative 
effects could be. But then there are things like acupuncture and yoga, that I 
do not see any reason to not do that but that is because those are things 
that are established by research, so… [MS3] 
 
There are some certified types of practice but for the most part they are not 
scientific, maybe? But then again, I do not want to say science is superior, 
but that’s what we know and are taught. And there are some applications 
that might be harmful especially for the patients who are receiving 
multiple medications. On the other hand I am sure there are also things 
that are helpful so instead of taking another medication the patient could 
just use a certain type of herb, but the thing is that you may not be able to 
take it with certain medications so you need to makes sure to talk to your 
doctor first. [MS3] 
 
And the last subfield consists of those statements that criticize the use of alternative 
medicine:  
So, like, there are some stories that people tell each other, like, for 
example, I know this guy who went to cardiac arrest because of taking a 
vaccine. So ironically, even though vaccine was there to help the person, 
he just died due to a vaccine. So kind of going back to… you know, like if 
my views on alternative medicine is based on, oh, this is gonna help me 
because it has helped generations in the past and everything, that’s just… 
like talking about that aspect of mind and the body which is really 
important in healthcare. Sometimes if a patient is depressed you give them 
an antidepressant which treats their symptoms and everything but it’s not 
getting them back to a healthy mind.  [MS1] 
 
Finally, attention needs to be paid to those statements in medical discourse that are part of 
the field of presence but are rejected or excluded from being part of the modern medical 
discourse. 
So, I’d still say things that are science-based are superior, because they are 
studied, there is evidence behind it, you know the side-effects for them, 
you know. [MS3]  
 
I feel like the evidence-based part is really important. So, my attending, 
earlier today was telling me about this patient who had a leiomyosarcoma 
on her leg but she decided not to have it resected, and to go and have 
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alternative treatments done. So, it took her two years and the thing just 
kept growing before she came back for a surgery. At that point they had to 
take her entire leg off at the hip instead of just saving the whole thing. So, 
they could have saved the leg had she not refused the surgery before and 
opted for these non-evidence-based things. There are like a lot of these 
industries that tell patients things that are not really true and they are not 
held to it from a legal perspective. They are not held to like the same 
standard that we are. And some patients just do not know any better, so I 
feel like that’s a danger. [MS4] 
 
Relations between statements that are approving, justifying, verifying, criticizing and 
rejecting certain types of statements in the field of presence must also be established. One 
can establish multiple forms of ordering among these statements. First, there is a 
somewhat chronological order that is possible to exist among various types of 
statements–this would be the order of experimental verification and logical validation. 
For example, it takes time to take those statements that are being criticized and verify 
them by experimental research so that they may become acceptable and verified items in 
modern medical discourse. The second form of order that is possible to exist among some 
statements is that of acceptance justified by tradition and authority, commentary. In other 
words, some statements might be deemed as true and acceptable even without 
experimental or logical verification. An example of this are statements that count as true 
and acceptable just because they are being backed by the culture/tradition of medicine in 
general. Also, according to the rules of discourse discussed in Chapter 2, statements that 
are talked about most and are receiving the most attention are the ones that become 
acceptable, and in time also popular and even dominant statements of a specific 
discourse. Both forms of ordering/relations can be explicit (e.g., part of formally 
organized critical discussions) or implicit and present only in informal commentaries on 
the discourse of medicine.  
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Field of Concomitance. Field of concomitance includes statements that have been 
borrowed from other discursive formations (e.g., religion, education, philosophy, 
mathematics, business administration, etc.) and therefore concern and/or belong to a 
different domain of objects. Such statements are being used either as models and 
templates in modern medical discourse or have some other function that legitimizes their 
existence among other statements in the discourse of medicine. Let us look at some 
exemplar statements that belong to the field of concomitance, but still belong to the field 
of statements of modern medical discourse.   
Examples of statements borrowed from humanistic philosophy and brought into 
medical discourse are provided below. They belong to medical discourse now too since 
they have the potential of affecting doctor’s clinical practice if he/she believes in them: 
[I am] not a religious person. I take my moral values from more 
humanistic values. My moral values come from how I want to be treated 
in that same situation. I value patient’s autonomy for ethical decisions. 
Making decisions based on the patient, be however they want you to be, 
thinking about myself, like, what’s going to help me in my most evil state? 
[004] 
 
I kind of think by putting myself in others’ shoes and say if I was that 
person, how would it make me feel. Being able to empathize with people. 
I have always found myself good with empathizing with people and being 
able to see things from their perspective. [012] 
 
Examples of statements borrowed from religion that are likely to affect medical practice 
of the doctor who believes in them as their personal values:  
I am a veeeery spiritual person. Christian, not Catholic, I do not use 
identifiers to narrow down myself but I can use those values enormously 
in medicine to get motivations, like my motivation to treat people well, it 
is largely based on the fact that it’s something God cares about and I love 
God, and I want to be like him, and I want to do things to please him. For 
me to try to restrain the effects of disease and illness, is like I believe that 




There is this thing in Buddhism that we call mindfulness, it’s like this 
ability to have power over all aspects of your identity to be able to 
maximize your capacity and be able to fully do your entire job. So, it’s 
about being mindful on what you’re doing, why you came here, how are 
you going to do this, and all those things. [MS1]  
 
Lastly, here is an example of the statements that are borrowed from business and brought 
into modern medical discourse. They too are likely to shape the medical practice in the 
event that the doctor believes in them:  
At least from my experience, there are a lot of business models that are 
coming to medicine ... it is just another style of doing the same thing… 
morally, it sounds right to you like, on the street, like, you should treat 
everyone you can at the same time ... well, what happens to your patients 
who can afford the treatment, if you do not stay up to date with your 
practice and facility because you cannot afford the fees of the building, or 
whatever it is that you need to pay for in order to have a private practice? 
[MS1] 
 
Other subfields of statements found in the field of concomitance of the modern medical 
discourse include those consisting of the statements borrowed from the fields of 
mathematics (mainly statistics), education, and business administration and management. 
Statistical statements and related concepts are found abundantly in medical research 
articles whereas statements and related concepts borrowed from the field of education are 
easy to spot in the medical talk that occurs in the medical school (e.g., the way medical 
classes and lectures are organized, the way student assessments are setup, etc.). Last but 
not least, numerous examples of the statements borrowed form business administration 
and management can be spotted at the hospitals (the way patient records are saved, the 
entire medical coding and billing system, technicalities related to admission and 
discharge of patients, etc.).  
Relations between statements (i.e., coming from humanistic philosophy, religion, 
business, education, mathematics, administration and management] in the field of 
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concomitance must also be established. No obvious system of dependence among 
different types of statements in the field of concomitance was spotted in this study. Yet, 
there is a system of hierarchy among them that dictates the amount of attention and time 
each of them receives in modern medical discourse. Statements that are borrowed from 
mathematics, especially those that relate to statistical information regarding disease and 
treatments are deemed as the most significant, objective, and useful part of the medical 
discourse since they are based on positivist values of scientific medicine. The next most 
significant types of statements that are deemed as necessary part of modern medical 
discourse and clinical practice are statements borrowed from the field of business 
administration and management–both institutions of medical school and hospital, and 
even private practices are currently relying upon these statements and need experts to be 
able to apply them in the field of medicine as best as possible.  
Medical training also relies on statements borrowed from the field of education 
because they need to develop medical curriculum including lesson plans, teaching and 
learning material, etc., all of which requires educational expertise to be part of the 
modern medical discourse. Currently, the least amount of time and attention is invested in 
discussing statements that are borrowed from humanistic philosophy and religion and are 
being put to use in medical clinical practice. While medical students are often encouraged 
to develop their own moral values, there is no standard set of such values that everyone 
needs to follow. Thus, various individuals nourish various sets of moral values depending 
on their own personal, cultural or family backgrounds. In sum, one can affirm that 
statements in the field of concomitance in modern medical discourse are hierarchically 
organized. Statements that are deemed as important and necessary are often scientifically 
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measured, whereas those that do not enjoy much attention from the medical community 
are often attached to professionalism without having been discussed or researched in 
sufficient depth. This is one reason why prompts discussed in relation to professionalism 
(e.g., excellence, humanism, accountability, and altruism) are often vague and lacking in 
definitions (see Chapter 2: What is Identity and Why it Matters for a detailed discussion 
of how medical professionalism and concepts attributed to it are lacking a standard 
definitions in medical education research).  
Field of Memory. Field of memory consists of those statements that are no longer 
accepted as true in the modern medical discourse. However, due to having been part of 
the medical discourse in the past, significant relations between statements in this field and 
those in the field of presence continue to exist. Surprising as it may sound to some, 
statements related to less obvious racism, sexism, and paternalism were found frequently 
among the data collected from medical student interviews and focus groups in this study. 
It may be helpful to remind ourselves of the fact that, not very long ago, medicine was 
considered to be a profession that is completely inappropriate for women (see Alfred 
Stillé’s inaugural speech, delivered in 1871, for more). And up until recently (see Boy’s 
in White, 1965, for more) medicine used to be a very White-male-dominated profession. 
It also used to be less interprofessional and so-called paternalistic in terms of the 
physicians’ behavior. It is true that things like sexism, racism, and paternalistic behavior 
are no longer accepted today and neither do they have a place in formal discussions. 
Nevertheless, the echoes of what used to be are still not difficult to spot in modern 
medical discourse.  
Examples of racist statements in modern medicine:  
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I had a good friend from Hispanic descend, and one of the first questions 
she was asked was: oh, so you are an illegal?! It was a student from 
Indiana coming from a very privileged family who asked her that. To me, 
that’s shocking, it’s appalling… so I can see, depending on who you meet, 
and depending on your cultural background, you know, this friend, had 
parents of Mexican origin and she had no control over that ... and she is a 
wonderful person. And it’s a shame that someone from my home area 
cannot figure that out. It’d be different for a Caucasian from California, 
for example, to them it’s all friendly, and there is no racial interaction, so 
it’s very much different depending on the person. [004] 
 
One night there was this thing that really annoyed me was that there was a 
call from a woman’s apartment, she woke up with piercing headache… 
anything with that type of a symptom would have been taken more 
seriously, but the paramedic nearly dismissed it. But then me and my 
partner were like, no, she literally woke up from her sleep, and also, one 
person was like gripping her arm and I thought I felt as if her left arm was 
not dropping as her right arm was, so… they wrote a report and the chart 
and the chart was given to the physician, and the physician just went 
through that, and like literally for 15-20 seconds examination, like in 
seconds, and she comes out like, oh, these people are faking it ... and it’s 
just a waste of resources etc. So, she completely dismissed any of her 
symptoms… not even like, she does not realize that she is okay, it’s like, 
she is ACTIVELY faking it. I mean, how do you even know that? You 
took only 15-20 seconds. The patient was an African American, in her 
early 20s, and they reported low-income status. There was really no 
explanation as to why she would have these headaches, and she had no 
history of repeated visits to the hospital. So, she was not a hypochondriac, 
or anxious or anything, she was just, she literally woke up from her sleep 
with this pain. And was wanting to know why… So, it was kind of an 
experience seeing how the “others”, the American “others” go through the 
healthcare system sometimes. [141] 
 
It usually happens with my parents, like they get frustrated with their 
healthcare experiences. But [they are immigrants form Uzbekistan and] 
they have a language barrier ... So, my mom has arthritis and her legs hurt 
like all the time, but she feels like wherever she goes they do not listen to 
her. Her doctor, was a really demeaning person, she was a Russian lady, 
and she was just being rude to her, she was talking to her in a rude way. 
So, like my mom kind of stopped going to the doctor anymore even when 
she had pain. And I felt like should not happen… and she we had to 
change her doctor then. That doctor was known for begin rude to patients, 
in general. One other one, it was when my mom was removing her 
hemorrhoid, there was the language barrier, she speaks minimal English, 
and the interpreter problems. So, they removed something else from her in 
that region. And then whenever we went to her doctor, he was an Asian 
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doctor, he got angry for that! And my mom was in so much pain, because 
they did not remove what they were supposed to remove, the hemorrhoid, 
they just got a polyp or something. So, the problem was probably the 
interpreter, because she had an interpreter that day, I was in school, 
everybody was at school ... So that was just another experience, like, you 
are not supposed to be mean to your patient. Because you’re getting paid 
for what you’re doing. I feel like it happens most of the time, to them, 
even to my dad, like he does speak English but I feel like they treat him 
differently than they would treat the White people. And you can see that. 
[161] 
 
Example of sexist statements in modern medicine:  
 
My sister is a 3rd year medical student ... She is rotating now and she feels 
like she is being treated differently than her male classmates, and 
especially their surgery rotation, they are very male dominated. She says 
she is the last person that her attending calls in, her attending calls other 
students first who are male, and kind of gives them more information. She 
is left out, or that’s what she feels like at least. She also said that her 
attending says if you are a female it’s really hard for you to get into 
surgery; which I feel like you should never say that to anybody. Even 
though it’s hard but… like you can see that some of these old attendings 
who have old mindsets such as like females should stay at home, they 
should focus on their families, surgery is not for you… [161] 
 
Examples of paternalistic statements addressed to medical students:  
 
The intern was scrubbed in, I got there a little late because I had another 
surgery. So, I was just watching but she was assisting. So, he kept telling 
her like, wrong! No! Do it differently ... But without really giving her 
specific instructions on how to change. And then he drew me in: Oh, I bet 
Jenna could even do it better, look at her, like she is probably thinking that 
how much better she could do it if she was scrubbed in ... And I am there, 
a 3rd year medical student, she is the intern. And he kept going on like that 
for like 10 minutes. Me and her, like get along, I thought she was doing 
pretty well, but I was like horrified. Like how can you talk to someone like 
that?! That’s an intern who is there to learn, you are not helping, and 
you’re making her feel bad. [043] 
 
Firstly, this neurosurgeon was kind of older, he was in his 60s, of a whole 
different generation, of a whole different idea of what it is like to be a 
doctor. Physicians used to be, I guess, way more paternalistic. It’s a lot 
more interprofessional nowadays. Secondly, neurosurgeons are kind of 
very bright, very smart, and have had to go to a lot of school. So, there is 




They are like, I’m a big shot, like a surgeon or whatever, so I get it that 
they are good and passionate or whatever but they are also that 
stereotypical personalities. [023] 
 
Examples of paternalistic statements addressed to other healthcare professionals: 
 
So on my surgery rotation I had this physician that I worked with, so she 
just yelled at a nurse because she was having trouble getting an NG tube 
on a patient and then she like, made me go put the NG tube in, and she 
was like, I had to bring in my medical student to do your nursing work, 
like, saying that to her. And, I thought that was kind of disrespectful 
because the nurse had obviously tried to do the NG tube and was having 
trouble with it and I do not know if she had help, but the surgeon helped 
me put the NG tube in, so it’s not like I just magically did it by myself, 
laugh. I think her treatment was kind of indicative of the message that 
your job is less important and you could not even do that, and I just 
thought that was really unprofessional. [093] 
 
I feel like, again, it has become way better than before, than what it used 
to be. It used to be more paternalistic. I think everybody is working in the 
team, doing their part. Like, I can’t do the part that a nurse does and the 
nurse can’t do the part that I do, and then the pharmacist can’t do the part 
of the nurse or PA. So, everybody is working toward the same thing, there 
should not be like, guess, oh I am higher than you, you gotta like, don’t 
even come talk to me, like, that kind of thing. Everybody is doing their 
job; they are getting paid and go home. You shouldn’t think like oh, I am 
their boss in this place. I have seen people doing that though, 
unfortunately. [161] 
 
Relations between various types of statements in the field of memory (i.e., racist, sexist, 
and paternalistic) must also be established. Among the three types of statements currently 
found in the field of memory in modern medical discourse, paternalistic statements are 
the most common and most obvious type. A lot of medical students and physicians are 
not afraid to clearly articulate their support for the hierarchical arrangement of the 
healthcare team. Numerous comments coming from the data collected from medical 
student interviews and focus groups in this study support this claim. Likewise, there are a 
lot of physicians that actively embody the paternalistic behavior towards medical students 
- again, evidence from data collected in this study can provide several examples of this 
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type of physicians in the clinic.  Whereas statements supporting sexist ideas are not as 
common and as obvious as paternalistic statements, their appearance is not completely 
scarce or secret either. Sexist and racist statements are often enunciated informally and as 
verbal or behavioral statement, they are almost never found in the written format or 
among formal enunciations in modern medical discourse. Even though an institution such 
as Indiana University may take a clear position against any kind of racist or sexist 
behaviors, this position is not necessarily shared by every single individual who is 
involved in modern medicine. There are controversies as to what is considered racist or 
sexist and what is not. Clearly, sexism and racism are not completely eliminated from the 
modern U.S. society, and the Indiana University School of Medicine is definitely not an 
exception in that regard. Figure 4.10 (at the end of this section) summarizes the 
archaeological model of analysis for discursive concepts used in modern discourse of 
medicine. 
Lastly, relations between the three fields of presence, concomitance and memory 
must also be established. In terms of relations between various forms of coexistence (i.e., 
statements belonging to the field of presence, field of concomitance and field of memory) 
no obvious dependency among them were detected in this study. Nevertheless, there is a 
hierarchical relationship among them that dictates significance and amount of attention 
needing to be paid to each specific group. Field of presence consisting of all statements 
that are accepted true, need verification and those that are rejected is the one field that is 
always under the spotlight and is constantly receiving time and attention from everyone 











Field of concomitance, on the other hand, is not being discussed as much or receiving 
attention. While important of course, the statements belonging to this field are not under 
the spotlight for constant discussion, verification or justification. They are mostly 
considered as “done” and accepted as they are. Lastly, statements belonging to the field 
of memory are the ones that are receiving least time and attention among the statements 
of modern medical discourse. Theoretically they no longer belong in modern medicine 
they are not the popular topics of discussion in modern medical discourse either. 
Procedures of Intervention. These include certain ways of dealing with a group 
of statements that are acceptable within the modern medical discourse. Procedures of 
intervention that were observed in this study include: techniques of rewriting (e.g., 
rewriting the lab results of a patient with high cholesterol and LDL levels in their blood 
in terms of their clinical significance such as, defining the patient as “prediabetic”, 
“prone to strokes”, “high-risk for coronary heart disease (CHD), etc.); methods of 
transcribing (e.g., transcribing patient’s history that is presented in lay language by the 
patient - using medical terminology) ; modes of translating (e.g., translating what is 
obtained as purely perceptual measurements and descriptions during a physical exam into 
a written report of medically defined signs and symptoms for a certain disease); methods 
of approximation, which refer to the means used to increase the approximation of 
statements and to refine their exactitude; these includes the following three methods: 
techniques of delimiting the domain of a statement’s validity (e.g., measuring accuracy of 
the alternative medicine by scientific research and measures–trying to define boundaries 
for statements that can be deemed as “valid” in modern medical discourse);  transfer and 
application of a statement into a new domain (e.g., medical students using skills they 
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have been practicing on cadavers–such as observation and palpitation of internal organs, 
making skin incisions, suturing, etc.–on living patients); and methods of systematization 
of statements in medical discourse. The latter group includes methods of systematizing 
propositions that already exist, that have been previously formulated but in a separated 
state. Also, the methods of redistributing statements that are already linked together, but 
which can be rearranged in a new systematic whole (e.g., putting all relevant statements - 
such as blood and urine test reports, medical imaging and physical exam reports - 
together in a single domain of application to help determine the diagnosis and plan of 
treatment for the patient).  
Relations between various procedures of intervention must also be established. 
The first three groups of procedures (techniques of rewriting, transcribing, and 
translating) are common technicalities used in modern medicine at this point. Most of 
them are practiced in the same way throughout the world (e.g., methods of transcribing) 
regardless of the country where the medical care facility resides and the language the 
procedure uses to transcribe patient’s history. While one might be able to outline a system 
of dependence between them, there is no obvious hierarchical relationship between the 
first three groups of procedures. The fourth group of procedures which is the methods of 
approximation carries more weight than the first three groups because it involves 
measures of validity, application, and systematization for the statements. 
Theoretical Strategies 
So far in this chapter, we discussed what people talk about in medicine (discursive 
objects), how they talk about them (modalities of statement for each object), and what 
general notions exist about those objects (concepts) in the modern discourse of medicine. 
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In this section, we will see what positions are possible to be assumed by people in 
medical discourse with regards to the four discursive objects: disease and treatment, the 
human body, the doctor, and the sick person. I will delineate a range of theoretical 
strategies currently found within discursive formation of modern medicine. A theoretical 
strategy (or choice) emerges each time there are two incompatible discursive elements in 
the same discursive formation. For example, when two objects, two types of enunciation, 
or two concepts appear in the same field of discourse but are not able to relate to the same 
group of statements, it is considered a point of diffraction for alternative theoretical 
choices. It is possible for the alternative and even opposing theoretical choices to appear 
and coexist within the same discursive field and share the same conditions of existence. 
Paradoxical as it may sound, one must note that points of diffraction not only indicate 
incompatibility between two or more elements, they also imply equivalence of these same 
elements. That is, incompatible elements are still considered equal in the sense that they 
are formed in the same way: obeying the same rules of formation, upholding the same 
discursive and nondiscursive relations, and therefore sharing the same conditions of 
existence and possibility for appearing in the same field of discourse. They are situated at 
the same level but as alternative ways of thinking about a certain object. Moreover, these 
incompatible yet equivalent elements give rise to a coherent series of objects, modalities 
of enunciation and concepts, all of which owe their existence to the mere fact that 
alternative strategies can appear and coexist within the same field of discourse. In the 
latter sense, points of diffraction also represent the link points of systematization. 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 66).  
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In this section, I will first discuss the strategies for each discursive object that we 
have previously established. Next, I will outline the points of diffraction for each strategy. 
This will include the: 1) points of incompatibility between two or more strategic choices; 
2) points of equivalence, which are the same as the rules of formation for each strategy; 
and lastly, 3) points of systematization for the entire group of strategies related to the 
same discursive object. When describing points of systematization, I will analyze the 
relations between strategic elements at various levels. From bottom up, these include 
relations between rules of formation for all strategies relating to the same discursive 
object; these would be discussed as points of systematization for the entire group. This 
will result in establishing, in part, the conditions of existence for all strategic choices that 
coexist in the discursive formation of modern medicine.   
Rules for the Formation of Strategies. As detailed in Chapter 3 and briefly 
mentioned above, archaeological analysis in this study first of all seeks to determine the 
points of diffraction for various strategic choices made in the discursive formation of 
modern medicine. Incompatible strategic choices then emanate from each point of 
diffraction. Each choice thus made is considered a separate strategy for which we need to 
establish the rules of formation and the overall conditions of existence. Rules governing 
the formation of strategies that need to be established by analysis are as follows:   
1. Rules concerning the economy of the discursive constellation 
2. Rules concerning the nondiscursive structures 
Strategies Concerned with the Disease and its Treatment. 
Objectivity vs. Subjectivity: Are Discussions of Disease and Treatment Standard for All 
Patients? Discussions about the disease and treatments in the clinical settings, especially 
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among doctors, are often perceived as objective and standard. The reason for that is that 
discussion of these topics are supposed to be based on medical scientific knowledge that 
is both objective and standard so it is assumed that there should not be much variation in 
terms of applying this knowledge to patients. The reality is, however, that the practices 
dealing with disease and treatment at the hospital are anything but standard or objective. 
The knowledge maybe standard, but it goes through several human filters before it is 
actually applied to the patient.  
First, just based on common sense, not all physicians are equally aware of and 
knowledgeable about the features of a certain disease and every single treatment option 
that maybe available for it. Some physicians are more dedicated to their profession and 
invest more time and energy to stay up-to-date with medical science. To complicate the 
issue further, the science of medicine is changing constantly and rapidly in our age. 
Second, every patient is different and unique in terms of developing and/or showing the 
signs and symptoms of a disease. Likewise, different patients respond differently to the 
same choice of treatment. Therefore, there is room for a lot of hesitation and uncertainty 
on the part of the doctors. The decisions doctors make about the diagnosis and plan of 
treatment for the patient are directly related to their level of knowledge and dedication, 
the amount of time and energy that they spend on a patient’s case. Yet, more often than 
never, both diagnosis and choice of treatment happen to be the doctor’s best guess and it 
also depends on an array of factors related to the patient. Third, sadly not every patient 
gets the exact same treatment and care from the healthcare staff at the hospital and there 
are various reasons for that, ranging from technical issues and implicit bias to racism and 
classism. As one can imagine, there is a lot of room for subjectivity and relativity in here. 
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Perhaps it is safe to assume that clinical practice is never objective in the real sense of the 
term. Below are a few excerpts pulled from the observation field notes to illustrate the 
above points.  
Examples of uncertainty and hesitation on part of the attending and residents:   
Five minutes discussion among the team outside patient’s door. Not a deep 
level of engagement. Resident 1 who presented the case to the team did 
not do a good job of explaining the case. Seems like he did not know 
much about the patient himself. Resident sounds clearly confused and 
hesitant. Attending asks: “I wonder if tachy is because of his lobectomy?” 
Resident 1 shrugs his shoulders. Resident 2 adds a side note that is 
apparently not important or relevant to the case. No one seems to take 
notice of the note. The team goes in. Resident 1 takes the lead. Patient is a 
50-year-old man with small cell carcinoma. [Obs] [p.50]  
 
Intern asks attending: “do we do… before ...?” Attending smiles and looks 
a bit flustered. “We should be getting Tramadol now” not really answering 
the intern’s question. [Obs] [p.54]  
   
Resident presents the patient case, skips some info, and does not seem to 
be sure about anything he is reporting. Begins and ends his statements 
with “I don’t know”, “I mean” [Obs] [p.51]  
   
Example of investing less time and effort on part of the team (attending, residents, 
and others):   
Resident describes the patient for 1 minute. Attending leads the visit, 
checks patient’s chest after surgery. [Obs] [p.53]  
 
Examples of competence, confidence, and care on part of the attending and 
residents:     
Intern describes the patient to the team. Attending looks at her with an 
appraising gaze. The intern does much better than the resident did on 
previous patient. He looks concerned, a bit too detail-oriented, perhaps. 
[Obs] [p.55]  
 
Resident leads the team. It’s a new patient. The attending acts very polite 
and humble. Both attending and resident listen to patient’s lungs. Resident 
speaks confidently, concernedly, almost does not sound like a resident. I 
would have thought he is an attending physician if I were the patient. “Let 
your nurse know if you need anything else, okay?” says the attending as 
314 
 
the team prepares to leave the room. Resident looks at the patient and says 
“nice to meet you!” before leaving the room: [Obs] [p.57]  
 
Points of Diffraction. Here we need to establish three categories of relations among 
strategic choices: 1) points of incompatibility (e.g., how strategic choices are different 
from one another), 2) points of equivalence (e.g., how strategic choices are equal to one 
another as they share the same conditions of existence), 3) points of systematization (e.g., 
how these strategic choices give rise to a series of objects, modalities of statement and 
concepts within the modern medical discourse). 
Points of Incompatibility. To find points of incompatibility among different 
strategic choices, one needs to answer the following question: What different positions 
are taken regarding modalities of statements and concepts relating to the disease and 
treatment? Based on the present study, at least the following two positions are taken 
regarding the disease and treatment as an object of modern medical discourse: 
A. Some invest more time and energy to hone their skills as physicians. As a 
result, they stay more informed about the updates in modern medical science 
about diseases and possible treatment choices. They also spend more time and 
energy with individual cases that they come across. 
B. Some invest less time and energy to hone their skills as physicians and as a 
result, they practice medicine with dangerous uncertainty and hesitation when 
it comes to diagnosing the patient and determining the plan of treatment. They 
also spend less time and energy with individual cases they come across.  
Points of Equivalence. To find points of equivalence among the two strategic 
choices above, one needs to show that they share the same conditions of existence. 
Conditions of existence for theoretical choices made in a discourse consist of rules for the 
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formation of strategic choices and the relations between those rules–as we have seen for 
the previous three elements of discourse (i.e., objects, modalities of statements, and 
concepts). First, let us discuss the rules for the formation of strategies that consist of: 1) 
rules concerning the economy of discursive constellation, and 2) rules concerning 
nondiscursive structures as they relate to the above-mentioned strategic choices.  
1. Rules concerning the economy of discursive constellation 
Here, we need to show how the choices made depend on the general constellation 
in which medical discourse is situated. Modern medical science is positioned in the same 
discursive constellation with natural sciences, technology, business, and capitalism in the 
USA, 2019. Though clinical practice is far from being one hundred percent scientific or 
objective, the knowledge of medicine that doctors across the globe draw from is mainly 
scientific, objective, and value-neutral. Bio-scientific medicine does not welcome the 
expression of emotions such as care and empathy on the part of the doctor. Thanks to a 
few scattered topics of social sciences such as medical humanities that are often 
discussed under medical professionalism, at least some students are aware of the issues of 
respecting the human dignity when handling bodies and why it is important to be vigilant 
of those. As a consequence of being in the same discursive constellation with natural 
sciences (e.g., biology, chemistry, etc.), medicine tends to identify with objectivity and 
value-neutral nature of hard sciences rather than humanistic values of medical humanities 
and social sciences. Moreover, being in the same constellation with business 
administration and management, which are inseparable parts of practicing modern 
medicine today, many people involved in medicine are under the influence of profit-
316 
 
based measurement of events and seeking personal interests in all social events–including 
a medical practice  
2. Rules concerning the nondiscursive structures 
Nondiscursive structure within which the entire process of medical education is 
housed consists of the medical school. As is evident from data in this study, from an 
administrative perspective there seems to be no consequences for choosing any of the 
above two strategies unless things go too wrong with a patient which cannot be justified. 
For the most part, students, doctors and residents have the choice of going with either of 
those two strategies. Furthermore, what seems to be the obvious rules and regulations at 
the hospital is not always respected by all hospital staff. There can be issues ranging from 
minor neglect to major personal prejudices against certain patients. Let us look at a 
couple of examples of technical or other issues in clinical setting that can affect the 
standard patient care practices:     
Attending is talking about a patient whose surgical complications were not 
reported to him soon enough. He seem frustrated: “ultimately, system-
wise, you are stuck!” He goes on talking about reliability, and confusion ... 
“Patient comes in at 8 pm, but won’t be seen by neurosurgeon until the 
next day!” ... “Nobody documents or comments about the fall that 
happened in the hospital ... Oh God, did anybody look at this patient? 
They renewed the documentation system so nobody’s physical exams are 
on the same page anymore ... And they finally gave him [two 
contradicting test results], 1 out of 5 versus 4 out of 5!” [Obs] [p.19]  
 
The two attendings are discussing a patient who came last night: “that’s a 
system-break. I mean, that sort of thing doesn’t happen quite often, true, 
but it takes only once, you know”. Sounds like something went wrong 
with Propofol, MRI, CT, and lab report reading. Attendings discuss patient 
for 10 minutes standing in the hallway. [Obs] [p.27]  
 
Points of Systematization. This is where we need to establish the link between 
each of the strategies about disease and treatment and show how they can affect the rules 
of formation for disease and treatment as an object of discourse, the rules of formation for 
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enunciative modalities about disease and treatment, and lastly, the concepts related to 
disease and treatment in the modern medical discourse. Points of systematization entails 
how each strategy contributes in production of statements (commentary) about an object, 
the types of statements about that object, and concepts that are born out of the specific 
relations among the rules of formation for objects and statement modalities. In this sense, 
as Foucault points out, “points of diffraction also represent the link points of 
systematization.” (Foucault, 1972, p. 66)   
Each of the strategic choices noted above (i.e., being a more committed medical 
professional or a less committed one) represent systematically different ways: of treating 
disease and treatment as object of medical discourse (delimiting it, grouping and 
classifying it), of arranging modalities of statement about disease and treatment (choosing 
them, placing them, and composing them), and of manipulating concepts regarding the 
disease and treatment (determining rules for their use and constituting the conceptual 
architecture of modern medical discourse related to the information about disease and 
treatment). In other words, each of the strategies above, are regulated ways of “practicing 
the possibilities of discourse” (Foucault, 1972, p. 70).  
For example, we know that doctors and residents are important authorities of 
delimitation for disease and its treatment. They are also the ones who have the right to 
authoritatively speak about the characteristics of diseases and the treatment options that 
are available for the patients. Doing so, they draw from the authority of medical school, 
hospital, and the institution of medicine in general. People are most likely to believe that 
their statements are true because they are based on these authorities. Now, if a student or 
resident chooses to invest less time and energy learning about and applying the 
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knowledge about disease and treatments, this choice will affect his/her professional 
identity as a doctor in the future. The way she sees this matter as an authority of 
delimitation, the way she chooses to use the objective science of medicine in relation to 
the patient’s condition, the way she chooses to talk about the disease characteristics and 
treatment choices, and finally the way she chooses to manipulate the concepts related to 
the disease and treatment in medical discourse will all be affected by her choice of 
investing less in keeping up with honing her medical skills constantly. This scenario is 
also true about the opposite case, where a student chooses to stay committed to refining 
her skills constantly enough. This decision too will affect her future professional identity 
as a doctor and will give rise to unique commentary and statements coming from her 
regarding how to deal with the disease and treatment in the clinic. This is how medical 
discourse is constantly produced and reproduced by people who are involved in 
medicine. The reason one can often see different and sometimes opposing behaviors from 
different doctors is that they each are using a systematically different way of dealing with 
a certain object of medical discourse, whether it’s about a treatment choice, the body, the 
doctor’s function, or the sick person.  
It is also important to show how different strategic choices are linked to the 
function carried out by modern medical discourse in the practice of current capitalistic 
culture; and the role medicine plays in realization of interests and desires of the upper 
class in society. Modern medical discourse is defined by “a certain constant way of 
relating possibilities of systematization interior to a discourse, other discourses that are 
exterior to it, and a whole nondiscursive  field of practices, appropriation, interests, and 
desires” (Foucault, 1972, p. 69). With doctors and medical scientists who produce the 
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science of modern medicine for use in the clinic, it is not difficult to see that certain 
choices are made by the upper class in society (doctors and scientists) that determine the 
way medical discourse is shaped. The information about recognizing the diseases and 
selecting treatment options for them are mostly pure scientific and included in medical 
textbooks that have no room for discussing the humanity side of medical practice. With 
medicine being dependent on the gigantic business industries such pharmaceutical and 
health insurance companies to name a couple, doctors being trained in medical 
humanities, developing traits such as empathy and compassion, and developing humane 
relationships with their patients will not be best suited to serve the interests and desires of 
the capitalistic society where business leads to serving the rich and ignoring the poor.  
Strategies Concerned with the Human Body.  
Objectification, Desensitization, and Personification: Medical Student Strategies for 
Dealing with the Human Body. Medical students’ first authoritative encounter with 
human body happens in the first year of medical school, in gross anatomy lab. Different 
students experience the time they spend in the anatomy lab differently; for some it is an 
emotional roller-coaster dealing with the death and dissection for the first time whereas 
for some others it is merely a unique learning experience. Based on personal values and 
preferences, students choose their own strategy to help themselves make the most out of 
their experience working with cadavers’ bodies. Student strategies that were discussed in 
personal interviews with medical students in this study range from complete 
objectification of the body as a non-living thing to a paralyzing personification of the 
cadaver’s body that hinders student’s learning process. The full spectrum of attitudes 
toward cadaveric bodies include objectification, desensitization to be able to work with 
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the body, balanced behavior standing on the middle grounds between objectification and 
personification and at times alternating between the two, and, full personification of the 
body impeding learning from a cadaver’s body let alone dissecting it. Example of 
comments referencing each strategy are provided below.  
Exemplar statements denoting objectification of the human body: 
I was over-stressed about how well we will dissect that body ... I do not 
think I actively tried a strategy, but I think subconsciously I dehumanized 
the body. I think I even referred to it as “it” at times. I am not sure why. I 
had not really considered, I guess, I was interested to know what caused 
him to die and trying to figure out like, different comorbidities he may 
have had, but by no means had I ever wanted to know his name, or what 
his family was like. I was definitely appreciative that he did give up his 
body - once he no longer needed it - to teach me. But I did not ever feel 
like I kind of owed him anything. Maybe just because I did not really 
think of him as a person before I started cutting him. 103] 
 
I was just so involved in the act of trying to learn the actual anatomy 
because I had not taken it before and I did not know anything, I was just 
so fascinated by it ... but no, it did not bother me. I never felt like this was 
a person, no. I did not feel like that at all.  I already was desensitized so, I 
do not know [laugh]. [043] 
 
Exemplar statement about desensitizing one’s self toward the human body in order to be 
able to overcome one’s emotional reactions and effectively work with the body: 
We often called our cadaver our first patient. I get that, we appreciate it, 
they dedicated their body to us and everyone deserves respect and 
dignity ... however, rather than seeing it us our first patient, I took it more 
as a learning experience, where this is something I learn from, rather than 
a patient encounter where I am advocating what’s best for my patient. My 
decisions kind of really matter more, like the decision that we were 
chopping off the leg, while I would not do that for a living person lightly. 
So, the emotion for me was not a huge factor ... the student who was very 
shy had had a surgery 6 months before and she was hesitant about cutting 
the human body, which I can get her point. But for me, I took it more as a 
learning experience. So, like, working on the face, it is a sensitive area, 
and at the end, bisecting the head when it does not really look like human 
anymore… so that was the part for me where I was like, whoa! We just did 
that! If I did not desensitize myself, there comes almost a little bit of a 
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paralysis of decision making like, people who are in the surgery often 
experience that feeling. [004] 
 
Exemplar statements against desensitization strategy chosen by some medical 
students: 
If you are going to become a physician and you need to desensitize 
yourself to a cadaver, then I think medicine will be very difficult for you. I 
think you can, if it helps you, but then how are you going to make it 
through a real person that’s alive than dying? You have to be able to 
confront the fact that this was a real human being who was kind enough to 
dedicate their body to the education of stupid first-years who do not know 
how to use the scalpels you know; we are not doing a good job…. I mean I 
see why people would do it [desensitize themselves] but then it’d concern 
me that you should think about everything as a real human being, you 
should think about every one of them as your first patient and do your best 
for them ... It was truly our first patient that we saw every day that we had 
goals to do ... If you desensitize, then how are you going to move on? 
There might be patients in the future who are in a gross state, you can’t 
just forget about their humanity and think of them as an object just to be 
able to work with them. [063] 
 
I mean, I think everybody including me said something at some point that 
if the patient or their family could hear, they would not be happy. Because, 
we would look at it objectively, and like, oh my patient is thin, thank God! 
And if you had an overweight patient then all you could comment about is 
like oh my God, they are so fat, how did they live like that ... so, things 
like that ... It’s just objectifying the patients to the point that, that’s the 
thing, if you desensitize too much, then it stops you from seeing that if 
they were your patients, and if the patient or your parents were here, could 
you still say what you said. And if not, then do not say it. [063] 
 
Exemplar statements denoting extreme personification of the cadaver’s body 
which impedes student’s learning processes: 
I am not afraid of any of that. The reason I was so afraid of the anatomy 
lab is that they [cadavers] actually look like a dead person. I did not want 
to be around that, I was thinking of that these people have families, are 
their families okay with this? I kept thinking that what if it was my sister 
with all of this happening to her ... so what if their families did not want 
this? And, I do not know, it was just very hard for me to ... So, I was just 
never able to desensitize myself, I know people do that as a strategy to be 
able to work with cadavers, but I just - thinking of it spiritually - I could 
not do that. [051] 
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Human dissection was just very hard for me. Like, I was like, I do not 
wanna do it. But it was like, here I go, I am walking through this waterfall, 
I am crossing this line ... but I was fully cognizant that it’s not a normal 
thing that people do, it’s kind of a special privilege, a responsibility almost 
and it’s kind of sick in a way and it’s kind of wrong, and it does feel 
wrong ... so, did I objectify the guy’s body? No. I never wanted to treat 
him like an object, I saw him as a human being, and I always was 
cognizant of the fact that I was defying this guy’s body, I was taking his 
body apart like a machine. Was destroying him. So, I felt bad. I felt like it 
was a defilement and it was defilement ... but specifically, what coping 
mechanisms did I use? I do not know. I always, padded him on the 
shoulder, when we got to work on him, I was like: here we go buddy… 
and I would call him “buddy” [smile]. [081] 
 
Exemplar statements about personification of the body which does not impede 
learning processes but rather helps it: 
So, we knew the real names, and ages, and met our donor’s families. I met 
with the daughter of my cadaver, I sent her an email. We had a memorial 
service, so afterwards I got to set with his wife, and my donor’s step-
daughter and talked to them about him and they shared memories of him. 
And it was cool, like, I had just had a month doing horrible things to his 
body but because I knew all along that he was a person, he liked polish 
pastries and he loved dancing, knowing these things about him, it was 
easier for me trying to be respectful of him and his body when I was doing 
things that otherwise were really gruesome. And not really making any 
comments about him, like, because I knew him as a person. But I also had 
classmates who did not answer the email, and like, did not go to the 
ceremony because they were like, I can’t think about “it” being a person. 
It was an optional thing, like, you did not really have to do it if you do not 
want to. There was a woman who died of breast cancer, so she and her 
family made a slide show of her life and she saying things, like, here is 
what I want you to know about me, about her life, kind of a little video 
that she made by herself. Her body was in the lab ... I think it was good to 
keep the humanity side of it, it was helpful for me. [023] 
 
We were not allowed to call them donors, we had to call them first 
patients. It was instilled in us very early that we were kind of their first 
care-taker after death. And we should treat them as patients with respect… 
and I like that, that was kind of my memory of the anatomy lab. I think it 
can help to desensitize yourself, yeah… It would not have helped me, 
because it helped me more to think of the whole system as this was a 
person. And I think it was not an issue for me because I was an MT prior 
to med school. I was no stranger to death or dead bodies, so it was not a 
shock to me when I saw a dead body… I mean yes it was a shock to see 
323 
 
that they did not have their skin on, but I was not rattled by that. I was not 
disturbed by that. I was expecting it and I knew that it needed to come. 
[134]  
 
Exemplar statements about choosing a balanced strategy–midway between 
extreme objectification and extreme personification: 
It was strange to think of it at times, but when the body is flipped over and 
you are just working on the back you kind of forget that it’s a human 
being. But when you see the face, the hands with finger nails like some 
cadavers have nail polish, or you see hair on some body parts, then it kind 
of, at least for me it is, you know, stop and appreciate them, do not treat 
your cadaver poorly. Somebody gave their body to do this, and so you 
know you completely forget for an hour again but then again you 
remember what it is that you are doing. You know like, nobody else in the 
world has got this, it’s such a weird privilege. [063]  
 
I wanted to treat their donated body with the most respect, I was not just 
setting there being comfortable, like some people would make jokes like, 
oh, do the hand-shakes, and like ... Look, I am gonna do what I am here to 
do and respect this person’s body. And I would not do anything that I’d 
perceive this person would not want me to do. Not that they are watching 
me right now. Like, this is a corpse, it’s no longer a human peer ... this 
person is dead, I do not have the same feeling as I was cutting through a 
living person, which I actually did when I was in the surgery rotation. But 
even though this person has passed away, I still want to honor their 
wishes, and I am gonna be respectful and treat their body in a respectful 
way. [034] 
 
With my donor, I was using a mindful objectivity, like understanding that 
this is not an instrument that this person is ... and not to treat this person as 
a “thing”. I think there is an interesting transition between a person and a 
cadaver… So, like there is a different aspect of meaningfulness in 
desensitization. I mean, you can’t function, if you completely think about 
that this is a human that you are working with, and unfortunately, that’s I 
think the kind of compromise that you have to make. To honor your 
cadaver and not letting her donation be wasted on you, you need to learn 
what you need to learn, and to be able to help the hundreds or thousands of 
patients in the future, you have to objectify this one body to a level that 
enables you to function. And it’s not like you are cutting someone’s body 
against their will, at least you know that the person you are cutting has 
given their consent for this to be a learning “tool” - for lack of a better 
word. But there still needs to be that balance between being mindful and 
objectivity. Sometimes the balance does not hold up and one side takes 
over, like you objectify the donor to an extent that you completely forget 
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that this was a person and needs to be treated with the due respect. And 
other times, some students fall completely on the side of personalizing 
their cadaver that all they see is a person who is a human, is somebody’d 
loved one, has had a life, etc. In that situation too, they can’t really 
function and learn and the entire process kind of goes for nothing ... So, 
you need to remember that it’s not a tool to the extent that you just treat it 
like a toy. So, it can’t be a toy and it can’t be a person. It needs to be 
something in the middle of those two poles/extremes for everything to go 
well. [141] 
 
Points of Diffraction. Here we need to establish three categories of relations among 
strategic choices: 1) points of incompatibility (e.g., how strategic choices are different 
from one another), 2) points of equivalence (e.g., how strategic choices are equal to one 
another as they share the same conditions of existence), 3) points of systematization (e.g., 
how these strategic choices give rise to a series of objects, modalities of statement and 
concepts within the modern medical discourse). 
Points of Incompatibility. To find points of incompatibility among different 
strategic choices, one needs to answer the following question: What different positions 
are taken regarding modalities of statements and concepts relating to the human body? 
The answer based on the present study is: At least the following three positions are taken 
regarding the human body as an object of modern medical discourse: 
A. Some see the body as merely an object for learning (cadaver’s body) or 
practicing medicine (patient’s body).  
B. Some see the body (alive or dead) as a person who has (or had) a life outside 
the doctor’s learning activities or medical practice. This cohort believes that 
human body should not be objectified because it belongs (or it did in the past) 
to a whole person with many connections with the outside world.   
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C. Some say there needs to be a balance between personifying the body to the 
point that one is unable to learn from it, and desensitizing one’s self to the 
point that one is unable to respect it anymore.  
Points of Equivalence. To find points of equivalence among the three strategic 
choices above, one needs to establish the conditions of existence for them and show how 
they all share those same conditions. Conditions of existence for theoretical choices made 
in a discourse consist of rules for the formation of strategic choices and the relations 
between those rules–as we have seen for the previous three elements of discourse (i.e., 
objects, modalities of statements, and concepts). First, let us discuss the rules for the 
formation of strategies that consist of: 1) rules concerning the economy of discursive 
constellation, and 2) rules concerning nondiscursive structures as they relate to the above-
mentioned strategic choices.  
1. Rules concerning the economy of discursive constellation 
Here, we need to show how the choices made depend on the general constellation 
in which medical discourse is situated. Modern medical science is positioned in the same 
discursive constellation with natural sciences, technology, business, and capitalism in 
USA, 2019. Though clinical practice is far from being one hundred percent scientific or 
objective, the knowledge of medicine that doctors across the globe draw from is mainly 
scientific, objective, and value-neutral; it does not welcome the expression of emotions 
on the part of the doctor. Thanks to a few scattered topics of social sciences such as 
medical humanities that are often discussed under medical professionalism, at least some 
students are aware of the issues of respecting the human dignity when handling bodies 
and why it is important to be vigilant of those. As a consequence of being in the same 
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discursive constellation with natural sciences (e.g., biology, chemistry, etc.), medicine 
tends to identify with objectivity and value-neutral nature of hard sciences rather than 
humanistic values of medical humanities and social sciences. Moreover, being in the 
same constellation with business administration and management, which are inseparable 
parts of practicing modern medicine today, people involved in medicine are often under 
the influence of profit-based measurement of events and seeking personal interests in all 
social events–including a medical practice  
2. Rules concerning the nondiscursive structures 
Nondiscursive structure within which the entire process of medical education and 
handling of cadaver bodies are housed consists of the medical school. Rules and 
regulations of medical school in general and the department of anatomy in particular do 
not identify an effective standard for handling cadaver bodies by medical students. The 
few verbal directives encouraging students to respect their cadavers and be mindful of 
their human dignity, which are often delivered on the first day of the course, are 
apparently the only checkpoint after which students are allowed to develop their own 
strategies for handling their assigned bodies. As is evident from data in this study, from 
an administrative perspective there seems to be no consequences for choosing any of the 
strategies. Students have the choice of objectifying or personifying their bodies with no 
interference from the faculty or course administration. As for handling patients’ bodies, 
there are no standards in place at the hospitals as well. Doctors have the choice of treating 
their patient’s bodies as an object of their medical practice or as a whole person, 
depending on their own preference, moral and ethical code, and other factors.  
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Points of Systematization. This is where we need to establish the link between 
each of the strategies about human body and how they affect the rules of formation for 
human body as an object of discourse, the rules of formation for enunciative modalities 
about human body, and lastly, the concepts related to human body in the modern medical 
discourse. Points of systematization entails how each strategy contributes in production 
of statements (commentary) about an object, the types of statements about that object, 
and concepts that are born out of the specific relations among the rules of formation for 
objects and statement modalities. In this sense, as Foucault points out, “points of 
diffraction also represent the link points of systematization” (Foucault, 1972, p. 66). Each 
of the strategies above (i.e., objectification, personification, or balancing between these 
two extremes) represent systematically different ways: of treating human body as an 
object of medical discourse (delimiting it, grouping and classifying it), of arranging 
modalities of statement about human body (choosing them, placing them, and composing 
them), and of manipulating concepts regarding the human body (determining rules for 
their use and constituting the conceptual architecture of modern medical discourse related 
to the human body). In other words, each of the strategies above, are regulated ways of 
“practicing the possibilities of discourse” (Foucault, 1972, p. 70).  
For example, we know that doctors, residents and students are among the most 
important authorities of delimitation for human body. They are also the ones who have 
the right to authoritatively speak about the structure and function of the body as an object 
of medical discourse. Doing so, they draw from the authority of medical school, hospital, 
and the institution of medicine in general. People are most likely to believe their 
statements are true because they are based on such magnificent authorities. Now, if a 
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student chooses to objectify the body (cadaver or patient), this choice will affect his/her 
professional identity as a doctor in the future. The way she sees the body as an authority 
of delimitation, the way she chooses to use the objective science of medicine in relation 
to the patient’s body, the way she chooses to talk about the body and finally the way she 
chooses to manipulate the concepts related to the body will all be affected by her early 
choice of objectifying the human body. For instance, this student is more likely to 
become a doctor who cannot see the patient as a whole person and chooses to speak more 
objectively (in terms of objective scientific facts, and statistical conclusions) to the 
patient rather than trying to create a human-to-human relationship with them. This doctor 
is also more likely to use paternalistic statements (or what Foucault calls the medical 
gaze) regarding her patient’s body–whether in a surgical specialty or not–she is more 
likely to refer to the patient’s body as an object for the medical practice. All this will 
create more commentary and is likely to affect other junior doctors around this doctor 
who might see her as a role model in the clinic and try to learn from her the appropriate 
way of dealing with human bodies.  
This entire scenario is also true about the opposite case, where a student chooses 
to personify the body in a balanced way. This decision too will affect her future 
professional identity as a doctor and will give rise to unique commentary and statements 
coming from her regarding how to deal with the human body in the clinic. This is how 
medical discourse is being produced by people who are involved in it at the hospitals, for 
example. The reason one can often see different and sometimes opposing behaviors from 
different doctors is that they each are using a systematically different way of dealing with 
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a certain object of medical discourse, whether it’s the body, the treatment choice, the 
doctor’s function, or the sick person.  
It is also important to show how different strategic choices are linked to the 
function carried out by modern medical discourse in the practice of current capitalistic 
culture; and the role medicine plays in the realization of interests and desires of the upper 
class in society. Modern medical discourse, is defined by “a certain constant way of 
relating possibilities of systematization interior to a discourse, other discourses that are 
exterior to it, and a whole nondiscursive  field of practices, appropriation, interests, and 
desires” (Foucault, 1972, p. 69). With doctors and medical scientists who produce the 
science of modern medicine for use in the clinic, it is not difficult to see that certain 
choices are made by the upper class in society (doctors and scientists) that determine the 
way medical discourse is shaped. On the other hand, doctors who are getting trained in 
objectivity of medical sciences and have the choice of objectifying the human bodies as 
part of medical practice are in a way more beneficial to the overall capitalistic culture of 
the modern U.S. society. With medicine being dependent on the gigantic business 
industries such pharmaceutical and health insurance companies to name a couple, doctors 
being trained in medical humanities, developing traits such as empathy and compassion, 
and developing humane relationships with their patients will not be best suited to serve 
the interests and desires of the capitalistic society where the purpose is serving the rich 
and ignoring the poor.  
Strategies Concerned with the Doctor. 
Competence or Compassion: What is the Most Significant Characteristic a Doctor Should 
Possess? In this section I will report various positions taken by medical students when 
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asked about the most significant characteristic(s) that a doctor should possess. Many of 
the students were not clear in their responses. They seemed to be confused about what it 
is that is wanted from them and what it is that they need to set out as a personal goal to 
achieve as a doctor. As a result, student responses were quite varied. It is remarkable that 
this matter receives little to no attention from the current education system. The problem 
is that students find it difficult to articulate who they are and what the number-one thing 
that will define their identity is, as a physician–all with no apparent consequences to their 
student status or assessment. Below are exemplar student comments in response to the 
following focus group prompt: “Is there this one thing that if you don’t have then you 
can’t even be a physician?” (See prompt #6, FG Protocol, Appendix D). Responses are 
divided into several groups as follows. 
Exemplar statements fully (or partially) denoting medical knowledge competency 
as the most important characteristic a doctor should possess:  
I think that something that every physician needs regardless, is the 
knowledge of medicine. Like, obviously you need a lot of other things like 
there is a human side, there is like a lot of etc. etc., but I think that the 
baseline every physician needs is the knowledge of medicine. [MS2] 
 
I mean you cannot separate knowledge of medicine from a medical care 
professional, so yeah. And also like, how to acquire the knowledge you 
don’t know yet ... Obviously, like, that’s a life-long mission. [MS2] 
 
I want to say study well. Like, I wanna care for patients but to do that I 
need to be competent. If I don’t know how to help them and I don’t have 
enough tools to help them then how can I say I am actually going to help 
people? So, that motivates my study. So, I think if you are really a true 
physician, then you are a smart physician, you are a well-studied 
physician, and X, Y, Z. [MS1] 
 
Exemplar statements denoting some sort of “care” as the most important characteristic a 
doctor should possess:  
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I’d say caring. [MS1]  
 
Caring, empathy [MS3] 
 
Compassion [long group silence follows] [MS3] 
 
The best doctors I have worked with have been the best listeners, and good 
communicators. Like, they used their knowledge to communicate with the 
patient, so the way they explained patients’ condition to them, I think that 
was the best thing that hit me. [Long silence follows] [MS3] 
 
I think empathy is important across the board for all specialties. Like there 
are a lot of physicians who try to protect themselves so hard, that does not 
mean that they are not good at what they do, but with regards to aspects of 
being a doctor. [MS4] 
 
Exemplar statements denoting both care and competence as the most important 
characteristics a doctor should possess:  
I do not think there is any one [characteristic for being a good doctor] that 
would suffice, because you can have like, someone who is really smart but 
is not good at interacting with patient, so may not be the best at caring for 
the patient for that reason, and vice versa. [MS1] 
 
Compassion is the true measure, if you are not compassionate what kind 
of a physician are you… I mean, when I say compassion there is kind of 
already so many checkpoints on intelligence and reliability that you have 
to go through to be a doctor, you know what I mean? So, in my mind, it’s 
almost like a ...  I guess this person is gonna be like, have the mental 
capacity to keep up with all those things, but I kind of see that the general 
opinion is that most doctors are very smart, but maybe a lot of them are 
not compassionate. So, I think being compassionate is not a true measure, 
but I think it’s the measure of a great physician. So, it’s like an extra thing, 
but it’s not exclusive. So, what’s the true measure of a physician? Oh boy, 
then I guess it’d be the other thing, which is not necessarily reliability but, 
you know, medical knowledge. Medical knowledge is kind of the true 
measure because you have to have medical knowledge, if you do not have 
that you’re not really a physician, are you? So, the point with compassion 
is that if you do have a medical knowledge but do not have compassion, I 
mean you are still a doctor, but you are not gonna be a great doctor to care 
about your patients, so. [MS3] 
 
Exemplar statements devaluing the importance of care in medical practice: 
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So, like, “caring” and being “mindful”, I think they are just terminology, 
and everyone’s definition for it kind of varies. Like, there are people who 
may not be able to show the emotions like everyone else, but he is caring 
in his own way, like he is doing everything that another person who shows 
the emotions would do… so, like, where is that line, between whether 
someone cares or not? [MS1] 
 
And that’s what actually goes on in a lot of places today, you know. So in 
this hospital they got a new chief surgeon, and he does not see the autistic 
guy as, like, he does not have empathy for patients… so, he like basically 
comes from a surgical program to do pathology because he is curious, and 
he is so smart, and he can do wonders here, but you do not have that 
aspect of being [a caring] doctor. So that’s basically what they are 
measuring as being a true physician. So, like, he doesn’t get to be a 
surgeon anymore just because he doesn’t have that aspect of…? He does, I 
mean, he still cares, but he can’t show it, so. [MS1] 
 
Finally, here are exemplar statements denoting things other than knowledge 
competency and care as the most important characteristics for the doctor to 
possess:  
I’d say, white coat [is the true measure of a physician]. [MS2] 
 
I think it depends on the type of physician. Like, if you are a pathologist, 
and you’re doing autopsies, you are gonna be needing to have much 
attention to patient’s details. But if you are like, the best surgeon it might 
be dexterity, and if you are a psychiatrist it’s gonna be the ability to 




Maybe character. I feel like the best physician is also a good person, who 
is trustworthy, reliable, moral, and so that is like a good character. So, if 
they do not know the knowledge you can teach them that, but for some 
reason teaching character to people is not that easy, unless the person is 
willing to be a good person, so…  [MS4] 
 
Points of Diffraction. 
Points of Incompatibility. Different positions taken about modalities of statements 
and concepts relating to the most important characteristic of the doctor are as follows: 
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A. Some say the most important characteristic of a doctor is to be competent in 
medical knowledge. 
B. Some say the most important characteristic of a good doctor is to have 
compassion and care for the patient.  
C. Some say it is important for the doctor to possess a balanced mixture of both 
competence and care in order to be successful. 
D. Some say most important characteristics of a doctor are things other than 
competence and care.  
Points of Equivalence. The above four strategies are all equally possible to 
emerge on the surface of the discourse since they are all sharing the same conditions of 
existence. Again, conditions of existence for a theoretical strategy consists of the rules for 
their formation and the relations between those rules.  
1. Rules concerning the economy of discursive constellation 
Again, here, we need to show how the strategic choices made above depend on 
the general constellation in which medical discourse is situated. As discussed in the 
previous section, modern medical science is positioned in the same discursive 
constellation with natural sciences, technology, business, and capitalism. Though clinical 
practice is not fully objective, the knowledge of medicine is mainly objective, and value-
neutral that does not welcome the expression of emotions on the part of the doctor. 
Having been exposed to a few scattered topics of medical humanities that are often 
discussed under medical professionalism, at least some students are aware of the 
importance of care and compassion in medical practice. Again, as a consequence of being 
in the same discursive constellation with natural sciences (e.g., biology, chemistry, etc.), 
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medicine tends to identify with objectivity and value-neutral nature of hard sciences 
rather than humanistic values of medical humanities and social sciences. Moreover, being 
in the same constellation with business administration and management, people involved 
in medicine are often under the influence of a profit-based measurement of events and 
seeking a personal interest in all social events–including a medical practice. Hence, some 
students are focusing on the abilities of the physician for the sake of the physician (e.g., 
wearing a white coat) not for the sake of a better healthcare for the patient. 
2. Rules concerning the nondiscursive structures 
According to the rules of the modern medical education at Indiana University School of 
Medicine, vast majority of time and resources are invested in training medical students on 
the hard science of medicine. That means objectivity and value-neutrality are indirectly 
being promoted throughout the medical training. In the hospitals, in addition to the 
scientific objectivity, the business models for management of care for the patient is under 
the spotlight. According to the data collected in this study, humanities have a tiny part (if 
any) in formal medical education; thus, only minimal interest or attention is paid to 
research produced in the fields of medical humanities. Students seem to attach minimal 
significance to what they sometimes refer to as “the wishy-washy” and “fluffy stuff” of 
medical professionalism during their medical school training. There are no serious 
assessments related to the humanistic side of medical practice, and knowing or not 
knowing at all about them is not going to affect students’ grades or their performance on 
the NBME exam. Having pretty much no incentive to learn professionalism is further 
reinforcing the neglect toward social aspects of medicine on the part of the students. This 
is despite the fact that IUSM has approved adoption of the six ACGME competencies as 
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the guiding framework for their new curriculum at the institutional level. These 
competencies include medical knowledge, patient care, practice-based learning and 
improvement, interpersonal and communication skills, professionalism, and system-based 
practice. Theoretically, professionalism should be part of the objectives for all courses.  
Is Medical Professionalism Just a Fancy Term for the Way Doctors Act? In this section, 
student responses about medical professionalism will be reported. According to the 
evidence from this study, definite opinions about what medical professionalism is are at 
best idealistic (as opposed to realistic or rationalistic), confused, and awfully dispersed. 
For the most part, students are thinking in terms of the doctor for the sake of the doctor 
and the profession–not for the sake of better healthcare delivery to the patient. For 
instance, many students remarked that professionalism stands for the things that the 
doctor should do with him/herself to embody a good professional: such as learning how 
to manage their time, responding to emails, dress up professionally, etc. It rarely came up 
that a student defined professionalism in terms of things to do in order to improve the 
outcomes in patient care. Let us look at some exemplar groups of statements below. 
Exemplar statements denoting a definite idea of medical professionalism that is 
mostly idealistic, often unpractical and not generalized. Moreover, every student’s 
definition of medical professionalism is different, though definite:   
My take on medical professionalism is that the doctor should, like, they 
treat patients with respect and they are always the bigger person. They do 
not get frustrated, are always looking at things from the patients’ 
perspective ... I know there are people who have had bad experiences but I 
think for the most part, when I think of a doctor they are much on the 
patients’ side, they are respectful of them, they are seen as an authority 
figure but they are not overbearing, they are not trying to make all the 
decisions. They are a source of knowledge that the patient comes to and 




Respectful. I followed a physician who had a 16-year-old girl who came 
with 50 lbs. a year, I mean, he told her, you need to start laying off Taco 
Bell if we are going to see this weight go down. So, I found that to be 
atrocious and just extremely unprofessional… so again, like, also 
exploring the patient’s perspective, [being] the doctor who cares, and asks 
personal questions, creates an environment where they [patients] can share 
what’s going on. It is good because they will be more comfortable to share 
more with you, so they are not gonna give you just short pieces of what’s 
going on they are gonna give actual story of what’s happening because 
they trust you. And they feel cared for, which is a huge thing in medicine. 
So also like, just being really smart. So, like, that guy who was talking 
about Taco Bell, he was really good. So, you know, his patients were 
afterwards like, oh he is such a good doctor. So, I think it is important to 
show up personally for them but you also need to be a good doctor in 
terms of seeking out diagnosis and good plan and all. So I think it’s about 
pursuing absolute excellence in your specialty that people can rely on you 
and you have really good outcomes alongside being friendly and make the 
patients feel welcome. .. So outside of that, I am trying to think ... I think 
working well on the team is important, being willing to do the consult 
stuff that doctors do not really want to do. [072] 
 
Exemplar statements denoting a definite idea of professionalism that is based on 
concepts of a medical morality. These ideas include being respectful and impartial 
towards patients:  
I feel like it is about being respectful to everyone no matter if you are an 
attending or a first-year student, for example. I read this a while ago, like 
someone was having a gynecological surgery and they put a local 
anesthetic in her vaginal region or whatever and he said, “I bet she is 
really enjoying this right now”! And I am like, this is something that I do 
not think is appropriate and I absolutely do not like this type of thing, to 
say something whether your patient is conscious or not, or to ever take 
advantage of them. Like, the power difference ratio, or to ever make them 
feel like they are dumb or they do not understand something. That’s just 
something that I really hate. So, I do not know ... just kind of being 
respectful to everyone regardless of their race or gender, like if it’s a 
transgender, or whatever you should treat everyone equally and never 
make it sound like they are different. And I think it should not be allowed 
to treat patients differently or deny them care just because they are, for 
example transgender or something. Like, even if you do not like it or 




I think that kind of embodies professionalism that you’re there to help 
people and you should treat them with respect, so they will also treat you 
with respect. [012] 
 
From a patient’s standpoint, I would not say professionalism is 
synonymous with making someone feel good or kind of gentle aspect of it 
but, I think professionalism is, in an abstract way, treating the patient the 
way you yourself want to be treated. Interpersonally, treating them with 
human dignity regardless of who they are; like, being an alcoholic does 
not dissuade you from giving them the proper treatment because you think 
they are not worth it. I do not think that’s professional. [034] 
 
Exemplar statements denoting a definite idea of professionalism that is based on 
common sense: 
I mean I think a lot of it is common sense, just like it starts at being 
respectful with the person, like yeah… Treating them like you want to be 
treated, like not being distracted, not being on your phone, not making 
jokes about stuff that they are talking about, being kind to them, taking 
them seriously, if they are saying something is going on do not just flush 
them off as though you already know what’s going on, just treating them 
like a human. [121] 
 
Like, you should not show up late to see your patients, wear jeans, like, 
that kind of professionalism… Like, being on time, being organized, being 
considerate like, if you are gonna be late, say, hey excuse me I had some 
one, or if you have to go take a phone call. Like sending emails to people 
when you need help and copying the clerkship people so everyone is in the 
loop and knows what’s going on, showing up when you need to show up. 
Poor professionalism, is like, if you are not gonna be somewhere, just let 
them know that hey, I was in a car accident or something, communication 
is a huge part of professionalism. And ... If you are in a pair of leggings 
and like a workout top then I’m like, ooh, you do not look like a doctor! 
So, I think it’s important to look put together as a physician. To look like 
you did not just come out of your bed, you are not just back from the gym, 
you do not have to wear a suit or tie or a blazer but you should look like 
you showered, and that you are taking care of yourself. [023] 
 
General things like being on time, being dressed appropriately, all those 
types of things but I also think of maintaining appropriate boundaries with 
your patients, asking about their preferences, in a way that it allows them 
to be kind of driving their own care. So, those are the main things that I 




One exemplar statement denoting medical students’ idea suggesting that professionalism 
mainly refers to the way a doctor behaves is provided below. According to this idea, 
professionalism includes just anything the doctors does, the way they carry themselves 
inside or outside the clinical settings. In the excerpt below, student remarks that a doctor 
going out and getting drunk outside of the working hours is a fault in his professionalism. 
This is an example of extreme thinking in terms of the doctor when it comes to defining 
medical professionalism–as opposed to thinking in terms of the patient and healthcare 
delivery.  
Like, one of our teachers told us a story about a student who was rotating, 
and went out one night and got really drunk. And it was such a small town 
that everyone knew who he was, so even though he was not in the 
hospital, that’d still be something that you need to be professional. So, 
like, I think just carrying yourself well. I mean, you can go out, you can 
have fun, but just making sure that you’re always representing yourself 
well. [121] 
 
Exemplar statement signifying the value of role-plays in medical professionalism. Many 
students believe that professionalism is something that can be played as a role on the part 
of the doctor. The idea is that when doctors need to look more knowledgeable, confident, 
or put together than what they are in reality, they should be able to act out the part in front 
of their patients and other staff–even when they are “screaming on the inside”: 
I think external confidence is incredibly important, patients need that; they 
need to believe in you as a medical professional. Even when you are 
screaming on the inside, it’s only having them believe in you and that’s 
important for the physician-patient relationship. So, being able to be 
confident. So, you’ll have to learn to put that confident face when you 
need it. It has to be part of your toolkit. [134] 
 
I do not know, it’s like, we can act. I mean if the physician is the leader at 
that situation, so like act like you know what’s going on, or it’s ok to say if 
you do not know what something is, but you have to act like, you have to 
be the one that’s like okay, you have to be the one who’s holding it all 
together. So, it reminds me of an incidence which is not medicine related, 
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but, so, I was on a flight one time and the flight attendants for some reason 
were like telling everyone about how bad the turbulence is gonna be and 
their voices were like, you could hear in their voices that they were scared 
and they were like running around like ponies, so like, if you are the 
doctor, you can’t do that, even if you feel that way, you can process it later 
or anything, but you have to be the one who is keeping it all together. 
[171] 
 
Exemplar statements denoting the idea that professionalism is highly subjective and its 
codes and rules vary from person to person, thus medical professionalism cannot be 
defined in a definite way, rather, it will always remain vague and subjective.  
I think it’s very subjective. What’s professional in Japan, is not the same 
level of professionalism [in the U.S.], you know. There might be different 
customs, different expectations. So, to be a good medical professional? I 
mean I have a tough time with that because if I was to be the perfect 
medical professional, I would know what everyone else expected of me, I 
would always know. I would have a sixth sense and I would just do 
whatever everyone wanted me to do, whenever they wanted me to do it. 
I’d always do whatever it is that they expected of me. Like, for example, 
when you are eating, you gotta eat this with the small spoon and that with 
the large spoon, and you’d know exactly which fork to use for what. Not 
that it matters, or at least it does not matter to me ... but if you wanna talk 
about real professionalism, you have to know what all the rules are that 
everyone has, every little quirk and thing, and if you were the perfect 
professional, then that’s what you’d do: you’d know exactly what 
everyone wants and just do it. It’s based on, not even rules, it is unwritten 
rules ... it’s the culture. And it is fluid; it changes from day to day or year 
to year–probably not every day, but it’s evolving. What was professional 
in the 60s is not professional today ... If I were to eat a sandwich with my 
hands, they might say that’s unprofessional, you need to cut the 
hamburger into pieces and eat it with your fork. So, it [professionalism] is 
a collection of everyone’s silently agreed-upon expectations and rules. 
And what’s professional to one person, might not be professional to 
another person. You know, it’s subjective ... it’s a fluid thing. I think it’d 
be hard to put rings on it, it’s fluid. It’s sort of like language, but it’s not 
really written down here. It’s kind of like, unspoken social norms, you 
know, and you can write about it, you can make rules about what’s 
professionalism, like, you know, when to use the small spoon, when to use 
the big spoon, like all that stuff ... So, there are a lot of things that people 
would do but I do not consider it unprofessional. For example, if my 
doctor walked into the room with a little juice box or a sippy cup, I think 
that’d be cool, and I would like that and I would still be interested in this 
doctor. Other people will find that unprofessional. But what would I find 
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to be unprofessional? Disrespecting someone, the patient, for no good 
reason. I think that’s unprofessional. Being rude, and part of that 
subjective thing is, like, doing something that the other person is not ok 
with. Whatever that maybe, and it’s different for different people. So, if I 
am not okay with you standing close to me, then that’s unprofessional. I 
am gonna write it up, if you give me a survey, I’d say he was 
unprofessional, he stood too close to me. And then he goes to the next 
room and they would say, I like how he stood close to me, it made me feel 
important. [181] 
 
That’s actually a question that everybody asks, and nobody has any so-
called definition for it ... I think [professionalism] means exercising your 
duties to the best of your ability and ensuring that some abilities are honed 
as best as you can, so that’s like, life-long learning. So, me as a med 
student now and after I have become a physician, I’ll need to keep up with 
learning so that you learn how to be humane to your patients, and to do 
what’s best just for the patient, and other times, what’s also best for the 
system you know, and other physicians. [184] 
 
Exemplar statements denoting the utter confusion of some medical students when asked 
about what medical professionalism means:  
So, like, I have some abstract understandings about what to do with my 
patients in the future. But now that I think of it in this way, I feel like my 
mind is completely devoid of any specific definitions for professionalism 
[smile]. [141] 
 
So right now I only know about professionalism among medical students; 
I do not know how that plays exactly with everyone above us. But, so, 
they have been talking to us about things that make you good 
professionals, or like, even things like, how to write an email 
professionally, or to respond to certain emails when you need to respond 
to them, and then there is a certain element of dress, I do not know if that’s 
really that big of a deal… Also, I think… ah…actually I do not know… 
[Student sounds frustrated]. [How about from patient’s perspective?] 
Ahhhh… I do not know… [Sounds frustrated, but laughs]. I think being 
like, attentive and not serious because you can make jokes or whatever, 
still being clear that you care about what’s happening in front of you and 
how you are treating that patient. [171] 
 
Points of Diffraction.  




A. Some say professionalism can be defined and put in action by the doctor. The 
definitions provided by different students are different from one another. Most 
definitions are based on common sense and/or personal codes of ethics and 
morality. Some also defined professionalism as everything a doctor does, and 
some others as something that can be played like a role in order to look 
confident and knowledgeable to the patients.  
B. Some say professionalism cannot be defined once and for all, it is highly 
variable depending on subjective preferences on the part of the patients. Thus, 
professionalism will always remain vague.  
C. Some are completely confused as to what medical professionalism is.  
Points of Equivalence. All three theoretical strategies are equally possible to 
emerge on the surface of the discourse since they share the same conditions of existence.  
1. Rules concerning the economy of discursive constellation 
The strategic choices that students make regarding medical professionalism 
depend on the general constellation in which medical discourse is situated. As discussed 
in previous sections, modern medical science is positioned in the same discursive 
constellation with natural sciences, technology, business, and capitalism. Again, as a 
consequence of being in the same discursive constellation with natural sciences (e.g., 
biology, chemistry, etc.), medicine tends to identify with objectivity and value-neutral 
nature of hard sciences rather than humanistic values of medical humanities and social 
sciences. Moreover, being in the same constellation with capitalistic culture, people 
involved in medicine are often under the influence of a profit-based measurement of 
events and self-centeredness in social events, including medical practice. Hence, some 
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students are thinking exclusively in terms of the doctor (e.g., what should he wear, how 
should he carry himself outside the hospital, how should he respond to emails, and show 
up on time, etc.) as opposed to thinking in terms of providing a better healthcare for the 
patients–when it comes to defining medical professionalism. As a result of medicine 
being in the same constellation with business administration, many people confuse 
medical professionalism with business professionalism as well. Hence certain directives 
about dressing up, time management, and responding to email communications, looking 
nice and put together, etc. All of which have very less to do with the quality of patient 
care a doctor can provide to the patient. 
2. Rules concerning the nondiscursive structures 
According to the rules of the modern medical education majority of time and 
resources are invested in training medical students on the hard science of medicine. Thus, 
objectivity and value-neutrality are indirectly being promoted throughout the medical 
training. As for hospitals, in addition to the scientific objectivity, the business models for 
management of care for the patient are in place. Teaching medical professionalism has a 
tiny part in formal medical education and therefore, only minimal interest or attention is 
paid to talk or learn about professionalism on the part of the students. Many students 
seem to think of professionalism as a marginal discussion in medical education, “the 
wishy-washy” and “fluffy stuff” that can be “annoying” and “just a waste of their time”. 
For example, in response to the question of “do you think professionalism should be 
thought as part of medical education?” many students used vague or negative 
observations such as these: 
I think that a lecture [on professionalism] would be poorly received and I 
know many times when there is a lecture that people are forced to go to 
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but they do not themselves think it’d be important to them, they’ll be very 
opposed to it, and they’d think that it’s just a waste of their time. [112] 
 
We had a couple of professionalism reflection sessions ... [I have] mixed 
feelings. I like them because we need to do stuff like that, but they are 
annoying to me as a student who is asked to do that. Like, having to come 
to the course, or whatever. [023]  
 
One of the reasons why students show less interest to learning professionalism is that 
there are no serious assessments related to the subject and so, knowing or not knowing at 
all about it is not going to affect students’ grades or their performance on the NBME 
exam, for example. According to the data collected in this study, if a student does a 
something that is considered “unprofessional” by one of the faculty or senior physicians, 
they can receive isolated deficiencies that can end up having repercussions that may 
influence their course grade, or result in them receiving a warning email from their 
superiors. However, this is not the same as an assessment of professionalism values in all 
students which should exist regardless of whether or not someone does something 
gravely wrong to attract the senior’s attention. Again, according to the students, unless 
someone does something wrong, they are not really taught about various aspects of 
professionalism in a systematic and standard manner either in medical school or in the 
clinical settings. What students understand of medical professionalism is mainly based on 
their personal experiences with senior physicians in the clinical settings, and thus, those 
experiences are not standard and the same for all students. However, the bigger and more 
important reason behind students’ disregard to the importance of medical professionalism 
is the fact that discussions of professionalism are not scientific, and therefore, they are 
rarely promoted and encouraged [if at all] by faculty who are trained in scientific basic 
science or clinical subjects. If faculty members teaching physiology or clinical radiology 
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have not been properly trained in medical professionalism themselves, they cannot teach 
it to their students, or even take it seriously enough to encourage their students frequently 
enough to learn about professionalism. Currently, little to no information about what is 
considered professional, and only minimal information about what is considered 
unprofessional in medicine is being provided to medical students during their formal 
medical training. Let us look at the student comments below: 
When you make a mistake onsite then they will tell you that it was wrong 
[like it was unprofessional]. You need to learn how to be humane to your 
patients, and to do what’s best just for the patient, and other times, what’s 
also best for the system you know, other physicians. [184] 
 
In transition-1 course, which was for 2 weeks at the beginning of the first 
year, we had things like socioeconomic aspects of health, professionalism, 
it was a lot of that wishy-washy topics… and, it kind of just been once 
together, and it’s been a while since we have seen those… You might get 
an email from the course director saying, hey I have a concern about your 
professionalism. If you do not dress well for the OSKE [the clinical 
exams] then you get that email about professionalism. But if you do not do 
anything wrong, then there is nothing. Not that I could remember ... I think 
in 3rd year we still do not get professionalism lectures or anything, but you 
will pick it up from the doctors that you are working with. But then, that 
might be good or bad, like, you might not be rotating with someone who is 
very professional. Hopefully that teaches you that, ok, that’s not what I 
wanna be like [112]. 
 
While it is expected (or hoped) that someone will tell the students if they do something 
unprofessional, there is no in-depth teaching as to why an act is considered 
unprofessional. Even less, little to no formal teaching of the behaviors that are considered 
as professional, which students would need to learn and adopt, are being provided. 
Students are expected to somehow “learn how to be humane” to the patients, without 
there being much discussion of humanities at all in medical education. Also, students are 
supposed to “pick it up” from the clinicians that they are working with, and as the student 
points out in the comment above, that can be good or bad. Thus, it is not clear who 
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exactly is responsible for teaching or not teaching professionalism to medical students 
given the current place of professionalism in medical educational curricula.  
Sacrifice or Self-care: Why people come to medicine? In this section I will report student 
statements as to why they think people come to medicine. They discuss their own 
motives for joining the path to becoming physicians as well as the hypothetical figure of 
Alex, a 12-year-old who is interested in becoming a doctor when he grows up (see 
prompt #9, FG Protocol, Appendix D). Some students affirm personal gain such as 
financial stability and social prestige as major motivations for them to become a doctor, 
and some say they joined medicine to be of service to others. There are those who think 
doing medicine is a sacrifice on the part of the physicians because they spend the best 
years of their lives in libraries missing out on the fun and financial gain that they could 
have had if they did not come to medicine. They also see doctors as selfless providers of 
healthcare who only work to serve the patient. Nevertheless, there are also those students 
who think many people come to medicine not to help others but rather, in pursuit of their 
own self-centered goals.  
Let us look at some exemplary groups of statements further describing each 
position. In the first part we will see statement groups denoting the importance of self-
care in medical practice and in the second part of this section, we will see statement 
groups discussing the sacrificial nature of pursuing a medical career. The third part of this 
section will report the statement groups that indicate involvement of both self-care and 
sacrifice on the part of the doctors as valid reasons for pursuing a medical career.  
I. In part one, first, we will look at the groups of statements denoting the 
importance of social prestige, for various reasons, followed by groups of 
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statements denoting the importance of money, again, for various reasons as 
provided by medical students.  
Exemplar statements indicating the importance of social prestige for making you 
feel good about yourself: 
I liked having a skill set that was specialized, like, people would rely on, 
that they needed my help, so it felt good to be me… since I have been here 
in med school too, it did not disappoint me ... Like reading a patient’s 
description is like, okay, I know what this person has and I know how to 
treat it, or what this person needs to get better, so it feels very good. [012] 
 
I wanna go to ophthalmology or some other surgical specialty. I also want 
to be the chief resident. That’s where you have this added responsibility 
that you are in charge of leading a lot of other residents ... I feel like, for 
me a lot of it boils down to respect. Other people look up to you, other 
people come to you because they know that you can help answer the 
questions. One of the things that I love to do is teaching… it feels good to 
me when someone like, anyone that they could talk to, they come to me 
and like, can you help me understand this? To me, that makes me feel 
great. It makes me feel like people really think that I can help them. That I 
have something that I can make them better and they think about me in 
that way.  [012] 
 
I can’t remember a time when I did not wanna be a doctor. As young as I 
remember, I have always wanted to be a doctor ... I think the social 
prestige is definitely a big deal. And I mean you can help people in other 
roles as well you know, you can be a nurse, you can be a respiratory 
therapist, a social worker, and those are all fantastic and they help people. 
But social prestige does not come with it. And I’d be lying if I said that I 
had not thought about that. I do not think it’s the number one reason why I 
am doing medicine but it’s a part of it. And for finances, I think definitely, 
if I was not gonna be paid a lot, I would have reconsidered. [134] 
 
Exemplar statements indicating the importance of social prestige for proving your worth 
to others: 
So where I got the idea was two of my teammate friends from high school, 
they both went to med school. So, I was like if they can come from the 
country in Indiana and make it then maybe I can do that too ...  When I 
was at school I was always like an outcast kind of, so like, I know, I just 
never really fit in… And I just always felt like I was really different from 
everyone. I did not have any friends. So, I guess I have had my ups and 
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downs with people. So, like when I wanted to be a doctor, I have thought 
about people whom I knew there at school and they were mean to me, they 
will feel bad, and like, one day I will be like: look! I am not the worst 
person. [051] 
 
I just wanted to do something good and important with my life, you know, 
make a difference. I have had a bunch of goals and mission type of things 
for myself. I’ve got this 10-years plan that I have got to meet. So that 
keeps me busy in the present with always doing something to build 
towards my little plan that I have got going. And then, there is my 
daughter, I have got a daughter who is 6 years old. Sometimes when I get 
discouraged or whatever, then I think about her… and I wanna make her 
proud of me, and if I were to not succeed then what would she think? You 
know, she would be disappointed. And then also what motivates me, the 
3rd thing is other people’s doubt in me. So that really drives me to 
succeed ... The money is kind of a nice bonus, really, but the social 
aspect ... And part of that is that I want other people to see that I am doing 
something good, I want other people to view me as a winner. I want 
people to see me as a valuable member of society. So yeah, that’s probably 
a very big part of it ... So, without medicine, could I? Sure, but not to the 
same extent maybe, you know, there is a balance between what makes me 
feel good and how I want other people to view me ... I wanted that prestige 
and everything so. [081] 
 
Exemplar statement indicating the importance of social prestige for making your family 
proud: 
Growing up, my parents always wanted me and my brother to become 
doctors, he did not end up getting into med school ... he is 5 years older 
than me… I found that I did like sciences and I was good in my academics 
in school, so I kind of stuck to it going to college taking medical science 
classes knowing that I am going to med school… If I were to fail in med 
school and go back home, my parents will be very disappointed because I 
know they have very high hopes for me like, “oh, he’s gonna do what we 
wanted for both our kids to do, so there is the pressure on me in that sense. 
[012] 
 
Exemplar statement indicating the importance of money for setting your family up: 
We do not have a physician in our family so my parents are excited. We 
are middle class. There were people I knew when I was growing up whose 
parents were doctors so they had tons of money doing all these cool 
things, and all… and I do not really care so much about the prestige, but I 
kind of wanted to set myself and my family up for a financial security in 
the future. I never really had to worry about money as I was growing up, 
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but I did. I went to private school and I was very aware that there were 
people who had tons of money. I was very aware. So, I wanted to set 
myself and my family up to a point that we get comfortable and do not 
have to worry about money, but I was not in it for the money. [023] 
 
Exemplar statements indicating the importance of money for achieving the lifestyle that 
you want: 
So, I did not see anything else ... like, I did not want to do business; that 
did not seem like something I would want to do. And my whole life had 
been medical, it was hard to imagine other careers. I literally could not 
think of what people did as jobs. My grandpa was a doctor, my grandma 
was a nurse, kind of everybody around me were medical, my friends’ 
parents were doctors, we had parties and stuff, so that was all anyone 
would ever talk about. So, when I went to college I really did not know 
what other jobs would there be ... so business? nah ... ok, what else ... 
maybe I could be a teacher but you know, I grew up with the lifestyle of 
my parents being a doctor so, I was like, I do not care, I want a career that 
pays well ...  It was like, you know, my parents did it, they liked it, money 
is good, you like people and science, why not? [063] 
 
There are some doctors who are motivated by that at least in part. I’ll be 
honest, like that’s a pretty big motivator for me [financial aspects?] No, 
the lifestyle. Like, setting your schedule to get through time, being able to 
do what you want to do, have kids and all, you know. [MS2] 
 
Exemplar statement indicating the importance of money for paying off your student 
debts: 
I will be just honest like, yeah. It’s not the reason I chose medicine but it’s 
definitely a strong supporter of why I’d want to do it. So, let’s just think 
like if the pay was half, I think it would have been less of a motivation 
because, physicians, they mostly work very hard, especially certain 
specialties harder than others. So generally, they pay more to compensate 
you for that but if they were not, then, it’s just, all this work, well what am 
I, like, how am I gonna get, like, how can I support my family and 
everything? Because, even during bachelors, I have paid a lot of money to 
come here and everything, so it’s nice to be reimbursed for that. [151] 
 
Below, are exemplar student comments in response to a Focus Group prompt that was 
basically asking: Are physicians selfless in their efforts to help the sick? (See prompt #2, 
FG Protocol, Appendix D). All students responded in negative to answer the question, 
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discussing various reasons as to why physicians are not necessarily selfless, rather, they 
work for various other reasons for including but not limited to money, prestige, having a 
cool career, and so on. 
Exemplar statements indicating the importance of making money as a part of medical 
practice: 
I do not agree. I do not think that most physicians are idealistic 
benefactors… it ends up being a job for people and it’s a tough job, but 
it’s a well-paying one. I do not wanna be cynical or something, I think 
there are a lot of really idealistic hardworking and so on people, and that 
ends up being really protective for some people, but it does not… I do not 
get the impression that physicians are selfless, necessarily, all the time. 
[MS1] 
 
Physicians are some of the most powerful, well-paid people in our society. 
so it’s not exactly that, I mean, I do not disagree with the fact that there are 
some things, but there is something more complex, it’s not like that we are 
going to be monks or swirling in poverty, and like, going and helping the 
sick… so, it’s like maybe that high pay is sort of empowering people to do 
a better job, but there is certainly some sort of compensation that you 
receive for the efforts. But I think going in to it, somehow the decision to 
take on the life is that some sort of good? Like, I do not know… I am 
struggling with that. [MS1] 
 
I do not think there is any profession out there that always has every single 
person in it always has 100% best interest possible. I think there are 
definitely doctors out there who are like, I want to make as much money 
as possible, as quickly as possible, so I can live a comfortable life, go on a 
vacation, or like, live in a big mansion, you know, or whatever it is that 
they want to have money for. I mean maybe to the detriment, like I have to 
agree that there are some out there that are even doing it to the detriment 
of their patients, like order brain scans that they do not need to, or perform 
procedures that they do not need to, because you know, you get some 
money. And I do not think the profession as a whole is 100% perfect. 
There is always a single doctor out there that does not do that. I do not 
think it’s “most” but I do agree that there is “some”. [MS2] 
 




I think the question is whether they are selfless in their efforts to help the 
sick, especially that a lot of physicians get burnt out, and I think some are 
more jaded. Some people whom I have interacted with are like, I do not 
think they are necessarily going into the medical profession as selfless to 
kind of see the sick people, I think it’s more for them, about the status you 
get for being able to say, I worked hard to become a physician. And now I 
get to hold this certain status in the society. I do not think, so like, this is 
what makes me feel better about this whole thing, that, I do not think in 
order to become a physician you have to be selfless, I do not think to 
become a medical student you have to be selfless. I think it makes it easier 
maybe, if your goal is to serve others, and makes it more worth it, cause if 
it does not feel like… I do not know. I would not say that I’m selfless in 
my efforts to help the sick all the time. [MS2] 
 
Exemplar statements indicating the importance of having a “cool” and interesting career 
as a part of medical practice: 
I think for some people it’s really about, like I wanna be in charge, and I 
do not think that’s a bad thing, I think some people just do it because it’s 
really interesting. So, it’s not like that they just do it to be selfless and help 
the sick. Like, I think medicine is awesome, and I want to be, like utilize 
the… like, I would not know everything, but it’s like yeah, it’s great to do, 
but what you get to do is to act really selflessly to help the sick. But I do 
not think it has to be selfless act. I mean, I am doing this because I think 
this is just really cool, you know. So, I think like, that’s also another 
factor. [MS2] 
 
My issue is sort of with “selfless”. I do not see myself as I am doing this 
completely selfless, like for some noble… like oh, it’s not about me it’s all 
about the patients. Like, I want a career, I want a stable job, and I want 
these things… if I could do it being in a career that helps a lot of people 
and you know, do my best with that, then that’s great. But if it’s gonna be 
volunteer work for ever, you know, then I’m not gonna sign up for that. I 
feel like most people might agree with that, at least, you know a lot of 
times people do not say that way because they do not wanna sound bad, to 
a degree. [MS4] 
 
I guess I always wanted to be a doctor but at the same time, I want a stable 
career, so it was not completely just selfless, no. And that’s not to say that 
you can’t do selfless acts, you know, but like, sort of the main overarching 
theme is still like yes, so you are giving something and you’re getting 




Below, are exemplar student comments in response to another Focus Group prompt that 
was basically asking: A 12-year-old boy wants to become a doctor when he grows up; 
what do you think are his major motivations? (See prompt #9, FG Protocol, Appendix D). 
Again, all students responded by denoting various reasons for self-care, including money, 
prestige, and having a cool career–as possible things to motivate a 12-year-old to want to 
become a doctor when he grows up.  
Exemplar statements indicating the importance of money in motivating a young 
person to want to become a doctor: 
The 6th graders that I talk to are usually like, they wanna be a doctor 
because like, a family friend has a Tesla, or they are going on this really 
cool vacation, so I think money is, at least in that age, money is also one 
big factor. [MS2] 
 
Also, money and career, I mean even at that age you will have think about 
those things. Like, they see a good future in being a doctor, a more stable 
future that many other jobs people have could not bring it. [MS3] 
 
Exemplar statements indicating the importance of social prestige in motivating a young 
person to want to become a doctor: 
As a 12-year-old he probably has little idea of the sick, just sort of like the 
social prestige, that he can help people, like, it’s all happy and great. You 
know. So, there is some of that. I mean, I’m gonna be a doctor and it’s 
gonna be awesome ...  And you can make a decent living too. Everybody 
will be happy; my parents will be happy and all [MS4] 
 
And definitely like, the societal culture. Like in some cultures, medical 
doctors and lawyers, and… those are the things that they want you to 
become when you grow up. So, it’s mostly like oh it’s a fun respectable 
job, maybe makes some good money too, but I think that would be a side-
thing at this age. I mean, not that there is anything wrong with that… 
[MS4] 
 
Exemplar statements indicating the importance of having a “cool” job in motivating a 
young person to want to become a doctor: 
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Like, it sounds good to become a doctor, I wanna know people, doctors 
help people, so I wanna become a doctor. [MS2] 
 
I think in my experience, kids that age have had some prior experience 
with doctors, and kind of like how respected they are, so as a kid, I mean it 
can be really inspiring you know, seeing that people look up to you [the 
doctor]. They see the doctor as someone who is really smart, 
knowledgeable and successful yeah, and when you are that young, you do 
not kind of know what goes into it, like all the effort that goes into it, all 
the long hours that they work as a doctor and all. As a kid you will just see 
a doctor and think like, okay, this is somebody that I want to be like when 
I grow up. Almost like a hero, you know, that they want to be like. [MS3] 
 
II. In part two, we will look at the exemplar statements pulled from interview and 
focus group data followed by the statements pulled from the field notes of 
direct observation - denoting the sacrificial nature of pursuing a medical 
career.  
Exemplar statements by students who see medical practice as pure service:  
 
I would love to practice in an underserved setting. I wanna go somewhere 
that if I do not go, people do not have access to care. Because I want to 
meet needs that are not being met. Not just, to like, oh, look at me I am the 
super altruistic guy who is wanting to do what no one else does… it’s just 
that those are needs that are not getting met and I have the ability to meet 
them. I care about those things. It could be here or overseas; I do not know 
about that. I will be open though. [034] 
 
I think there is something unique that I bring, like, a different background, 
without having doctor parents and without having any money or anything 
like that. I think I can be more understanding to people of that type. I think 
in society in general, I feel like I can be more understanding to middle 
class people, as well as to people who are poor, because I actually come 
from there. I want to be a family practitioner. I hope I am in a more 
underserved state, I want to go somewhere that they do not have anyone 
else to go there and practice there. Maybe I am the only doctor around 
there for miles and miles, so if I was not here then these people won’t have 
access to medical care. That’s what I want, to serve just somewhere that 
nobody else wants to. [051] 8% 
 




In general, to consider that you are in school for ever, you will be in a lot 
of debt, you risk burn out, depression and even suicide. That’s hard work 
and selfless. [MS4] 
I guess the right reason [for coming to medicine] is the strong desire to 
give up yourself and make sacrifices for the benefit of other people even if 
you have not met them before. Medical school is a sacrifice. Especially I 
struggled with these 4 years in my 20s, all of my friends are having fun, 
getting married, and buying houses, and I am like, I just have to study for 
an exam tomorrow. And it’s like, I think, knowing that you’re getting 
yourself into that and still having that desire to be that physician who 
helps others, is the right reason. [134]  
 
I’d argue that we are like, literally giving up our youths for this career, 
like, my brother, my siblings are asking me like, I cannot believe you’re 
doing this, cause they see how little free time we have, you know. So, I 
think if you are not selfless, then the way this training is set up it’d make 
you become one ... Like, this is the path to the most impossible. [MS2] 
 
In response to the above comments, there were comments denying that people who come 
to medicine are sacrificing themselves. Rather, several students voiced against the above 
comments and pointed out, instead, the selfish reason for pursuing a medical practice. 
Below is an exemplar statement that sums it up: 
If you are in science, you kind of never get that opportunity to say okay 
now I can help someone… which is, I’d want to say, not “selfless” but the 
goal is to help people ... But I feel like they just wanna be that person who 
jumps in and says, “I can do this!” And then the other person is paying 
like $300 for you to be able to do this [help them], and that’s not selfless. 
In fact, it’s very selfish, I think. [MS2] 
 
Examples of selfless acts and behaviors as documented in the field notes written during 
the direct observation of medical practice at IU Methodist Hospital:  
Residents, interns and 3rd year students are all looking at their desktop 
screens checking patients’ labs etc. before morning rounds. Residents are 
super busy, do not talk to anyone, just reading their screens, writing down 
notes ... Seem super focused and concerned, but are doing their work 
enthusiastically. They seem to be into it. No extra conversations at all, 
except about patients. [p.85] No one is talking except every now and then 
the phone rings and residents pick it up. Tense, dry, environment. A lot of 




The team has been going up and down the stairs for the 6th time. This is 
too much work for me, I am out of breath keeping up with the team. [p.7] 
the team talks about the patient’s diagnosis and meds for another 10 
minutes standing in the hallway. My legs are dying! [Obs] [p. 24] 
 
Attending sounds stressed and tired, but is still in a good mood. Says he 
forgot to drink anything the entire day without the need even “crossing his 
mind”. He gets home drained out and drinks something, then he 
remembers he had not done that the entire day! [Obs] [p.27]  
 
 
Things like this brings another side of the medical practice in light. One can tell from the 
above comments that medical practice is not all about technicalities, it’s not just a job that 
gets done. Doing medicine does generate emotions in those who act as care-takers of the 
sick since they are nothing but humans themselves. Doctors do express their emotions, 
they get happy and sad, laughing and crying with their patients. Celebrating the number 
of people who get well and get discharged, and sighing about patients who refuse to take 
their medications are good examples of how emotions are expressed in the clinic. Let us 
look at some exemplar statements denoting this point: 
Attending: x, y, z (patient names) did so and so… “I thought everybody 
pooped yesterday, everybody!” He sounds excited to share this news. The 
entire team laughs. [Obs] [p.61]  
 
Resident says laughing: “do you know how many discharges I have today, 
three! Let's celebrate!” 1:25 PM, we are back from the morning rounds, 
back on the dock at the 8th floor. [Obs] [p.43] 
 
I say good morning to the resident. No response. After almost an entire 
minute: “good morning!” he says. A few minutes later he is talking to the 
other resident: “oh… [Deep sigh]… I wonder if Mr. Richardson will see 
the daylight today”. The other resident replies: “it’s terrible…” [Obs] [p. 
65] 
 
Resident: “So, Mr. Richardson had a bowel movement yesterday at 6:30 
pm!” Others: “oh, boy, great!” Smiles all around the room, they are glad 




55-year-old patient, happy and interactive, smiles at all of us. She is sitting 
on a chair with a blanket on her legs. Attending and the resident look up 
the screen. Attending smiles, he seems genuinely happy. “She’s doing 
well, good for her!” says the resident, smiling. The other resident listens to 
the patient reporting, talks to her, answers her questions. Attending is 
happy, sounds like a happy kid now, speaking in a very soft voice. Phone 
rings, resident leaves the room to answer it. Attending is still smiling at the 
patient, happily. [Obs] [p.37] 
 
III. In part three we will see exemplar statements denoting a middle ground 
between self-care and sacrifice when it comes to motives for joining a medical 
career: 
I think it’s a mix of things like, career, money, their own choices, helping 
others, that motivates the doctor ... as far as helping people, I think that’s 
definitely a big part of why people go to medicine, there are a few that 
maybe go in for money, but… I mean there is a part of you that wants to 
have a good professional career that wants to have a good lifestyle, and 
also that part of you that wants to help people. So, it’s a good mix of 
things for those who want to push themselves, and are hardworking… so I 
do not know. I feel like selfless is a bit extreme, maybe? Because there are 
two sides to it, some things you do for yourself and some others for the 
patient. I feel like, if you go completely to the selfless part, you end up 
burning out, you give so much of yourself to your patient… so I feel like 
people who have gone that far have actually ended up resenting the 
profession altogether. So, I think that we should not have to be selfless 
[MS3]  
 
So those [prestige and money] really were not my motivations. I mean, if 
they were completely absent, if people hated the doctors and I’d be 
working for peanuts, I probably would not have done it. [Laugh]. There 
are ways that I need to benefit from medicine so that I can keep doing it 
for them. I need to feel fulfilled, I need to wake up in the morning excited 
to go in, I need people around me that I enjoy working with, I have a lot of 
needs that have to be met for me to be able to have a 30-year-career as a 
person. But it’s not about I want to enjoy this just as much as I possibly 
can. It’s for the sake of me being able to do what I am doing and not 
burning out, and feeling like that I need to quit and find something else to 
do ... People’s ideas do change like, in 15 years from now, I do not know 
what it is, if it’s the infrastructure, or the demands, and burning out, or 
whatever, people change. They lose sight of that sense that “wow, this is a 




Points of Diffraction.   
Points of Incompatibility. What different positions are taken regarding modalities 
of statements and concepts as to why people become doctors? 
A. Some say that physicians are idealistic and selfless in their efforts to help the 
sick. 
B. Some say it is the social prestige, financial stability and the idea of having a 
“cool” job that draw people in to join medicine. 
C. Some say it is a combination of things, without any of the above having an 
exclusive influence on the person’s decision to become a doctor. 
Points of Equivalence. All three strategies have an equal chance of emerging on 
the surface of discourse because they share the same conditions of existence. Conditions 
of existence for theoretical strategies include the rules for their formation and the 
relations between those rules. Let us discuss the rules for their formation below: 
1. Rules concerning the economy of discursive constellation 
Again, the strategic choices made above depend on the general constellation of 
discourses in which medical discourse is located. We know that modern medical science 
is positioned in the same discursive constellation with natural sciences, technology, 
business, and capitalism. As a consequence of being in the same discursive constellation 
with natural sciences medicine tends to identify with objectivity and value-neutral nature 
of hard sciences rather than humanistic values of medical humanities and social sciences. 
Moreover, being in the same constellation with business and capitalist culture, people 
involved in medicine are often under the influence of a profit-based and self-centeredness 
goals in social relations, including medical practice. That is one reason why many of the 
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students cannot see the humanistic value of practicing medicine and rather pursue it for 
their own self-interest. The idea of being a doctor is no different than the idea of having 
any cool job that can get them financial stability and a high status in the society.  
As a result of medicine not being in the same constellation with medical 
humanities, these fields do not share much in terms of using each other’s research and 
scholarship. Humanities including morality are not being taught in medical school so 
even those students who want to see the humanistic side of medical practice do not have a 
clear idea about how exactly that should work. Same is true in the case of medical 
professionalism; students who want to think of professionalism as medical morality often 
do not have a firm grasp on their own personal code of morality and get confused when 
facing difficult clinical scenarios. Here too, students who want to see the humanity side 
of medicine often lack a firm ground to base their statements upon. Many of them were 
confused when asked questions such as why should not you care about money more than 
what is best for the sick person, for example. At best, students replied with, because that 
is not right. They cannot explain why or based on what rules it is not the right thing to do. 
In other words, they cannot explain what is right and what is wrong by basing their 
argument on any firm grounds of a personal or communal moral code.  
2. Rules concerning the nondiscursive structures 
As a result of a heavy focus on teaching the hard science of medicine in Indiana 
University School of Medicine, objectivity and value-neutrality are indirectly promoted 
throughout the medical training. In the hospitals, in addition to the scientific objectivity, 
the business models for management of care for the patient is under the spotlight. 
Humanities have a very small part in formal medical education and therefore only 
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minimal interest or attention is paid to research produced in the fields of medical 
humanities. The two main nondiscursive structures where medical discourse resides are 
medical school and hospital. Below are exemplary student comments about how the rules 
and regulations in these two structures affect who they are as medical professionals and 
their desire to be better. The following discussion shows how these nondiscursive 
structures (including the system that backs them up) shape professional identity of 
students as they go through the training to become doctors. 
Exemplar statements denoting the clash between individual and the system. These 
statements were uttered during the discussion of whether doctors are selfless benefactors 
of humanity (see prompt #2, FG Protocol, Appendix D):  
In my experience with shadowing a lot of doctors, the general attitude is I 
think kind of more “realistic”… I think what is said in the quote is the 
ideal, that’s the goal. Like, especially modern medicine with kind of 
having most of their time spent on modern technology and stuff, it can 
seem like an occupation a lot. It has become a conveyor belt of patients. I 
think there is still an element of, like, in order to be efficient, you kind of 
have to numb yourself to the interests of others and I think that’s where 
you need that sixth sense to be still able to see the human aspect of it.  
[MS1] 
 
I hope that the intention starts there at least, like, at our level, we do come 
in at least like we are gonna be idealistic benefactors … but I’d agree that 
a lot of us will lose that along the way, I mean not lose the intention but 
lose the action part of it. I think the intention is really there, you are going 
to med school to be overall beneficial and helpful and selfless and all 
those things, but we do not necessarily have the kind of system in place to 
cultivate that. Only try-hard personality types could still keep it. [MS1] 
 
So, there is also a system that is in tension between the individual, their 
wants and desires, like, the individual physician and what the system 
needs you to be doing as a whole. Because it does take a lot of investment 
in order to go through this track. Therefor the people who finish this get 
some of the high-paid jobs to be able to recover that time lost, (well it’s 
not necessarily lost but…) and opportunities, you know, therefore the 
system is like, in order to get admission you have to seek the standard 
venue to be able to pay all the money until you graduate from here, and 
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once you graduate they pay you, so it’s the cycle of what the system needs 
the individuals to go through, that’s how we have it here. So, it’s kind of a 
vicious track, and you can see why people maybe more interested in fees 
that they “should” be. [MS1] 
 
I think we need to add in there the need to make also the administration 
happy. So, one of the ways that they are happy is to make sure you’re 
checking all your boxes and charging all your patients, making the 
hospital money. It’s not necessarily something like: oh, now that I have 
used all these cards, and if I do not do this, I lose my job. Yeah ... so, I 
think that is a factor too, keeping the hospital administration’s interests in 
mind as well. [MS2] 
 
I think there is a pro-money structure… as long as you… if you take from 
someone’s age 22 traditional to 29 until they finish residency, and if you 
were to work for 6 years and put money into your account, so how much 
that’d be compared to what you’ll start making at 29 or later depending on 
when you started? And the other part is that most of us are gonna be 
minimum $100,000 to $200,000 in debt by the time we graduate. And if 
you do not get compensated for that, like, money has to be a factor, you 
cannot work with $200.000 in debt and not be in position to make… or 
later people who do not make it into residency are like stuck in a hole that 
they really can’t get out, and the only way to pay back that much money is 
to doing things that a doctor does. So, that’ why it’s like, yes, we should 
be money-centered, but we should not be doing it for that, but like, if you 
have been doing this for so many years of your life without making 
money, you can’t just be like, oh we are gonna do everything for free. Not 
at least in the early years after you become a physician. [MS1] 
 
I think there’s an interesting difference between physicians and other 
people who are just part of medical system as patients, because it’s like, 
we know, how much debt we are in, like, we know how much work we 
need to put into this before we can pay off this debt. Whereas for the 
patients, we are just getting all these fees, they do not kind of see all these 
other sides, it’s like obvious why I’d be frustrated with them also, because 
I think it’s part of the bigger problem like the healthcare system, medical 
education system, the confront between the two, and… it’s like hospitals 
want you to make money, doctors generally want what’s best for the 
patient, but we also have a lot of debt we want to pay off, so like all these 
things kind of come together to clash over the who gets to decide how 
interested the doctors should be in fees… [MS2] 
 
Below is an exemplar statement pulled from a one-on-one interview with a 4th year 
medical student. This is a typical example of assuming some sort of sacred “core” to the 
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medicine and giving it a transcendental immunity. The student below believes that 
medicine has some sort of humanistic core that has been travelling through the ages and it 
is being affected by “outside stressors” that are “muddying the water” in our time. 
Whereas the assessment provided below is clear and to the point, archaeological theory 
and analysis does not agree with the transcendental core of the medicine. In archaeology, 
it is believed that medicine in any age is only as good as people involved in it can make 
it. There is no sacred core or outside stressors; rather, all factors taking part in shaping the 
discourse of medicine are its forming factors. They are all part of the discourse itself, not 
internal or external to it. Except for that matter, the rest of the student comments below 
resonates well with the issue at hand here, regarding the tension between the individual’s 
desires and the system. 
I think at the heart of it, the idea and the spirit of medicine is still there, 
going back to, you know, someone needs help and you are the person who 
can help them. I definitely see that at the core of it but I see a lot of other 
things seeping in, you know, trying to be the biggest medical school, 
create the most number of doctors, focusing so much on what numbers 
you can produce on the exams and where you’re gonna match yours 
students… I know that it’s all important, but sometimes, I feel like, you 
lose sight of what was the original purpose of medicine. And in the larger 
healthcare world, I mean, for-profit hospitals and the amount of money 
that these hospitals bring in… it is kind of disturbing to see all of that, and 
to see how much hospitals focus on the bottom line [of making money]. 
Being a medical student, and to look at that, and to see it for your career, 
do I wanna practice at the county hospital or at a for-profit hospital, are 
very different. And I think again, that they both still have that spirit of 
medicine at the core but there are a lot of other things that are kind of 
muddying the water I think. [Can you give a few examples of these “other 
things”?] Money, definitely, position too in some specialties. So, I know 
there are people in my specialty too, in the emergency medicine, there are 
very high paying jobs, you move around the country and some people do 
that, you know, they personally want that money. Other things would be 
the prestige aspect of it, like trying to be the biggest medical school and to 
say that you’re training the most doctors, and you’re keeping the most 
doctors in the state, and then research. I mean research is incredibly 
important and I think it needs to be here… but when you focus more on 
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that than the patient in front of you, I think that’s when it can be a 
problem. [So, you think that some people might lose sight but others are 
still on the right path and see the core?] Yes, definitely. [Would these 
things affect professionalism on the part of the doctors too?] Yes. I think in 
an ideal world, everyone going into medicine would keep that original 
idealistic view of medicine as, you know, I am going into this to serve 
others, you know and this is my job and whatever it takes… And I think 
there are some people who are able to keep that with the outside stressors 
of the medical world today but there are a lot who can’t. For example, 
short amount of time with patients, you’re overworked, and like, if you are 
on the consulting team and you think this is what is best for the patient, 
and the care team physician says no, so I think those things definitely get 
on the way of “professionalism”. [134] 
 
What's The Doctor’s Role in the Interprofessional Healthcare Team? In this section I will 
report various strategic choices made by medical students regarding the positioning of the 
doctor in an interprofessional healthcare team. Medical student statements can be divided 
into two basic categories: 1) Those who think physician is often the most knowledgeable 
(and sometimes the smartest) individual in the team; so they should be at the top of the 
hierarchy for good reasons and they should always be the leader of the healthcare team; 
2) Those who think that physician is but one team member among the others; they are not 
the most knowledgeable in all areas related to the patient (and definitely not the smartest 
person in the room). Let us first look at some exemplar statements coming from the first 
cohort.  
Exemplar statements denoting the doctor as the outright leader of the healthcare team 
who needs to be at the top of the hierarchy for good reasons:  
Usually, the physician is the one who is highly trained in diagnosing and 
treating the patient. Everyone else is kind of geared toward that role. 
Nursing has the role of executing directives from physician. Usually they 
are the ones who are closest to the patient. PT, OT, Social worker, all of 
these are auxiliary, they come in for a different amount of time every day 
or other day and help out. So, it’s usually the physicians leading and 
everyone else kind of carrying out the orders to get the patient better. 
There are a lot of nurses who bring in the expertise to treat the patients, 
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hey we have seen this thing done before, can we try doing this, and they 
do help in figuring out how best to execute the job within their realm ... 
Usually, there will be a team (nurses, social worker, pharmacy etc.) every 
morning, so the physician is the one who is taking all the inputs from 
everyone and saying, ok, we’re gonna do this. [004] 
 
I think definitely, the physician is more of an expert and knows more and 
has had so much more training that anyone else in there so of course they 
are gonna know much more, so I think it makes sense to have the 
physician kind of like on top ... you do not want someone doing something 
that they do not have the experience for or the training for. Nurses do a lot, 
for example, I do not know much about the majority of things that they do, 
their job is like very critical, but I think it’s more about who goes to 
medicals school versus who goes to a PT or PA school, cause I know 
people who are good at nursing school, good a PA school, and they are not 
as smart as the one who goes to medical school. And that’s why they did 
not go to medical school [Laugh]. That’s why they became a nurse, that’s 
why they became a PT. And I think with any school, there is obviously 
different levels, but there is also a different personality associated with 
each specialty and it’s very different. [043] 
 
I think I might be a bit biased, but I think I am okay with that [hierarchical 
structure of healthcare team with the physician on top], because that’s like 
your job if you are the one with the most training. But, I feel like it should 
be a cellular model as opposed to a pyramid, like the physician should be 
the nucleus who integrates all these other professionals together, with the 
patient themselves. So instead of a pyramid, the relationship should rather 
look like a concentric circle. [Around physician, not the patient?]  ... I 
think if you have the more training then you are able to put different inputs 
together and create a well-organized plan which you would then represent 
to the patient. As far as the difference in social prestige, so, I have kind of 
a mindset that the more hard work you put in the more… like, doctors, 
they get a longer education and training. So, not in terms of social 
prestige, but I think the physician should be the leader to integrate things 
together and not overwhelm the patient with so many different people at 
once. [141]  
 
Exemplar statements from students who had a confused idea of the work other allied 
health professionals are doing. For instance, it was assumed that nurses can suggest drugs 
or treat the less complicated patients, where doctor is not needed. These students seemed 
to now understand that nurses and other health professionals have their own specific 
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skills that the doctor may not possess at all. These students, of course, believed that the 
doctor should be the leader and at the top of the hierarchy in the healthcare teams: 
I can’t agree with the statement of the physician, nurses, and the OTs and 
the social worker are at the same level. They are the same in terms of what 
they contribute in the team, but I feel like they all have different levels, for 
a reason ... Like, nurses are trained in a specific way to treat some cases 
but most of the times when something comes up that’s pretty complex, 
they refer that to the doctor. So, I think that’s where the prestige comes 
in ... I mean, that’s still a hard question, because, all of them are really 
important and everything ... but I do think that there is a knowledge 
difference, and that they are pretty much trained in a different way and 
everything ... In terms of the physician being the leader of the team, I think 
yes. I’d say most of the time though, like the physician can also ask the 
nurse something like, oh, what should we give them? And the nurse is 
perfectly capable of suggesting a medication or whatever. So, I’d say for 
the most cases yes. But there is gonna be those instances where the 
physician kind of says, okay patient is doing fine, so you guys know what 
to do, so the nurses and everyone else can do on their own. So… A 
physician can’t work by himself, he needs nurses, he needs PTs, and he 
needs social workers ... But I’d say that everyone has a different weight 
though. [151] 
 
Being a good leader with your team members and making sure that all of 
your team members feel valuable. That no one feels like they are an 
inadequate part of the team, everyone feels like they have a position. So, 
some physicians feel like, you know, that’s not my job for the nurse to feel 
useful. But it kind of is. Because, they are part of your team and they need 
to have feedback, positive and constructive from the person in charge in 
order to get better and to get your patients better. [134]  
 
The latter student is assuming that the doctor somehow knows everything about how to 
do a nursing job, for example, so he should give nurses feedback on how to become 
better at their job. This is another example of medical students not having a clear idea 
about what other health professionals’ job is and what exactly they are doing to help the 
patient. Many medical students have only a preliminary understanding of allied health 
professions and assume that their job is a less complicated and less developed version of 
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the doctor’s job–like, they go to their professional schools for a shorter time because they 
are only leaning a simplistic version of medicine.  
Exemplar statements coming from those who are aware of the doctor’s role as the leader 
of the team and agree with the hierarchical system in the healthcare teams that puts the 
doctor on top. However, these students are also suggesting that doctors should treat other 
healthcare professionals with respect, because everybody deserves respect at a personal 
level:  
From a decision-making standpoint, the hierarchy is there for a good 
reason. People have different levels of education, different proved 
competencies to do certain things, but just because you are higher up the 
chain in medical decision making, it does not mean that you should ever 
be treating someone on a different level differently just because they are 
not at your level. You should not look down on them, not on a personal 
level. They should be treating the nurse for example just as good as 
another doctor or like their boss ... Like, I saw a physician who knew the 
janitors by name, on first name basis, that’s a really special work culture. 
So that janitor felt like they were doing something to contribute to the 
healthcare team. [034] 
 
So the hierarchy is set up in a way that there are roles and responsibilities, 
and I think each person is important in that setup, so whether it’s fair or 
not is not the right question maybe ... But, I think, you’re not the smartest 
person because you’re a physician, it’s a skill set, it’s very very honed, but 
it’s not a mark of intelligence for the person. So, I guess in my head, I am 
not better than the nurse. They are professionals being nurses and I am a 
professional being a physician. I do not think you can play the role 
differently, if I tried to do all those things, I’d be terrible at it so I actually 
need those people to be very good at what they do, because then I can be 
good at what I do ... In terms of who makes the patient well, I’d say the 
physician is leading the team. If it comes to patient care, based on what 
I’ve known, I think yes, it should be the physician who leads the team. But 
just because you’re leading the team, it does not mean you are gonna be 
playing all the roles and kind of passing a privileged time ... I’d suggest 
that the physician should be leading the team. The idea is that it’s his job 
to come up with action plans, and I think he is the best suited for that. 
[184]  
 
While you still have to be cognizant of the fact that everyone on that team 
do not have the same job, and the same level of training, people have their 
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own mesh to kind of fill in, still being able to recognize everyone’s 
contributions ... I do see the hierarchy that sits the physician at the top ... 
The difference in prestige is partly due to the length of training. PA goes to 
school for 2 years, and did not even have a residency. This person went to 
school for 4 years and they did a residency so they must know more. 
There might also be the implicit bias as far as they went to school longer 
and therefore, they are more committed, they are more dedicated, they are 
better at their job. That’s I think what puts those personal biases, but if you 
look at the actual performance, obviously this probably do not correlate as 
much. Like you may get a really good PA and a really poor physician–and 
they still have different amounts of training. [112] 
 
Exemplar statements denoting the significance of the doctor as one team member among 
the team of healthcare professionals: 
I do not agree with the difference in social prestige among people on the 
healthcare team. I do agree that our society has put different stratifications, 
but I do not agree that it’s a good thing. I personally hope to kind of 
dismantle that from the inside, I’d like to. I guess it’s different because we 
also have the hierarchy of individuals in military. So, like, there is a nurse 
who is an admiral, by no means I could be persecuting her, she would be 
my superior, like six times over ... I think part of the reason why doctors 
are kind of maybe, considered above the rest is that it’s kind of their name 
on the line. A patient does not go to a clinic or hospital for a nurse, they go 
there for the doctor. And it’s also the doctor’s name that’s on the medical 
insurance, so if something goes wrong it’s the doctor who is gonna be 
sued, not necessarily the nurse ... like, I’d say the two most useful tools in 
a doctor’s toolbox is a really good nurse and a really good pharmacist. 
Like, behind any good doctor, there is either one of those ... In short, it is a 
teamwork; and it’s not the doctor’s decision to make on every single thing 
when it comes to treatment, at least not singularly. [103] 
 
Doctors go to school to get training and become physicians, but it does not 
make them better than anyone else, and that’s a key part of the 
professionalism. Like, doctors are still people and they are still part of the 
team, they just have a different skill set than some other part. And part of 
that professionalism comes down to like, you should not give out a sense 
of superiority. Like everyone is an equal member of the team. Part of 
professionalism is like being aware that you have a different skill set, and 
you put a lot of work into it, but you’re supposed to be humble and listen 
to them and treat them as equal, because it boils down to that we are all 
people. And you do not have a right to trample over anyone [012] 
 
I do not think there should be this power hierarchy, because I think 
everybody brings something from their own area of expertise. I do not 
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really think that the doctor should always be positioned on top necessarily, 
it just depends on the situation ... I think that money plays a huge role in 
which school you go to, med school is way more expensive than PA would 
be. Or maybe you want the PA school because you think you can 
reasonably get through without much hardship. And I guess, there are 
some people who really do want to do that other job rather than medicine, 
like I do not think it comes from whether you were smart enough to come 
to med school ... And I do thin money is a big part of everything again, 
like taking the MCAT is like $400 and it’s $500 to do an application and if 
you are applying to more schools, then secondary application, which is 
another $100. So, I think that there maybe are people who would really 
like to go to medical school but they can’t afford it so they go to nursing 
school instead- but they are still just as smart. [051] 
 
Below are a group of statements in response to the focus group prompt # 8 (see FG 
Protocol, Appendix D). The prompt was showing a picture of the entire healthcare team–
including physician, nurse and other healthcare professionals–and a picture of a sick 
person, asking the following question: Who gets the patient well? 
Exemplar statements denoting the role of the doctor as the leader of the team who will get 
the patient well, with the help of others in the picture:  
So, the doctor is going to make the patient well by diagnosing the problem 
and prescribing a treatment plan that will resolve the condition. Those 
other ones are just administering the treatment plan, which the doctor 
usually sets up. So, I’d put the main responsibility on the doctor. I think 
making the patient well is all about developing a treatment plan and that’s 
the role of the doctor. I don’t know. So, I’d say the doctor is playing the 
pivotal role in this scenario. [MS3] 
 
I definitely know the physician as leader so I’d say: the doctor will help 
this patient get well, with support or guidance, or _______ (blank) of the 
other people. [MS4] 
 
I think it’s the doctor who diagnoses and treats the patient. I mean, I guess 
everyone has a role on this panel, but I think the doctor should be the one 
who is driving the ship but… so, in two sentences: the doctor will lead a 




Exemplar statements denoting the role of the doctor as a team member in the healthcare 
team. This group believes that it is a group of people who work as a team to get the 
patient well: 
In a healthcare team there are people each with a different skill set but all 
are working towards helping with the health of this patient. Who all have 
knowledge about different aspects of how to make this patient well. [MS2] 
 
The biggest thing to say about this is that it’s a team, you have to sort of 
acknowledge that they all have certain knowledge and you guys all need to 
work together to make sure that patient gets well. [MS2] 
 
I’d say everyone in that picture has different expertise and a different role, 
and together their knowledge and their abilities should make this patient 
well. [MS4] 
 
Everybody comes together so the whole team make the patient well, there 
is no one individual specifically who can make the patient well, in my 
opinion. So, all of us will make the patient better, I play a little role, and 
they play a little role, we all make a big ball to make the patient better. 
[MS4] 
 
Points of Diffraction.  
Points of Incompatibility. What different positions are taken regarding the 
position of the doctor in the interprofessional healthcare team? 
A. Some say the doctor is the leader of the team and the person who has the main 
responsibility of making the patient well. Other healthcare professionals help 
out with executing the care and treatment plan which is developed by the 
doctor alone. Some among this cohort also believe that the doctor is the 
smartest and/or the most knowledgeable person on the team, hence the 
difference in social prestige between the doctor and other healthcare 
professionals is there for a good reason. 
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B. Some say the entire team carries the responsibility of making the patient well, 
and the doctor is a team member in the healthcare team. It is believed that 
each team member brings their own specific skill set that is indispensable to 
the team. Most people in this cohort believe that the doctor is not necessarily 
the smartest and/or most knowledgeable person on the team, and therefore 
difference in social prestige between the doctor and other health professionals 
should not exist.  
Points of Equivalence. The above two strategies are equal in the sense that they 
both have an equal chance for emerging on the surface of the discourse, as we saw in this 
section. That is because both strategies share the same conditions of existence, including 
the rules for the formation of theoretical strategies below. 
1. Rules concerning the economy of discursive constellation 
The strategic choices made above depend on the general constellation of 
discourses in which medical discourse is located. We know that modern medical science 
is positioned in the same discursive constellation with natural sciences, technology, 
business, and capitalism. As a consequence of being in the same discursive constellation 
with natural sciences medicine tends to identify with objectivity and value-neutral nature 
of hard sciences rather than humanistic values of medical humanities and social sciences. 
Moreover, being in the same constellation with business and capitalist culture, people 
involved in medicine are often under the influence of a profit-based and self-centeredness 
goals in social relations, including medical practice. It is difficult to respect the human 
dignity of all allied health professionals the same as that of their physician colleagues, for 
many doctors. The objective and scientific value-neutral mindset promoted at the medical 
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schools and hospitals can affect medical students’ professional identity in a way that in 
certain cases, all they can see and value is the amount of objective knowledge of 
medicine someone possesses and the number of years he/she has studied in school.  
As a result of medicine not being in the same constellation with medical 
humanities, these fields do not share much in terms of using each other’s research and 
scholarship. Humanities including morality is not being taught in medical school so even 
those students who want to see the humanistic side of medical practice do not have a 
clear idea about how exactly that works. This too was noticed in the statements coming 
from some students who could not let go of the hierarchically superior position of the 
doctor in the healthcare team. As for the students who do see the value of respecting 
everybody’s human dignity and believe that the doctor is not superior than anyone else on 
the healthcare team since everyone has their own skill specific skill sets, it is hard to say 
where they get those values from. It might be that these students have had more real-life 
experiences of working with actual healthcare teams and are therefore understand the 
value of every team member on interprofessional teams better. Also, it is possible for 
some to reach these conclusions through making use of their personal codes of morality 
(e.g., religious beliefs, humanistic philosophy, parental and community upbringing, etc.) 
even when they have not yet had much experience working in interprofessional 
healthcare teams.  
2. Rules concerning the nondiscursive structures 
As a result of a heavy focus on teaching the hard science of medicine during 
medical school training, objectivity and value-neutrality are indirectly promoted 
throughout the medical training. In the hospitals, in addition to the scientific objectivity, 
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the business models for management of care for the patient is under the spotlight. 
Humanities have a very small part in formal medical education and therefore only 
minimal interest or attention is paid to research produced in the field of medical 
humanities. The two main nondiscursive structures where medical discourse resides are 
medical school and hospital. Below are exemplary student comments about how the rules 
and regulations in these two structures affect who they are as medical professionals and 
their desire to be better. The following discussion shows how these nondiscursive 
structures (including the system that backs them up) shape professional identity of 
students as they go through the path of becoming doctors. 
I don’t like it [the hierarchy] so much because I worked as a patient care-
tech at the hospital, and I was at the bottom of the little totem pole, and I 
saw some terrible things, I got a little burnt out, I didn’t get burnt out 
myself but I could see that it’s a TOXIC environment. And they gotta fix 
it, they gotta do something to fix it. Because it’s not right, the hierarchy, 
it’s not good. And I don’t know, I have thought about it a lot, like how are 
they gonna fix it, what can they do, you know? And with the insurance and 
health, and hospitals, I mean this is a giant machine there is a lot of things 
that need fixing, but just specifically the hierarchy, ummmmmhhhh. So 
yeah, I don’t think it’s good, I don’t agree with it, I mean I don’t have a 
suggestion on what would be better, but I think it sets up a toxic 
environment in a lot of ways. [081] 
 
First, I do not think med students are necessarily smarter than everybody 
else. Second, to say that would be downplaying the effects of the system 
and the pressure it puts on some but not all types of people. For example, 
med school is expensive, even applying to med school is expensive. I had 
to work for a while to even pay for my applications to become a med 
student. So, there is already a bias towards people who can afford that. 
And that does not mean all those who can afford that possess a higher 
biological intelligence in terms of a higher IQ. And then there are studies 
showing that social factors have, if not the most significant but a crucial 
effect on IQ… so I do not think people going to med school are the 
smartest, there are the ones who had the resources to be able to do that. I 
think they are smart, but not all smart people are in medical school… So, I 
think currently, it has to be the physician who is at the top, not because 
they are the smartest, but it’s just necessary because of the way the 
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institution of medicine is set up, and the power structures were initially 
constructed, it just gives the biggest responsibility to the doctor. [141] 
 
What Is the Ultimate Goal of Medical Practice from a Doctor’s Perspective? In this 
section, I will report student statements regarding the ultimate goal of medicine that a 
doctor should pursue. It is a significant part of medical professional identity of a doctor to 
know what to aim for and what the ultimate goal of his/her clinical practice should be. 
Student comments reported below were pulled from the focus group data in response to 
the following prompt (see prompt # 10, FG Protocol, Appendix D). Question: What is the 
ultimate goal of providing medical care that a doctor should aim for? Answers choices:  
A) to fix/mend/recover the human body, B) to eliminate the disease, C) to alleviate 
human suffering, D) other. Most participants in all four focus groups picked the answer 
choice “C”.  
Exemplar statements denoting “to alleviate human suffering” as the ultimate goal 
of medical care:  
I think there is a lot of overlap, like if you want to eliminate the disease 
then you’ll probably alleviate suffering from that disease, so if I want to 
pick one broad category like, to alleviate suffering, I think that hits more 
boxes and is more likely to maybe hit all boxes. [MS2] 
 
If I had to pick one it’d be C, I feel like that’s the most achievable, 
realistic, and ethical and ideal goal. And like, the other stuff, I think they 
also achieve C in a way and a lot of times, but you can’t always eliminate 
the disease, can’t always, at least fully, fix or mend or recover the human 
body. But you can almost always do C, one way or another. [MS4] 
 
I’d probably choose C, cause, I think that falls the most in line with ... and 
suffering it is unique to each individual. Sometimes when people have like 
terminal diseases, they are not looking to fix or mend their body, for some 
patients, they’d just like to go to a hospice care and to relief their suffering 
they’d like to spend as much time as possible with their friends and family. 
And be comfortable. So, they are not trying to eliminate the disease nor 
trying to fix the body they are just trying to get us help them end their 
suffering, which in this case would be, going to repeated chemo, staying 
372 
 
away from their family and always be tired. So, if I had to choose between 
A, B and C, then I’d go with C. [MS2] 
 
A few of the participants in focus groups picked the answer choice “A”. Exemplar 
statements denoting “to fix and recover the body” as the ultimate goal of medical care: 
I think there are a lot of times that you are unable to eliminate the diseases, 
and then we don’t always alleviate human suffering in medicine, like to be 
in hospital is no fun and no one likes to go to the doctor so, you know, I 
don’t know if it’s necessarily alleviates the suffering. So, the idea is to 
attempt to mend the body. [MS3] 
 
Very few students in focus groups picked the answer choice “B”. Exemplar statements 
denoting “to eliminate the disease” as the ultimate goal of medical care: 
I think mostly the money and research goes into curing the disease, so I 
think it’s kind of the most attractive sounding goal, I’d say, that most 
people would want to invest in research for curing the disease research. 
Like, trying to find a cure for HIV, cure for breast cancer, things like that. 
[MS3] 
 
I’ll probably go with the first one. That’s like the primary goal… to 
eliminate the disease is kind of a new possibility with vaccines and 
everything. [MS3] 
 
Some students did not pick any of the provided options and responded with “other”, 
denoting one or more of the following options as the ultimate goal of their future 
practice: 1) to help the patient through whatever they are going through 2) to enhance 
quality of life for patients 3) to enhance the quality of public health services for all. 
Below are exemplar statements indicating something “other” than alleviating suffering, 
recovering the body and eliminating the disease as the ultimate goal of medical care. 
(1) 
I think, to help as many people as possible, to be able to live their own 
life. Something that one of our teachers says, I think it sums it up pretty 
well, is if someone wants to smoke a box of cigarettes and drink 10 bears 
every day, then you have to do everything you can to make sure they can 
do that for as long as possible. So obviously, you’d want them to stop 
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doing certain things, but people are gonna live the way they wanna live, 
and I think it’s our job to just help them to be as happy as possible with 
the lifestyle that they choose. I think that’s the ideal. [121] 
 
I’d say “other”, and I’d say the ultimate goal of medical practice is to help 
the patient achieve their goals, whatever that may be. Because that’s 
gonna vary based on the patient and the type of disease, so. [MS2] 
 
I’d pick D, and I’d like to help people through their health condition 
whatever it is, like you may not be able to fully recover the body, or 
eliminate the disease. You may not be able to alleviate their suffering 
either, I mean it depends on the condition, but my goal would still be to 
help them through those conditions, in whatever way that’s possible to 




I’d go even beyond just alleviating suffering to maybe even increase 
happiness, like not just taking care of mental troubles or fixing issues, but 
help your life become better. Like, for example, physical education in high 
school, and stuff like that you know, not to just get people out of their 
sickness but also help them physically become healthier and happier. 
[MS4] 
 
I think I’ll go with the other, like in addition to A, and B, and also trying to 
alleviate suffering, I think we should also try to improve the quality of life 
for people, and like try to improve public conditions of life. [MS3] 
 
(3) 
I’d say to improve public health in general. So, if you consider like a 
vaccine, a flu shot or whatever, like, a flu shot does not technically mend 
the human body, or it does not eliminate the disease or viruses… so more 
of preventive medicine. [MS4] 
 
When students were asked the same question (what would be the ultimate goal of their 
practice in the future) during one-on-one interviews without having the answer choices to 
pick from, they were mostly confused and could not come up with any concrete answers 




I am assuming that the goal is like, to improve everyone’s health, but I do 
not know. It’s maybe just about money, I don’t know. So, like my personal 
goal would be to help people. [051] 
 
I think the goal is to pursue excellence in whatever it is that you are going 
in to. So, like being a good doctor, getting down the tools that you need to 
succeed. And once I am getting that down and I am achieving mastery in 
that working on this personally to become a physician who cares, you 
know. Picks up on asking good questions about personal things, to get 
their perspectives as I am caring for my patients. [072] 
 
Points of Diffraction. 
Points of Incompatibility. What different positions are taken regarding the 
ultimate goal of medical practice that a doctor should aim for? 
A. Some say the goal should be to alleviate human suffering to the point that it is 
possible. 
B. Some say the ultimate goal of medicine is other than alleviating human 
suffering. They indicate other things such as: mending the body, eliminating 
the disease, enhancing quality of life, helping the patient get through whatever 
state they are in (or wish to be), increasing public health measures, and more 
as the main goal a doctor should pursue.  
C. Many students are utterly confused as to what the goal of their practice would 
be as a doctor (when they do not get options to pick from). 
Points of Equivalence. The three strategic choices about the ultimate goal of a 
doctor’s practice that are made above have equal chances of coming to the surface of 
modern medical discourse–as seen in this section–partially because they all share the 





1. Rules concerning the economy of discursive constellation 
As we know, the strategic choices made above depend on the general 
constellation of discourses in which medical discourse is located. We know that modern 
medical science is positioned in the same discursive constellation with natural sciences, 
technology, business, and capitalism. As a consequence of being in the same discursive 
constellation with natural sciences medicine tends to identify with objectivity and value-
neutral nature of hard sciences rather than humanistic values of medical humanities and 
social sciences. This seems to be the reason why most medical students could not 
articulate any clear humanistic goals for medical practice when they were asked to do that 
during one-on-one interviews. As for the focus groups, many students picked “alleviating 
human suffering” as the ultimate goal of their future practice as doctors. This could be 
due to one or more of the reasons below: 1) Medical students’ familiarity with certain 
topics of professionalism that are sometimes discussed in formal sessions such as 
intersessions I and II. 2) Medical students’ familiarity with their own personal code of 
morality dictating the alleviation of human suffering as the main goal of medicine, 3) 
Students’ familiarity with real-world practice of medicine and realizing that fixing the 
body and eliminating disease is not always possible to achieve, 4) and lastly, students’ 
being under the influence of popular transcendental traits of idealistic medicine and what 
it should aim for under the ideal condition. As a result of medicine not being in the same 
constellation with medical humanities, these fields do not share much in terms of using 
each other’s research and scholarship. Humanities including morality is not being taught 
in medical school so even those students who want to see the humanistic side of medical 
practice do not have a clear idea about how exactly that works.  
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2. Rules concerning the nondiscursive structures 
As a result of the heavy focus on teaching the hard science of medicine in medical 
school, objectivity and value-neutrality are indirectly promoted throughout the medical 
training. In the hospitals, in addition to the scientific objectivity, the business models for 
management of care for the patient is under the spotlight. Humanities have a very small 
part in formal medical education and therefore only minimal interest or attention is paid 
to research produced in the fields of medical humanities. The two main nondiscursive 
structures where medical discourse resides are medical school and hospital. Below are 
exemplary student comments about how the rules and regulations in these two structures 
affect who they are as medical professionals and their desire to be better. The following 
statements illustrate how these nondiscursive structures (including the system that backs 
them up) shape professional identity of students by limiting the possibility of things they 
can do as physicians in the future. Many students are now only aware but they also 
advocate against the limiting current healthcare system that creates tension between the 
individual doctor’s wants and desires and what is being dictated by the system itself: 
If you want to alleviate human suffering, that’s not necessarily limited to 
medicine, that’d be like why don’t we mend our broken medical system 
and then you can eliminate their suffering by giving them the chance to 
apply to more opportunities to have healthcare and stuff like that.  [MS2] 
 
I think at the heart of it, the idea and the spirit of medicine is still there, 
going back to you know, someone needs help and you are the person who 
can help them. I definitely see that at the core of it but I see a lot of other 
things seeping in, you know, trying to be the biggest medical school, 
create the most numbe74r of doctors, focusing so much on what numbers 
you can produce on the exams and where you’re gonna match yours 
students…[134] 
 
Points of Systematization. Now that we are at the end of this sub-section 
concerned with strategies about the doctor, we need to establish the link between each of 
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the strategies that were made above about doctor and understand how they can affect the 
rules of formation for the doctor as an object of discourse, the rules of formation for 
enunciative modalities about the doctor, and lastly, the concepts related to the doctor in 
the modern medical discourse. Points of systematization entail how each strategy 
contributes to production of statements (commentary) about an object, the types of 
statements about that object, and concepts that are born out of the specific relations 
among the rules of formation for objects and statement modalities. In this sense, as 
Foucault points out, “points of diffraction also represent the link points of 
systematization” (Foucault, 1972, p. 66).   
The strategic choices made above (e.g., opting for competence or care as the most 
significant trait of a doctor, taking professionalism as dressing up and providing timely 
responses to one’s emails, pursuing medicine for the sake of money and social prestige, 
seeing the doctor either as the ultimate leader or as a team member in the 
interprofessional team, and, aiming for fixing the bodies as the ultimate goal of one’s 
medical practice) represent systematically different ways: of treating the doctor as an 
object of medical discourse (delimiting it, grouping and classifying it), of arranging 
modalities of statement about the doctor (choosing them, placing them, and composing 
them), and of manipulating concepts regarding the doctor (determining rules for their use 
and constituting the conceptual architecture of modern medical discourse related to the 
doctor). In other words, strategic choices made above, are all different but regulated ways 
of “practicing the possibilities of discourse” (Foucault, 1972, p. 70).  
Let’s take an example here. We know that doctors are among the most important 
authorities of delimitation for the doctor as a function. Moreover, the medical students 
378 
 
today will become not only the doctors, but the faculty, the hospital administrators, the 
persons in charge of policy making organizations and professional bodies of tomorrow.  
In other words, they will be the ones who will have the right to authoritatively speak 
about the function of the doctor as an object of medical discourse. Doing so, they will 
draw from the authority of medical school, hospital, and the institution of medicine in 
general. People are most likely to deem their statements true because they are based on 
quite outstanding authorities. Now, if a student chooses to define medical professionalism 
as “wishy-washy” and “fluffy stuff” that is only a waste of his/her time, this choice will 
definitely affect his/her professional identity as a doctor in the future. The way she sees 
the function of the doctor as an authority of delimitation, the way she chooses to talk 
about the function of the doctor and finally, the way she chooses to manipulate the 
concepts related to the doctor will all be affected by her early choice of objectifying the 
human body. For instance, this student is more likely to become a doctor who cannot see 
the patient as a whole person and chooses to speak more objectively (in terms of 
objective scientific facts, and statistical conclusions) to the patient rather than trying to 
create a human-to-human relationship with them. This doctor is also more likely to use 
paternalistic statements when referring to the patients. All of this will create unique 
commentary about who the doctors are and how they should function in the clinic. Such 
commentary is likely to affect other junior doctors around this one doctor who might see 
her as a role model in the clinic and try to learn from her the appropriate way of 
functioning as a doctor. 
This entire scenario is also true about the opposite case, where a student chooses 
to see professionalism as the morality of medicine. This decision too will affect her future 
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professional identity as a doctor and will give rise to unique commentary and statements 
coming from her regarding how to function as a doctor in a clinical setting. This is an 
example of how discourse of medicine is being constantly produced by people who are 
involved in it. The reason one can often see different and sometimes opposing ways of 
acting as doctors in the hospital is that every doctor is using a systematically different 
way of dealing with certain objects of medical discourse such as the function of the 
doctor.  
Finally, it is also important to show how different strategic choices made about 
the function of the doctor are linked to the task carried out by modern medical discourse 
in the practice of current capitalistic culture, and the role medicine plays in the realization 
of interests and desires of the upper class in society. Modern medical discourse is defined 
by “a certain constant way of relating possibilities of systematization interior to a 
discourse, other discourses that are exterior to it, and a whole nondiscursive  field of 
practices, appropriation, interests, and desires” (Foucault, 1972, p. 69). With doctors, 
medical educators, hospital administrators and policy makers who produce the common 
image of the doctor and the way he should function in the clinic, it is not difficult to see 
that certain choices are made by the upper class in society (senior doctors, faculty, 
administrators, and policy makers) that determine the ways in which medical discourse is 
constructed and shaped. On the other hand, doctors who are getting trained in objectivity 
of medical sciences - and have the choice of opting for competence as the most 
significant trait of a doctor, taking professionalism as dressing up and providing timely 
responses to one’s emails, pursuing medicine for the sake of money and social prestige, 
seeing the doctor either as the ultimate leader in the interprofessional team, and, aiming 
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for fixing the bodies and eliminating disease as the ultimate goal of one’s medical 
practice - are in a way more beneficial to the overall capitalistic culture of the modern 
U.S. society. All of these strategic choices, in one way or another, get their validity drawn 
from the basic values of objectivity and value-neutrality that is being heavily promoted in 
medical education. With medicine being dependent on giant business industries such 
pharmaceutical and health insurance companies to name a couple, doctors being trained 
in medical humanities, developing traits such as empathy and compassion, and 
developing humane relationships with patients and the healthcare team will not be best 
suited to serve the interests and desires of the capitalistic society where the goal is 
serving the rich and ignoring the poor.  
Strategies Concerned with the Sick Person. 
How Medical Students Define Their Code of Morality and How Likely Are They to Use 
it in Their Future Medical Practice? In this section we will look at the strategic choices 
medical students make regarding their personal code of morality and how that may affect 
their future practice as physicians. During the one-on-one interviews, students were asked 
the following question (see question #6, INT Protocol, Appendix C): What is your 
personal code of morality and do you plan to use it in the future as a physician? How can 
you tell the right from wrong when making important decisions in life? Some students 
said they get their moral code from their religion, some said they will use humanistic 
values, family values, laws and personal feelings when making tough decisions in the 
field of medical practice.  
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Exemplar statements from students who indicated religion as the main source for 
their personal code of morality, which they are also planning to use in their medical 
practice in the future: 
I am a veeeery spiritual person. Christian, not Catholic, I do not use 
identifiers to narrow down myself. I can use those values enormously in 
medicine to get motivation, like, my motivation to treat people well, it is 
largely based on the fact that it’s something God cares about and I love 
God, and I want to be like him, and I want to do things to please him. For 
me to try to restrain the effects of disease and illness is like, I believe that 
God is working through healthcare providers. [034] 
 
I grew up Catholic and went to Catholic school for 13 years. Was baptized, 
made my communion, my parents are both Catholic ... I will go to church 
when I am home with them, but I do not go when I am not with them. As 
for drawing values form it, I definitely think so. I think like, service to 
others and giving of your compassion, I think all of those were kind of 
instilled in me at a young age, especially in high school. It was a 
requirement for our graduation that every semester we had to do certain 
hours of community service. So that just kind of taught us how to go back 
and how good it felt doing that, then I just kind of continued that going 
forward. [134] 
 
I am a Buddhist. As for drawing values form it and making ethical 
decisions in medicine, yes. For the most part, yeah. I think I’d use a good 
mixture of religiosity and personal experience, as to how people should 
and should not be treated. [141] 
 
Christianity. Not Catholic. I do draw values from it and could use some of 
those values being a physician in the future, yes, I think so. For me 
growing up and reaching where I am now in my life so far, understanding 
some of the personal and social things, my faith has always been there 
guiding the way. So, even though I would like to keep my religion 
personal to myself and not make it social, I feel like it’ll guide me if there 
is like a gray area. [184] 
 
Exemplar statements coming from those who admitted being religious and drawing 
values from their religion about what is right and what is wrong in general, yet, they 
would like to think of their religion as something separate from their professions as a 
doctor in the future:  
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I was raised Catholic, so I guess I am still a Christian. But I do not really 
follow the things ... I do believe in God, in Jesus, but I do not follow 
anything. I do draw my values from it though. I do believe that if I am to 
be a Christian, even if I do not follow all the rules, I will still like to be my 
best self for God, you know. I guess I do not relate compassion etc. to 
religion, like if you are in the field of medicine then you should be 
compassionate and all. I do not really connect me being a doctor with me 
being a Christian. [063] 
 
I have trouble identifying with one religion, I was raised Catholic, but I 
just believe in God, in a higher power. That’s all I really know, and I can’t 
really be sure about anything else ... I don’t know if I would draw my 
values from it in medical practice. I think, ethics is different than religion, 
but I also think like, to just treat people how you want to be treated 
yourself. So, you could say that, Jesus said that so you could say it’s 
religious, but I separate spirituality from ethics and that kind of thing, you 
know ... I don’t know … it gets a little messy. I think legally it’s gonna 
have a little bit more precedence for me, and ethics over religion, religion 
is something like, it’s me personally, it’s not a professional thing ... And I 
don’t think that there is a connection between religion and charity. I think 
there are people who are very generous without even being religious or 
anything. I almost feel like it’s a genetic thing, it is like, altruism rather 
than your religion. So, it’s kind of where I am coming from. So, I don’t 
know. I am not the most altruistic person; I am kind of just, like, a medium 
tipper. I am not like a super generous person, but I am a fair person. So, I 
am just right there in the middle. [081] 
 
Exemplar statements from students who indicated humanistic values as the main source 
for their personal code of morality: 
[I am] not a religious person. I take my moral values from more 
humanistic values. My moral values come from how I want to be treated 
in that same situation. I value patient’s autonomy for ethical decisions. 
Making decisions based on the patient, be however they want you to be, 
thinking about myself, like, what’s going to help me in my most evil state? 
[004] 
 
Both my parents are religious, but I never really hopped in, the most 
spiritual I get is that I think if I am a good person, in some type of 
afterlife, then it just feels good for me to be nice to people. If I am not a 
good enough of a person that way, then there is not a place like a church or 
temple where I need to be, so ...  I was basically the only Indian person at 
my school, majority were white, in high school ... So, being a minority, I 
knew how bad it made me feel, so I kind of think by putting myself in 
others’ shoes and say if I was that person, how would it make me feel. So, 
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being able to empathize with people ... I have always found myself good 
with empathizing with people and being able to see things from their 
perspective. [012] 
 
I guess spiritual but not religious. Just humanistic values. I draw values 
from the latter, yes. [103] 
 
Exemplar statements from students who indicated family and community values as the 
main source for their personal code of morality: 
I am not religious. I went to church on Sundays as a kid, have not gone 
since. My parents are Orthodox Christians. If I have to make a tough 
decision, I think as if my parents were next to me, and what would they 
want me to do. I imagine if they were next to me what would have they 
done? [121] 
 
I was raised Catholic ... but I would not say I am a full-blown Catholic. I 
have a special relationship with God as of my own. So, I’d say, 
relationship, yes, but religious, not really ... but I do believe in God. As for 
drawing values and morality from it, yes ... I do think that my relationship 
with God, and my religious beliefs in general, do have a strong relation 
and influence on how I would practice in the future. Where do I get my 
moral beliefs from? Ah, that’s a hard question ... So, I’d say, the 
commonality, I mean it’s just the way I was raised. And that teaches me to 
like, I think people should be treated how God tells me that they should be 
treated… so with religion… like I can’t pinpoint to one specific thing, I 
just want to say that it’s just the way I was raised, my parent’s influence, I 
have good parents they are great people ... and just kind of taking the 
philosophy of my father and my mother and testing on… like seeing other 
people and ask questions like how did he do that? That’s just selfish and 
everything. So, I’d say what I consider moral is just how I was raised. 
[151] 
 
Exemplar statement from students who indicated laws and personal feelings as the main 
source for their personal code of morality: 
I’d say personal ethics, also those that have been imposed by society and 
the system. So, laws and personal feelings will be the main ethical 
determinants for me. [112] 
 
Below, we will see student statements in response to a focus group prompt (see prompt # 
4, FG Protocol, Appendix D) that was asking the following question: If you get an 
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undocumented immigrant patient who cannot afford to pay the fee but is in a life or death 
situation that you can manage in your private clinic, would you see him and treat him? 
This question was asked as a basic test to see whether students incorporate their personal 
code of morality to make a decision, or if they prefer to remain objective and value-
neutral toward the patient. Below are exemplar statements coming from both groups–
those who said yes they would treat this patient, and those who said no, they would not 
treat this patient. Below are exemplar statements coming from students who responded 
with “Yes” to the prompt and indicated that they will treat this particular patient 
regardless of anything that might become a problem. Would they actually be able to do 
this given the real situation of the nondiscursive conditions such as hospital rules and 
regulations or those of a private practice? That is a discussion that needs to be had at 
another time. Let us look at the exemplar statements from those who responded with 
“yes, always” without setting any conditions: 
And I have been in that situation myself, being an immigrant and needing 
to access healthcare so I do understand the struggle ... No matter what the 
narrative that people may make, I mean, this is what we do. Even if it’s 
going to affect my job… I’d still like to advocate for them. I mean, if 
you’re not gonna do it so who is gonna do it, you know? That’s still what I 
think ... I have no line for them to be treated [MS1]  
 
For me, there is no amount of money that you can give me ... like, seeing a 
patient who can’t pay that would make me feel good about my trying 
personally. That would like, hurt me, if I couldn’t do that, like, not seeing 
a patient who needs my help just for money? [MS2] 
 
Exemplar statements coming from those who responded with “yes, maybe” depending on 
various conditions such as: 1) seriousness of patient’s medical condition, 2) number of 
similar patients who cannot afford the fees 3) the time and mood of the doctor on a 




Yeah, I’d still treat them. I mean it kind of depends on his health condition 
as well, like if he comes to your office looking perfectly fine, then it’s 
different than if they come to you seeking urgent help for something that 
essentially needs to be treated, then yeah, I’d treat them. I mean if the 
person needs your help, then I’d treat them. [MS3] 
 
I am assuming this is presenting like something necessary, so yeah, I’d do 
as best as I can. It may not be like physically or financially a profitable 
case to me, but yeah, it’s nice to try. [MS4] 
 
(2) 
I think, if you’d say this is a life or death situation, I’d definitely treat 
them and everything, but I mean, occasionally I am okay with that but if 
that’s going become a process and then that could be a problem. So, I am 
not saying I’m not going to treat him and everything, but I am saying that 
just because I get that sentence, I am not gonna be like, yes, for sure, I’d 
treat them. But I think it’d be something to consider depending on other 
factors. Like, for example depending on whether this is a life or death 
situation, is it just a stabilization case, or this is just a not so serious ... I 
mean, something that is not life or death situation. So, I am not sure, you 
know, but I just can’t see myself being 100% sure that I’d definitely treat 
this person just because he is undocumented, nothing against that crowd or 
anything but just… I also have the responsibility of my family members, 
like I have to pay off debt, you know, provide food for the household and 
kind of maybe put my own family first before some case. But again, 
occasionally, I have no problem with that, but if it becomes something 
like, ok, maybe half my patients are not gonna pay the fee then that’s 
gonna become an issue that is threatening my practice. I’d not be able to 
make enough money, as I could be, to provide for my family. [MS1] 
 
I worked for private practice and there were slots dedicated for people 
who had Medicaid. Who are still paying at the state levels but what they 
are paying is not comparable with the sum you receive from a private 
insurance. So, they have like 2 slots a day for those, which is I think is a 
good compromise in a situation like, there is not only you can support 
your private practice but you can still be in the service of the community, 
but at the same time also see some patients who need care but are not quite 
at the… [MS2] 
 
(3) 
If there is time, then yes. I mean, if there isn’t another patient that has 
already been put on the schedule. [He has an appointment so he is in his 
own time-slot]. Well ... then, yeah. Absolutely. [MS2] 
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I am more business-minded, I guess you could say… I don’t know, it’s 
tough. I mean, is it a business or is it a nonprofit organization? Cause, if I 
was running my own clinic and it’s my personnel like, I have 4 or 5 
people, and they [the patient] did not have insurance? You know, the nurse 
says, or the secretary says, this person does not have insurance, do you 
wanna see them? I think it’d almost depend on my mood that day [laugh]. 
I mean, I may say sure send them in, or, no I do not have time for this, 
send them to an urgent care. I think it’d also depend on his condition you 
know, if he had a really severe condition then maybe I would not be able 
to treat him so I would need to send him to emergency room, maybe call 
him an ambulance or something ... say, he sliced his hand or something 
while he was working in the field, [laugh]. So, maybe I would not feel 
comfortable taking that patient in, you know, it’s kind of… but if it was a 
nonprofit place like a hospital, then I think you’d have to treat that person, 
you know. It all depends on your mission statement. [He can’t go to an 
urgent care or hospital because he is undocumented, and he does not need 
to go to ER, he is just been vomiting and has diarrhea. Needs simple 
stabilizing]. Sure, I’d talk to them, if I had the time. [What if you don’t 
have the time, but he is dying?] Well, if I don’t have the time, then I might 
not be able to see him, ah ... [Laugh]. I don’t know. [But you do have the 
time because he has an appointment and he is showing up in his own time 
slot, you just learned that he doesn’t have insurance though. Would you 
still see him in that time slot?] Yeah. Yeah…. I guess so. I mean, if I had 
the time, and if I was in a good mood, sure. I’ll see him. [MS3] 
 
Exemplar statements coming from those students who responded with “no” to the 
question of whether they would be willing to treat the undocumented patient who cannot 
afford to pay the fees.  
I think like, it may also be possible to have a person designated for that, 
like if one person comes like that who is in a life and death situation then 
there will be a designated doctor that helps them, which is obviously like 
morally and ethically great but it’s take a toll on your practice, and so 
there are really a lot of important things to think of if you are in that 
situation. So if you are in this situation that you get people coming in, I’d 
want to let them know about the services nearby who can help them 
longitudinally because it probably isn’t sustainable anyways, since like 
everything you need for their treatment needs money, like if it’s that lab or 
the imaging or anything like that, they all charge money and you can’t just 
pay all of that out of pocket to treat this patient. So, knowing about the 
local services that can provide free healthcare services for people, and 
helping that person get to them and register for whatever service that they 




I agree with that, because you are still helping them but necessarily by 
treating them yourself, but by referring them to the right services where 
they do not put a toll to the local practice. So I thing that’s a good balance 
between interests of all sides. [MS1] 
 
Points of Diffraction. 
Points of Incompatibility. What different positions are taken regarding codes of 
morality as it relates to treating the sick person? 
A. Some medical students draw their moral values from their religion (e.g., 
Christianity, Buddhism).  
B. Some medical students draw their moral values from humanistic philosophy 
(e.g., traits such as empathy), their families- especially parents, the way they 
were raised, the overall commonality, personal feelings, and laws.  
C. Some medical students say they have a code of morality (any of the above) 
and directly draw from it when confronted by a tough clinical scenario.  
D. Some medical students say they have a code of morality but they do not draw 
from it when confronted by a tough clinical scenario.  
Points of Equivalence. The above four strategic choices are equally possible to 
emerge on the surface of modern medical discourse because they all share the same 
conditions of existence including the following two rules for their formation.  
1. Rules concerning the economy of discursive constellation 
Again, the strategic choices made above depend on the general constellation of 
discourses in which medical discourse is located. We know that modern medical science 
is positioned in the same discursive constellation with natural sciences, technology, 
business, and capitalism. As a consequence of being in the same discursive constellation 
with natural sciences medicine tends to identify with objectivity and value-neutral nature 
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of hard sciences rather than humanistic values of medical humanities and social sciences. 
Let us look at a couple of student statements below:  
I think it also brings up a good point of like, how we learn the scientific 
stuff in school, we become really hard in terms of like vaccines are good, 
you know change programs are good, and then anything against that we 
become very objective, I guess, so like we are entirely just [objective-
minded] [MS1] 
 
I don’t want to say science is superior, but that’s what we know and are 
taught. [MS3] 
 
Moreover, being in the same constellation with business and capitalist culture, people 
involved in medicine are often under the influence of a profit-based and self-centeredness 
goals in social relations, including medical practice. That is one reason why many of the 
students cannot see the humanistic value of practicing medicine and rather pursue it for 
their own self-interest. Here is an example of a statement from a student supporting this 
claim: 
At least from my experience, there are a lot of business models that are 
coming to medicine it is just another style of a primary thing… Morally, 
that sounds right to you like, on the street, like, you should treat everyone 
you can at the same time well what happens to the patients who can afford 
the treatment, if you don’t stay up to date with your practice and facility 
because you can’t afford the fees of the building, or whatever it is that you 
need to pay for in order to have a private practice. [MS1] 
 
It rather shows that the healthcare system and the way it is set up based on the models 
borrowed from business administration and management discourses is not supporting the 
humanity/morality of medicine. Rather, it’s inherently opposed to it. 
As a result of medicine not being in the same constellation with medical 
humanities, these fields do not share much in terms of using each other’s research and 
scholarship. Humanities including morality is not being taught in medical school so even 
those students who want to see the humanistic side of medical practice do not have a 
389 
 
clear idea about how exactly that should work. As a result, student responses were all 
over the place, as is noted in this section. It is remarkable that this matter receives little to 
no attention from the current education system. The problem is that students find it 
difficult and at times simply impossible to do what they feel is right as human beings. 
They are bound by the system that limits the things they can say, do, and even think about 
in modern medical discourse. On the other hand, there is no reward or punishment system 
setup in medical education to require - or at least encourage - students to think about 
medical morality and how it can be practiced by physicians under difficult clinical 
circumstances. Rather, the focus of medical education is on teaching students the 
scientific medical knowledge and avoiding as many subjective topics and attitudes as 
possible. The question is: Are these subjective attitudes important in healthcare delivery 
and shaping the discourse of medicine in the society? Are these subjective takes and 
codes important in shaping professional identity of our future doctors? I would like to 
affirm: yes they are.  
2. Rules concerning the nondiscursive structures 
As a result of the heavy focus on teaching the hard science of medicine in medical 
school, objectivity and value-neutrality are often indirectly promoted throughout the 
medical training. In the hospitals, in addition to the scientific objectivity, the business 
models for management of care for the patient is under the spotlight. Humanities have a 
very small part in formal medical education and therefore only minimal interest or 
attention is paid to research produced in the fields of medical humanities. The two main 
nondiscursive structures where medical discourse resides are the medical school and 
hospital. Below are exemplar student comments about how the rules and regulations in 
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these two structures affect who they are as medical professionals and their desire to do 
better. The following statements illustrate how these nondiscursive structures (including 
the system that backs them up) shape professional identity of students by limiting the 
possibility of things they can do as physicians in the future. Many students are now only 
aware but they also advocate against the limiting current healthcare system that creates 
tension between the individual doctor’s wants and desires and what is being dictated by 
the system itself. 
Exemplar statements denoting the clash between individual and the system:  
This really reminds me of some conversations people have about faith, and 
I don’t wanna talk about any specific faith or anything but this contrast 
between these ideals, high values that people are taught about, and then 
like what actually happens in the real world… at least for me, I have this 
sense of like what my ideal role as a physician would be and my ideal 
responsibility. For example, I feel like I want to profess to people that I 
have like a commitment to say like a preferential option for the poor. But 
the understanding that there is this very real sense that it’s just not a thing 
that’s always going to be able to happen or like that we serve this high 
value system or like we serve our profession or something.  But in reality, 
we all are sort of employed by private entities, or employed by the state, or 
like, we receive money you know, and so that tug of war, it’s just like, 
inherent to the job… so we are all very aware, and I am not challenging 
anybody who is saying this, it’s their right, when you are a realist 
somehow you get more things done, right… or people who are like, oh 
that’s nice to say, you know, that like, you’ll treat every undocumented 
immigrant, in fact you want to have only undocumented immigrants as 
your clients, so that would be something that I’d want to say, right? But 
it’s like, oh then how many people are you really gonna help, because 
you’re not gonna have resources or something, you know, like, these 
debates are really like inherent in moving forward and I think a 
disillusionment that happens at some point in the career ends up leading to 
burn out and stuff, I don’t know. [MS1] 
 
I feel like, there is definitely sort of a teaching of a system of ethics, or 
like an ethical identity that we are being asked to take on, but then that 
identity is just gonna get challenged and muddled all the time, so it’s like 
important to be able to maintain that while being able to operate in the real 
world. So, there is a component for us to advocate for our patients that the 
system may not advocate for them, so we are gonna be the first people to 
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set the regulations right ... and I wanna treat these people, if you get yelled 
at for treating people who can’t pay, you gotta push back on that. So, like 
we are still able to advocate for them. [MS1] 
 
The other thing to think about is that if it’s a private practice, then you are 
responsible for paying your team. So, like if half of your patients are on 
Medicaid or something, well then, you’d have to consider that that means 
you’ll not be able to pay your team. That’s something that you would want 
to consider too, I mean how can we like, I mean obviously, you’ll still 
treat the patient but like, how can we get rid of these things that are on our 
way? [MS2] 
 
Who is Most Deserving of Care? Attitudes Leading to Equity/Disparity in Patient Care.  
In this section we will see medical students’ statements on how to determine the most 
deserving patient to receive attention and care at the hospital. Some of the statements 
below are pulled from interview data whereas others were stated in response to the 
following focus group prompt # 3 (see FG Protocol, Appendix D). Students were also 
told to assume that none of the three patients are in a critical condition or else that might 
just determine the choice of patient to visit first. Here is what they were told at the 
beginning of the discussion: “Let’s say, all 3 of them were in a motor-vehicle accident 
and got the exact same experience. Like their injuries are the same, there is no health-
based thing that you’d say like oh, this person has celiac disease or that person has a 
bronchitis.” Student responses can be divided into two categories: 1) responses from 
students who feel bound by principles of social justice and equity in healthcare delivery, 
and 2) responses from those who do not feel bound by principles of social justice in 
healthcare delivery system. Below are exemplary statements from each group.   
1. Those who advocate for equity in healthcare delivery are basing their opinions 




Exemplar statements supporting equity that are based on principles of social 
justice and person experiences:  
It’s possible that the system in which you work tends to exclude the 
population that you’d like to serve. Like, we were just talking about the 
“Others” in healthcare system. I think, many people tend to see it as 
though being a low-income is the person’s own fault, while it’s mostly the 
system that either maliciously Othered them or just didn’t know how to 
include them to the current structures. And I think to have an innovative 
mindset [as a doctor] is to look at something that is in front of you, and not 
only linking it to its immediate manifestations, but also linking it to a 
greater context which is probably the cause of it. And being able to 
innovate the system that caused that situation. [141] 
 
Exemplar statements supporting equity that are based on the doctor’s personal and or 
professional judgments:  
I’d probably lean toward the homeless person for the reasoning that he has 
been through medical system and has kind of been let to fall through the 
cracks so ... I mean he has been here before and this is his 4th time being 
admitted ... As far as the 80-year-old lady, I mean, just because you 
happen to be married to someone who is also a doctor, I’d not put them 
before my other patients. [MS1] 
 
In terms of helping someone who… I think I’d go and help the homeless 
person because he keeps discharging himself so you know, maybe he will 
discharge himself again if I leave him to be helped by interns or… I would 
not just choose patient A.  Obviously, if A is the one who is most sick then 
maybe, but I do not wanna just choose her because she is the wife of an 
attending. That’s not… [MS2] 
 
I think that is exactly why they need your help, because if they are not able 
to take care of himself then he needs help and that’s why he is here at the 
hospital. The other two patients will seek help whether or not you help 
them here today, they will go and seek help elsewhere, whereas C is 
someone who is struggling, and he needs your attention and help. [MS3] 
 
Exemplar statements supporting equity that are based on the feeling of empathy–where 
the doctor is thinking from the patient’s perspective:  
To me, as a patient, I believe he needs more of our attention, and in the 
grand scheme of the case, I think sometimes you can be really less 
fortunate like, maybe you met with someone, whom, like you needed a 
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little extra time, you know, trying to encourage you a bit more to stay and 
believe in your treatment, you know, so…. [MS4] 
 
2. Those who do not feel bound by the principles of equity and social justice in 
healthcare delivery use concepts such as professional courtesy, fear of 
disobedience punishable by superiors, personal judgment and career ambition 
in order to determine which patient is the most deserving of their time and 
attention.  
Exemplar statements not supporting equity that are based on the concept of 
professional courtesy: 
It’s the professional courtesy of some sort so, I don’t know. In my 
experience, I have seen people cut the line 3 times because they were 
related to someone inside, not because they were medically urgent, like, 
there were people who were more sick than them, but they did that… so, it 
happens, it happens all the time. And I talked to a doctor afterwards and 
they justified it, they were like, this is our professional courtesy so we do 
that. If we don’t take care of ourselves then who will? [MS1] 
 
I used to work at an urgent care and there was no real triage system. So, 
basically, they see people, like, those who are actually their friends or 
families in the place of a patient who is supposed to be on the chart; and 
one time they cut like 115 people in this g-technology device called a 
PPD, and he was like, “oh, it’s just a PPD”, so… yeah. [MS1] 
 
Exemplar statements not supporting equity that are based on the fear of disobedience 
punishable by superiors: 
So, I can also see like, if I want to go and talk to patient C, and my boss 
comes to me and he is like, why were you talking to this homeless person 
who keeps leaving all the time, he is not even interested to take care of 
himself, and like, why didn’t you go talk to so and so’s wife instead ... So, 
that can be a very real situation! So, like, I chose C, like, I am not super 
afraid about the consequences, but I am also aware that it exists. So, like, 
A is also something that I might have to consider because if I just went to 
see C then I might have to be answerable to my boss later as to why I 




Okay, [laugh] so, I think we are seeing the situation as idealist students, 
but once we get into practice, I don’t know the pressures that would be 
there at that moment, like, I can’t appreciate the pressures of actual 
clinical practice at this early stage in our education, so it’s possible that in 
that case I’d lean towards patient A [who is an attending’s wife rather than 
the homeless patient]. [MS1] 
 
Exemplar statements not supporting equity that are based on the doctor’s personal 
judgment and career ambitions: 
Oh, tough… okay. I would not choose the homeless guy because he is 
noncompliant. Even though I worked with homeless people, I mean, you 
can’t help somebody who does not want to help himself. And between the 
other two, chance of getting sued or upsetting the attending physician, 
mmh… Being completely honest, I’d probably, you know, I’ve got 10 
minutes only and the 80-year-old women is very talkative. Normally I’d 
go have a little chat with her, I mean 10 minutes would be enough for a 
little chat, but she might take too long so… otherwise I might choose her. 
But with 10 minutes, I wanna choose the easiest one because I am being 
crushed for time here, so I just wanna pop-in and give somebody some 
information and check up on them ... So, with 10 minutes I’d visit B, with 
20 or 30 minutes, I’d set down with the 80-year-old woman and chat with 
her, and try to make a good impression on her. [MS3] 
 
Points of Diffraction. 
Points of Incompatibility. What different positions are taken for determining 
which patient is most deserving of medical care? 
A. Some say all patients are equally deserving of care but if the doctor is being 
pressed for time then he/she should go with the patient that requires most 
medically complicated treatment. 
B. Some believe patients can be categorized into more important and less 
important categories by making use of concepts such as: doctor’s personal 
judgment, career ambition, professional courtesy, and fear of disobedience 
punishable by doctor’s superiors.  
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Points of Equivalence. The strategic choices above have an equal chance of 
surfacing at the level of the medical discourse because they share the same conditions of 
existence, including the following two rules for their formation as possible strategic 
choices that can be made in modern medical discourse: 
1. Rules concerning the economy of discursive constellation 
Just like any other strategic choices that are possible made in modern discourse of 
medicine, the strategic choices made above depend on the general constellation of 
discourses in which medical discourse is located. We know that modern medical science 
is positioned in the same discursive constellation with natural sciences, technology, 
business, and capitalism. As a consequence of being in the same discursive constellation 
with natural sciences medicine tends to identify with objectivity and value-neutral nature 
of hard sciences rather than humanistic values of medical humanities and social sciences. 
Moreover, being in the same constellation with business and capitalist culture, people 
involved in medicine are often under the influence of a profit-based and self-centeredness 
goals in social relations, including medical practice.  
All in all, for many people doing medicine is simply about having a job that pays 
well and having a high status in society. They want to keep their job and are likely to 
have ambitions of getting promoted, so they want need to be nice to their superiors in 
order to facilitate that. In the meantime, as they are busy doing all this, are they likely to 
create further disparities in healthcare delivery as they practice, in the name of their own 
personal benefits, ambitions, and professional courtesy? The answer is yes–as we have 
seen in this section already. Of course, this is not true for all physicians, however, it is 
true for many of them and that should be enough to stimulate medical educators and 
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policy makers to pay further attention to the matter if they are hoping to decrease the 
disparities in healthcare delivery that frequently happen in the U.S. society due to these 
and other similar reasons.  
2. Rules concerning the nondiscursive structures 
Again, as a result of the heavy focus on teaching the hard science of medicine in 
medical school, objectivity and value-neutrality are indirectly promoted throughout the 
medical training. In the hospitals, in addition to the scientific objectivity, the business 
models for management of care for the patient is under the spotlight. Humanities have a 
very small part in formal medical education and therefore only minimal interest or 
attention is paid to research produced in the fields of medical humanities. The two main 
nondiscursive structures where medical discourse resides are medical school and hospital. 
Below are exemplar student comments about how the rules and regulations in these two 
structures affect who they are as medical professionals and their desire to do better. The 
following statements illustrate how these nondiscursive structures (including the system 
that backs them up) shape professional identity of students by limiting the possibility of 
things they can do as physicians in the future. Many students are now only aware but they 
also advocate against the limiting current healthcare system that creates tension between 
the individual doctor’s wants and desires and what is being dictated by the system itself. 
Exemplar statements denoting the clash between individual and the system:  
So, I’d lean toward the homeless person but I can’t say for sure because it 
just depends on the environment, like, as of my experience right now, it’s 
not like, because I know someone, I’m gonna treat you this way or I’ll 
treat you before so and so. But I have not even been through the clinical 
years yet, so… [MS1] 
 
So there are like some ethical ideas that we got introduced to in our 
preclinical years, like, we shouldn’t think about things like the hospitals 
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getting sued, or like, somebody who is related to a physician or something 
like that in terms of a problem. But I have the impression that it is a big 
scene of medical life.  [MS1] 
 
Doctor-Patient Relationship: Idealistic and Humane or Just A Job Requirement? In this 
section, I will report student statements about the nature of a doctor-patient relationship. 
While some students were inclined to attach some sort of transcendental, sacred, and 
idealistic traits to the relationship between a doctor and patient, other students admitted 
that sooner or later, the relationship becomes part of the doctor’s job. The latter cohort 
believes that just because the doctors are involved with personal information about their 
patients it does not mean that they personally care to know about those things and have a 
real human to human relationship with the patient. Below, I will provide exemplary 
comments from both groups of students. Some of these statements below are pulled from 
the interview transcripts whereas the rest were statements provided in response to the 
focus group prompt # 1 (see FG Protocol, Appendix D ).  
1. Some say that a doctor-patient relationship is more than just a job getting done 
on part of the doctor. They say this relationship is more humane because it is 
deeper, stronger, more intimate, and personal.  
So, I think there is some level of similarity between doctors, butchers and 
plumbers, because you are still receiving a service and you are paying for 
a service. But I think when it comes to doctors you need to have a little 
more of a personal relationship, a more deeper relationship than just a 
plumber or butcher. Because that’s someone whom you trust to tell your 
personal history. So, it’s the person who kind of runs through that type of 
information by your choice. [MS1] 
 
I think just generally, doctors taking a patient’s life history, I think it runs 
through certain aspects of things, in it can be kind of a 5-minute job versus 
3 days for a plumber. It’s just that the medical work is gonna be different 




I think even if you are that doctor who is not making any attempts to make 
personal connections, when you look at the full spectrum of it, you still 
have a more intimate relationship simply because, that person is gonna be 
working on your body ... So, I think even though you’re as cold as 
possible, it’s still gonna be a different relationship. [MS2] 
 
It is also said that the doctor-patient relationship is more humane because it is sensitive, 
high-stakes for the patient, and there needs to be trust on both sides for this relationship 
to work.  
I think there are certain matters that you probably don’t want to discuss 
with anyone else, it’s just with your plumbers. And certain matters are 
limited to your relationship to your doctor. Like some patients will share 
with us things that they have never really shared with anyone else, and we 
are being trusted to carry that to the extent that our relationship with that 
patient holds up.  [MS2]  
 
I think the service that doctors provide are a little bit more important, not 
saying that doctors are more important but, my health is more valuable to 
me than my toilet and the quality of meat that I get, you know. So, the type 
of service is a little bit higher stakes, I think. It’s more intimate. And 
you’re not (hopefully) being judged by your doctor for the health 
condition you have, it’s really important in doctor-patient relationship to 
feel like you’re not gonna be judged by your doctor so it’s more intimate I 
think, and it’s more sensitive. [MS4] 
 
So, the type of service you are providing makes it different that these 
alleged professions, and that it’s more sensitive information and there 
needs to be more trust and more feeling of like you’re not being judged. 
[MS4] 
 
2. Some say just because the doctors have access to more intimate information 
about patients, it does not mean they care about those patients. This cohort 
says sooner or later it become more like a job for the doctor - where patients 
merely receive the service that they are paying for.  
I mean, the point is like, so many doctors are just doing their job. So, if 
they are asking for your detailed information it’s because they need it for 
the history not that they actually care, okay?! That’s what this [the quote 
in the prompt] says, like, they are not actually your friends, they are just 
doing their job, just like the butcher is doing his job. I think some doctors, 
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it’s sadly true, that they get it done but they do not actually care about 
people. I think it’s hard to become the doctor who actually cares. [MS2] 
 
So, just because it’s a more intimate physical relationship between you 
and your doctor, it does not necessarily imply that they care, and that they 
have your best interest at heart. I mean, this is certainly not true for most 
doctors but I think to a certain group of doctors, it could be true. [MS2] 
 
I think people sometimes look at us like we are their friends, and I think 
it’s about the intimacy of how we have to get information and what type of 
information. That’s the type of information that they may share only with 
their close friends so they may look at us like their friends, but in actuality, 
we are not what I would define as a “friend” per say, that’s not what we 
are. [MS4] 
 
I don’t know because I have had some experience with doctors before, like 
not really good ones. I’d actually tend to agree in the sense that doctors are 
no different than anyone else. And there are good doctors and there are 
bad doctors, just like, there are good plumbers and bad plumbers, you 
know. Some plumbers really care about their job, you know, they really 
wanna do a good job for you. And I think it’s the same way with some 
doctors. They really care about their patients and they love them and 
wanna do whatever they can for them. But then, some other doctors you 
know, like, if they have had to meet with 50 patients that day, they just 
wanna get through it as quickly as possible and so, I’d say in some ways I 
agree with it the quote. [MS4] 
 
Points of Diffraction. 
Points of Incompatibility. What different positions are taken regarding the nature 
of the doctor-patient relationship? 
A. Some say the doctor-patient relationship is inherently more humane than other 
services that are simply provided in return for payment. They say this is so 
because the relationship is deeper, strong, intimate, personal, high-stakes, and 
trust is required on both sides for this relationship to work.  
B. Some say the doctor-patient relationship is not always so humane. They say 
there are doctors who do not really care about their patient but simply do their 
job of providing them with medical treatment. This can be due to lack of time 
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and energy the doctors usually have to invest in order to build more humane 
relationships with their patients.  
Points of Equivalence. Theoretical choices made above have an equal chance of 
emerging on the surface of medical discourse due to the fact that they both share the same 
conditions of existence, including the following two rules for their formation as strategies 
that are possible to be made in modern medical discourse. 
1. Rules concerning the economy of discursive constellation 
Again, the strategic choices made above depend on the general constellation of 
discourses in which medical discourse is located. We know that modern medical science 
is positioned in the same discursive constellation with natural sciences, technology, 
business, and capitalism. As a consequence of being in the same discursive constellation 
with natural sciences medicine tends to identify with objectivity and value-neutral nature 
of hard sciences rather than humanistic values of medical humanities and social sciences. 
Here is a student comment that sums it up:  
I think the quote really advises to the preclinical years really well, in terms 
of like, uh… butchers and plumbers, really does make me think about 
what I am doing, you know ... so just speaking of the pressure and things 
like that… and how you end up learning just a lot of biomechanics and a 
lot of like, this muscle connects this bones, and this muscles connects this 
muscle, if you don’t watch out - it can be really distracting you from the 
big picture of why you are here in the first place. So, the quote [about 
plumbers and butchers] is really interesting in general. [MS1] 
 
The problem is that with such a huge focus of modern medical education on mechanical 
and technical training of medical students, how can one expect them to think personal 
about medicine? Furthermore, being in the same constellation with business and capitalist 
culture, people involved in medicine are often under the influence of a profit-based and 
self-centeredness goals in social relations, including medical practice. That is one reason 
401 
 
why many of the students cannot see the humanistic value of practicing medicine and 
rather pursue it for their own self-interest. The idea of being a doctor is no different than 
the idea of having any cool job that can get them financial stability and a high status in 
the society. Here is a student comment touching the core of the issue:  
In my experience with shadowing a lot of doctors, the general attitude is I 
think kind of more realistic… I think what is said in the quote is the ideal, 
that’s the goal. Like, especially modern medicine with kind of having 
most of their time spent on modern technology and stuff, it can seem like 
an occupation a lot. It has become a conveyor belt of patients. I think there 
is still an element of, like, in order to be efficient, you kind of have to 
numb yourself to the interests of others and I think that’s where you need 
that 6th sense to be still able to see the human aspect of it.  [MS1] 
 
As a result of medicine not being in the same constellation with medical humanities, 
these fields do not share much in terms of using each other’s research and scholarship. 
Humanities including morality is not being taught in medical school so even those 
students who want to see the humanistic side of medical practice do not have a clear idea 
about how exactly that should work.  
2. Rules concerning the nondiscursive structures 
With the heavy focus on teaching the hard science of medicine in medical school, 
objectivity and value-neutrality are indirectly promoted throughout the medical training. 
In the hospitals, in addition to the scientific objectivity, the business models for 
management of care for the patient is under the spotlight. Humanities have a very small 
part in formal medical education and therefore only minimal interest or attention is paid 
to research produced in the fields of medical humanities. The two main nondiscursive 
structures where medical discourse resides are the medical school and hospital. Below are 
exemplar student comments about how the rules and regulations in these two structures 
affect who they are as medical professionals and their desire to do better. The following 
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statements illustrate how these nondiscursive structures (including the system that backs 
them up) shape professional identity of students by limiting the possibility of things they 
can do as physicians in the future. Many students are now only aware but they also 
advocate against the limiting current healthcare system that creates tension between the 
individual doctor’s wants and desires and what is being dictated by the system itself. For 
example, in this study, many students believed that it would be ideal to develop intimate, 
personal and humane relationships with their patients, if they would have the time and 
energy to do it. They thought it would make their work more enjoyable to know their 
patients on a personal level. However, developing relationships like that requires time 
and energy that is difficult to invest while working under normal hospital environments. 
Doctors do not have enough time to invest getting to know their patients when they did 
not even get enough sleep the night before and they are seeing so many patients during 
the day. 
Exemplar statements indicating the clash between individual and the system:  
You do not have time due to being student or doctor, you can’t afford to 
invest a lot of time in your patients to become intimate with them. The 
system is just not set up in a way that could support this more humane 
relationships between doctor and patient… I was just thinking of my 
friendships this year in class and also in undergrad, you are now running 
out of time for a lot of people you care about, I think, entering this phase 
of life [being a medical trainee]… I mean, a lot of professional people I 
know that have to develop these intimate relationships but they have to be 
very sort of professional with the people they are taking care of because if 
they start to get close and deeper, then they sort of end up dropping some 
other plates they have been spinning, you know. So, I just think that the 
word “friend” is not very interesting to think about in terms of being a 
doctor or something. [MS1]  
 
My experiences in the clinic has mostly been just routine checkups. I did 
not come out of it super happy, like oh yeah, this is what I wanna do every 
day. And I understand that they are busy. Especially now as a medical 
student I know how much stuff they have to deal with, how much charting 
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they need to complete, how many patients they have to see, how many 
shadowing etc.  I know that doctors sometimes have to schedule multiple 
patients at the same time because the odds are that someone will not show 
up. So, they end up having to see too many patients sometimes. Plus, if 
both patients do show up, then someone is gonna be waiting. [012] 
 
I think it’s kind of a shame, like, so if I go and shadow in a clinic. The 
physician sees a patient every 20 minutes and has to spend hours and 
hours charting so they can get the billing codes, reimbursement and all 
that. I think that kind of takes away from the experience of the physician 
where your one goal should be to spend as much time as you can with the 
patient. You have to chart, obviously, but I think when you have to chart to 
get your money, that’s the way for you to get reimbursement, then I do not 
think that is right. Then I can see why people would lie, or cut down their 
patients’ times so they can chart more and get reimbursed for it. I think 
that’s just a shame. And then, they don’t have time for medical student 
because things are so rushed, you don’t have any time to waste. So, like, 
my parents chart until like 9 PM sometimes. And it makes them hate what 
they do. Which is why I think being med student is better because you 
don’t have to do anything like that and instead you can just go and 
hangout with the patient. [063] 
 
Points of Systematization. Here, we will establish the link between all strategic 
choices that involve the sick person and see how they affect rules of formation for sick 
person as an object of discourse, the rules of formation for enunciative modalities about 
the sick person, and lastly, the concepts related to the sick person in the modern medical 
discourse. Points of systematization entail how each strategy contributes in production of 
statements (commentary) about an object, the types of statements about that object, and 
concepts that are born out of the specific relations among the rules of formation for 
objects and statement modalities. In this sense, as Foucault points out, “points of 
diffraction also represent the link points of systematization” (Foucault, 1972, p. 66).  
Figure 4.11 summarizes theoretical strategies related to all four objects of modern 





Archaeological Model of Theoretical Strategies in Modern Medical Discourse 
 
 
The strategies choices made in relation to the sick persons above (e.g., using or 
not using religion as a personal code of morality, advocating for equity or disparity in 
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healthcare delivery, and having or not having an idealistic relationship the patient) 
represent systematically different ways: of treating the sick person as an object of medical 
discourse (delimiting it, grouping and classifying it), of arranging modalities of statement 
about sick person (choosing them, placing them, and composing them), and of 
manipulating concepts regarding the sick person (determining rules for their use and 
constituting the conceptual architecture of modern medical discourse related to the sick 
person). In other words, the strategic choices made above are regulated ways of 
“practicing the possibilities of discourse” (Foucault, 1972, p. 70). For example, we know 
that doctors and other healthcare professionals are among the most important authorities 
of delimitation for the sick person as an object of medical discourse. Doing so, they draw 
from the authority of medical school, hospital, and the institution of medicine in general. 
People are most likely to follow their statements and deem them as credible because they 
are based on these magnificent authorities. Now, if a student chooses to develop a 
personal code of morality which he/she will use when confronted by touch clinical 
scenarios involving the sick person, this choice will definitely affect his/her professional 
identity as a doctor in the future. The way she sees the sick person as an authority of 
delimitation, the way she chooses to use the authority of medicine in relation to the sick 
person, the way she chooses to talk about the sick person, and finally the way she chooses 
to manipulate the concepts related to the sick person will all be affected by her this early 
choice of developing a code of morality and use it as a doctor while still in medical 
school. For instance, this student is more likely to become a doctor who sees the patient 
as a whole person and choose to build a human-to-human relationship with the patient 
rather than entering into a business-like relationship with them. This doctor is also less 
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likely to use paternalistic statements when talking about the sick person–whether in a 
surgical specialty or not–she is more likely to refer to the patient as a whole person and 
not just as an object of her medical practice. All this will create a unique way of 
producing commentary about the sick person in medical discourse and it is likely to affect 
other junior doctors around this one doctor who might see her as a role model in the 
clinic and try to learn from her the appropriate ways of dealing with the sick people.  
This entire scenario is also true about the opposite case, where a student chooses 
not to adopt a strong code of morality and use it to guide their decisions when practicing 
medicine on sick people. This decision too will affect the student’s future professional 
identity as a doctor and will give rise to unique commentary and statements coming from 
her regarding how to sort out and handle the sick people in the clinic. It is how medical 
discourse is constantly being produced by people who are involved in it at the hospitals, 
to take an example. The reason one can often see different and sometimes opposing 
behaviors toward the sick people coming from different doctors is that they each are 
using a systematically different way of handling a certain object of medical discourse: the 
sick person.  
Moreover, it is important to show how different strategic choices are linked to the 
function carried out by modern medical discourse in the practice of current capitalistic 
culture; and the role medicine plays in the realization of interests and desires of the upper 
class in society. Modern medical discourse is defined by “a certain constant way of 
relating possibilities of systematization interior to a discourse, other discourses that are 
exterior to it, and a whole nondiscursive  field of practices, appropriation, interests, and 
desires” (Foucault, 1972, p. 69). With gigantic companies running the health insurance, 
407 
 
pharmaceuticals and money coming from for-profit hospitals and other healthcare 
organizations, one can see that certain choices are made by the upper class in society, 
which determine the way medical discourse is shaped. It is these business-owners 
collectively who establish the system that doctors are expected to fit in if they want to 
have a job as a doctor at a certain hospital. On the other hand, doctors who are getting 
trained in objectivity of medical sciences and have the options of not developing and 
using a personal moral code, opting for practices that create disparity in healthcare 
delivery, and treating their patients as though they were customer in the healthcare 
business that are actually more beneficial to the overall capitalistic, business-oriented 
culture of the modern US society. With medicine being dependent upon enormous 
business industries such health insurance and pharmaceutical companies to name a 
couple, doctors being trained in medical humanities, developing traits such as humanistic 
moral codes and traits like empathy and compassion, and developing humane 
relationships with their patients will not be best suited to serve the interests and desires of 
the capitalistic society where the goal is to serve the rich and ignore the poor.  
Archaeological Analysis at the Level of the Discursive Relations 
In the previous section I described several discursive elements including various 
objects, modalities of statement, concepts and theoretical strategies as part of the modern 
discourse of medicine. However, the task of an archaeological analysis is to not only 
locate and describe the elements but also establish the framework of the discursive 
formation that one is analyzing. As Foucault says, “how can one speak of a ‘system of 
formation’ if one knows only a series of different, heterogeneous determinations, lacking 
attributable links and relations?” (Foucault, 1972, p. 43). It is by establishing these 
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relations among discursive elements and between the rules for the formation of these 
elements that one can describe a discursive formation.  
It is worth emphasizing here that most of what goes under rules of formation, the 
relations among the rules of formation and, hence, the conditions of existence for a 
discursive element in an archaeological study does not and cannot come directly from the 
data. In this study, I have used data mainly to identify and support the elements of 
discourse in modern medicine, and wherever possible, for supporting the rules, relations, 
and conditions of existence that are the results of my analysis of the data. In other words, 
in an archaeological analysis data is used to point out the dots for the analyst, but it is the 
job of the analyst to connect those dots through providing commentary on the data. It is 
this commentary that establishes many of the rules, relations and conditions in discourse. 
In his own archaeological studies, Foucault never used a lot of directly obtained data to 
come up even with the elements of discourse. While he uses some data to back up his 
elements, he does not use almost any data to support his own commentary that, at times, 
contains his personal and moral judgments in relation to the discursive elements and 
rules9. In this study, I follow the same course of action as Foucault. As mentioned above, 
I have used data mainly to come up with the dots as the basic discursive elements. 
However, in order to establish the rules, relation, and conditions of existence for those 
elements, I have provided my own commentaries on the data, which, of course, reflect 
from my personal lens through which I see the world.  
                                               
9 See MC (Foucault, 1988) and BC (Foucault, 1975) for examples of how Foucault did his own 
archaeologies. However, it must be noted that Foucault’s archaeologies before he wrote AK (1972) are only 
preliminary works that paved the way for the development of a full-blown methodology presented for the 
first time in AK. In AK, Foucault clearly puts the burden of analysis on the shoulders of the archaeologist 
to establish the rules, relations, and conditions without making any suggestions on the use of primary data.  
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In this final section of the current chapter, I would like to discuss some of the 
discursive relations that have not be addressed yet. Many of the relation have already 
been looked at in this chapter (e.g., relations among different types of a single object, 
relations among rules for the formation of the same discursive element including objects, 
statement modalities and concepts. What we have not yet covered are the relations among 
different discursive elements, for example: relations between the four objects of medical 
discourse (i.e., disease and treatment, human body, the doctor and the sick person), 
relations between various modalities of statements regardless of what object they refer to, 
relations between the three rules for formation of discursive concepts (i.e., forms of 
succession, forms of coexistence, and procedures of intervention) related to all four 
objects of medical discourse. Some of these relations will be addressed in this section.  
It is worth reiterating here that an archaeological analysis is never a complete 
project that can describe a discursive formation once and for all. The field of statements 
is fluid and is constantly changing. Any archeological analysis is at best a cross-sectional 
examination of the local and regional discursive formation at a certain point in time. 
Having said that, it is not possible to locate and report every single discursive element in 
the discursive formation that is being analyzed by archaeology; for example, I was not 
able to locate any strategic choices about the disease and its treatment in this study. Also, 
it is not possible to locate and report all possible relations between discursive elements. A 
single archaeological analysis can capture at best some of them but not all. Therefore, I 
will be reporting the groups of relations that have emerged on the surface of the modern 
medical discourse through the data that was collected in this study. It is possible that there 
are other discursive elements and other discursive relations that were not captured by the 
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analysis done in the present study. I would like to quote Foucault here to support the 
reasoning above: 
What are described as ‘systems of formation’ do not constitute the 
terminal stage of discourse, if by that term one means the texts (or words) 
as they appear, with their vocabulary, syntax, logical structure, or 
rhetorical organization. Analysis remains anterior to this manifest level, 
which is that of the completed construction: in defining the principle of 
distributing objects in a discourse, it does not take into account all their 
connections, their delicate structure, or their internal sub-divisions; in 
seeking the law of the dispersion of concepts, it does not take into account 
all the processes of elaboration, or all the deductive series in which they 
may figure; if analysis studies the modalities of enunciation, it questions 
neither the style nor the succession of the sentences; in short, it leaves the 
final placing of the text in dotted outline (Foucault, 1972, p. 75). 
 
On this note, let us now begin examining some of the remaining relations that link the 
elements of discourse in the discursive formation of modern medicine.   
Objects 
The basic relations related to discursive objects were discussed where I described 
the conditions of existence for the objects in the previous section. Here, I will go over the 
relations among the four objects of discourse that were noted in this study: disease and 
treatment, human body, the doctor, and the sick person. First, it is interesting to see the 
same field of modern medical discourse gives rise to different types of objects that are 
coming from different surfaces of emergence, dealt by different authorities of 
delimitation, and therefore, have different grids of specification. Among the four objects 
of medical discourse, the one that is spoken about the most is by far disease and 
treatment. It requires the most concrete type of knowledge to talk about this object 
(medical scientific knowledge) and for some reason many doctors feel most comfortable 
talking about this object rather than any of the other ones. Talking about disease and 
treatment involves the highest level of objectivity and value-neutrality, which many 
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doctors actually feel comfortable with. The second most spoken object, which also 
incorporates mostly medical scientific knowledge, is the human body. Doctors talking 
about the body often use scientific information to describe the structure and function of 
the body. The remaining two objectives, the doctor (as a function) and the sick person are 
the least spoken about. There are only certain types of discussions (e.g., professionalism, 
medical ethics, medical humanities, etc.) that would require the doctor or the medical 
community in general to talk about these two objects. As for credibility too, the talk about 
body and disease and treatment are the kind of talk that is going to be deemed as most 
credible when spoken by the doctors.  
Different objects also have different surfaces of emergence, as was described in 
the previous section. Disease, human body, and the sick person share some common 
surfaces of emergence, namely the individual, families and communities. Doctor is the 
only object of discourse that does not share these surfaces of emergence; rather, it rises 
from the institutions such as medical school and hospital. As for the authorities of 
delimitation, the most credible and significant authorities that can speak about the all four 
objects of medical discourse authoritatively are the doctors themselves. They pretty much 
run the discourse by creating enormous amounts of commentary that shapes the society’s 
understanding of disease and treatment, the human body, the function carried out by the 
doctor and the sick person. Lastly, the grids of specification for each object (e.g., different 
kinds of bodies, different kinds of doctors, etc.) are based on various rules depending on 




One can also locate and examine various relations between different modalities of 
statement that are commonly used in modern medical discourse. For example, statistical 
statements are the statements that bear most credibility in medical discourse. Whether it 
is statistical statements about disease and treatment or about some attribute of the sick 
person, people tend to trust it as long as it is coming from a research project. This kind of 
ties back to the culture of objectivity that is so prominent throughout medical education. 
There are other types of statements, such as qualitative descriptions, deductive clinical 
reasoning and analogy that can be enunciated by the doctors that are also deemed 
credible, though not as credible as statistical value statements.  
Many of the relations between the various rules for the formation of statements 
about a single discursive object were examined and documented as I tried to establish 
conditions of existence for these modalities of statements, in the previous section. One 
may go further ahead and explore the relationship between the conditions of existence for 
each category of modalities. This can definitely add further depth to the archaeological 
analysis but I am not going to do that here since it would require an extensive discussion 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. Future research may be interested in digging up 
more relationships between each rule of formation among all four categories of 
statements. For example, one may compare and contrast the authorities who are 
enunciating statistical statements about the doctor with those that enunciate statistical 
statements about the sick person, the body, and the disease. One may also examine which 
authority each of the above authorities draw from when generating statistical statements 
regarding their respective objects, and what relations exist between those authorities (e.g., 
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which is more credible, more commonly used, or deemed as less valid, etc.). Lastly, one 
may compare and contrast the positions of those who enunciate the statistical statements 
regarding their respective objects, and what relations may exist between such positions. 
For instance, one may examine the relations between the possible positions the doctor can 
assume as a perceiving, observing, describing, teaching, or questioning subject with 
regard to a certain object of discourse, such as the human body.  
Concepts 
 Perhaps, concepts are the discursive elements with the most diversity and 
disparity of nature when compared to other discursive elements (i.e., objects, modalities 
of statement, and strategic choices). Some of those that we have called discursive 
concepts constitute rules of formal construction, some rhetorical practices, others 
determine the internal configuration of a text (e.g., rules for history taking and physical 
exam) or the modes of relation and interference between different texts. Some concepts in 
medical discourse are characteristic of a particular period (e.g., rules on how to report the 
lab tests and circulate among clinicians) others have a distant origin and far-reaching 
chronological significance (e.g., concepts defining the procedure of a breast or abdominal 
exam). It is neither possible nor required that one should establish some sort of 
connecting thread in order to link what seems to be a very disconcerted pile of discursive 
concepts. Unlike other common analytical techniques, archaeology embraces disparity 
and acknowledges it as a reality in discourse. Having said that, there are still those 
discursive relations that are already present which might connect some of these concepts 
to one another. As Foucault points out, “what properly belongs to a discursive formation 
and what makes it possible to delimit the group of concepts, disparate as they may be, 
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that are specific to it, is the way in which these different elements are related to one 
another” (Foucault, 1972, pp. 59-60). 
 Again, I am not going to work through all discursive relations that might be 
established by archaeology in this study as it requires extensive examination and lots of 
space to document. Some of the relations among concepts were documented in the 
previous section as part of the discussion for determining condition of existence for 
various groups of concepts. Future research may establish relations between the way in 
which, for example, the ordering of descriptions provided in patient’s history is linked to 
the techniques of rewriting it using medical terminology; or the way in which the field of 
memory is linked to the forms of hierarchy and subordination that govern the statements 
of a text; the way in which the modes of approximation and development of the 
statements are linked to the modes of criticism, commentary and interpretation of 
previously formulated statements, etc. As Foucault affirms, “it is this group of relations 
that constitutes a system of conceptual formation” (Foucault, 1972, p. 60). Furthermore, 
the relations between the three groups of rules for the formation of concepts can be 
established thorough examining the links between forms of succession, forms of 
coexistence, and the procedures of intervention for different categories of concepts that 
are about a specific object of medical discourse (i.e., the sick person). 
Theoretical Strategies 
 Again, most of the relations concerning theoretical strategies have already been 
established in the previous section as part of the discussion covering the points of 
diffraction for each strategy. The relations among various strategies relating to the same 
object (e.g., personal code of morality, judging the worthiness of the patients, and 
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indicating the ultimate goal of medical practice–all of which are strategies relating to the 
same object that is the sick person) have been discussed in detail as part of the discussion 
establishing the points of systematization among those strategies. What I am not going to 
do here but future research is welcome to determine is to establish relations between 
points of systematization for different groups of strategies relating to all four discursive 
objects (i.e., relations between points of systematization of strategies related to disease, 
points of systematization of strategies related to human body, and points of 
systematization of strategies to each of the other two remaining objects). This will result 
in a deeper understanding of the conditions of existence for all strategic choices that 
coexist in the discursive formation of modern medicine.  
 Additionally, the relations between all four groups of discursive elements (i.e., 
objects, modalities of statement, concepts and theoretical choices) can also be established 
by future research. One can try to perhaps establish these relations in a “reverse 
direction’. As Foucault points out, “the lower levels are not independent of those above 
them. Theoretical choices exclude or imply, in the statements in which they are made, the 
formation of certain concepts, that is, certain forms of coexistence between statements” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 73). Furthermore, “it is not the theoretical choice that governs the 
formation of the concept; but the choice has produced the concept by the mediation of 
specific rules for the formation of concepts, and by the set of relations that it holds with 
this level.” (Foucault, 1972, p. 73). In the next chapter, which is also the final chapter of 
this document, I am going to discuss general significance of the analytical procedures that 
were presented throughout this chapter. Also, we will begin drawing the final conclusions 
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from the complicated network of discursive formation as they relate to the future of 
medical education and practice.   
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusions 
Using Foucault’s archaeological methodology, this study aimed at defining the 
system of formation for modern medical discourse, and the role this discourse plays in 
formation of medical professional identity in medical students. Results of the 
archaeological analysis were presented in the previous chapter. This chapter begin with a 
brief discussion of general archaeological descriptions as undertaken by this study. Here, 
I explain how I got the results that were presented in Chapter 4, why I presented my 
results the way I did, and how my work fits in with the general archaeological model of 
analysis and the chief principles of archaeology described in Chapter 2. Next in this 
chapter, I will discuss the results of this study at three different levels (the level of 
statements, the level of elements, and the level of discursive relations and conditions), 
which corresponds with the way I presented the structure of modern medical discourse in 
the previous chapter.  I will also discuss what my results mean, how they should be 
interpreted, and what some implications of these findings are. Future directions to be 
pursued by medical education research and the final conclusions of this study will be 
presented at the end of this chapter. 
Before moving on to more specific discussions, I would like to add a few remarks 
here. It is important to understand that this research is not pinpointing some specific 
discovery, nor does it provide a new brick to contribute to the construction of the good-
old body of medicine. Instead, it is looking at the entire construction from the outside; 
zooms into its building blocks and, opens new ways of looking at things. In a nutshell, 
this research is broad. Archaeological analysis does not aim to provide specific findings 
or answer specific questions. It is inherently broad because it provides new spaces to 
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think, opportunities for seeing things in a different light, and to carry on out-of-the-box 
scholarship. This research is a preliminary archaeological work in medical education. 
Perhaps the biggest value of an archaeological study is that it provides an alternative way 
to think. As Gutting puts it,  
one reason that established systems of thought and practice often maintain 
their authority despite basic flaws is that, precisely because they are so 
entrenched, it is difficult to think of any serious alternatives to their 
conceptions and procedures. Another reason is that they have, over years 
of dominance, developed subtle ways of masking their flaws. Historical 
analyses such as Foucault’s can be used to overcome both these sorts of 
defense mechanisms. By unearthing alternative ways of thinking and 
acting, they end the de facto monopoly of the dominant systems. This is 
particularly so since the alternatives such historical analysis uncovers are 
not mere logical possibilities but have themselves been entrenched in the 
reality of our past (1989, p. 106). 
 
The above excerpt sums up the value of an archaeological research well. There are 
various definitions for what counts as good research in the social spheres. I believe good 
research is not always about solving a problem. It is also about identifying the right (and 
sometimes new) problems and being able to show why they are important. It is about 
opening new research avenues and creating future directions for researchers so the issue 
can be addressed in a systematic manner. Let us now turn to see how results of this study 
fit in with the chief principles of archaeology presented in Chapter 2.  
Discussion of General Archaeological Descriptions 
The present research is based on the assumption that to know the reasons behind 
things that are said in medicine, one should look into the system of their formation and 
the enunciative possibilities and impossibilities that this system lays down for medical 
discourse. Such reasons cannot be found through analyses of the thoughts or experiences 
of people who are involved in medicine (e.g., doctors, medical students, or patients). 
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Analysis of thoughts (and feelings) is most likely to lead one toward the transcendental 
characterization of medicine; whereas analysis of experiences would lead to empirical 
results about the already existing medical discourse. In archaeology, one is looking 
neither for transcendental nor for the empirical facts to emerge from the data (Webb, 
2013). In archaeology, 
one is not seeking, therefore, to pass from the text to thought, from talk to 
silence, from the exterior to the interior, from spatial dispersion to the pure 
recollection of the moment, from superficial multiplicity to profound 
unity. One remains within the dimension of discourse (Foucault, 1972, p. 
76). 
 
By employing an archaeological methodology, this study describes the system of 
formation for modern medical discourse. It is this system of formation - also known as 
the discursive formation - that sets up the law of what can be said, done, or thought about 
modern medicine. In other words, it is this system that governs the appearance of all 
statements made in medical discourse. The goal here was to define the archaeological 
model of modern medical discourse at Indiana University School of Medicine, as 
observed and documented in 2019. In the previous chapter, I tried to show “the play of 
analogies and differences” as they appear at the level of formation, and I undertook at 
least four major tasks to do that:  
(a) Showing how different (and sometimes radically heterogeneous) discursive 
elements are formed on the bases of similar rules of formation, which is called 
archaeological isomorphism (e.g., different objects, or different concepts, or 
strategies forming on the basis of the same rules of formation). 
(b) Showing the extent to which rules of formation and the relations between 
them apply to, and are arranged in accordance with, the main model of the 
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discursive formation of modern medicine. This involved defining the 
archaeological model of each discursive element including its types, rules of 
formation, relations between those rules, and establishing the conditions of 
existence for that element and its related rules. 
(c) Showing how elements that are radically different from each other could 
occupy a similar status in the system of formation of modern medicine. This is 
called archaeological isotopia. Let us take the example of securing financial 
benefits and helping people as two different strategic choices that are common 
reasons for becoming a doctor. These are two incompatible elements because 
“their domain of application, their degree of formalization, and their historical 
genesis make them quite alien to one another” (Foucault, 1972, p. 161). Yet, 
both elements are equivalent in their status as alternative, yet possible, 
strategic choices that can emerge in modern medical discourse. 
(d) Showing how different discursive formations (which reside in the same 
discursive constellation) can relate to one another, have relations of 
subordination or complementarity with one another, and thus contribute in 
formation of one another in various ways. This is known as archaeological 
correlations. 
It is worth reiterating here that the main task of the present analysis was not to merely 
locate the discursive elements (i.e., objects, modalities of enunciation, concepts and 
theoretical strategies) in modern medical discourse. Rather, the main task was “to reveal 
what made them possible… to show the proximities, symmetries, or analogies that have 
made generalizations possible” (Foucault, 1972, p. 161). In sum, in archaeology, the task 
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is to outline the field of modern medical discourse including conditions that define 
possibilities and impossibilities within this field. 
Interpretation of data 
Since archaeology is not an interpretive method of analysis, all statements 
collected as data in this study were treated as facts of language. It was not assumed at any 
point that a statement implied something other than what was being said on the surface. 
Even if such a duplication were to exist, it does not affect the fact of language enunciated 
by the statement so it would be irrelevant to the archaeological level of analysis. 
According to Foucault,  
to interpret is a way of reacting to enunciative poverty, and to compensate 
for it by multiplication of meaning; a way of speaking based on that 
poverty, and yet despite it. But to analyze a discursive formation is to seek 
the law of that poverty, it is to weigh it up, and to determine its specific 
form (Foucault, 1972, p. 120). 
 
As described in Chapter 2, archaeology is opposed to customary qualitative analytical 
methods in many ways. Yet, it is but one “possible line of attack for the analysis of verbal 
performances” (Foucault, 1972, p. 206). The findings of an archaeological analysis do not 
hold “a definitive place in an unmoving constellation”, but with its description of the 
discursive formation, its positivity, the statements, and their conditions of formation, it 
draws up a very specific domain (Foucault, 1972, p. 207). A domain that is irreducible to 
interpretation and formalization, and one that has not been the object of any other form of 
analysis before.  
 Furthermore, unlike a great many conventional research reports, the data in this 
study are presented in extensive amounts. Since archaeology analyzes discourse and 
discourse is made of statements, the statements need to be reported in their integrity if the 
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goal is to support a point the researcher is trying to make. In most other qualitative 
methods of data analysis (e.g., thematic analysis, simple coding methods and so on), the 
researcher is mainly looking to summarize experiences or perceptions of the research 
participants in order to come up with common themes. Archaeological analysis, on the 
other hand, is not interested in the experiences or perceptions of individual subjects. It is 
against the chief principles of the method to regard for the psychological state of 
individuals (intentions, motivation, meaning behind their statements, etc.). In this study, I 
did not seek to find hidden meanings that might have existed deeper than the statements 
themselves. Instead, I went with the notion that, with no internal dimension, “the 
enunciative domain is identical with its own surface.” (Foucault, 1972, p. 119).  
 Research participants in this study took anonymous subjective positions that were 
analyzed by archaeology. The data collected through interviews and focus groups were 
transcribed verbatim so that the reader can be exposed to the actual statements as they 
were enunciated by discursive subjects participating in this project. Even so, due to 
limitations of the space, I have presented only the exemplar data (and not all statements 
that were collected as data) to support the results outlined in Chapter 4. Again, I did not 
make any attempts to discover the meaning of statements, identify what was implied by 
them, or interpret them in a way that would add more language than was enunciated in 
their original version. In archaeology, one rather goes by the notion that “the statement is 
not haunted by the secret presence of the unsaid, of hidden meanings, of suppressions” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 110). 
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Transcendentality, Origin, Originality, and Truth   
The problem with most critical research studies on topics such as medical 
professionalism, medical humanities and, professional identity formation is their basic 
assumption about medicine having a transcendental humanistic core that is somehow lost 
in the mud and needs to be recovered. Archaeology, on the other hand, does not search 
for the origin and foundations of medicine to recover them. The humanity of medicine is 
not like a crystal of purity that is lost in the mud; rather, it needs to be constructed 
through teaching people about humanities such as ethics and morality as part of a medical 
training. It has to be constructed in real-time, not discovered or recovered. Hence, 
archaeology refuses to create “some form of patched-up unity” amidst the chaos of 
dispersed discursive elements in a search for the original and transcendental core of 
medicine (Webb, 2013, p. 154). Throughout this project, I did not assume such a core 
existed in the first place. It is not a realistic expectation to wait for medicine as a social 
discipline to somehow move away from the tangled mass of its present (and historical) 
discontinuities and become the ideal, the great and uninterrupted unity that we wish for 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 6). Medical practice has never been nor will ever be ideal and 
unbound from its conditions of existence. 
Thus, in this study, I have not trailed the origin and the promise of its return for 
medicine. I did not presume that medicine as a social practice has a sacred humanistic 
core; one with the transcendental power to traverse time and space and travel across the 
hundreds of centuries of human history. This study does not elude an analysis of the 
actual practice of medicine in the present time based on such presumptions. Rather, one 
fundamental assumption here is that all social actions are constructed. Therefore, 
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medicine as a social discourse at any point in time is only as good as its conditions of 
existence allow it to be. Being a constructed social discourse, medicine has never been 
nor will it ever be free of discontinuity and dispersion. Findings of the present analysis as 
outlined in the previous chapter are evidence on the constructedness of medical practice 
and the nature of this dispersion.  
The statements collected as data in this study were also not quarried in search of 
their origin (e.g., where they came from). If a statement referenced a current practice, for 
instance, I did not ask or look to find when that practice was first initiated and by whom, 
or how did it evolve in order to reach our time. It is important to note that archaeology is 
not history. Hence, for the purpose of analyzing a discursive formation, it is enough that a 
certain practice exists in discourse and is being referenced in a discursive statement. In 
archaeological analysis, “one no longer has to seek that point of absolute origin or total 
revolution based on which everything is organized, everything becomes possible and 
necessary, everything is effaced to begin again. [Rather,] one is dealing with events of 
different types and levels, caught up in distinct historical webs” (Foucault, 1972, p. 146). 
 Furthermore, during the data analysis, I did not make a distinction between 
original/true/innovative statements and those that I thought were repeated/false/trivial 
ones. First, determining the truth of the statements is not relevant to the level of analysis 
in this study. Archaeological findings presented in the previous chapter are not meant to  
define the state of knowledge at a given moment in time: they do not draw 
up a list of what, from that moment, had been demonstrated to be true and 
had assumed the status of definitively acquired knowledge, and a list of 
what, on the other hand, had been accepted without either proof or 
adequate demonstration, or of what had been accepted as a common belief 





Thus, no attempts were made to determine what parts of the statements collected as data 
in this study were true and what parts were merely born from the imagination of the 
speaking subject. Second, in archaeological analysis, one does not care about locating the 
originator of a given idea as opposed to those who merely repeat or modify that idea. 
Thus, during data analysis in this study, no attempts were made to trace the precursors of 
a thought since the question of who thought it first is considered to be irrelevant to the 
analysis of discursive formation. For this reason, the question of originality/banality of 
the statements collected as data is also not relevant to the analysis of discursive formation 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 144). Instead, archaeology is concerned with defining the field where 
all statements - from most original to most banal - can emerge based on a defined set of 
rules and conditions. In this study, I have been interested in all statements which I 
thought had the potential to reveal something about the discursive rules and conditions in 
medical discourse. It turns out that the most innovative statements embody the rules of 
discourse no more and no less than the most repetitive ones and thus “the question of 
innovation is of no interest to archaeology” (Gutting, 1989, p. 245). Plus, even the most 
trivial statement puts a whole set of rules into effect regarding the object that it 
references, the modality of statement that it uses to refer to that object, the concept that it 
draws from to talk about that object, and the strategic choice, of which this statement is a 
part of and which is made in relation to that object.  
The above discussion takes us to the argument that all discursive elements are 
derived from groups of statements that may as well be called the governing statements. 
However, this derivation is not the same as a deduction, nor does it represent the 
development of some general idea at the base whose consequences and possibilities 
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gradually develop to unfold (Foucault, 1972, pp. 147-148). The archaeological derivation 
is different than both of those and therefore it must be described in its own particular way. 
It is important to understand the proper order of archaeological derivation and  
not to seek in an ‘initial’ discovery or in the originality of a formulation 
the principle from which everything can be deduced and derived; not to 
seek in a general principle the law of enunciative regularities or individual 
inventions; not to demand of archaeological derivation that it reproduce 
the order of time or reveal a deductive schema (Foucault, 1972, p. 148). 
 
In this study, I have attempted to follow the rules defined in the above excerpt. Therefore, 
none of the findings presented in Chapter 4 should be read as though implying either a 
logic of deduction or a transcendental origin at the base of the governing statements that 
give rise to the discursive regularities.  
Agency of the Human Subject  
It is worth restating here that no particular groups were designated as “a study 
group” in the present research. What is studied here is rather the discourse, which 
includes all talk and behavior related to medicine. The data analyzed in this study 
includes the interview and focus group transcripts (containing the talk coming from 
medical students) as well as direct observation fieldnotes (containing the talk and 
behavior coming from doctors, residents, interns, patients, patient families, etc.). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, it is one of the chief principles of archaeology to decentralize the 
subjects (people who are subjected to medical discourse, that is, those who are involved 
in medicine, e.g., medical students, physicians, etc.) from playing the main role in 
discourse. Therefore, people by whom the “talk” and “actions” were enunciated are not 
playing the central role in the analysis of medical discourse in this study. Statements that 
were collected as data were not analyzed with the intention to seek their speakers’ 
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opinions, intentions, motivations, feelings, etc. Rather, in this study the attention has 
shifted from the subjects to the discourse itself. Regardless of who enunciated them, the 
statements (data) have been organized in a system with the intention to discover the rules, 
regularities, and conditions that facilitate their existence. The reason I interviewed only 
medical students in this study (and not the doctors or patients, for example) was that this 
study is focusing on the function of discourse in constituting professional identity in 
medical students. Students’ professional identity is best reflected in students’ statements, 
and that is why they were collected as data. 
Furthermore, this study refrains from analyzing relations between the speaker of a 
statement and what they say. For example, I have not attempted to determine my 
interviewees’ intentions or motivation behind the statements they made in their interview 
with me. What I have attempted to analyze, instead, is the position of these speakers, 
which needs to be occupied by anyone who would attempt to make that statement 
(Foucault, 1972, pp. 95-96). While it is possible to explain why such and such a person 
should think in a certain manner rather than another, archaeological analysis is more 
interested in defining the conditions of existence for the statement they make regarding 
the objects of discourse. In other words, archaeological analysis does not scrutinize the 
psychological state of the speaking subjects and discuss things such as an individual’s 
thoughts, feelings, intentions, motivations, etc. Foucault also adds “faculties, aptitudes, 
degrees of development or involution, different ways of reacting to the environment, 
[and] character types, whether acquired, innate, or hereditary” to the list of things he 
counts as “planes of psychological characterization” (Foucault, 1972, p. 44). Hence, this 
study does not concern itself with these or any other psychological characterization of the 
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speaking subject in discourse. That is because “archaeology is not… concerned with the 
average phenomena of opinion” on the part of the subject at all (Foucault, 1972, p. 144).  
An archaeological analysis should not be confused with psychoanalysis either. 
The quest for the present study was not to explain the precise form that medical culture 
gives to the norms, rules, and systems, which, by organizing functions, rules, and 
meanings, would produce unconscious representations. This would be a task for a 
psychoanalytical study, which in doing so would describe a culture’s distinctive form of 
historicity (Gutting, 1989, p. 215). Unlike psychoanalysis that claims to reveal the 
general conditions for unconscious representations of things such as life, labor, and 
language (Gutting, 1989, p. 215), archaeology does not define conditions of possibility 
for all possible forms of thought that humans are capable of, under the effect of a 
particular culture. It is important to note that the 
analysis of statements operates… without reference to a cogito. It does not 
pose the question of the speaking subject, who reveals or who conceals 
himself in what he says, who, in speaking, exercises his sovereign 
freedom, or who, without realizing it, subjects himself to constraints of 
which he is only dimly aware. It is situated at the level of the ‘it is said’ - 
and we must not understand by this a sort of communal opinion, a 
collective representation that is imposed on every individual; we must not 
understand by it a great, anonymous voice that must, of necessity, speak 
through the discourses of everyone (Foucault, 1972, p. 122). 
 
Thus, the present archaeological study explains not the conditions of possibility for 
medical discourse at some point in the future, but the conditions of actual existence for a 
series of enunciations making up the architecture of discursive formation for modern 




Another significant point to note is the relation between human freedom and 
discourse. One needs to understand that archaeology challenges the basic premise about 
subject and freedom in the first place. For Foucault, human freedom is not spontaneous 
and unregulated, and people do not come with their innate freedom only to be constrained 
by discourses (Webb, 2013, p. 156). It is also true that discourse is like a spider-less web 
in which the only positions that are offered (to be taken by the subject) are those in 
relation to others. One may change one’s position in the web, but there is no jumping off 
of it (Thiele, 1990). For example, those involved in medicine only earn their status of 
being involved by virtue of assuming a position in the web of medical discourse. There is 
no social space related to medical education or practice that is not governed by discursive 
rules and conditions. Moreover, people who are involved in medicine are shaped by this 
discourse: their language, their actions, and their thoughts about medicine are defined by 
the system of relations in modern medical discourse. It is this discourse that determines 
what positions are possible to be assumed by the subject and therefore it opens a limited 
number of opportunities without suppressing others. Consequently, it is really the rules 
and conditions of the discursive formation that are “constituting the field in which the 
freedom of the subject is articulated” (Webb, 2013, p. 156).  
Given the above discussion, it is important to understand that the initiative of the 
subject (medical students, physicians, patients, etc.) are neither the origin nor the focus of 
discursive rules and conditions, even though they participate in reproducing and 
maintaining the discourse of modern medicine. Understanding the limited role of the 
subject in discourse might be difficult to accept for those who are too used to modernist, 
structuralist frames when thinking about human freedom. In Foucault’s words: 
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I understand the unease of all such people. They have probably found it 
difficult enough to recognize that their history, their economics, their 
social practices, the language that they speak, the mythology of their 
ancestors, even the stories that they were told in their childhood, are 
governed by rules that are not all given to their consciousness; they can 
hardly agree to being dispossessed in addition of that discourse in which 
they wish to be able to say immediately and directly what they think, 
believe, or imagine; they prefer to deny that discourse is a complex, 
differentiated practice, governed by analyzable rules and transformations, 
rather than be deprived of that tender, consoling certainty of being able to 
change, if not the world, if not life, at least their ‘meaning’, simply with 
a fresh word that can come only from themselves (Foucault, 1972, pp. 
210-211). 
 
Indeed, it is not easy to treat the discourse that we once thought was a place for the 
expressions of intimate consciousness, genius, and freedom like an unintelligible set of 
anonymous rules, bound by limitations and necessities. Nonetheless, according to the 
discourse theory, truth is that our talk, our actions, and even our imaginations as human 
beings are not determined by our individual free will, but by the rules and conditions of 
the discourses to which each of us are subjected.  
Like any other discourse, medicine is strictly rule-governed, and Chapter 4 was an 
attempt to illustrate this point. After all, there are limited things that one can talk about in 
medicine, limited ways to talk about them, and limited ways to order and organize your 
talk around them. Most importantly, there are very few positions the subject can take 
regarding these things (objects). Moreover, the talk about these things mainly goes from 
mouth-to-mouth without actually engaging people’s minds on a deeper level. Is it even 
possible, one may ask, to come up with your own ideas, things to talk about, and ways to 
talk about them? The answer is no, because the space of discourse is limited, and an 
individual in the discourse has only the place of a node within a network. One cannot talk 
or think outside of this network, the whole of which one cannot see. All one may ever see 
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is the small corner where one is positioned. The entire network obeys the same rules and 
exists under the same conditions. In Foucault’s words: 
Different oeuvres, dispersed books, that whole mass of texts that belong to 
a single discursive formation - and so many authors who know or do not 
know one another… meet without knowing it and obstinately intersect 
their unique discourses in a web of which they are not the masters, of 
which they cannot see the whole, and of whose breadth they have a very 
inadequate idea… (Foucault, 1972, p. 126) 
 
Archaeological analysis conducted in this study focuses on the system of formation for 
statements, and the conditions defining the space in which all statements are formed. 
Hence, the people who enunciate the statements (e.g., speak or act the statement) are not 
under the spotlight in this study. It is rather the space in which taking a particular position 
was made possible for this speaker that is being analyzed in archeology (Gutting, 1989, p. 
244). It is this characteristic of decentralizing the speaking subject from playing the main 
role in actualizing the discourse that makes new forms of inquiry such as archaeology 
possible (Webb, 2013, p. 151). Foucault’s statement below sums up the archaeological 
stance regarding the subject of discourse: 
I shall abandon any attempt… to see discourse as a phenomenon of 
expression - the verbal translation of a previously established synthesis; 
instead, I shall look for a field of regularity for various positions of 
subjectivity. Thus conceived, discourse is not the majestically unfolding 
manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the 
contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his 
discontinuity with himself may be determined. It is a space of exteriority 
in which a network of distinct sites is deployed… It is neither by recourse 
to a transcendental subject nor by recourse to a psychological subjectivity 
that the regulation of its enunciations should be defined (Foucault, 1972, 
p. 55). 
 
Thus, it is true that every statement presented as data in this study has a subject, but that 
subject is not the same as the person who spoke it. The subject of an archaeological 
statement is considered to be “a position that may be filled in certain conditions by 
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various individuals” (Foucault, 1972, p. 115). Archaeology maintains that the various 
positions adopted by the speaking subject are “effects of discourse” (Webb, 2013, p. 108). 
As a result, the position is not defined by the enunciating consciousness, but by the rules 
of modern medical discourse which are in place quite apart from any individual’s mental 
activity (Gutting, 1989, pp. 241-242). The following quote from sums up the essence of 
the present study the way I see it. This study attempts  
to reveal discursive practices in their complexity and density; to show that 
to speak is to do something - something other than to express what one 
thinks; to translate what one knows, and something other than to play with 
the structures of a language; to show that to add a statement to a pre-
existing series of statements is to perform a complicated and costly 
gesture, which involves conditions (and not only a situation, a context, and 
motives), and rules (not the logical and linguistic rules of construction); to 
show that a change in the order of discourse does not presuppose ‘new 
ideas’, a little invention and creativity, a different mentality, but 
transformations in a practice, perhaps also in neighboring practices, and in 
their common articulation. I have not denied - far from it - the possibility 
of changing discourse: I have deprived the sovereignty of the subject of 
the exclusive and instantaneous right to it (Foucault, 1972, p. 209). 
 
Hence, the altered position of the human subject is one of the major themes in this 
study and it is important to bear that in mind when reading the results that are 
presented in Chapter 4.  
Historicity of Findings 
This section will serve as a reminder that discursive elements, their rules of 
formation, and their conditions of existence that are defined in Chapter 4 are all 
historically constructed. For example, the definitions for the doctor, medical science, 
medical knowledge, medicine itself, as well as the language, signs, and the order to 
describe them are all time and space-bound and historical. One of the tasks of an 
archaeological study is to illustrate the historicity of the discourse it analyzes, in various 
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ages, and that is what I am aiming to do in this section. It is important to understand that 
the discourse of medicine in each historical period has possessed its own unique and 
relative positivity. Therefore, the relations of medicine to history have not been the same 
at all times. My task in the present study is to show the relationship of discursive 
elements of medicine with the history, and to show that objects, modalities of statement, 
concepts, and theoretical strategies outlined and analyzed in the previous chapter are all 
relative to space and time, with each item possessing its own historicity. Let’s take the 
example of the doctor as an object of medical discourse and an element in the discursive 
formation of modern medicine. As argued above, the function of the doctor possesses its 
own historicity. That is, the doctor has developed as an object of medical discourse 
through history and its definition has been modified in different historical periods per the 
specificities of that particular period. 
It is easy to spot many alternatives to our modern conception of medicine and that 
of a physician along the history. At several points in time, there have been sharp changes 
in the way people experienced medicine and the way they treated the medical men. For 
example, being a surgeon was considered to be a highly respectable profession at one 
period, and next to that of a barber at another (Bagwell, 2005). There was a time when 
…the medical personage… had to act not as the result of an objective 
diagnosis, but by relying upon that prestige which envelops the secrets of 
the Family, of Authority, of Punishment, and of Love; it is by bringing 
such powers into play, by wearing the mask of Father and of Judge, that 
the physician  ... became the almost magic perpetrator of the cure (Gutting, 
1989, p. 94). 
 
However, following the “positivist ideal of purely objective, value-free knowledge” as 
part of the new developments emerging in the nineteenth century medical practice, 
doctors stopped invoking moral considerations to explain their power over the patient. 
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This was followed by a period when society as well as the physicians themselves thought 
they were working solely on the bases of the objective medical knowledge, which 
corresponded with the inception of the modern concept of scientific medicine. For 
Foucault, however, a purely objective medical practice has never been more than a myth 
and “a disguise for the doctor’s moral domination… in the name of bourgeois society and 
its values” (Gutting, 1989, p. 95).  
In short, it is also important to note that the function of the doctor has been 
conceptualized differently in different points in the history of medicine. What actually 
determines this function at any given period is the specific group of relations between 
medicine and other discursive - as well as nondiscursive - practices.  
If, in clinical discourse, the doctor is, in turn, the sovereign, direct 
questioner, the observing eye, the touching finger, the organ that deciphers 
signs, the point at which previously formulated descriptions are integrated, 
the laboratory technician, it is because a whole group of relations is 
involved (Foucault, 1972, p. 53). 
 
Also,  
because the doctor has gradually ceased to be himself the locus of the 
registering and interpretation of information, and because, beside him, 
outside him, there have appeared masses of documentation, instruments of 
correlation, and techniques of analysis, which, of course, he makes use of, 
but which modify his position as an observing subject in relation to the 
patient (Foucault, 1972, p. 34). 
 
This reminds us that what we know as “the doctor” in the U.S., in 2019, has not been a 
universally accepted, natural, and essential part of medical discourse across the history of 
medicine. Rather, the function of the doctor has been defined in different ways, doctors 
have assumed different roles, and their function has had different effects at different 
points in the history. It is these characteristics that give the doctor, as an object of medical 
discourse, its particular historicity. The same is true for all other discursive elements (i.e., 
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discursive objects, modalities of the statement, concepts, and theoretical strategies) that 
were described in Chapter 4. However, it is important to understand that in archaeology 
one acts according to a different sense of the history (see Chief principles of Archaeology, 
Chapter 2, for more) that is based on discontinuity and dispersion of elements rather than 
describing the continuity of their progression across history. Therefore, the results 
described in Chapter 4 are also based on discontinuity and dispersion of discursive 
elements and their relations across the field of discourse. I have made no attempts to 
discover the patterns or establish linearity of medical progress through time in this study. 
Having discussed the historicity of the doctor as a discursive element, let us now 
return to “medicine” and say a few more things about its historicity, which needs to be 
acknowledged by archaeological analysis. As argued before, “medicine” has transformed 
several times along the history, with new concepts, relations, and rules substituting the 
old ones every time (Foucault, 1972, p. 173). Medicine in 2019 is based on different 
relations and rules compared to medicine in the fifteenth century, for example. The 
business administration model of healthcare delivery had not yet been adopted in 
fifteenth century. Moreover, what is known as the modern medical discourse today 
incorporates a series of alterations that gradually appeared in medical discourse 
throughout the nineteenth century. Let us take the example of the transformation that 
happened with the advent of cell pathology. Microscopic inspection and biological tests 
began to augment gross visual inspection, auscultation, and palpitation in clinical 
practice. Under the effects of this transformation, not only scientific medical knowledge 
but also the mode of descriptions related to the pathology/illness, scales and guidelines, 
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information systems, as well as the “lexicon of signs and their decipherment” were either 
displaced, modified, or entirely reconstituted (Foucault, 1972, p. 33).  
One can tell that every time a transformation, such as the one in the nineteenth 
century, has happened, the entire discourse of medicine has been affected as a 
consequence of that transformation.  Hence, with so many changes in the substance of 
medicine as a discursive formation throughout history, it is evident that the unity of 
medicine is not due to some specific type of statements or mode of action. Rather, if there 
is a unity, it must be sought in the group of rules that has made the coexistence of 
dispersed and heterogeneous statements under the unifying banner of medicine possible 
throughout the history. Indeed, the discourse of medicine is inclusive of sometimes 
radically heterogeneous items, such as pure perceptual descriptions, instruments-
mediated observations, laboratory and experiment procedures, statistical calculations, 
epidemiological or demographic observations, institutional regulations, therapeutic 
practices, and so on. Yet, an archaeological analysis of medical discourse such as the one 
conducted in the present project can explain “the system that governs their division, the 
degree to which they depend upon one another, the way in which they interlock or 
exclude one another, the transformation that they undergo, and the play of their location, 
arrangement, and replacement.” (Foucault, 1972, p. 34). Undoubtedly, medicine has had a 
heterogeneous unity throughout history because what we know as medical discourse is 
really a historical construction. The discursive elements, rules, and conditions of 
medicine have varied at different times and different places. Thus, it is important to note 
that medicine does not embody some universal transcendental unity that has traveled 
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through time and space to reach us. Rather, it is a historical concept that has been 
accorded varying definitions and structures at various points in time. 
It is worth reminding ourselves here that archaeological analysis is concerned 
with the savoir and not the connaissance (e.g., empirical knowledge of medicine achieved 
by science). In this study, savoir represents the social knowledge of modern medicine 
including science, fiction, reflection, narratives, institutional regulations, and political 
decisions involving medicine. Furthermore, the phrase knowledge of medicine has born 
different meanings across the human history. What counted as medical knowledge in the 
Classical Age (from the mid-seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth century) 
was different than what counted as medical knowledge in the Modern Age (from the 
beginning of the nineteenth century to at least the middle of the twentieth), and yet again, 
from what counts as medical knowledge today, in the U.S.,  in 2019.  
People in different historical periods have also had a different conception of what 
counts as science at a more fundamental level of its conception. To understand the 
cognitive status of human sciences in any given period, one needs to first understand that 
period’s conceptions of order, signs, and language. First, the conception of knowledge is 
grounded in the way people experience the order; that is, “the fundamental way in which 
it sees things connected to one another” (Gutting, 1989, p. 140). Some of this has already 
been discussed in Chapter 4 as part of the discussions concerned with the relations and 
conditions of existence for the discursive elements. Medicine being positioned alongside 
the discourse of business and its overwhelming relations with the capitalistic market are 
good examples of the way people experience the order when they come into contact with 
the medicine in U.S., in 2019. Next, “since knowledge is always a matter of somehow 
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formulating truths about things, its nature in a given period will depend on the period’s 
construal of the nature of the signs used to formulate truths” (Gutting, 1989, p. 140). In 
our age, science and objectivity are the foremost tools for constructing what counts as 
“knowledge” in medicine. Finally, since all knowledge claims are formulated through 
linguistic signs, the nature of knowledge in an era also depends on that era’s specific 
conception of language. In Chapter 4, I have tried to include a sizeable amount of 
linguistic data, hoping that they could provide useful hints about the nature of language 
that is currently being employed to produce the modern discourse of medicine. 
In summary, given the fact that discursive formations are not invariant absolutes 
fixed in some solid constellation, the full set of discursive elements in medical discourse 
cannot be defined once and for all–at any given point in the history. In Foucault’s words:  
A discursive formation does not occupy therefore all the possible volume 
that is opened up to it of right by the systems of formation of its objects, 
its enunciations, and its concepts; it is essentially incomplete, owing to the 
system of formation of its strategic choices. Hence the fact that, taken up 
again, placed and interpreted in a new constellation, a given discursive 
formation may reveal new possibilities (Foucault, 1972, p. 67).  
 
Thus, the definitions and conditions of existence for the discursive elements are rather 
bound to the constellation in which the discursive formation of medicine is situated, and 
with each element possessing their own historicity. The objects and concepts, for 
instance, will be different if the constellation in which modern medicine is situated 
changes for another. If there comes a time when medicine is no longer positioned 
alongside business administration, and humanities such as sociology and anthropology of 
medicine are inserted into the same constellation as modern medicine, surely these 
changes will have major effects on several of the objects, modalities of the statement, 
concepts, and theories in medical discourse.  
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Universality, Totality, and Temporalization of Results 
This study was conducted at the local and regional level in Indiana University 
School of Medicine and the findings presented in Chapter 4 do not imply a universal 
discourse that is common to all people involved in modern medicine across the globe. 
Thus, this study has no claims on having discovered universality in the discourse of 
modern medicine. Rather, my goal has been to illustrate examples of “positions and 
functions that the subject could occupy in the diversity of discourse” in the modern 
discourse of medicine (Foucault, 1972, p. 200). Archaeological statements collected as 
data in this study were not assumed to be natural, essential, or belonging to some 
universal unities. Instead, statements were treated as nodes in the network of the 
associated field to which they belonged. Nonetheless, one necessary step that was taken 
during data analysis was freeing the statements from all synthetic unities that might 
otherwise claim them (e.g., professionalism, individual opinion, etc.). Only after this was 
done, I was able to locate and describe links between those statements that would have 
otherwise been invisible or obscured by the previous synthetic unities.  
Also, I have tried to take precautions so that this analysis does not hint at 
totalization with regards to any of the discursive practices described in Chapter 4. 
Archaeology does not aim to suggest cultural totalities of any kind since discursive 
formations are always constructed, local, and historical. Therefore, in this study I have 
not made any attempts “to describe cultural totalities, to homogenize the most obvious 
differences, and to rediscover the universality of constrictive forms”. Instead, this study 
aims to “define the unique specificity of discursive practices” in modern medicine 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 204).  
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Lastly, in archaeological analysis, one does not document and present the 
discursive events per their linear temporality. Archaeology rejects any uniform model of 
temporalization in discourse with regards to discursive elements, rules, and conditions 
(see Chief Principles of Archaeology, Temporal Pluralism: A different Sense of Time, in 
Chapter 2, for more). Hence, I have presented both data and results here not following 
their chronological existence but depending on the type of regularity to which they 
belong (e.g., objects, strategies, rules of formation for concepts, etc.).  
Dispersion, Contradiction, and Coherence of Results 
As stressed throughout this study and explained in detail in Chapter 2, the concept 
of dispersion has a central place in archaeology. It is evident from Chapter 4 that results 
of this study are dispersed in a way that they do not seem to follow any rules of 
coherence in a conventional sense of the term. There are variations in statements, in 
positions, in concepts, and in strategic choices even though they all coexist in the same 
field of discourse. I hope that Chapter 4 has succeeded to show how it is possible for 
people involved in medicine to speak of different objects and make contradictory choices 
while abiding by the same rules of the same discursive practices. I have made no attempts 
to look for an underlying coherence beneath such contradictions. That is because in 
archaeology, “contradictions are neither appearances to be overcome, nor secret 
principles to be uncovered. They are objects to be described for themselves” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 151). Instead of explaining away the contradictions, I have tried to describe 




All in all, discursive formation is a conceptual framework that is comfortable with 
dispersion and contradictions that are inherent in the discourse. Archaeology refuses to 
admit a fundamental dichotomy of values and paint events in either black or white colors 
only (Gutting, 1989, p. 211). For example, the present study describes a space of 
dispersion where more than two positions are possible to be assumed in relation to any 
object of medical discourse. This study does not facilitate a discussion of the dichotomy 
between normal and abnormal, good and bad, or, right and wrong talks and practices; 
rather, what I have tried to illustrate in Chapter 4 of this study is a space where multiple 
other positions between each of those extreme poles are possible to be assumed by the 
subjects. Archaeological analysis is one that “is continually making differentiations, it is a 
diagnosis” (Foucault, 1972, p. 206). It is important to note, however, that archaeology 
does not invent these differences. Rather,  
archaeology is simply trying to take such differences seriously: to throw 
some light on the matter, to determine how they are divided up, how they 
are entangled with one another, how they govern or are governed by one 
another, to which distinct categories they belong; in short, to describe 
these differences, not to establish a system of differences between them. If 
there is a paradox in archaeology, it is not that it increases differences, but 
that it refuses to reduce them - thus inverting the usual values. For the 
history of ideas, the appearance of difference indicates an error, or a trap; 
instead of examining it, the clever historian must try to reduce it: to find 
beneath it a smaller difference, and beneath that an even smaller one, and 
so on until he reaches the ideal limit, the non-difference of perfect 
continuity. Archaeology, on the other hand, takes as the object of its 
description what is usually regarded as an obstacle: its aim is not to 
overcome differences, but to analyze them, to say what exactly they 
consist of, to differentiate them. How does this differentiation operate? 
(Foucault, 1972, pp. 170-171). 
 
Traditional research inquires not only tend to attribute to the discourses they analyze a 
basic coherence, they also tend to maintain that coherence by explaining away any 
contradictions as background noise. Contradiction is commonly seen as something that 
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needs to be resolved in order for the consumer of research to see the underlying 
coherence of events. Hence, at least three major assumptions are typically held regarding 
contradiction: 1) contradictions come from outside and as foreign agents to interrupt the 
ideality of a discourse, 2) contradictory texts or speeches are rather unintentional or 
accidental expressions that cannot/should not challenge the underlying, fundamental 
coherence of the discourse, and 3) any discontinuities should be adding up toward an end 
goal of cohesion and progress in the discourse. Put in another way, discontinuities are 
seen as “a series of incremental changes, all contributing toward a finally achieved 
enlightenment” (Webb, 2013, p. 129).  
Thus, in traditional research methodologies it is common to assume that 
individual events cannot lie outside a historical continuity without sharing a common 
principle or some hidden meaning connecting them to one another. Having to establish 
coherence among your research findings is almost considered to be a moral constraint in 
conventional research methodologies. A traditional researcher feels duty-bound not to be 
taken in by small contradictions and to see them as surface reflections of some profound 
underlying coherence. To this end, traditional analyses feel compelled to suppress 
contradiction in research findings as accidents, defects, or mistakes. The hope is to finally 
reveal an organizing principle that could account for all minor contradictions that are 
encountered during data analysis. (Foucault, 1972, pp. 150-151). In archaeology, on the 
other hand, one acknowledges that discourses are born on the bases of contradictions. The 
archaeologist understands that “men’s discourse is perpetually undermined from within 
by the contradiction of their desires, the influences that they have been subjected to, or 
the conditions in which they live” (Foucault, 1972, p. 149). There is no use escaping 
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them or translating them into some linear coherence because “contradiction is ceaselessly 
reborn through discourse” and therefore it can never be entirely escaped. (Foucault, 1972, 
p. 151). Rather than trying to find a point of conciliation and resolve them, archaeology 
takes contradictions as objects which need to be described for themselves (Foucault, 
1972, p. 151). In short, contradictions are not seen as distractors, confounders, or the mud 
around the crystal of pure medicine in this study. I would rather regard contradictions as 
forming factors and therefore intrinsic characteristics of modern medical discourse. In 
Foucault’s words, 
a discursive formation is not, therefore, an ideal, continuous, smooth text 
that runs beneath the multiplicity of contradictions, and resolves them in 
the calm unity of coherent thought; nor is it the surface in which, in a 
thousand different aspects, a contradiction is reflected that is always in 
retreat, but everywhere dominant. It is rather a space of multiple 
dissensions; a set of different oppositions whose levels and roles must be 
described (Foucault, 1972, p. 155).  
 
Contradiction could also carry different functions in a discursive formation. Some may be 
merely obstacles needing to be overcome, some may provide a starting point or an 
opportunity for growth. Some contradictory stances make it possible for the new objects 
or concepts to arise, they may open new directions for experimentation and verification 
of inferences, or define new fields of application for discursive concepts - all without 
actually changing the system of positivity (which is defined by discursive relations and 
conditions). Thus, a contradictory statement is always in its particular functional stages.  
Again, this study does not aim to discover original themes or hidden laws 
underneath the statements that could connect all dots together. I did not aim to produce an 
archaeological model to show the coherence of discursive practices in modern medicine 
in this study. I did not aim to present a cohesive image of the discourse in the first place. 
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Rather, my task in Chapter 4 was to reveal the dispersion in the discursive practice of 
medicine and acknowledge it so it can be addressed in real-time, without the illusion of 
medicine’s purity shading over its analysis. In that sense, Foucault’s statement below 
sums up the goal of my analysis in the present study: 
[Archaeological analysis] is a discourse about discourses but it is not 
trying to find in them a hidden law, a concealed origin that it only remains 
to free; nor is it trying to establish by itself, taking itself as a starting point, 
the general theory of which they would be the concrete models. It is trying 
to deploy a dispersion that can never be reduced to a single system of 
differences, a scattering that is not related to absolute axes of reference; it 
is trying to operate a decentering that leaves no privilege to any center. 
The role of such a discourse is not to dissipate oblivion, to rediscover, in 
the depths of things said, at the very place in which they are silent, the 
moment of their birth (whether this is seen as their empirical creation, or 
the transcendental act that gives them origin); it does not set out to be a 
recollection of the original or a memory of the truth. On the contrary, its 
task is to make differences: to constitute them as objects, to analyze them, 
and to define their concepts (Foucault, 1972, p. 205). 
 
In the present study, I have tried to show how two or more contradicting concepts or 
theoretical strategies can share a common locus of description and the same enunciative 
status. I have shown how multiple contradictory statements can coexist within the same 
“space of dissension” (Foucault, 1972, p. 152), while following the same rules of 
formation and sharing the same conditions of existence in the discourse of modern 
medicine. I have also established the points of divergence for various groups of 
statements opposing one another by describing the structure and extent of the difference 
between them. Moreover, I have broken down the larger chunks of contradiction into 
different types, levels and functions following the archaeological model of analysis. In 
short, this study has taken contradictions as objects needing to be described in their own 
terms. During the data analysis phase of this project I was specifically drawn to 
contradictions wherever they arose and tried to document them accordingly. Mapping the 
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system of contradictions revealed divisions in the discourse that would have not been 
possible to reveal otherwise.  
Locality and Limitation of Findings 
In this section, I want to emphasize the locality and relativity of the results 
presented in Chapter 4. It is important to recognize that all results of this study are local, 
historical, and relative to Indiana University School of Medicine, Indianapolis Campus, 
which is a Midwestern medical school in the U.S., 2019. The structure of discursive 
formation of medicine is expected to be different in other countries as well as other 
schools in the U.S. For example, concepts, strategies, and even objects of medicine will 
be different in another school where more curricular space and time is devoted to talking 
about emotional intelligence, holistic medicine (seeing and treating the whole person), 
patient-centeredness, diversity and privilege, and other topics related to medical 
humanities. This difference would feed into the way students in that school understand 
medical professionalism and, in turn, the way they form their professional identities.  
Also, I would like to emphasize that the structure of medical discourse is not 
exclusively defined by discursive elements themselves, but the relations between those 
elements as well as relations among several discourses that reside in the same discursive 
constellation as medical discourse, and relations between discursive and nondiscursive 
practices in the society in which the medical discourse is based. Let us take the example 
of Afghanistan as a different country to illustrate this point. Being born and raised in 
Afghanistan, I have the privilege of seeing a different healthcare system in real life. The 
experience of studying medicine in Afghanistan provided me with the ability to think 
outside the box in this matter. In a nutshell, discursive rules and relations related to 
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medicine are dramatically different from those in the United States. Afghanistan is not a 
capitalistic country so business administration and economic relations do not have that 
big of a say in the way medicine is taught and practiced there. While a number of private 
medical schools and hospitals are available, the largest and best-equipped institutions 
across the country are those that are fully-funded by the government. All government-
funded institutions are free to the public. Patients receive all medical services including 
complicated surgeries free of charge at government-funded large teaching hospitals. On 
the other hand, getting a medical education is free at government-funded schools so, 
doctors are not in debt because they did not pay fees going through their medical training. 
Doctors are paid by the government and they are not being paid a whole lot either. Being 
a physician is not at all among the highest paid jobs in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the 
health insurance system does not exist in Afghanistan and therefore everybody pays out 
of pocket to receive medical services in private hospitals. 
The situation described above drastically changes the structure of medicine as a 
social practice in Afghanistan. As one can imagine, people involved in medicine do not 
talk about the same things, nor in the same ways, as their counterparts in the U.S. do. 
They do not draw from the same notions, and do not assume similar positions regarding 
the doctor’s function, his position related to the patient, or his position related to money 
and social power. Discursive elements such as the doctor, the human body, disease and 
treatment, and the sick person are surely part of the medical discourse there too. 
However, the relations these elements have with other discourses (e.g., business and 
religion) and with nondiscursive structures (e.g., political economy and the market) are 
what change the face of their medical discourse to what might be unrecognizable as 
447 
 
“medicine” to people in the U.S. This example emphasizes the fact that findings of an 
archaeological study can only hold true about the field of discourse that it analyzes. 
It should be noted that the findings presented in this study do not embody the 
terminal state of modern medical discourse even at its own specific domain (IUSM, 
Indianapolis). Regularities outlined in this study are simply those that my analysis has 
found so far. I have not exhausted the field of all possible forms of regularities or 
contradictions that have the capacity to appear on the surface of medical discourse at this 
site. Any discursive regularities that are not described here have simply remained out of 
sight during the present inquiry, not that they do not/cannot exist. It is worth reiterating 
here that in archaeology, one does not assume any ideal or pure elements in medicine that 
are being disrupted or concealed, those that we should seek after their image in order to 
reclaim the purity of medicine. Rather, one knows that the objects of medicine do not pre-
exist, so they cannot be held back by some obstacle. (Foucault, 1972, p. 45). It is 
important to note that modern medicine is not like a big puzzle that we can complete 
simply by finding all missing pieces and putting them together. Medicine is rather 
constructed, locally and historically, as we go about our daily life in medical schools and 
hospitals. One may find pieces that one thinks are good fits and put them together to 
create one’s own image of medicine. However, it will be a mistake to think of any such 
images as universal and equally plausible by all definition of medicine. No templates are 
given. Moreover, medicine (or its image) can never be perfect, because no one knows 
what “perfect medicine” looks like. Yet, it can become better or worse than it is, relative 
to its local discursive relations and societal context. Thus, exploring local solutions for 
the problems related to medical discourse would be a far better investment than 
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attempting to chase after universally acceptable definitions for any discursive regularities 
in modern medical discourse.  
It important to understand that archaeological analysis is essentially limited, and 
Foucault affirms that he has made it deliberately so (Foucault, 1972). It does not attempt 
to characterize the “spirit” of a period, and its possibility remains higher than its actual 
form at any given moment (Webb, 2013, p. 133-134). Having that said, the 
archaeological analysis conducted in this study is open to further analyses and 
refinement. Indeed, I began this project with no expectation of arriving at a final correct 
version of discursive structure given the fact that archaeology is a method of analysis 
“whose limits and points of intersection cannot be fixed in a single operation” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 159). In particular, then, the analysis of statements does not claim to be a total, 
exhaustive description of “language” or of “what was said”. In the whole density implied 
by verbal performances, it is situated at a particular level that must be distinguished from 
the others, characterized in relation to them, and in abstract (Foucault, 1972a, p. 108).   
Furthermore, in archaeological analysis, depending on the discourse that is being 
analyzed, one or more discursive elements will be more significant, compared to others, 
to be described. For example, in his archaeological study of madness (MC, 1988), 
Foucault focused on the objects more than the other three elements of discourse. 
Similarly, in the archaeological study of the clinical practice (BC, 1975), he focused on 
explaining discursive concepts and dedicated more time and space to outlining and 
explaining them. In none of his archaeological studies (MC, BC, OT), Foucault has 
actually covered, with an equal attention, all four elements of the discursive formation he 
analyzed (Gutting, 1989, p. 233). The same can be said about the present study. There are 
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some discursive elements that have been described in much more detail (e.g., doctor as an 
object) compared to some others (e.g., disease and treatment as an object). The decision 
of which elements to cover more extensively was dictated by the data collected in this 
study and was not the result of a deliberate choice I made by myself. For example, there 
happened to be a large amount data describing surfaces of emergence for the doctor as an 
object of modern medical discourse, whereas, it was difficult to find any data pieces 
describing the surfaces of emergence for disease and treatment. Even though 
unintentional, the focus of the analysis being put on one element rather than the others 
shows that the former element has more complicated rules of formation, more 
complicated relations with its discursive constellation and nondiscursive practices, and 
consequently, more complicated conditions of existence–all of which require more time 
and effort on the part of the archaeologist in order to describe that particular element and 
its conditions of existence. 
Lastly, it must be noted that archaeological description of a discourse is an 
undertaking that can never be “completed” or “wholly achieved” (Foucault, 1972a, p. 
131). It will always have room for revision and modification. The reason for this is the 
fact that discourse, as Foucault describes it, is a dynamic phenomenon. That means the 
discursive elements and relations between them are not fixed and static. Discursive 
regularities can never reach a stage of completion, calcification or termination because 
they are constantly changing and transforming, even “without appeal to an external 
cause” (Webb, 2013, p. 109). Consequently, discursive regularities (e.g., elements, 
relations, rules and conditions) established by archaeological analysis are “only ever 
partial, provisional, and already, if imperceptibly, in transformation” (Webb, 2013, p. 
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127). Other limitations of this study include having less time for conducting direct 
observation in the clinical settings (only two weeks), and having the opportunity to 
observe only two clerkships (family medicine and surgery) at only two teaching 
hospitals. These were the limitations which could not have been overcome given the 
technical issues of allowing PhD students to conduct research and directly observe the 
clinicians onsite, at Indiana University School of Medicine. Nonetheless, they were less 
than actual limitations for the archaeological analysis of modern medical discourse that I 
have carried out in this study. As mentioned above, there was no expectations to 
document every word that is uttered in medical school and its related teaching hospitals 
in order to be able to effectively analyze the discourse of medicine at this specific 
medical school. One can collect only a certain amount of data in a single study while 
acknowledging that archaeology is a never-ending-analysis. Collecting more data–
whether through multiple sites’ observation, interviews, or focus groups–might have 
added few additional objects, modalities of statements and theoretical strategies; but it 
would not have affected the elements that have already been established and discussed in 
Chapter 4. Furthermore, savoir is not the sum total of everything that is said in a 
discourse; it’s rather a set of rules and sites into which new statements can always be 
added (Foucault, 1972). 
As for generalizability of findings presented in this study, the data were collected 
and analyzed as relevant to the specific discursive field at IUSM, Indianapolis, and as 
such, they do not have indefinite possibilities for extension. As Foucault suggests, “the 
most one can do is to make a systematic comparison, from one region to another, of the 
rules for the formation of concepts” (Foucault, 1972a, p. 63). I have attempted to 
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elucidate the identities and differences in the groups of rules described in this study in a 
way that they are specific enough to characterize the individualized discursive formation 
of medicine at IUSM. In the meantime, it is my hope to have offered enough analogies 
that could make it possible for another archaeologist to compare and contrast different 
discursive domains–based on their own local identities and differences–in relation to the 
set of rules that have been outlined in this study.  
Transformation and Possibility of Change in the Discursive Structure of Medicine 
It is important to bear in mind that the system of formation of modern medicine 
(as described in Chapter 4) is not a static structure that is imposed on medicine from the 
outside, one that defines all characteristics and possibilities for medicine once and for all. 
Rather, discourse is like a web in which each position is either taken or can be taken. The 
web is not a continuous space but rather “a distribution of gaps, voids, absences, limits, 
divisions” (Foucault, 1972, p. 119). This is not to say that any statements not yet part of 
medical discourse or any positions not yet taken are being suppressed. The potential for 
their appearance is still there, though they cannot appear simply as a floating island in the 
space. Any new statement must find a place for itself to fit within the web of medical 
discourse; it must find an associated field to attach to. That means, new statements can 
only appear when discursive conditions allow them to appear in a discourse. This is not 
the same as being suppressed. It is also not the same as denying new statements the 
possibility to exist and appear on the surface of discourse (Webb, 2013, p. 105). It is must 
be noted that the conditions described by this archaeological study (in Chapter 4) are not 
the conditions of possibility for discursive elements; they are rather the conditions of 
their actual existence. Furthermore, as archaeological conditions, they are not preexisting 
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or predetermined, but are brought to existence by those same discursive elements that 
they apply to.  
With the discourse of modern medicine not being static or complete at any given 
point in time, the possibility of both big and small changes in its discursive structure is 
always there. There are two ways in which the discursive formation of modern medicine 
can change. First, it is possible for the new discursive elements to arise in addition to - or 
as replacement of - the elements that are already there. New objects, new modalities of 
statements, new concepts, or new strategies can appear on the surface of medical 
discourse at any time. It should to be noted, however, that changes such as these would 
not cause a transformation in the discursive structure of medicine because the elements 
may be new, but their rules of formation will not. Those new elements will still be based 
on the same rules of formation that were described in the previous chapter. Even if they 
occupy a different position and do not presume the same sequence created by the rest of 
the elements, the appearance of new elements based on the same rules of formation will 
not be considered a transformation in the discourse of modern medicine. Yet, any new 
elements will add a new positivity in the system of formation of modern medicine 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 176).  
Second, wholesale transformations in the discursive formation of medicine is also 
possible to take place at some point in the future. Several transformations have already 
taken place in medicine along the history. In general, a shift in the position of the 
discursive formations that work closely together within the same discursive constellation 
can bring about a change in that specific constellation and therefore cause a 
transformation in each of the neighboring discourses. Let’s take the example of business 
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administration and modern medicine, which have a great many relations by working 
closely together as two discourses located in the same discursive constellation. It is 
remarkable to think that a transformation took place in the discursive formation of 
modern medicine with the advent of employer-sponsored health insurance plans in the 
1920s, in United States (Jost, 2014). As a result of this transformation, the system of 
interpositivity in which medicine was involved (with business) was so profoundly 
affected that it gave rise to the appearance of a great many new elements such as concepts 
and theoretical strategies in modern medical discourse. As a consequence of developing 
close relations with business administration, medicine gradually became less attached to 
things such as its commonly held humanistic values. According to Althusser (1969), “the 
most radical discontinuities are the breaks effected by a work of theoretical 
transformation which establishes a science by detaching it from the ideology of its past 
and by revealing this past as ideological” (p. 168.). 
Although medicine has seen several wholesale transformations before reaching 
our age, for a discursive formation to undergo transformation does not necessarily mean 
to let go of all its elements so that it can be substituted by an entirely new discursive 
formation. Instead, for a discourse to undergo a transformation means that its “statements 
are governed by new rules of formation” (Foucault, 1972, p. 173). For example, not all 
objects, concepts, statements, and their modes of enunciation that belonged to the 
seventeenth century medical discourse simply disappeared in the next few centuries. 
Several of them have remained the same until now (e.g., the doctor, the human body, 
disease etc.) though they belong to a “different systems of dispersion” and are “governed 
by distinct laws of formation” now (Foucault, 1972, p. 173). Let us take the example of 
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changes that began to appear in medicine during the late eighteenth century. Foucault 
uses this event as the example of a profound transformation in medicine. He believes that 
events that occurred during only a quarter of a century (from 1790 to 1815) changed the 
discourse of medicine more than it had changed since the Middle Ages, and perhaps even 
since Greek Medicine. As a result of these changes, an entire group of new objects (e.g., 
organic lesions, anatomoclinical sings and correlations), modalities of the statement (e.g., 
new techniques of observation, detection of pathologies, and recording them), concepts 
(systematic naming and classification of disease), and whole new sets of theoretical 
strategies related to each of the above elements were added to the discourse of medicine 
(Foucault, 1972, pp. 170-171). Many of these resulting elements are still part of the 
modern discourse of medicine today.  
Relations between Discursive and Nondiscursive Practices 
As discussed in Chapter 2, discursive practices often reside within nondiscursive 
structures, and as such, they are surrounded by nondiscursive practice. Nondiscursive 
domains relevant to medicine include institutions, political events, and economic 
processes particular to a time period. As one can imagine, the connection between 
discursive and nondiscursive practice is inevitable to the point that the nondiscursive may 
form part of the discourse itself. For example, the interrelations of modern medical 
discourse and nondiscursive practices can easily be spotted in the rules for formation of 
specific objects, modalities of the statement, concepts, and theoretical options as outlined 
in Chapter 4. It should be noted that some of the regularities outlined in Chapter 4 extend 
well beyond the boundaries of medical discourse itself. Take the example of medical 
students assuming particular positions about nuances of their future practice based on 
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how much debt they will be in during their early years of practice. Those particular 
positions mark an example of discursive regularities that are based on interrelations of 
medical discourse with the nondiscursive structures of the society in which it is based. 
According to Foucault, 
this whole group of relations forms a principle of determination that 
permits or excludes, within a given discourse, a certain number of 
statements: these are conceptual systematizations, enunciative series, 
groups, and organizations of objects that might have been possible (and of 
which nothing can justify the absence at the level of their own rules of 
formation), but which are excluded by a discursive constellation at a 
higher level and in a broader space (Foucault, 1972, p. 67).  
 
It is also important to bear in mind that some discursive regularities tie medical discourse 
partially, and often in latent ways, to other discourses (e.g., business, natural sciences, 
etc.). Description of such relations too falls under the domain of archaeological analysis. I 
have tried to discuss some of these relations in the section outlining theoretical strategies 
in Chapter 4. 
Thus, the question of relations between discourse of modern medicine and the 
nondiscursive practices in which it is embedded is the question of “how medical 
discourse as a practice concerned with a particular field of objects, finding itself in the 
hands of a certain number of statutorily designated individuals, and having certain 
functions to exercise in society, is articulated on practices that are external to it, and 
which are not themselves of a discursive order” (Foucault, 1972, p. 164). This question 
falls under the domain of archaeology. An archaeological analysis, should it be 
appropriately expanded, can seek to map out “the whole domain of institutions, economic 
processes, and social relations on which a discursive formation can be articulated” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 164).  
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Among various other forms that the relations between discursive and 
nondiscursive practices (as they relate to medicine) can assume, this study does not deny 
the existence of causal relations between them. Indeed, the field of relations that 
characterizes a discursive formation is the locus in which effects of the context and the 
situation on the speaking subject may be perceived, situated, and determined (Foucault, 
1972, pp. 163-165). Archaeological analysis conducted in the present study establishes 
more direct relations than those of a causality communicated by a speaking subject. For 
example, rather than showing how political practice determines the meaning and form of 
medical discourse, in this study I wish to show how political capitalism takes part in 
forming the conditions of emergence for several theoretical strategies and other 
discursive elements, as a consequence of those strategies. Furthermore, this study tries to 
show how politics takes part in shaping the function that is expected of medicine in 
modern society. Despite the difference in time and place and numerous other factors, my 
results in this study were pretty similar to what Foucault found in his archaeological 
analysis of the clinical medicine, in The Birth of the Clinic (1975). The following excerpt 
contains points that should sound particularly familiar to my reader: 
One can also see the appearance of this relation of political practice to 
medical discourse in the status accorded to the doctor, who becomes not 
only the privileged, but also virtually the exclusive, enunciator of this 
discourse, in the form of institutional relation that the doctor may have 
with the hospitalized patient or with his private practice, in the modalities 
of teaching and diffusion that are prescribed or authorized for this 
knowledge. Lastly, one can grasp this relation in the function that is 
attributed to medical discourse or in the role that is required of it, when it 
is a question of judging individuals, making administrative decisions, 
laying down the norms of a society, translating - in order to ‘resolve’ or to 
conceal them - conflicts of another order, giving models of a natural type 





Foucault’s primary concern from mid-1970s onwards had been the interconnection of 
power and knowledge that explains the relations between discourse and the nondiscursive 
structures in its due detail. That type of analysis, which would require a genealogical 
methodology, is beyond the scope of the present study. This study focuses on archaeology 
of discursive formation only. Perhaps in the future, I will pick up the second volume of 
the present project and carry out a detailed analysis of interrelations between 
nondiscursive structures, such as medical school and hospital, and the modern medical 
discourse. Such analysis will need to be based on the theme of power/knowledge–as is 
the way of a Foucauldian genealogical methodology.  
Relations between Medicine and Ideology 
Here, I would like to say a few words about relations of modern medicine to 
ideology, which is a particular form of nondiscursive practice, as observed in this study. 
More often than not, modern medicine as a discipline claims to be based on modern 
biomedical science. Even so, it is evident from the findings of this study that there are 
important practical connections between medicine and the political, economic, and 
religious ideologies of our time. Several statements in this study referred to religious 
beliefs on the part of medical students, which they said will guide them through their 
future medical practice. That does not mean their practice can no longer be trusted to be 
objective or science-based, because “ideology is not exclusive of scientificity” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 186). Rather, it should be seen as an example of how sometimes “the ideological 
function of a science requires it to meet certain standards of objectivity” (Gutting, 1989, 
p. 258). The following conclusions that Foucault draws from his analysis of clinical 
medicine in BC are similar to findings of the present study. He notes,  
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few discourses have given so much place to ideology as clinical discourse 
or that of political economy: [however] this is not a sufficiently good 
reason to treat the totality of their statements as being undermined by 
error, contradiction, and a lack of objectivity (Foucault, 1972, p. 186). 
 
Obviously, ideology has the capacity to cause defects of objectivity in the practice of a 
science, but, at least at a theoretical level, both ideology and science share a common 
presubjective origin and thus they are not exclusive of each other. Archaeology, therefore, 
“moves away from the standard view that there is a deep gap between valid science and 
ideologically influenced inquiry and leads us to see scientific objectivity and ideological 
bias as two intertwined aspects of a discipline’s rootedness in a discursive formation” 
(Gutting, 1989, p. 259).  
Morality and Non-objectivity in Medicine 
Results of this study as presented in Chapter 4 can provide the basis for a critique 
of the moral values that often remain hidden under the purported objectivity and value-
neutrality of modern medicine, and its alleged claims of humanity and compassion. 
Archaeology does not deny the fact that medicine is based on an objective body of 
scientific knowledge. However, unlike pure natural sciences such as physics and 
chemistry, clinical practice is not objective at all times. Plus, analytical works such as that 
of Bachelard (see Gutting, 1987, for more) have exposed the controlling role of human 
reason even in the experiments of physics and chemistry. This study displays the 
powerful role of the human discourses in practicing the so-called objectivity of medicine. 
As argued before, the fact that clinical practice is value-laden, and at times driven by 
ideology (as shown in Chapter 4), does not undercut the scientific status of medical 
science itself (Gutting, 1989, p. 136). Foucault makes a similar case by stating “it would 
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be a mistake to deny that pathological anatomy is a science because of the connections of 
clinical medicine to institutional norms” (Gutting, 1989, p. 137).  
It is important to clarify that archaeological critique of modern medicine carried 
out in this study does not lead to a global rejection of the way modern medicine works as 
a practice. It rather suggests specific ways of calling into question important aspects of 
medical education and practice that directly affect professional identity formation in 
medical students that, in turn, affects the quality of medical care delivery. Not to forget 
that archaeological critique of reason and morality presented in this study is limited and 
local; yet, these results are contributing to the extensive evidence in support of the 
argument that medical practice is not based on modern medical science alone. In other 
words, the science of medicine is not the only component of medical discourse as things 
that are said and done daily in the clinical settings are not all scientific, objective, and 
value-neutral. Thus, the analysis conducted in this study seeks to map out an 
archaeological territory that includes all scientific and non-scientific practices that are 
conditioned by savoir–the knowledge that is not only found in science but also “in 
fiction, reflection, narrative accounts, institutional regulations, and political decisions” as 
they relate to medical practice (Gutting, 1989, p. 252). 
Medical Professional Identity Formation 
As discussed in Chapter 2, medical professional identity is expressed by ways in 
which medical professionals execute medical professionalism. Professional identity is not 
something that one can have or not have; it is not a job title or a skill set that one may 
possess. Professional identity is rather what one does as a professional (Jenkins, 2008). 
Furthermore, professional identity is not something one can achieve once and for all. It is 
460 
 
not a static entity; rather, it is constantly being developed, formed, and transformed 
through discourse. On the other hand, “discourse and system produce each other” and the 
cycle keeps going on and on (Foucault, 1972, p. 76). This study aimed to show the 
structure of medical discourse so one can see how it constitutes the identity of medical 
students (that is, the future doctors) that are involved with this discourse. Data collected 
by interviews and focus groups with medical students were analyzed to show the objects, 
modalities of statements, concepts, and theoretical strategies adopted by medical students 
in relation to medicine. This analysis not only establishes the system of discursive 
formation but also the gradations of medical students’ professional identities. 
Archaeology reveals “how ways of speaking are invested in systems of prohibitions and 
values” (Foucault, 1972, p. 193). Students’ professional identities are formed by 
discourse and it is these students who partake to produce and reproduce the discourse 
again. The fact that it is a two-way process makes it only more fascinating from an 
archaeological standpoint.  
As medical educators, we should care about the discursive structure of medicine. 
We should care about what people talk about in clinical settings, how they talk about 
them, what notions they draw from when talking about those things, and what positions 
they assume concerning those things. These talks and actions produce and reproduce the 
discourse of medicine in both educational and clinical settings. It is this discourse that 
defines the field in which professional identities of all who are involved in medicine are 
deployed. Furthermore, it is this discourse that dictates what people say, do, and even 
imagine about medicine–more often than not–subconsciously.  
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Discursive Statements, Elements, and Relations 
Statements 
A relatively large number of statements were collected as data through conducting 
twenty one-on-one interviews, four focus groups, and over sixty hours of field 
observation. A small portion of these statements are reported as exemplary data in 
Chapter 4. The unit of analysis in this study, however, was not the individual statement, 
but the associated field to which the statement belonged. It is the function that an 
individual statement plays within its associated field that makes that statement a unique 
and rare event, regardless of how many times it has been enunciated in a discourse. As 
Foucault puts it: 
However banal it may be, however unimportant its consequences may 
appear to be, however quickly it may be forgotten after its appearance, 
however little heard or however badly deciphered we may suppose it to 
be, a statement is always an event that neither the language nor the 
meaning can quite exhaust (Foucault, 1972, p. 28). 
 
Each statement is bound, first of all by a series of other formulations within which the 
statement appears in its associated field. Thus, the associated field is composed of  
all the formulations to which the statement refers (implicitly or not), either 
by repeating them, modifying them, or adapting them, or by opposing 
them, or by commenting on them; there can be no statement that in one 
way or another does not re-actualize others… [also] the associated field is 
made up of all the formulations whose status the statement in question 
shares, among which it takes its place without regard to linear order, with 
which it will fade away, or with which, on the contrary, it will be valued, 
preserved, sacralized, and offered, as a possible object, to a future 
discourse (Foucault, 1972, pp. 98-99). 
 
Thus, the enunciative field is “the domain of coexistence in which the enunciative 
function operates” (Foucault, 1972, p. 100). The enunciative field allows the statements 
“to follow one another, order one another, coexist with one another, and play roles in 
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relation to one another” (Foucault, 1972, p. 100). It should be noted that an 
archaeological statement is not free and it cannot take anything that it likes as its theme 
unless that thing has already emerged as an object of discourse and is supported by an 
entire network of relations. Hence, “a statement occurs [only] following a regularity 
established by other antecedent statements.” (Webb, 2013, p. 110). 
Each statement recorded and presented as data in this study has been treated as 
belonging to an enunciated field. Therefore, statements reported in Chapter 4 should be 
seen as nodes in a network of other statements referencing the same object of discourse in 
one way or another. Individual statements collected in this study were not (and should not 
be) analyzed or thematized as independent units of analysis with the assumption that they 
might have just sprung out of some creative mind. It is worth reiterating here that all 
statements that have been reported in relation to a particular associated field in this study 
share the same status. The reader may wish to give them the status of research literature, 
or some trivial comment, or a universally valid scientific fact, depending on the 
associated field that they belong to. None of the statements can be separated from its 
status or its associated field that, in a sense, functions as a natural habitat where the 
statement is born, raised, and ultimately forgotten. The rule of thumb is that, if it does not 
belong to an associated field in the discourse, it is not considered an archaeological 
statement. Such statements were simply not included in the analytical process (e.g., some 
doctors talking about Jimmy Johns’ sandwiches in the hospital setting, with those 
statements not belonging to any associated field within the territory of the modern 
medical discourse). According to Foucault,  
there is no statement in general, no free, neutral, independent 
statement; but a statement always belongs to a series or a whole, always 
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plays a role among other statements, deriving support from them and 
distinguishing itself from them: it is always part of a network of 
statements, in which it has a role, however minimal it may be, to play… 
There is no statement that does not presuppose others; there is no 
statement that is not surrounded by a field of coexistence, effects of series 
and succession, a distribution of functions and roles (Foucault, 1972, p. 
99). 
 
In conclusion, statements in this study ought not to be seen as the smallest units of the 
discursive formation of medicine, the units based on which discerning an individualized 
meaning is possible. Rather, it is important to note that “the statement is that which 
situates these meaningful units in a space in which they breed and multiply” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 100). 
This rarity of statements, the incomplete, fragmented form of the 
enunciative field, the fact that few things, in all, can be said, explain that 
statements are not, like the air we breathe, an infinite transparency; but 
things that are transmitted and preserved, that have value, and which one 
tries to appropriate; that are repeated, reproduced, and transformed; to 
which pre-established networks are adapted, and to which a status is given 
in the institution; things that are duplicated not only by copy or translation, 
but by exegesis, commentary, and the internal proliferation of meaning. 
Because statements are rare, they are collected in unifying totalities, and 
the meanings to be found in them are multiplied (Foucault, 1972, pp. 119-
120). 
 
Having expanded on the analysis of statements, I will now turn to elaborate on the 
elements of discourse and the ways in which they were observed and analyzed in the 
present study. 
Elements 
Objects. Two major discursive objects of medical discourse, namely disease and 
treatment, and the human body, are the most common topics of discussion throughout the 
medical school training. Let’s say, vast majority of the talk in any classroom or lab 
settings in medical school is about one or both of those two objects. Moreover, in places 
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such as the dissection lab and simulation lab, “[it is] the sole truth of man that can be 
objectified and perceived scientifically” (Foucault, 1988, p. 622). In both school and 
hospital settings, the most likely occasions where some talk about the doctor happens are 
seminars on medical professionalism. For a lot of students especially in the school 
settings, the discussions on professionalism count as one of the “wishy-washy” topics 
that are there just to fill a spot on the schedule (see Chapter 4, theoretical strategies about 
medical professionalism, for more).  
The fourth object of medical discourse, which is the sick person, rarely comes up 
anywhere in doctor-doctor or teacher-student conversations either in medical school or 
hospital. In medical school, the talk about the sick person rarely comes up during didactic 
teaching sessions such as lectures–such sessions are often meant to teach students about 
scientific medical knowledge. The same goes with the hospital. It is possible to spot some 
talk about the sick person when doctors are talking informally among themselves; yet, it 
rarely comes up during a formal session of education or anything that involves the 
presence of several doctors talking about medical knowledge or practice. The sick person 
is still an object of medical discourse because it is always present in doctor-patient 
conversations, though mainly spoken about by patients, and patient families themselves. 
Patients talk about it either with their doctor and other healthcare staff or with their own 
families as part of the medical discourse that takes place at the hospital. Thus, the sick 
person as an object occupies a sizeable space in the overall medical talk that happens in 
the clinical settings. Doctors may avoid talking about this object when they are among 
themselves from fear of seeming unprofessional to others, or, because they really do not 
care about the person of the patient beyond their health condition. Given the focus on 
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scientific medical information about human body and disease for about ninety-nine 
percent of the time during their medical training, it is probably unreasonable to expect the 
doctors to act differently. In fact, it will be interesting to find out why/how those doctors 
who do talk and care about the human being beyond their medical records do so. Who 
teaches them to do so? Culture, faith, tradition? Whatever it might be, it is not something 
that we currently focus on in medical education.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is not enough to simply identify the objects of 
discourse in archaeology. One has to discuss the rules for their formation as well as the 
overall conditions that facilitate their existence. The following were my guiding questions 
while writing the section on discursive objects in Chapter 4:  
Is it possible to lay down the rule to which their appearance was subject? 
Is it possible to discover according to which non-deductive system these 
objects could be juxtaposed and placed in succession to form the 
fragmented field - showing at certain points great gaps, at others a plethora 
of information…? What has ruled their existence as objects of discourse? 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 41) 
 
As Foucault suggests here, the system according to which the objects alternately appear 
on the surface of discourse is non-deductive, and not based on logic at all. During the 
analysis of rules and relations, it was found that there were a plethora of branching 
information related to some objects (i.e., the doctor) whereas it was difficult to find much 
at all about some other objects (i.e., disease and treatment)–leaving gaps in the overall 
picture of rules and relations that are governing the appearance of discursive objects.  
Establishing relations among the rules of formation for the objects also is 
important because it is these relations that bring about the conditions that could then 
facilitate the appearance of an object in a discourse. If disease and treatment, human 
body, the doctor and the sick person have emerged on the surface of modern medical 
466 
 
discourse as its objects, it is because a group of particular relations exists among the 
surfaces of emergence, authorities of delimitation, and grids of specification for each 
respective object. Furthermore, relations between discursive and nondiscursive practices 
must be maintained in a certain way to keep these four objects on the surface of medical 
discourse in the future. If any of the above relations changes in a profound manner, it will 
give rise to new object(s) that would be more fitting with the updated set of relations 
(conditions of existence) in medical discourse and thus they will replace one or more of 
the above four objects that exist at present. However, it is important to note that  
these relations are not present in the object; it is not they that are deployed 
when the object is being analyzed; they do not indicate the web, the 
immanent rationality, that ideal nervure that reappears totally or in part 
when one conceives of the object in the truth of its concept. They do not 
define its internal constitution, but what enables it to appear, to juxtapose 
itself with other objects, to situate itself in relation to them (Foucault, 
1972, p. 45). 
 
In Chapter 4, I have tried to seek the unity of modern medical discourse first of all in its 
objects: in their dissemination, in the interplay of their variations, and, in short, in “what 
is given to the speaking subject” (Foucault, 1972, p. 46). From there, I started seeking 
other elements and relations that characterize discursive practices related to each of the 
objects (modalities of statements, concepts, and theories related to each specific object). 
The picture that is drawn of the discursive formation of medicine in Chapter 4 is neither a 
configuration nor a form, it is a system of distribution for these four objects that is 
organized in a non-deductive manner.  
After describing objects, rules, relations, and conditions of existence for each 
object, and the modalities of statement, concepts, and strategies related to them, there are 
brief but important discussions of relations between medical discourse and other 
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discourses in its discursive constellation as well as relations between medical discourse 
and some nondiscursive structures that are presented in the last section of Chapter 4, 
concerning strategies related to each object. According to Foucault, relations between 
several discourses can be “relations of mutual delimitation [with] each of them giving the 
other the distinctive marks of its singularity the differentiation of its domain of 
application” (Foucault, 1972, p. 67). One such group of relations that has been 
established was between the discursive formation of modern medicine and that of 
business administration with the latter giving the former some “distinctive marks of its 
singularity”. I have attempted to show how business administration differentiates the 
domain of application for modern medical discourse by setting out specific outlines for 
what is possible to do in modern medicine at various steps in both medical education and 
practice. Business administration specifically sets out criteria of possibility for modern 
physicians and defines the domain within which they are allowed to navigate, and of 
course, the domain within which they are not allowed to navigate (e.g., seeing poor 
patients, who cannot afford to pay the fee, out of compassion). There are many things that 
physicians (and other healthcare professionals) can simply not say or do because it will 
be against the rules and regulations set out by business administration within their 
workplace (e.g., hospital or private practice), not because there are any rules in medicine 
itself that would prevent them from taking those actions.  
The discussion of objects in medical discourse can have numerous implications 
for medical education and practice. Let’s take an example of how this knowledge can be 
applied to the day-to-day practice of doctor-patient interviews. Admittedly, the 
conversation between a doctor and a patient is always uncoordinated–to some extent. 
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During these interviews, the doctor is thinking in terms of the disease that has possessed 
the patient’s body like a ghost, and the scientific facts about that ghost (signs and 
symptoms, prognosis, drugs, etc.). The patients often know that they stand outside of the 
paradigm where the doctor’s mind is. That’s one reason why the patients, no matter how 
educated and civilized, always feel in a way “less” than the doctor during a medical 
interview. Moreover, the patient is thinking in terms of her person; the person that she is, 
not her body that is sick, and not the disease which has taken over her body. The patient 
is thinking of her own person as the center of this entire conversation and practice. The 
problem is that, thinking in terms of two different objects creates a disconnect between 
patient and the doctor (to complicate the doctor-patient relationship further, modalities of 
statements and concepts used are also drastically different between the two parties). Of 
course, the patients cannot be thinking of what the doctor is thinking because they were 
not trained in medicine, but it should not be too difficult to teach the doctors to think in 
terms of the patient’s person more often. To acknowledge the existence of a person who 
lives behind a broken body and beyond the disease that has possessed her body; to see 
that person and be mindful of her. Individual doctors cannot take this initiative since it is 
often not something that is facilitated by the rules and conditions under which clinical 
medicine takes place. It is these rules and conditions that need to change and provide the 
sick person with a stronger stance in medical discourse to allow her to appear more often 
and carry more weight in medical talk, and to break the taboo of seeming odd/weak for 
the doctors who do talk about the person as well as her body and her disease. The 
question is, can we do anything different in medical education to address these issues–
469 
 
such as devoting more time and space for discussing the sick person besides the body and 
disease during medical training?  
Modalities of Statement. As described in Chapter 4, people use various types of 
statements to talk about the same object, which are referred to as modalities of 
enunciation, or simply, modalities of statement in archaeology. Depending on who is 
speaking the statement, which type of authority this speaker has, and what is his/her 
specific position regarding the object being talked about, different modalities of 
statements are accorded different types of status in medical discourse. Plus, not all of 
these modalities are privileged with the same authority and credibility, even when spoken 
by the same person. For example, statistical information is often deemed more credible 
than qualitative descriptions or biographical accounts, even when they are spoken by the 
same speaker (e.g., doctor). Thus, modalities of statement in medical discourse are 
distinct elements of medical discourse that are concerned with the status of doctors, the 
institutional and technical site form which they speak, and their position as subjects 
perceiving, observing, describing, teaching, etc. (Foucault, 1972, p. 53) 
Modalities of enunciation that were spotted and discussed in this study as the 
most common types of statements include qualitative descriptions; biographical accounts; 
the location, interpretation, and cross-checking of signs; reasoning by analogy and 
deduction, and statistical calculations. The initial categories were borrowed from 
Foucault’s archaeology of clinical discourse (BC, 1975), but they still hold true as is 
evident by the present study. Examples of each category referencing different discursive 
objects are presented in Chapter 4. To establish the rules for the formation of modalities 
in Chapter 4, I have attempted to provide answers to the following three questions: 1) 
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Who is speaking? 2) What institutional sites does this speaker draw his/her authority 
from? 3) What is the position of the subject about the object of medical discourse? 
Concerning the first question, I have tried to discuss the following:  
Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to 
use this sort of language? Who is qualified to do so? Who derives from it 
his own special quality, his prestige, and from whom, in return, does he 
receive if not the assurance, at least the presumption that what he says is 
true? What is the status of the individuals who - alone - have the right, 
sanctioned by law or tradition, juridically defined or spontaneously 
accepted, to proffer such a discourse? … Medical statements cannot come 
from anybody; their value, efficacy, even their therapeutic powers, and, 
generally speaking, their existence as medical statements cannot be 
dissociated from the statutorily defined person who has the right to make 
them, and to claim for them the power to overcome suffering and death 
(Foucault, 1972, pp. 50-51). 
 
Signifying the authority of the speaker who is allowed to make medical statements is 
important, partly because it involves the rules and processes of appropriation of medical 
discourse at large. In modern societies with the progressive specialization of discourses, 
the property of a single discourse is often confined to only a particular group of 
individuals who are considered to be qualified to produce or even get involved with it. 
For example, to be qualified to contribute to medical discourse one needs to be trained in 
medicine, and to merely get involved with it one needs to be a patient or patient family. 
The doctors are the only group of individuals who are considered to have the right to 
speak medical statements and the only ones that can understand them, have licit and 
immediate access to the body of previously formulated medical statements, and finally, 
have the capacity to make use of medical statements for decision making, and 
investments in institutions and practices. Medicine is not the only social discourse with 
this kind of specialization, however. Others, such as the economic and literary discourses, 
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are no more available to the layperson than medicine when it comes to the discussion of 
who has the right to produce or get involved with them.  
The point to be noted is that, neither the processes of appropriation nor the role 
that the doctor plays in relation to the discursive/nondiscursive structures are extrinsic to 
the unity of the function of the doctor (as an object of medical discourse). Rather than 
looking at the processes that are less than ideal as some sort of distortion of the real 
function of the doctor, one must admit that they are formative elements of that very 
function. The function of the doctor does not possess some pure, neutral, atemporal core 
that needs to be rescued from the harm of such superposing factors. Rather, one needs to 
recognize that the doctor can only function as well as its formative elements allow 
him/her to. This same doctor would function differently if the formative elements in the 
conditions of its existence were to change or get replaced. Nonetheless, there exists no 
central purity that can ever be freed from the external factors and function in a so-called 
ideal way (Foucault, 1972, pp. 68-69). Lastly, one needs to recognize and appreciate the 
specific position of the speaker (e.g., doctor, patient, etc.) in relation to the discursive 
object that they are speaking about (e.g., disease and treatment, the doctor, the body, and 
the sick person). For instance, Foucault describes the position of the doctor (as the subject 
of medical discourse) in relation to the discursive objects as follows: 
The positions of the subject are also defined by the situation that it is 
possible for him [the doctor] to occupy in relation to the various domains 
or groups of objects… he is situated at an optimal perceptual distance 
whose boundaries delimit the wheat of relevant information…To these 
perceptual situations should be added the positions that the subject can 
occupy in the information networks (in theoretical teaching or in hospital 
training; in the system of oral communication or of written document: as 
emitter and receiver of observations, case-histories, statistical data, general 




In this study, no attempts were made to reduce the disparity of modalities of statement 
that was found in the data. I did not seek to establish any form of coherence between 
them based on their logical succession, types of reasoning, formal structure, etc. Instead, 
the main questions I have attempted to answer or at least discuss regarding the various 
modalities of enunciation in this study were as follows: “What is it that links them 
together? What necessity binds them together? Why these and not others?” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 50). My hope is that the section on enunciative modalities in Chapter 4 is 
addressing and discussing these questions, at least in part.  
Concepts. The conceptual framework of modern medicine sets out the boundaries 
of what is possible to speak about in medical discourse. Relations between rules for the 
formation of objects and modalities of statements bring about the concepts, and concepts 
give rise to strategic choices that are possible to make within the modern medical 
discourse. The point is, both theoretically and practically, it is not possible to speak of 
something in medical discourse unless that thing has already been established as an 
object of medicine, and its existence has been facilitated by a whole set of rules and 
conditions. In Webb’s words: 
Discourses are governed by rules understood as regularities. Given the 
complexity of the conditions required for the appearance of a discursive 
object, the constraints on what it is possible to speak of at any given time 
are quite tight: it is not even in principle possible to speak of anything 
whatsoever at any time. For it to be possible to speak of a thing, it must 
first emerge, and this means that the group of relations between its surface 
of emergence, its delimitation and its grid of specification must have 
achieved at least a threshold degree of clarity (2013, p. 66). 
 
Furthermore, the objects, types of statements, and concepts are laid down in medicine 
with their appearance being bound to entire sets of rules and relations that are not easy to 
break through. Anybody who speaks in medicine is basing their statements on the ground 
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of these same rules and regulations and therefore it is not possible for people to get out of 
this framework and draw from something else, from other notions and principles that are 
not supported by the rules and regulations (described in Chapter 4) that are in place, in 
modern medical discourse. Therefore, ideas emerging on the surface of the discourse are 
always finite and limited.  
 In a discursive formation, individual possibilities are restricted to the point that 
differentiation of ideas cannot occur. Individuals involved in medicine can express 
themselves and their positions only by following the rules and regulations drawn for them 
by the larger discourse of medicine, and have the option of actualizing their personality 
only to the extent that would fit within the boundaries marked by conditions of existence 
set up by medical discourse itself. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, conditions of 
existence for a discourse do not precede the discourse itself, rather, they are drawn from 
the discourse and they set out boundaries for what is possible to say, to do, and to think 
within a particular discursive formation such as that of modern medicine. Discursive 
rules are at work “not only in the mind or consciousness of individuals, but in discourse 
itself; they operate therefore, according to a sort of uniform anonymity, on all individuals 
who undertake to speak in this discursive field” (Foucault, 1972, p. 63). 
Concepts of medical discourse may be modified, renewed or replaced over time; 
however, the new/modified concepts will still follow the same rules and conditions 
marked out by the modern medical discourse. In that sense, they are not the result of new 
and creative thinking on the part of people who come up with new concepts, rather, they 
are merely the result of practicing the possibilities that have already been set out by the 
discourse. It is only in the event that a transformation occurs in a discourse, such as that 
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of medicine in the late eighteenth century that conceptual frameworks can expand and 
give room for entirely new concepts due to the emergence of new objects and new 
modalities of statements that are emerging on the surface of discourse, after going 
through transformation. A transformation can change the way statements are being 
arranged in discourse through changing the relations of discourse with other discourses in 
its discursive constellation and its relations with the nondiscursive practices of its time. 
Again, unless those rules and relations are changed first, it is not possible to simply add a 
new discursive element in modern medicine (e.g., an object or a concept) and start talking 
about it. Although formation of concepts in discourse does not follow a logical 
architecture (Foucault, 1972, p. 61), it is not based on an absolute chaos either. Concepts 
follow a set of rules for arranging statements in series, such as those governing the 
formation of conceptual schemata of dependence, order, and succession among certain 
types of statements. For example, the field of presence demonstrates what might seem 
like an absolute chaos due to an extreme dispersion of statements. Yet, all statements - 
even when contradicting one anther - coexist under the same conditions and have an 
equal chance to emerge on the surface of modern medical discourse.  
However, I would like to draw attention to a couple of important points here. 
First, it must be noted that there are no standards to control for dispersion. The chaos is 
real and it cannot be scientifically controlled for. Dispersion is a central theme in 
discursive formations, and archaeological analysis does not make any attempts to create 
an artificial coherence among dispersed items appearing in discourse. Thus, archaeology 
challenges the assumption of everything needing to be coherent at all times (see Chapter 
2 for more). If one wishes to theorize medicine, the only way to map out its structure is 
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through defining dispersion of its statements, which I have attempted to conduct in this 
study. Second, it must also be noted that all contradicting concepts have an equal chance 
to emerge in discourse, because all of them are formed based on the same rules and 
conditions that are provided by discourse. For example, statements that approve of 
alternative medical practices, those that justify it, those that require verification of its 
validity, those statements that are against practicing alternative medicine, those that reject 
it, deny its validity and exclude it from the discourse of modern medicine–all of them 
have an equal chance to emerge as statements in the discourse of modern medicine.  
In the light of the above discussion, a few important questions that arise here are: 
First, do doctors’ beliefs about this or that object (e.g., accepting, criticizing, or rejecting 
some idea related to a discursive object) in medical discourse affect their professional 
identity and clinical practice? The answer is: Yes. As argued several times already, the 
object of discourse is “what is given to the speaking subject” and discourses 
“systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972, pp. 46, 49). The 
next question is: Do we do anything to address this issue in medical education? The 
answer to this is, perhaps: No. Do we even acknowledge the non-scientificity of 
dispersion among statements in modern medical discourse so we may be able to discuss 
it? Again, the answer is: No. My hope for the present study is to at least open the doors 
for discussion of these and other similar questions in medical education research. 
It must be recognized that the locus of emergence for concepts is the discourse 
itself, not any external factors that might affect discourse to shape it in a certain way. To 
think external factors can affect medical discourse is to assume there is a central piece to 
medicine that can exist independent of all external factors, which is against the chief 
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principles of archaeology. When someone utters the word “medicine”, perhaps it makes 
many people think of an ideal group of concepts that are good and pure, and that have 
been so across all human history. Archaeology, on the other hand, does not believe in the 
transcendentality of medicine leaning against the horizon of idealism. Therefore, in 
archaeological analysis one describes the conceptual framework of a discourse merely 
based on the intrinsic regularities of discourse and its relations, which is what I have 
attempted to do here. In this study, I have not tried to reduce the multiplicity of 
statements to a handful of concepts in order to establish coherence. Also, I have not 
assumed some origin that gives rise to a central core of purity to the idea of medicine 
across the history of mankind, counting any illusions, prejudices, errors, and traditions 
merely as external factors that are distorting the purity of medicine. Further, I have not 
tried to resolve contradictions in the complex network of concepts as they were recorded. 
Instead, I have tried to relate the complexity of the conceptual framework of modern 
medicine to the rules that characterized its discursive practice; the rules that emerge from 
intrinsic regularities of discourse. In Foucault’s words: 
My intention is not to carry out an exhaustive observation of them 
[discursive concepts], to establish the characteristics that they may have in 
common, to undertake a classification of them, to measure their internal 
coherence, or to test their mutual compatibility… One stands back in 
relation to this manifest set of concepts, and one tries to determine 
according to what schemata (of series, simultaneous groupings, linear or 
reciprocal modification) the statements may be linked to one another in a 
type of discourse… These schemata make it possible to describe - not the 
laws of the internal construction of concepts, not their progressive and 
individual genesis in the mind of man - but their anonymous dispersion 
through texts, books, and oeuvres. A dispersion that characterizes a type of 
discourse, and which defines, between concepts, forms of deduction, 
derivation, and coherence, but also of incompatibility, intersection, 
substitution, exclusion, mutual alteration, displacement, etc. (Foucault, 




In sum, the archaeological analysis of modern medical discourse conducted in this study 
does not look beyond the statements of its data to draw concepts from some 
transcendental field of ideal and pure medicine in the past, nor does it appeal to the 
inexhaustible field of possibility for the medicine to become pure and ideal in the future. 
This archaeological study rather looks “at the most superficial level”, at the level of 
discourse, and the “group of rules that operate within it” (Foucault, 1972, p. 62). In the 
present study, I have only undertaken an example of alternative medicine to illustrate the 
structure and rules governing the statements in the field of presence. 
Theoretical Strategies. Theoretical strategies arising in discourse are “the 
spontaneous philosophy of those who did not philosophize” (Foucault, 1972, p. 136). Put 
in another way, we know that the questions of what to talk about, how to talk about it, 
which concepts to draw from, and what positions to take regarding all of those are 
already mapped out in the discursive formation of modern medicine. In Foucault’s words, 
strategic choices do not emerge directly from a world-view or from a 
predominance of interests peculiar to this or that speaking subject; but that 
their very possibility is determined by points of divergence in the group of 
concepts; I have also shown that concepts were not formed directly against 
the approximative, confused, and living background of ideas, but on the 
basis of forms of coexistence between statements; and, as we have seen, 
the modalities of enunciation were described on the basis of the position 
occupied by the subject in relation to the domain of objects of which he is 
speaking. In this way, there exists a vertical system of dependences: not all 
the positions of the subject, all the types of coexistence between 
statements, all the discursive strategies, are equally possible, but only 
those authorized by anterior levels [the systems of formation] (Foucault, 
1972, pp. 72-73). 
 
Thus, what people say and the way they say it, as well as positions they assume in 
relation to the objects of their talk are not the result of any novel, individual choices that 
they make in modern medicine. For example, almost every single medical student 
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interviewed in this study stated that they came to medicine to help other people. It is not 
that each one of them philosophized their position regarding medicine and dissected out 
their decision for coming to medicine to come up with that very same answer. Rather, 
they are choosing this ready-made philosophical position since it was one of the choices 
that are made available to them by the discourse of medicine. 
In Chapter 4, I have tried to individualize the discursive formation of modern 
medicine by defining the system for the formation of different theoretical strategies. My 
goal has been to show how various strategic choices, despite their extreme diversity at 
times, can derive from the same set of relations. These relations include the rules of 
formation for all strategic choices related to the same discursive object. I have not made 
any attempts to describe the system of ramification for strategic choices, as these 
strategies are “not organized as a progressively deductive structure” (Foucault, 1972, p. 
37). In archaeology, one does not try to isolate “small islands of coherence” and describe 
their internal structure; nor attempts to locate and explain the hidden conflicts among 
statements in a strategy (Foucault, 1972, p. 37). What one does, instead, is to examine the 
forms of division and describe the systems of their dispersion. Archaeology does not 
establish chains of inference in this system of dispersion. In this study, attempts were 
made to discern a regularity among theoretical strategies in the form of an order in the 
sequence of their appearance, correlations in their simultaneity, positions that are 
assignable to others in the common space of modern medical discourse, and reciprocal 
functioning of strategies with nondiscursive practices.  
Description of the system of dispersion for theoretical strategies in the previous 
chapter includes determining points of diffraction for groups of strategies referencing the 
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same medical discursive object. As deliberated in Chapter 4, points of diffraction include 
points of incompatibility, points of equivalence, and link points of systematization. Points 
of equivalence, in turn, includes establishing the rules for the formation of theoretical 
choices about the same object. The rules of formation consist of describing the economy 
of the discursive constellation and the relations between theoretical choices and relevant 
nondiscursive practices. Points of equivalence show how two or more incompatible 
strategies are formed based on the same rules of formation while their conditions of 
existence are identical and they are located at the same level in the system of dispersion. 
Therefore, the diversity of strategies does not correspond to a defect in coherence. The 
incompatible strategies are equally possible alternatives that can appear on the surface of 
medical discourse in the form of either/or. Even if they do not have the same significance 
accorded to them by authorities of delimitation, or, they are not equally represented in the 
population of emerging statements, they still have an equal chance of emerging as 
possible strategic choices in medical discourse at any given point in time. 
Strategic choices that people make in discourse are important for several reasons. 
First, someone who takes a position regarding a particular object of discourse will 
produce statements supporting his/her position, and thus actively produce and reproduce 
the discourse of medicine in the field. Let us take an example here. A doctor who believes 
“competence is the most important characteristic of a physician and compassion is not 
important if the doctor is good at what he does” is making a strategic choice. Every time 
this doctor acts in accordance with his positionality, or talks about it, he creates new 
statements to circulate on the surface of medical discourse, which further reinforce his 
position. The discourse will be produced and reproduced by this doctor who is an 
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authority of delimitation and therefore will be taken seriously by people in the clinic as 
well as the society at large. This is where the link points of systematization become vital. 
This example shows how an entire series of objects, modalities of the statement, and 
concepts can be derived to become part of medical discourse–as a consequence of a 
single strategic choice. Moreover, as Foucault suggests,  
the dispersions studied at previous levels do not simply constitute gaps, 
non-identities, discontinuous series; they come to form discursive 
subgroups - those very subgroups that are usually regarded as being of 
major importance, as if they were the immediate unity and raw material 
out of which larger discursive groups  (‘theories’, ‘conceptions’, ‘themes’) 
are formed (Foucault, 1972, p. 66). 
 
While it is possible to discuss each set of related strategies (as outlined in Chapter 4), I 
am not going to do that in this chapter for three major reasons. First, most of what should 
have been part of a traditional “discussion” chapter is already discussed under points of 
equivalence and points of systematization in Chapter 4. These sections include the 
discussion of rules of formation for specific strategies concerning the economy of the 
discursive constellation as well as nondiscursive practices. They were discussed in 
Chapter 4 due to the unique structure of archaeological analysis that required to include 
that information as part of the analysis itself. Second, most of the literature already there 
in the medical education research is not compatible with chief principles of archaeology 
and the Foucauldian notions of the subject, transcendentality of medicine, and keeping 
the analysis at the level of the statements (without searching for hidden meanings and 
intentions of the speaker). Therefore, not all findings of this study can be discussed in the 
context of the non-Foucauldian literature due to major paradigmatic differences. It will be 
like comparing apples to oranges if one tries to situate findings of an archaeological 
analysis in the context of post-positivist, interpretivist, and even critical research findings 
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recorded in the literature. Third, it will require a whole lot of space with less merit to 
discuss each set of related strategic choices separately here. However, I am planning to 
turn each strategic theme into a publishable manuscript in the future where it will be 
more appropriate to link it to literature and follow up with further analysis. Nonetheless, 
for the sake of completeness here, I would like to pick up one example from theoretical 
strategies referencing the doctor: Competence or Compassion: What is the Most 
Significant Characteristic a Doctor Should Possess? Let us discuss this theme in the 
context of literature denoting some similar notions.  
Traditionally, there have been two somewhat conflicting themes regarding the 
fundamental goal of modern medical practice, which are the theories of cure versus care 
(Bleakly, Bligh & Browne, 2011). Radical followers of the cure theory emphasize the 
bio-scientific role of medicine in elimination of diseases that are housed in the human 
body. The human body is seen as an object of medicine that can be manipulated in order 
to be cured, similar to a machine that needs fixing, by an expert. All is considered to be 
well as long as the expert possesses the necessary knowledge about various parts of the 
machine as well as necessary skills to fix them. In the opposite camp, radical followers of 
the care theory argue that the human body is not a machine and, as such, it should not be 
seen as an object by medical professionals. They believe that disease is not initiated in the 
body, rather, it is initiated in the physical and social environment that affect the human 
body. Thus, to alleviate their suffering, people do not just need a mechanic to fix them. 
They need a healer, who not only cares for them but also cares about them. This is an 
exemplar description of the basics of each theory in its most general terms. Of course, 
there is a range of middle-ground positions between these two radical positions. 
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Moreover, the concepts of cure and care themselves can be interpreted in different ways 
by different people.  
Foucault takes a somewhat similar position to describe the modern experience of 
madness in his archaeological study of Madness and Civilization (Foucault, 1988). He 
describes the experience of madness in terms of two general types of consciousness, 
evaluative and cognitive. Cognitive consciousness of madness in modern psychology and 
psychiatry (which is comparable to the cure theory) tends to be “value-free, [and] treating 
madness simply as an object of disinterested scientific inquiry” (Gutting, 1989, p. 88). On 
the other hand, an evaluative consciousness of madness (comparable to the care theory) 
tends to be that of “a compassionate scientist, eager to use his knowledge to improve the 
lot of his less fortunate fellows” (Gutting, 1989, p. 88). According to Foucault, the 
evaluative consciousness of madness in the modern time is “much less straight forward 
and innocent and, moreover, is inextricably tied to the cognitive methods and content of 
scientific psychology and psychiatry” (Gutting, 1989, p. 88). 
The cure theory (in various forms) is being powerfully promoted across the 
biomedical curriculum by stressing the significance of content knowledge and skills 
necessary for successful medical practice. On the other hand, several values of the care 
theory are addressed in formal documents related to medical professionalism and medical 
ethics. Below is an excerpt pulled from the American Medical Association issued 
Principles of Medical Ethics as an example of a formal document promoting several 
concepts of the care theory: 
The practice of medicine, and its embodiment in the clinical encounter 
between a patient and a physician, is fundamentally a moral activity that 
arises from the imperative to care for patients and to alleviate suffering. 
The relationship between a patient and a physician is based on trust, which 
483 
 
gives rise to physicians’ ethical responsibility to place patients’ welfare 
above the physician’s self-interest or obligations to others, to use sound 
medical judgment on patients’ behalf, and to advocate for their patients’ 
welfare (AMA Code of Medical Ethics, 2016) 
 
It must be noted that the discussion of physician’s morality in the present study is not 
confined to the exemplar strategic theme of competence versus compassion noted here. 
The indications for taking morality into account arise in multiple places throughout the 
analysis in Chapter 4 in general, and most sections on the analysis of theoretical 
strategies, in particular. A few important questions that arise here are: How can one be 
sure about the physicians’ moral integrity and have faith that they will always make 
humanistic, even altruistic, choices? When, where and how are physicians supposed to 
learn about morality? And morality on what grounds? Besides, one who has been a 
regular consumer in the medical industry can see that there are several discrepancies 
between what the above document is suggesting and what actual clinical practice usually 
looks like. This type of talk is not confined to documents on medical professionalism and 
medical ethics, they are to be found in various other places in medical discourse 
including symbolic documents such as the Physician’s Oath that students take at Indiana 
University School of Medicine. They talk about morality and ethics as if they were 
ultimately obvious concepts and somehow everybody is expected to know how to work 
to work them out. Given the level of expectation versus the amount of time and 
dedication that are actually spent on teaching humanities, such as morality, to medical 
students, it is not difficult to see why students would think of medical professionalism as 
one of those “wishy-washy” topics which are just there to fill some spots on the 
schedule. Having discussed the major points concerning the presentation of discursive 
elements in Chapter 4, let us now turn to discuss their discursive relations and conditions.  
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Discursive Relations and Conditions 
After all, discourse is a “set of rules for arranging statements in a series” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 57). As shown in Chapter 4, the discursive formation of modern 
medicine is “a complex group of relations that function as a rule” and to define its system 
of formation one has to characterize a group of statements by “the regularity of a 
practice” (Foucault, 1972, p. 74). At the same time, it is the discursive formation itself 
that “determines a regularity” (Foucault, 1972, p. 98), which reveals the influence 
moving in two directions at the same time. Let me explain how this works. We know that 
the rules for the formation of elements move from strategy to concept to statement. This 
does not mean that each level directly determines the level beneath it, rather, all levels are 
in communication with one another and the influence can move in either direction. For 
example, rules for the formation of an object influence the rules for the formation of 
strategies about that object, and vice versa, the rules for the formation of strategies 
influence the rules for the formation of the object of interest as well. That is because 
discursive rules and conditions are not predetermining what is possible to happen in 
discourse, rather, they merely describe a regularity that has emerged from the discourse. 
Thus, discursive rules and conditions 
are not constraints whose origin is to be found in the thoughts of men, or 
in the play of their representations; but nor are they determinations which, 
formed at the level of institutions, or social or economic relations, 
transcribe themselves by force on the surface of discourses. These systems 
- I repeat - reside in discourse itself; or rather on its frontier, at that limit at 
which the specific rules that enable it to exist as such are defined 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 74). 
 
Hence, it must be noted that all discursive rules and relations emerge from the discourse 
itself, precisely from the same regularities that they apply to. It is always a tight group of 
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relations that give rise to the elements of a discourse. I have tried to describe as many of 
such relations as possible for the modern medical discourse, in Chapter 4. However, to 
draw a full map of all relations for a discursive formation is neither expected nor even 
possible in a single archaeological study. In addition to internal discursive relations, I 
have also attempted to discuss common relations between discursive and nondiscursive 
practices as they relate to medicine (e.g., the way rules and regulations in medical school 
and hospital - or the capitalistic market in general - might form discursive practices of 
modern medicine). Furthermore, discussing the relations at the level of a single discourse 
cannot nearly explain the formation of all its elements and conditions of existence for 
those elements. To do the latter, I have attempted to discuss the relations of medical 
discourse with neighboring discourses that are placed in the same constellation as 
medicine (e.g., business, natural sciences, etc.). It is these inter-discursive relations, 
discursive-nondiscursive relations, and the discursive relations, together, that mark up the 
general conditions of possibility for all discursive elements and their rules of formation as 
outlined in Chapter 4  
Future Directions 
As is evident in the present study, analyzing the discursive structure of medicine 
can provide a great deal of information about social aspects of medical practice. Future 
studies can dig deeper into each of the objects, concepts, and theoretical strategies that 
are outlined in this study. Separate research manuscripts can be written to explore each 
rule of formation for the above elements. For example, further exploration of surfaces of 
emergence for the doctor, grids of specification for the sick person, forms of coexistence 
for statements about any concept of interest in medical education, and points of 
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diffraction between objectification and desensitization attitudes toward human body can 
each be a separate research topic. Each set of theoretical strategies related to a discursive 
object can also be taken up as a separate study and explored further. Most importantly, 
additional research is needed to examine conditions of existence for discursive elements 
in a focused and systematic manner. All of this has the potential to provide a world of 
insight about territories in medical education research that have not been explored before, 
or at least not in a systematic way.  
Furthermore, this study has identified several forms of contradiction that are 
operating at various levels (statements, discursive elements, and discursive relations) and 
exercising different functions in the modern discourse of medicine. Closer attention to 
any of these contradictions will reveal further discontinuity as well as more insight into 
the discursive structure of modern medicine. With regards to moral principles in 
medicine, local research is needed to feed into the knowledge of what positions regarding 
medical morality is already possible to be assumed within the discourse of modern 
medicine, and what positions are missing from the discourse due to a certain combination 
of rules and relations that are not allowing their existence as part of the medical curricula 
at this time.  
Conclusions 
The present study describes the system of relations that govern the formation of 
local medical discourse at Indiana University School of Medicine. It is this local medical 
discourse that, 1) defines discursive ways of talking, doing, and thinking in and about 
medicine, and 2) constitutes the professional identity of those who are involved with 
medicine. This study focuses the lens on the professional identity of medical students 
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who will be tomorrow’s doctors. In this section, I am providing a summary of the main 
points and major conclusions of the study. Medicine is a well-established institution 
possessing its own rules, and a group of individuals (the doctors) who are representing 
the medical profession in modern society. It is a body of knowledge and practice that is 
recognized as an authority by the public opinion, the law, and the government, in modern 
U.S. society. Medicine is also the main authority that delimits, designates, names, and 
establishes objects of its own discourse (Foucault, 1972, p. 42). Part of what this project 
is hoping to have achieved is to remind us all that medical practice is not science alone. It 
is a social practice that is both delivered and received by human beings, and is, therefore, 
governed by human discourses. It is the discourse of medicine that decides medicine’s 
immediate practical uses and defines values related to those uses. Moreover, the critical 
role of the political economy in the capitalistic society of the modern U.S., which marks 
an array of concepts and the overall logical architecture of modern medical practice, is 
undeniable. To think how and why a practice, which is overlaid with human perceptions 
and subjective contents, is widely given the status and function of a scientific concept in 
our society is quite fascinating.  
This study serves as a reminder that clinical medical practice is neither always 
objective nor scientific. The study shows that medicine is invested in a system of values 
formed by pieces and bits of various social relations, and it displays the conflicts of 
morality that arise as a result of those specific relations. The present analysis is carried 
out in the direction of what one might call ethical. As is evident from the findings 
presented in Chapter 4, there is a real discrepancy between what people wish to see in 
doctors and what we actually teach them in medical school. To take an example, the 
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description of the third rule for the formation of the doctor as an object of medical 
discourse, the grids of specification, indicates what people usually wish for their doctors 
to be like. Thinking of themselves as patients, medical students stated that they want their 
doctor to be a good listener and communicator, a humble person, one who does not use 
prejudice against their patient, one who acknowledges their own privilege, who attends to 
the person of the patient as well as their health condition, etc. In light of these findings, I 
would like to raise a few questions here: As medical educators, how do we make sure that 
students we train to become doctors will do all of the above? Do we teach them how to 
listen, how to be humble, not to use prejudice, and acknowledge their privilege as 
doctors? Do we teach them how to attend to the person of the patients? If no, then why 
not? If yes, what percentage of the curriculum is dedicated to teaching these topics? It 
must be noted that these questions are not addressed to any specific persons or 
institutions here, rather, my hope is for them to serve as reminders to anyone who is 
involved in medical education and carries the responsibility of training tomorrow’s 
doctors.  
As is evident from the results of this study, many medical students are well-aware 
of their own prestige and power in the system of the hierarchy in patient care. They know 
what their relationship with a patient can mean to that patient, and that this relationship is 
personal and high stakes for the patient. They understand that they have the choice to 
either see or not see a dying patient depending on their mood, and whether they have the 
time that day. They know where they stand in relation to other allied health professionals 
in the clinical settings, and how their position is observed and commended by the patient 
who comes to the hospital to seek medical help. Further, it is evident from the results of 
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this study that the defining elements in many students’ decision to become a doctor are 
financial stability (money) and social prestige (power and authority) that come with the 
medical profession. These findings further reinforce the fact that knowing about medical 
students’ professional identity is important. The way medical students position 
themselves in a healthcare team, and in relation to the patient, matters. The code of 
morality they draw their values from and whether they even have one, matters. These 
students are tomorrow’s doctors and the way they produce and reproduce discursive 
practice of modern medicine will affect the lives of thousands of patients in the future.   
Results of this study also indicate that those who believe doctors should care 
about their patients in addition to caring for them base this idea either on religion or on 
certain codes of morality (e.g., humanistic philosophy). However, many of the students 
interviewed in this study were not sure about their personal code of morality. The next set 
of questions I would like to raise here, are as follows: Do we encourage the development 
of moral values in medical education? Do we instill values to help students combat with 
racism, sexism, and other similar notions in medical care delivery? If we do not discuss 
these issues, how efficient it is to simply hope that they are not going to increase the 
present level of disparities in healthcare delivery based on the issues of racism, sexism, 
classism, etc.? We want students to care about the patient, but do we ask ourselves, why 
should they do so? What about those students who are not religious and also do not 
believe in humanistic values? What about those who have no moral values instilled in 
them before coming to medical school? Do we assess those values at any point during 
medical training? Do we provide them with any moral values in medical education? As 
medical educators, what is our own definition of medical morality anyway?  
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At the moment, medical professionalism counts as an umbrella term for 
addressing medical morality in medical education (Huddle, 2005). However, what 
medical schools teach and assess as medical professionalism is not standard. 
Professionalism is rather an empty pot that everyone gets to fill with what they think is 
appropriate to teach as professionalism. Various themes are crammed under the topic of 
professionalism and teaching is dispersed across only a few weeks throughout the four 
years of undergraduate medical education. Findings of this study show that some students 
think of professionalism as “wishy-washy stuff” that are just a waste of their time; some 
interpret it only in terms of business professional codes such as dressing up, being on-
time, responding to emails, etc.; and many are quite confused about what professionalism 
might mean at all. One can safely argue that whatever we are teaching them as 
professionalism is not meeting the goal of depicting a clear picture of medical morality 
for medical students at this time. 
Indeed, the ethical/moral codes are always local and historical, not universal. 
They do not conform to a single law or principle, and the “knowledge that may provide a 
basis for ethics is therefore a knowledge not of the natural world, but of the historical 
world” (Webb, 2013, p. 164). Furthermore, it has been known that our decision-making is 
determined, to a remarkable extent, by the origins of the ethical ideas that we employ and 
the history of their development (Macintyre, 2006). Based on the findings of the present 
study, I would like to make a call for the need for teaching medical humanities in medical 
schools. The subject of medical humanities should include (but not be limited to) 
discussions of philosophy, ethics, and history of medicine, as well as topics in 
psychology, sociology, and anthropology of medicine as a social practice operating in the 
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context of the modern North American society. These discussions will help medical 
students develop, execute, and maintain their own codes of morality that they will use as 
future doctors. The topics taught should be adjusted to match local and regional social 
issues. By including medical humanities as a required subject in the medical curriculum, 
we can provide the discussion of medical morality with a stronger foothold in medical 
education. Creating more room for morality-related statements in medical discourse can 
help make morality an object of medical discourse in the future. That is, teaching medical 
students about morality can make the topic important enough to talk about in medical 
decision-making without feeling unprofessional or non-objective as a doctor.  
In medical school, we teach students the many details of scientific and 
biomechanical information. We teach them the names of specific genes responsible for a 
certain disease and the mechanisms by which they cause that disease. We teach them 
about things, such as the annular ligament of the radius in the hope that upon 
encountering a patient suffering from dislocation of the elbow in the future, they will be 
able to diagnose the problem and recognize its potential causes. The questions I would 
like to ask here are: Is there a guarantee that all students will remember this minutia 
information that they are being taught in the first year of medical school all the way until 
they become physicians? How many students will actually go to orthopedic surgery, 
which would be relevant to treating a dislocation of the elbow anyway? And, how often 
would one encounter a patient with a dislocated elbow as an orthopedic surgeon? I am 
raising these questions not because I am after specific answers for them; rather, I am 
asking these to trigger the thought process facilitating the discussion of what follows. 
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For some reason, we do not invest much time in medical curriculum to teach 
students about medical morality so they can develop the appropriate sense of medical 
professionalism, and develop an appropriate medical professional identity, to treat their 
patients in the future. This leads us to the following questions: Is it important to have 
compassion and other moral characteristics to treat patients? Is it important to be aware of 
the race and class disparities in medical care delivery? If yes, how much time do we take 
to teach students about these issues? Is there a guarantee that they will remember these 
lessons by the time they become physicians? Maybe not, but there is no guarantee that 
they will remember ligaments of the elbow joint either. How many students will actually 
go to a specialty which would be relevant to treating a patient of color with equal 
compassion and respect as a white patient? The answer is: every single one of them. How 
often would one encounter a patient who needs compassion and care, in whatever 
specialty one is? The answer is: every single day of one’s career as a doctor. Why then, it 
is more important to teach about the genes and the ligaments but it is way less important 
to teach about morality in medicine? One might argue that it is not easy to teach people 
about morality and that not everyone can learn that easily. However, is that not so with 
teaching everything else in medicine? I believe it is not easy to teach or learn anything in 
a medical curriculum. However, we do it because we think they are important to teach 
and to learn. We create the means and facilitate the grounds for teaching about genes. A 
lot of time and other resources are invested in having individuals who can teach about 
genes and their mechanism of action. There is an entire system of political and economic 
relations to back them up (e.g., institutional focus and funding). When it comes to 
teaching morality, however, this entire system needs to change and give room for 
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humanities as well as they do for science. Is that going to be possible at the national level 
anytime soon? I do not know. Yet, it is always possible to start bringing changes at our 







INDIANA UNIVERSITY STUDY INFORMATION SHEET 
A Foucauldian Archaeology of the Modern Medical Discourse 
You are invited to participate in a research study of how medical students perceive the 
essence of “medicine’. You were selected as a possible subject because your experiences 
as an actively enrolled medical student at Indiana University School of Medicine (IUSM) 
can provide relevant data for understanding the topic under the focus of the present study. 
An email invitation was sent to all actively enrolled medical students at IUSM, 
Indianapolis campus, regardless of the year of the study (MS1, MS2, MS3, and MS4). A 
maximum of 80 medical students (20 students from each year) will be selected from 
amongst the volunteers. We ask that you read this form and ask any questions you may 
have before agreeing to be in the study.  
 
The study is being conducted by Homaira Azim, a PhD student at the Department of 





The purpose of this study is to explore how medical students perceive the role of modern 
medicine in the society and how their day-to-day experiences in medical school 
contribute to the development of those perceptions. The study aims to understand what 
meanings are attached to the modern medical practice by medical students and how those 
meanings are developed, maintained, and circulated in the context of medical education. 
The goal is to examine the perception(s) of medicine that are most dominant among 
medical students and understand the power dynamics of medical education that support 
those perceptions.   
 
PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDY 
 
This study will employ a total of 40 one-on-one interviews involving 10 students from 
each year of medical school, a total of 4 focus groups involving 10 students from each 
year of medical school, and several hours of direct observation of the educational settings 
including lecture rooms, labs, small group study sessions, hospital rounds and other 
similar contexts where formal medical training is delivered.  
 
If you agree to be in the study, you will do the following things: 
 
You can choose whether you want to participate in 1 interview, participate in 1 focus 
group, or participate in both an interview and a focus group. One-on-one interviews will 
take ~45-60 minutes, whereas focus groups will be held for 1hour. All meetings will be 
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on campus either in the MS building or medical library. Focus groups will be scheduled 
on a mutually agreed date/time to make sure it works with your schedule. A doodle poll 
with be sent to you where you can sign up for a date and time which suits you best for an 
interview within the spring, summer, or fall 2019. All interviews and focus groups will be 
audio-recorded and transcribed at a later time. This study is expected to be completed by 
early 2020.  
 
RISKS AND BENEFITS 
 
The risks of participating in this research include being uncomfortable answering 
questions during the interview or discussing a topic in the focus group. The researcher is 
not planning to ask any personal or otherwise questions that is likely to make students 
uncomfortable, but it is possible for someone to feel so due to their personal or cultural 
beliefs. Your preferences will be respected at all times. You do not have to answer a 
question if you feel it makes you uncomfortable. The researcher will simply move on to 
the next question. There is also a risk of loss of confidentiality in the case of extremely 
unforeseen circumstances. For instance, if the researcher’s personal laptop gets lost and 
someone cracks all the passwords to get to the protected data.  
You are not expected to benefit from participating in this research directly, unless you 
count contributing to understanding of a problem related to medical education as a 




Efforts will be made to keep your personal information confidential. You will have an 
identification number and a pseudonym to protect your identity. We cannot guarantee 
absolute confidentiality.  Your personal information may be disclosed if required by law. 
Your identity will be held in confidence in reports in which the study may be published 
and databases in which results may be stored. Only the researcher will have access to the 
data. The audio-recording files from the interviews and focus groups will be stored in a 
password-protected personal OneDrive account. The data will be accessed only by the 
researcher on her personal laptop computer which is also password protected. The audio-
recordings will not be used for any educational purposes by anyone in the future. All data 
will be destroyed within five years from the date of the completion of this study.  
 
Organizations that may inspect and/or copy your research records for quality assurance 
and data analysis include groups such as the study investigator and her research 
associates, the Indiana University Institutional Review Board or its designees, and (as 





You will not receive payment for taking part in this study. However, a free lunch will be 




CONTACTS FOR QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
 
For questions about the study, please contact the researcher Homaira Azim at 
hmohamma@indiana.edu.  
 
For questions about your rights as a research participant or to discuss problems, 
complaints or concerns about a research study, or to obtain information, or offer input, 
contact the IU Human Subjects Office at (317) 278-3458 or [for Indianapolis] or (800) 
696-2949. 
 
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF STUDY 
 
Taking part in this study is voluntary.  You may choose not to take part or may leave the 
study at any time.  Leaving the study will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to 
which you are entitled.  Your decision whether or not to participate in this study will not 





Recruitment Email for: A Foucauldian Archaeology of the Modern Medical 
Discourse 
 
Dear (Medical Student),  
My name is Homaira Azim and I am a PhD student in the Anatomy and Cell Biology 
department, Education Track program at Indiana University School of Medicine, IUPUI. 
As part of my dissertation research, I am conducting a qualitative study exploring student 
perceptions and experiences regarding topics of medical professionalism, medical ethics, 
and students’ view of what it means to become a medical professional, and students’ 
understanding of the medical profession in general. This information will be used to 
identify factors that influence various perceptions regarding medicine as one of the most 
prestigious professions in the modern society. This study entails one-on-one interviews 
with students, focus group meetings with students, and direct observation of medical 
educational settings.  
You are invited to participate in this research as a medical student at IUSM. This email 
will be sent to all actively enrolled medical students (MS1, MS2, MS3, MS4) at IUSM, 
Indianapolis campus, to recruit maximum 80 volunteers (20 students from each year) for 
participating in the interviews and/or focus groups.  
If you agree to participate, you can choose whether you would like to be interviewed, 
participate in a students’ focus group, or participate in both an interview and a focus 
group. One-on-one interviews will take ~45-60 minutes, whereas focus groups will be 
held for ~1hour. All meetings will be on campus either in the MS building or medical 
library. Meetings will be scheduled on a mutually agreed date/time to make sure it works 
with your schedule. This study is not funded by any organizations, so you will not receive 
any compensation for participating. Nevertheless, free lunch will be provided to all 
participants at any given meeting.  
Please understand that your participation in this research will be completely voluntary, 
and you will have the choice to terminate your cooperation at any time during the study. I 
value your social knowledge and experiences as an IUSM medical student and you can be 
a great asset in my research study. No specific technical knowledge about any subjects 
are required for participation. Questions will be asked about your day-to-day experiences 
and perceptions only.  
Please let me know by replying to this email by --/ --/ 2019 indicating whether you 
decline or agree to participate in this research study.  Should you have any questions or 
would like more information regarding the focus of the study, please do not hesitate to 
contact me. Thank you for your time and consideration.  
 
Homaira Azim, M.D. 
PhD Graduate Student 
Department of Anatomy and Cell Biology 







1. Students’ name, year of school 
2. Students’ race, gender, social class (as perceived by themselves) 
3. Student’s educational background  
4. World experiences: Number of countries/states lived in? Colleges attended? Jobs 
held responsible for? Studied or lived close/far from home?  
5. Family background: Parents’ education? 
6. Moral/religious beliefs–if any? 
7. Why did you choose medical school? How is this preferred? By whom? Why? 
8. What if–for whatever reason–you fail in medical school and had to go back home? 
9. How different do you find medical school from previous other colleges that you have 
attended? In what ways? What new challenges were you faced with? How did you 
adapt? 
10. How do you get along with faculty/staff? Any problems? How did you deal with 
them? 
11. What were your general opinions about medicine/medical profession/medical 
education before you became a medical student?   
12. What does it mean to be a good [medical] student? 
13. Have you had any contacts with practicing physicians on a personal level? Family 
members, friends, relatives? Did you learn anything from those conversations about 
what medical profession is really like? 
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14. Describe your emotional experience with the anatomy dissection lab. Did you face 
any moral/ethical dilemmas? Did you find it easy to talk about your experiences with 
your family and friends? Why/why not?   
15. Would you like to donate your body or a see a loved one’s body being donated to 
anatomical dissection? Why/why not? 
16. What are your experiences as a patient? How would you describe your level(s) of 
satisfaction, inspiration, anxiety, disappointment, anger, etc. toward medical 
profession in general?  
17. What does it mean to be a “successful physician”?  
18. What is your ideal practice that you want to live up to? 
19. What specialty are you planning to go in to? Any particular reasons?   
20. How do you see yourself in 10 years from now? Draw a detailed mental picture of 
the setting, your role, responsibilities, and how you feel about them. 
21. Have you noticed any changes in your character/personality since you have entered 
medical school? Have you become stronger, or tougher, for instance? Do you still 
socialize with friends who are not in medical school? 
22. What is your idea of medical professionalism? Is it useful the way it is being taught? 





Focus Group Protocol 
1. What is your opinion about the following excerpt? 
“Doctors are no more your friends than are butchers and plumbers. As a matter of 
fact, I had trouble with my plumber last week” ~A Series of Unfortunate Events, 2018             
(Netflix TV-show) 
2. What is your opinion about the following excerpt? 
“Although some doctors are said to be more interested in fees than they should be, 
most physicians are idealistic benefactors of humanity, both hardworking and selfless 
in their efforts to help the sick.” ~From an interview with a medical student, Boys in 
White, 1965 
3. You are a resident and have 10 min before participating in a surgery you have 
been looking forward to. There are 3 patients who need your urgent attention:  
a. An 80-year-old who is very talkative and has been mean to junior doctors, 
but she is the wife of an important attending physician at your hospital.  
b. A 25-year-old educated patient who is nice and engaging and takes good 
care of himself. His mother sued the hospital last year.  
c. A 55-year-old homeless patient who has been admitted 3 times over the 
last month with no improvement because he keeps discharging himself.  
You have enough time to visit only 1 of these patients and leave the other two to your 
interns. Which one would you choose, and why? 
4. If a patient cannot afford the fees, or is undocumented, would you still treat them? 
How does patient-centrism play out in this? 
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5. What are your thoughts about alternative medicine? 
6. “Scariness is the true measure of a monster, if you are not scary, what kind of a 
monster are you?”~2013 Film: Monster University.  
What if you had to fill-in-the-blanks for the following: _________ is the true 
measure of a physician, if you are not _________, what kind of a physician are 
you? 
7. What are your thoughts about the following documentary movie trailer: To Err is 
Human (https://www.toerrishumanfilm.com/)?  
8. There is a healthcare team of more than 10 people caring for a patient. Who, in 
your opinion, is going to make the patient well? Provide your answer in maximum 
2 sentences. 
9. Alex is 12, he wants to become a doctor when he grows up. What do you think is 
one major motivation behind his decision?  
10. What is the ultimate goal of medical practice? 
a. To fix/mend/recover the human body 
b. To eliminate the disease 
c. To alleviate human suffering  
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